This essay begins with a current case involving racial profiling and DNA testing. The two combine to raise some troubling issues involving the use of each in police investigation. It is argued that racial profiling is unethical and ought to be avoided and that DNA testing on general populations of innocent people is fraught with dangers.

The paper defends the theoretical strength and consistency of Rawls's constructivism, showing its ability to articulate and convincingly weave together several key ethical ideas; yet it questions the political relevance of this admirable normative architecture. After having illustrated Rawls's conception of moral agency and practical reason, the paper tackles two criticisms raised by Scheffler. First the allegation of naturalism based on Rawls's disdain of common sense ideas on desert is rebutted. It is then shown that, contrary to Scheffler's contention, Rawls (...) takes proper account of our moral sentiments in the process of constructing his normative theory. Finally, the second criticism is assessed, namely the inability of Rawls's theory to increase consent around liberal policies. Despite disagreement with details of Scheffler's argument, it is suggested that the failure of recent normative liberal theories to have a political impact belies their inability to take into proper consideration the reality of politics. A more realistic appraisal of political life and of historical events and developments are called for if political philosophy wants to be something more than an academic exercise. (shrink)

A prominent feature of the ongoing politics of welfare state restructuring is the development of workfare policies, defined as the attachment of a work condition to entitlement to basic income support. Workfare rejects unconditional rights of social citizenship, which formed the basis of social democratic political reforms and advocacy throughout the twentieth century. Nevertheless, workfare has received notable theoretical justification from egalitarian political theorists. This paper addresses four egalitarian arguments for workfare: the arguments from recipient self-respect, rational paternalism, fair reciprocity, (...) and equal opportunity for active citizenship. It attempts to demonstrate the tensions between each and egalitarian justification, and it is argued that none of the arguments successfully ground workfare policies in an egalitarian framework. (shrink)

The rise of regional identities in Europe is a process largely welcomed by liberals and especially applauded by radical democratic and postcolonial theorists. Yet this trend towards post-nation-state identity is not only attractive to democratic and postcolonial theories, but is also an integral part of current neo-fascist ideologies. This article examines the intellectual origins of rightwing ethnoregionalism and the idea of ‘exclusionist multiculturalism’ through the works of Pierre Drieu La Rochelle and Alain de Benoist. It also compares the idea of (...) exclusionist ‘regional’ multiculturalism with liberal multiculturalism and defends a democratic, civic republicanism as an alternative to both. (shrink)

The paper advances an interpretation of political scandal and its place in democratic politics, taking the scandals of the ‘Watergate era’ in American politics as its evidential basis. The interpretation focuses on an aspect of political scandal that has been neglected in existing treatments, namely the politically constructed rather than epistemologically simple nature of scandalous ‘exposure’. The career of the ‘smoking gun’ in the Watergate era provides illustration. The paper goes on to relate political scandal as both symptom and stimulus (...) to trends in late-modern democratization concerning ‘hyperpolitics’ and ‘metainformation’ . On this basis, the generalization of scandal politics as a typical mode of democratic politics is suggested. (shrink)

Despite the relative ease and regularity with which it is used by policymakers and the functional role that it often plays in the policy development process, the concept of reasonableness has essentially been overlooked by public policy scholars in their analysis of the factors influencing the development of public policy. However, the maintenance of the analytical status quo is likely to prove increasingly difficult. As the issues that governments must address become increasingly complicated and controversial and it becomes correspondingly more (...) difficult to identify easily or clearly the most appropriate response to associated problems, policymakers will inevitably be forced to place greater reliance on the concept of reasonableness as the final court of appeal when seeking to determine the attractiveness and acceptability of policy decisions. Accordingly, it seems ‘reasonable’ to suggest that greater, explicit consideration be given to the concept of reasonableness and the role it does and should play in the development of public policy. This article simultaneously offers both a brief overview of the current situation with respect to the meaningful consideration of the concept of reasonableness by public policy scholars and practitioners and a preliminary argument for a reconsideration of the analytical status quo. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is threefold. First, I critically examine two dominant Kantian views of practical justification and argue that they cannot provide an appropriate account of the normative force of moral and political principles. Secondly, as the main reason for these unsuccessful attempts, I identify a certain interpretation of Kant's account of practical judgement. Finally, I point to some of the differences between this interpretation and Kant's own claims on practical judgement, in order to suggest an alternative approach; (...) I also note the tension between slogans, like ‘political, not meta – physical’ or ‘we must stay philosophically on the surface’, on the one hand, and, on the other, the appeal this alternative approach must make to some elements of Kant's metaphysics. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is threefold. First, I critically examine two dominant Kantian views of practical justification and argue that they cannot provide an appropriate account of the normative force of moral and political principles. Secondly, as the main reason for these unsuccessful attempts, I identify a certain interpretation of Kant's account of practical judgement. Finally, I point to some of the differences between this interpretation and Kant's own claims on practical judgement, in order to suggest an alternative approach; (...) I also note the tension between slogans, like ‘political, not metaphysical” or ‘we must stay philosophically on the surface’, on the one hand, and, on the other, the appeal this alternative approach must make to some elements of Kant's metaphysics. (shrink)

This piece presents an account of Kant's notion of provisional right and connects this conception to his defence of two principles of publicity. The argument is to the effect that understanding the notion of provisional right will enable us to comprehend the Kantian picture of the state of nature, the basis of the transition from such a state to the civil condition and also his treatment of international right. The paper also presents the sketch of a Kantian theory of normatively (...) justified institutions. (shrink)

