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  1. Varela on the Pragmatic Dimension of Phenomenology.Andrea Pace Giannotta - 2017 - Constructivist Foundations 13 (1):78-81.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Varela’s Radical Proposal: How to Embody and Open Up Cognitive Science” by Kristian Moltke Martiny. Upshot: I examine Varela’s relationship with Husserl’s phenomenology, highlighting Varela’s acknowledgment of the pragmatic dimension of its phenomenological reduction. I argue that Varela sees, in some developments of phenomenology, a deconstruction of the subject-object duality and an embodied view of the mind. I also highlight the existential dimension of Varela’s radical proposal, which contributes to further opening up and embodying (...)
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  2. Explaining Top-Down Minds From the Bottom Up. [REVIEW]Sven Delarivière - 2017 - Constructivist Foundations 12 (3):369-372.
    The main topic of Dennett’s book is intelligent design and the design of intelligence, trying to make intuitive the processes of both, be it the top-down process of comprehension that designs with foresight and reasons or the bottom-up process of evolution that has, through blind trial and error, captured free-floating rationales and ultimately, through co-evolution (between memes and genes), achieved top-down intelligence, flipping its original design process upside down.
     
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  3.  9
    Varela as the Uncanny.Y. Ataria - 2017 - Constructivist Foundations 12 (2):153-154.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Enaction as a Lived Experience: Towards a Radical Neurophenomenology” by Claire Petitmengin. Upshot: Why has the neurophenomenological approach not been adopted as a common and even obligatory tool in the study of consciousness? I suggest that the problem with the neurophenomenological approach is its effectiveness on the one hand and its almost impossible demands from the scientist on the other: One cannot accept the neurophenomenological approach without rejecting not only the paradigm of cognitive science, (...)
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  4.  3
    Modeling Subjects’ Experience While Modeling the Experimental Design: A Mild-Neurophenomenology-Inspired Approach in the Piloting Phase.C. Baquedano & C. Fabar - 2017 - Constructivist Foundations 12 (2):166-179.
    Context: The integration of data measured in first- and third-person frameworks is a challenge that becomes more prominent as we attempt to refine the ties between the dimensions we assume to be objective and our experience itself. As a result, cognitive science has been a target for criticism from the epistemological and methodological point of view, which has resulted in the emergence of new approaches. Neurophenomenology has been proposed as a means to address these limitations. The methodological application of this (...)
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  5.  3
    Author’s Response: Multiple Views in Search of Unifying Models.C. Baquedano & C. Fabar - 2017 - Constructivist Foundations 12 (2):186-189.
    Upshot: We respond to three main challenges that the commentaries have raised. Firstly, we clarify our misunderstood intention of introducing a newcomer to the neurophenomenological family. Rather, we situate our approach under the broader umbrella of phenomenology. Secondly, we argue that from our empirical position it is questionable that the strategy we pursued in the target article left the black box of consciousness completely closed. Thirdly, we argue that the subjective fluctuations that may appear as outcomes in an experimental paradigm (...)
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  6.  6
    Radical Neurophenomenology: We Cannot Solve the Problems Using the Same Kind of Thinking We Used When We Created Them.A. Berkovich-Ohana - 2017 - Constructivist Foundations 12 (2):156-159.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Enaction as a Lived Experience: Towards a Radical Neurophenomenology” by Claire Petitmengin. Upshot: The neurophenomenological project is too ambitious technically, but highly appealing on the philosophical level, as can be learned from the extremely high ratio between theoretical and empirical work concerning neurophenomenology accumulated thus far. While “radical” neurophenomenology could possibly create, in highly unique projects, “mutual generative constraints,” will the hard problem be dissolved? I argue that although using micro phenomenology, as long as (...)
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  7.  8
    Phenoneurology.M. Bitbol - 2017 - Constructivist Foundations 12 (2):150-153.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Enaction as a Lived Experience: Towards a Radical Neurophenomenology” by Claire Petitmengin. Upshot: Petitmengin’s strategy of dissolution of the “hard problem” of consciousness is shown to rely on some radical phenomenological premises that are listed and analyzed. It presupposes a starting point of research in a state of epoché ; it unfolds into a participatory conception of truth; and it ends in a quest for non-dual pristine experience. Each one of these moves is endorsed (...)
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  8.  7
    Musical Emotions Emerge From the Interaction of Factors in the Music, the Person, and the Context.J. Cespedes-Guevara - 2017 - Constructivist Foundations 12 (2):229-231.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Body Awareness to Recognize Feelings: The Exploration of a Musical Emotional Experience” by Alejandra Vásquez-Rosati. Upshot: A complete account of musical emotions implies examining how factors in the music, the situation, and the person interact, producing objective and subjective changes on affective, bodily and cognitive levels simultaneously. Therefore, a first-person phenomenological method can only provide a limited understanding of these experiences.
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  9.  2
    Modelling Subjectivity and Uncertainty in “Real World” Settings.A. Ciaunica - 2017 - Constructivist Foundations 12 (2):184-185.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Modeling Subjects’ Experience While Modeling the Experimental Design: A Mild-Neurophenomenology-Inspired Approach in the Piloting Phase” by Constanza Baquedano & Catalina Fabar. Upshot: The authors show in their pilots how open it is to participants not to obey the instructions during an experiment. Their findings leave us to choose between two options: either we accept that subjective confounds are inevitable and stronger than we think, but in this case, why should we continue trying to measure (...)
