Many people regularly watch horror films. While it seems clear that sporadically watching horror films will not make us bad people, if it is the main type of media that we consume, then are we still safe? I will defend most horror films from Di Muzio (2006), who worries that we are harming our moral character by watching them. Most horror films (e.g., Candyman, Get Out, and Scream) fall into what I call the summit of safe horror (SoSH), the inverse (...) of the uncanny valley effect, wherein almost-but-not-quite-human robots elicit discomfort from viewers rather than empathy. In the SoSH, violence elicits excitement rather than pity for the victims because the violence is mitigated by, among other things, comic relief and foolish choices by the characters. These narrative features allow most horror films to be intense enough to cause excitement and terror yet not so intense as to cause a negative moral attitude to form in our soul, because we feel what Aristotle would consider the appropriate amount of fear. Torture porn, a subset of horror films lacking plot and focus solely on gore (e.g., the Saw sequels), falls outside of the SoSH because it lacks these narrative features, making the violence depicted too intense to be entertaining. These films outside the SoSH will not necessarily cause an inappropriate amount of fear but are simply the only ones that could possibly do so. Caution: spoilers ahead! (shrink)

This article is an introduction to the special issue of the European Journal of Analytic Philosophy dedicated to aesthetic education and philosophy of screen stories.

In this paper, we provide a novel explanation of McGee’s (1985) alleged counterexample to Modus Ponens for indicative conditionals. Our strategy is to show that pragmatic phenomena interfere with intuitions concerning the acceptability of the inference. More specifically, we argue that two confounding factors at play affect our intuitions concerning the acceptability of the inference, neither of which is related to validity. First, the indefinite determiner phrase “a Republican” is ambiguous, to wit, it may receive either a specific or a (...) non-specific reading (and as we shall see, substituting a disjunction or a definite description for the indefinite is of no help). Second, the conclusion triggers an ignorance inference concerning its antecedent. In light of this, we shall argue, McGee’s diagnosis must be rejected. (shrink)

U ovom radu tvrdim da tragični filmovi mogu imati značajan potencijal za etičku edukaciju kada potaknu publiku na suosjećanje s patnjom prikazanom na ekranu. Prvo sažimam dva pristupa odnosu između tragične umjetnosti, moralne edukacije i estetske vrijednosti (pristupe koje nude Rorty i Lamarque). Zatim raspravljam o problemima tih pristupa i objašnjavam kako novi kriterij estetske vrijednosti može pomoći u njihovom rješavanju. Potom iznosim argument da tragični filmovi mogu etički educirati publiku na način koji obogaćuje estetsku vrijednost filma u najmanje tri (...) smjera: produbljivanjem moralnog razumijevanja, produbljivanjem razumijevanja ljudske prirode i etičke svrhe te produbljivanjem razumijevanja etičke teorije. Na kraju pokazujem kako film Denisa Villeneuvea, Arrival, prikazuje tragičnu priču s potencijalom za etičku edukaciju u svakom od navedenih aspekata. (shrink)

Here is a puzzle about aesthetic education. In a variety of contexts, we commit significant time, energy, and resources to aesthetic education. We teach (and in many cases publicly subsidize) university courses and degrees that have aesthetic education as their primary aim; we also invest public resources into museums, including enrichment programs that are also designed to afford aesthetic education. It would seem that if our commitment to aesthetic education is rational, then aesthetic appreciation is something that can be done (...) better or worse. However, we also, in a variety of contexts (oddly enough, some of them being the same sorts of contexts that are designed to abet aesthetic education), act as if it is true that there is no disputing taste. We may try to persuade students to come around to particular judgments, but we do not penalize students for judging one way or another. The aim of this paper is to dissolve the apparent puzzle of aesthetic education by clarifying its aims and advancing a conception of it that deemphasizes the role of taste. I claim that, pace “the default view of aesthetic education” (as I shall call it), the primary purpose of aesthetic education is not to educate taste. It is, rather, to facilitate the development of certain perceptual-cognitive capacities so as to enhance aesthetic experience and improve aesthetic appreciation. Thus, I call the view of aesthetic education advanced here “a perceptual-cognitive model”. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the existing arguments for narrow aesthetic cognitivism are not valid. The reason is that the proponents of the view have mostly focused on theoretical debates rather than on empirical studies of the matter. I make my argument in five steps. First, I distinguish narrow from broad aesthetic cognitivism. Second, I specify the scope of the narrow claim and suggest that narrow aesthetic cognitivism is not about art in general but about narrative fictional works. Third, (...) I point out that arguments in favor of the possibility of such works expressing truth do not discuss how truth is justified. Fourth, I concede that justification of truths in fictional and nonfictional works in the end rests on the experiences outside of the work but argue that it is an empirical matter whether belief has been acquired or not. Fifth, I demonstrate that the most recentanalysis on belief-acquisition evinces that fiction is a not an effective vehicle for imparting beliefs. I conclude with a discussionof what would count as evidence in favor of aesthetic cognitivism. (shrink)