The paper examines a specific charge against Rawls's political liberalism, namely that the manner in which it uses the notion of reasonableness renders it a form of secular fundamentalism. The paper begins with an examination of what Rawls means by his notion of ‘the reasonable’ and briefly outlines its role in his version of political liberalism. This leads to a discussion of the different meanings of ‘secular fundamentalism’ and how it is specifically used in its criticism of Rawls's ‘justice as (...) fairness’. The essay then offers two arguments to show that the charge of secular fundamentalism cannot be sustained due to a deep misunderstanding of the derivation and use of the notion of reasonableness as well as the context, scope, and aims of Rawls's political liberalism in particular and the project of political liberalisms more generally. (shrink)

This article re-examines the Habermas–Rawls debate. It contends that what is at issue in this dispute has largely been missed. The standard view that principle and the original position form a useful point of comparison between their respective theories and that the dispute between them can be fruitfully understood on this basis is rejected. I show how this view has arisen and why it is wrong. The real issue between them lies in their respective accounts of the justification of political (...) norms,and in their competing conceptions of legitimacy. I show how these two concepts connect. I distinguish between methodological disputes arising from the differences in approach that each takes to the questions of political legitimacy and political justification, and substantive issues about whether, and if so how moral reasons are germane to the justification of political norms. (shrink)

The principle of right is Kant's main formulation of the rules of politics, and it has obvious affinities with the moral law. Do we have moral reasons to obey the principle? I argue that we may have moral reasons to obey the principle ourselves, but not coercively to enforce it. Do we have prudential reasons to obey the principle? I argue that we do not have reasons based on happiness, but that we may have prudential reasons of a wholly different, (...) but distinctively Kantian kind. These may be reasons both to obey the principle ourselves and to enforce it. (shrink)

For Kant, the contents of cosmopolitan law are to be ‘limited’ to non-citizens' subjective rights to hospitality. Although hospitality yields universal and far-reaching communicative rights, its limits may seem overly restrictive at first. I argue that this narrow focus is intended to fend off justifications for colonial occupation that could otherwise draw support from Kant's own doctrine of private law. Kantian hospitality is further limited in that it does not cover all forms of communicative exchange. As can be shown from (...) his endorsement of China's and Japan's protectionist policies, Kant is not averse to limiting cosmopolitan citizens' commercial speech. In conclusion, I discuss rivalling interpretations of Kant's justification of hospitality. I argue that this justification cannot rest exclusively on the innate human right to freedom, but must draw on facts about the world as well. (shrink)

Critics and defenders of Rawls' idea of public reason have tended to neglect the relationship between this idea and his conception of democratic legitimacy. I shall argue that Rawls' idea of public reason can be interpreted in two different ways, and that the two interpretations support two different conceptions of legitimacy. What I call the substantive interpretation of Rawls' idea of public reason demands that it applies not just to the process of democratic decision-making, but that it extends to the (...) substantive justification of democratic decisions. I shall argue against this interpretation and suggest a procedural interpretation instead. On this view, public reason is invoked when it comes to the political justification of the principles that should govern the process of democratic decision-making, but not – at least not directly – in relation to the content of public deliberation. (shrink)

This paper looks at the attribution of moral responsibility in the light of Kant's claim that the maxims of our actions should be universalizable. Assuming that it is often difficult for us to judge which actions satisfy this test, it suggests one way of translating Kantian morality into practice. Suppose that it is possible to read each action, via its maxim, as a communication addressed to the world: as an attempt to set the terms on which we should interact with (...) one another. The paper suggests that respect for the actor requires us to take this communication seriously. When we suppose that an action is wrong, we then have a powerful reason to dispute its message: to hold the actor responsible for her deed. Although we are often unreliable judges ‘in our own case’, our mutual attributions of responsibility show us judging together, what the moral law should mean in practice. (shrink)

This paper provides an outline of Kant's ideas on international right showing how they derive from his general view of law and showing how they relate to his cosmopolitan ideal of hospitality, his views on colonialism and the vexed issue of intervention in the internal politics of other states. It can be shown – based on his ideal of hospitality and good state practice – that Kant is reluctant to recommend intervention by advanced states in the affairs of other states (...) and societies even where those societies have not attained a settled, civil status. This is not to imply that we should be indifferent to the situation of other peoples, but rather that we should encourage them to find their own way to a more advanced condition. We can best encourage them by setting and abiding by rigorous standards of law both domestically and internationally that create the possibility of a wholly legally regulated international system.War should be regarded as neither a desirable nor, ultimately, a legitimate means of pursuing foreign policy. (shrink)

The paper defends the theoretical strength and consistency of Rawls's constructivism, showing its ability to articulate and convincingly weave together several key ethical ideas; yet it questions the political relevance of this admirable normative architecture. After having illustrated Rawls's conception of moral agency and practical reason, the paper tackles two criticisms raised by Scheffler. First the allegation of naturalism based on Rawls's disdain of common sense ideas on desert is rebutted. It is then shown that, contrary to Scheffler's contention, Rawls (...) takes proper account of our moral sentiments in the process of constructing his normative theory. Finally, the second criticism is assessed, namely the inability of Rawls's theory to increase consent around liberal policies. Despite disagreement with details of Scheffler's argument, it is suggested that the failure of recent normative liberal theories to have a political impact belies their inability to take into proper consideration the reality of politics. A more realistic appraisal of political life and of historical events and developments are called for if political philosophy wants to be something more than an academic exercise. (shrink)