Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy

ISSNs: 1559-3061, 1559-3061

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  1.  83
    It's Only Natural! Moral Progress Through Denaturalization.Charlie Blunden - 2025 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 29 (2):219-248.
    Several philosophers have proposed that key instances of moral progress in the past, as well as perhaps some present or future progressive changes, rely on people overcoming the notion that their current institutions and social practices are “natural, necessary, and inevitable feature[s] of the social world” (Pleasants, “Moral Argument is Not Enough,” 166). I call this account of how moral progress happens denaturalization. In this paper, I provide a more rigorous account of denaturalization than has thus far been provided in (...)
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  2.  3
    Enclaves for the Excluded.Jamie Draper - 2025 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 29 (2).
    This paper investigates the claim that immigrants have a moral duty to integrate. I argue that socially excluded immigrant minorities have a moral permission to form enclaves, which means that they have at most only limited duties to integrate. Positively, I argue that enclaves can play an important role in supporting the self-respect of socially excluded immigrants. Negatively, I argue social exclusion makes the putative duty to integrate—when it conflicts with enclave formation—unreasonably burdensome. I also argue that even if integration (...)
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  3.  6
    Crime, Public Health, and Inhumane Objectivity.Nadine Elzein - 2025 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 29 (2).
    The suggestion that crime be treated as a public health problem instead of being treated retributively provokes unease for two reasons. Firstly, it is thought to foster impersonal treatment, which is “objectifying” or “dehumanizing.” I argue that practices are problematically impersonal when they bypass or undermine an agent’s ability to take responsibility. However, there is a difference between taken responsibility and retributive responsibility. Skepticism about the latter does not entail skepticism about the former. Skeptics about retributive desert still have strong (...)
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  4.  18
    The Overweighted Integrity Problem: Conscience, Complicity, and Moral Standing.Kyle Fritz - 2025 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 29 (2):159-187.
    Most states in the United States have conscience laws protecting conscientious refusal to perform some medical service. Yet many state conscience laws protect providers from being even indirectly involved with some procedure they find objectionable, which can include not only referrals but also simply informing patients of medically indicated but morally contentious options. I argue that such policies are unjust, offering too much protection for integrity in the face of competing values and patient interests. In other words, these policies grant (...)
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  5. Committing to Parenthood.Nicholas Hadsell - 2025 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 29 (2).
    How do adults acquire the moral right to rear a child? In Luara Ferracioli’s new Parenting and the Goods of Childhood, she argues that adults acquire this right when they morally commit to a child. In this note, I’ll critically evaluate Ferracioli’s account. I’ll first describe the moral commitment view in further detail. After this, I’ll argue that it suffers from what I call the Swooping Problem. Contrary to Ferracioli’s defenses, her view permits adults to swoop in and acquire a (...)
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  6. Voting, Representation, and Institution.Ben Saunders - 2025 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 29 (2).
    Kevin J. Elliott has recently defended an institutional duty to vote. This duty is based on (i) the role obligation of citizens to do what is necessary for well-functioning representative institutions and (ii) the claim that universal voting is ordinarily necessary for fair representation. This critical response takes issue with the second of these claims. I argue that neither the informational nor motivational problems that Elliott identifies require universal voting. Representatives have other ways of identifying citizens’ wants and interests and (...)
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  7.  10
    Gratitude for What We Are Owed.Aaron Segal - 2025 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 29 (2).
    Many philosophers hold that we never owe others gratitude in return for their treating us in ways that we are owed. Instead, we owe others gratitude only for treating us in ways that go above and beyond the demands of morality. In this paper, I argue that this view is mistaken: we sometimes owe others gratitude for treating us in ways that we are owed. In particular, I argue that some moral duties require us to act in ways that express (...)
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