Što je manje ograničenja s kojima se susrećemo u umjetničkom stvaranju, to je veća naša umjetnička sloboda; kako tehnologija napreduje i pruža nam sve više opcija i sve veću kreativnu fleksibilnost, tako naša umjetnička sloboda cvjeta. Tako glasi narodna mudrost o ovom fenomenu. No je li ta mudrost doista mudra? Mnogi umjetnici i teoretičari umjetnosti smatraju da nije; za Stravinskog, “[š]to više ograničenja namećemo, to se više oslobađamo lanaca koji sputavaju duh”. U radu razmatram ortodoksno gledište i ovu alternativnu perspektivu (...) kroz analizu ograničenja koja proizlaze iz fizičkih, psiholoških i tehnoloških čimbenika, kao i iz heterogene skupine rutinskih praksi koje nazivamo "konvencijama". Kako bih produbio analizu, oslanjam se na perspektivu "rješavanja problema" u umjetničkoj kreativnosti, ispitujući međudjelovanje između izuma i konvencija u umjetnosti, koristeći različite primjere iz filma i rock glazbe. Prema teoriji Jona Elstera, problemi s kojima se umjetnici suočavaju proizlaze iz mješavine izabranih, nametnutih i izmišljenih ograničenja; prema teoriji Davida Bordwella, ti se problemi mogu riješiti replikacijom, revizijom, sintezom ili odbacivanjem postojećih rješenja. Zaključujem da ni pučka teorija, ni alternativna teorija nisu točne; umjesto toga, postoji "idealna zona" umjetničke kreativnosti smještena između onemogućujućeg viška opcija i sputavajuće oskudice istih. Tvrdim da Stravinskijeva protu-teorija umjetničke kreativnosti, iako nije doslovno istinita, djeluje kao "sretna neistina" – epistemološki vrijedna pretjerana korekcija. (shrink)

Krindž komedija može učiniti ljude toliko nelagodnima da se osjećaj neugode nastavlja i nakon što komedija prestane. Ovaj rad objašnjava taj učinak, koji nazivam "krindž preostatak". Ako se publika slabo poveže s likovima, smiju se. Ako se snažno povežu, imaju negativnu emocionalnu reakciju – na primjer, teško im je gledati ili žele napustiti prostoriju.Prvo, tvrdim da su šale u krindž komediji ilokucijski činovi osmišljeni da izazovu smijeh putem posredne neugode (Austin, 1975). Drugo, priznajem da te šale ne proizvode uvijek željeni (...) perlokucijski učinak smijeha – ponekad šala ne uspije prevladati neugodu, ostavljajući gledatelja samo u stanju nelagode. Treće, oslanjajući se na teoriju benigne povrede McGrawa i Warrena (2010), objašnjavam da višak neugode proizlazi iz maksimiziranja povrede u komediji uz relativno mali dodatak benignog. Na kraju, tvrdim da je zabavnost krindž komedije uvjetovana nedostatkom socijalno-psihološkog distanciranja. Budući da ne ostavlja prostor između gledatelja i lika, nelagoda se maksimizira, komedija postaje manje benigna (odnosno snažnija povreda) i polarizirajuća kao rezultat. Ovo objašnjava i) zašto krindž komedija kod nekih gledatelja proizvodi komičan "preostatak", gdje se osjećaj neugode nastavlja i nakon što komedija završi, i ii) zašto krindž komedija kod nekih izaziva smijeh, a kod drugih stresne reakcije. (shrink)

BOOK REVIEW Umberto Galimberti L’ETICA DEL VIANDANTE, Feltrinelli, 2023, ISBN: 788807493645 (paper), ISBN: 9788858858530, (e-book) Paperback, 20,90 EUR, e-book: 12,99 EUR.

Integrative bioethics is a predominantly Croatian school of thought whose proponents claim to have initiated an innovative and recognizably European concept of bioethics capable of dealing with the most pressing issues of our time. In this paper, a critical overview of the integrative bioethics project is undertaken to show that it is, in fact, a poorly articulated and arguably pseudoscientific enterprise fundamentally incapable of dealing with practical challenges. The first section provides the basic outline of integrative bioethics: its historical development, (...) major proponents, geographical context and philosophical foundations. The second section considers its main theoretical shortcomings: the absence of normativity, collapse into ethical relativism and frequent intratheoretical inconsistencies. The third section addresses the issue of typically pseudoscientific features of integrative bioethics: verbose language, constant self- glorification and isolation from mainstream science. The fourth and concluding section of the paper argues that integrative bioethics––regarding its quality, reception and identity––does not merit the “European bioethics” label and is better described as a blind alley of European bioethics. (shrink)

Can addiction be credibly invoked as an excuse for moral harms secondary to particular decisions to use drugs? This question raises two distinct sets of issues. First, there is the question of whether addiction is the sort of consideration that could, given suitable assumptions about the details of the case, excuse or mitigate moral blameworthiness. Most discussions of addiction and moral responsibility have focused on this question, and many have argued that addiction excuses. Here I articulate what I take to (...) be the best argument for this view, based on the substantial difficulty that people with severe addiction experience in controlling drug-related behavior. This, I argue, may in some cases be sufficient to ground a mitigating excuse, given the way in which addiction undermines agents’ responsiveness to relevant moral reasons to do otherwise. Much less attention has been devoted to a second set of issues that critically affect the possibility of applying this mitigating excuse in particular cases, derived from the ambivalent nature of agential control in addiction. In order to find a fitting response to moral harm, the person with the right standing to blame must make a judgment about the extent to which the agent possessed certain morally relevant capacities at the time of the act. In practice, this will often prove tremendously difficult to assess. The ethical challenge for the person with the right standing to blame is fundamentally one of making a judgment about matters that seem underdetermined by the available evidence. (shrink)

Call the epistemological grounds on which we rationally should determine our ontological (or alethiological) commitments regarding an entity its arbiter of existence (or arbiter of truth). It is commonly thought that arbiters of existence and truth can be provided by our practices. This paper argues that such views have several implications: (1) the relation of arbiters to our metaphysical commitments consists in indispensability, (2) realist views about a kind of entity should take the kinds of practices providing that entity’s arbiters (...) to align with respect to their metaphysical dependencies, (3) if realists take a kind of practice to provide grounds on which to affirm the existence of a kind of entity, they should turn to those same grounds when seeking to provide an epistemology of the relevant domain. (shrink)

The paper analyses the validity of arguments supporting the assumption of a constant universe of individuals over all possible worlds within Transparent Intensional Logic. These arguments, proposed by Tichý, enjoy widespread acceptance among researchers working within the system. However, upon closer examination, this paper demonstrates several weaknesses in the argumentation, suggesting that there is an open possibility to incorporate a variable universe of individuals even in models within this system.

Ovaj članak ide protiv struje akademskog diskursa odgovarajući na naslovno pitanje negativno. Ovaj suprotni odgovor nije zamišljen da potkopa stav da je ljubaznost dobra stvar; niti je, međutim, primjer puke filozofske sklonosti za igru riječima. Tvrdim da shvaćanje ljubaznosti kao vrline više zamagljuje nego rasvjetljuje, iz razloga što zanemaruje različite razlike koje nam pomažu razumjeti moralni jezik i postići „kreposnu pismenost“. U radu dajem pregled relevantne psihološke literature prije nego što se prebacim na filozofske izvore. Nakon toga ocrtavam alternativne načine (...) na koje dosljedni etičari vrline mogu reći sve što žele reći o ljubaznosti, koristeći mnogo bolje utemeljene i manje nejasne pojmove. Nudim pogled na ljubaznost kao klasterski pojam u istom smislu kao što je Wittgensteinov pojam igre. Na kraju, iznosim neke implikacije ovog stajališta za praktične izazove za razvoj karaktera. (shrink)

L.A. Paul calls “deep” the kind of essentialism according to which the essential properties of objects are determined independently of the context. Deep essentialism opposes “shallow essentialism”, of which David Lewis is said to be a prominent advocate. Paul argues that standard forms of deep essentialism face a range of issues (mainly based on an interpretation of Quinean skepticism) that shallow essentialism does not. However, Paul claims, shallow essentialism eliminates the very heart of what motivates essentialism, so it is better (...) to be deep than shallow. Accordingly, she proposes a very sharp novel account of essentialism, which, while attempting to preserve some of the advantages of shallow essentialism over the classical forms of deep essentialism, can be deemed to be deep. In this paper, I compare Paul’s proposal for a kind of deep essentialism with Lewis’s account, as it is presented by Paul. My aim is to show that the differences between the two approaches are not as significant as Paul takes them to be, and that Paul’s account can be taken to be deeper than Lewis’s only at the cost of sacrificing the very idea at the bottom of deep essentialism. This might be taken to suggest that, if Paul is correct in asserting that shallow essentialism is better equipped to address some skeptical challenges, but it is generally preferable to be deep than shallow, then Lewis’s account should be re-evaluated, since, as shallow as it can be, it might be deeper than it looks. (shrink)

A light form of value realism is defended according to which objective properties of comparison objects make value comparisons true or false. If one object has such a better-making property and another lacks it, this is sufficient for the truth of a corresponding value comparison. However, better-making properties are only necessary and usually not sufficient parts of the justifications of value comparisons. The account is not reductionist; it remains consistent with error-theoretic positions and the view that there are normative facts.

Panpsihizam, gledište da je fenomenalna svijest prisutna na fundamentalnoj fizičkoj razini, suočava se s problemom kombinacije subjekata—pitanjem mogu li se (i kako) subjekti iskustva kombinirati. Iako su predložena različita rješenja za taj problem, često se čini da se temelje na pogrešnom razumijevanju izazova koji predstavlja problem kombinacije subjekata. Primjer je razmjena u ovom časopisu između Siddhartha (2021) i Millera (2022). Siddharth je tvrdio da rješenje fenomenalnog povezivanja nije uspjelo riješiti problem kombinacije subjekata, dok je Miller odgovorio da je Siddharth (između (...) ostalog) pogrešno razumio problem koji je rješenje fenomenalnog povezivanja pokušavalo riješiti. U ovom radu nastojim razjasniti stvarni problem kombinacije subjekata s kojim se suočava panpsihizam i na temelju toga procijeniti različite pokušaje obrane mogućnosti sastava subjekata. (shrink)

Normativni teoretičari pogreške nastoje braniti teoriju pogreške koja kaže da normativni sudovi pripisuju normativna svojstva, a takva svojstva, uključujući razloge za vjerovanje, nikada nisu instancirana. Mnogi filozofi su iznijeli prigovore obrani teorije koja podrazumijeva da ne možemo imati razloga vjerovati u nju. Spencer Case prigovara da teoretičari pogreške jednostavno ne mogu izbjeći samopobijanje. S druge strane, Bart Streumer tvrdi da ne možemo vjerovati u normativnu teoriju pogreške, ali da to, pomalo iznenađujuće, pomaže njenim zagovornicima da je obrane od ovih prigovora. (...) Smatram da, ako je Streumerov argument uspješan, on omogućuje teoretičarima pogreške izbjegavanje Caseovog prigovora o samopobijanju. Međutim, nadograđujem i poboljšavam Caseov argument kako bih pokazao da nikada ne bismo mogli uspješno obraniti normativnu teoriju pogreške, bez obzira na to možemo li vjerovati u nju ili ne. Dakle, samopobijanje ostaje. Rad zaključujem nudeći neke razloge za mišljenje da naša nesposobnost da obranimo normativnu teoriju pogreške znači da bismo je trebali odbaciti, što bi posljedično značilo da je ona neistinita. (shrink)

In this paper, using Mark Schroeder’s (2008a) expressivist semantic framework for normative language as a case study, I will identify difficulties that even an expressivist semantic theory capable of addressing the Frege-Geach problem will encounter in handling the logical possibility of moral dilemmas. To this end, I will draw on a classical puzzle formulated by McConnell (1978) that the logical possibility of moral dilemmas conflicts with some of the prima facie plausible axioms of the standard deontic logic, which include obligation (...) implies permission. On the tentative assumption that proponents of ethical expressivism should be generally committed to securing the logical possibility of moral dilemmas in their semantic theories, I will explore whether and how expressivists can successfully invalidate obligation implies permission within the framework developed by Schroeder. The case study eventually reveals that this can indeed be a hard task for expressivists. Generalizing from the case study, I will suggest that the source of the difficulty ultimately lies in the mentalist assumption of the expressivist semantic project that the logico-semantic relations exhibited by normative sentences should be modeled in terms of the psychological attitudes that speakers express by uttering them. My final goal will be to show that the difficulty expressivists face in dealing with the logical possibility of moral dilemmas is a reflection of the more general problem that their commitment to the mentalist assumption prevents them from flexibly adopting or dropping axioms in their semantic theories to get the right technical results. (shrink)