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  10.  5
    Has the Philosopher’s Stone of the Interaction Between First- and Third-Person Data Finally Been Found?L. Ciechanowski - 2017 - Constructivist Foundations 12 (2):203-205.
    Open peer commentary on the article “A First-Person Analysis Using Third Person-Data as a Generative Method: A Case Study of Surprise in Depression” by Natalie Depraz, Maria Gyemant & Thomas Desmidt. Upshot: I present a critical review of Depraz et al.’s target article and its promise to provide a novel “generative method” of analyzing first-person micro-phenomenological interviews using third-person physiological data. I argue that although indeed promising, the generative method may still be haunted by the issues pertaining to the other (...)
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  11.  5
    A First-Person Analysis Using Third-Person Data as a Generative Method: A Case Study of Surprise in Depression.N. Depraz, M. Gyemant & T. Desmidt - 2017 - Constructivist Foundations 12 (2):190-203.
    Context: The use of first-person micro-phenomenological interviews and their productive interaction with third-person physiological data is a challenging and pressing issue in order to offer an effective and fruitful application of Varela’s neurophenomenological hypothesis. Problem: We aim at offering a generative method of analysis of first-person micro-phenomenological interviews using third-person physiological data. Our challenge is to describe this generative first-person analysis with the third-person physiological framework rather than put Varela’s hypothesis into practice in a generative way (as we did in (...)
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  12.  4
    Author’s Response: Situating Generative First-Person Analysis Within Neuro-, Micro-, Cardio- and Transcendental Phenomenology Natalie Depraz at Al.N. Depraz, M. Gyemant & T. Desmidt - 2017 - Constructivist Foundations 12 (2):214-218.
    Upshot: Thanks to the commentaries we have been able to further clarify the situation of generative first-person analysis in the general framework of neurophenomenology and more specifically of cardio-phenomenology as its extension and reformulation. We have also provided more detailed information about the way phenomenology as transcendental philosophy is genuinely operating as a practice in cardio-phenomenology and has a central function regarding the creation of categories and their suspensive questioning thanks to the epoché method. We have also drawn great benefits (...)
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  13.  3
    Progress in First-Person Method: A Few Steps Forward, a Few Steps Back.D. G. Gozli - 2017 - Constructivist Foundations 12 (2):205-206.
    Open peer commentary on the article “A First-Person Analysis Using Third Person-Data as a Generative Method: A Case Study of Surprise in Depression” by Natalie Depraz, Maria Gyemant & Thomas Desmidt. Upshot: Supplementing physiological measures with first-person data involves several benefits and challenges. The collection and analysis of the two types of data might not be optimal within the same procedural framework. Therefore, the synthesis of the two remains problematic.
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  14.  3
    Plurality of Consciousness Appearances - Plurality of Methods.K. Pavlov-Pinus - 2017 - Constructivist Foundations 12 (2):182-184.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Modeling Subjects’ Experience While Modeling the Experimental Design: A Mild-Neurophenomenology-Inspired Approach in the Piloting Phase” by Constanza Baquedano & Catalina Fabar. Upshot: Baquedano and Fabar’s provoking article highlights several difficulties of neurophenomenology, and brings into light the necessity of further clarification of its basic concepts such as human experience, first-person perspective, phenomenological validation, explanation, adequate measurement and so on. Particularly, it becomes more and more clear that the “explanatory gap” cannot be liquidated by means (...)
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  15.  1
    The Resonant Biology of Emotion.K. Peil Kauffman - 2017 - Constructivist Foundations 12 (2):232-233.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Body Awareness to Recognize Feelings: The Exploration of a Musical Emotional Experience” by Alejandra Vásquez-Rosati. Upshot: The enactment view echoes the deeper biology and chemistry of emotion. Music resonates innately because emotional evaluation is the evolutionary grandfather of all senses.
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  16.  6
    Author’s Response: Discovering the Microgenesis of the Hard Problem.C. Petitmengin - 2017 - Constructivist Foundations 12 (2):159-165.
    Upshot: My answer focuses on two issues raised by the commentaries that it is essential to clarify in order to understand what radical neurophenomenology implies: Does radical neurophenomenology means stopping doing science? Does radical neurophenomenology require an intersubjective agreement on a method for investigating lived experience?
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  17.  18
    Enaction as a Lived Experience: Towards a Radical Neurophenomenology.C. Petitmengin - 2017 - Constructivist Foundations 12 (2):139-147.
    Context: The founding idea of neurophenomenology is that in order to progress in the understanding of the human mind, it is indispensable to integrate a disciplined study of human experience in cognitive neuroscience, an integration which is also presented as a methodological remedy for the “hard problem” of consciousness. Problem: Does neurophenomenology succeed in solving the hard problem? Method: I distinguish two interpretations and implementations of neurophenomenology: a light or “mild” neurophenomenology, which aims at building correlations between first-person descriptions and (...)
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  18.  4
    Unforeseen Influences on the Classification of Categories Reflecting the Structure of Experience.B. Pierce - 2017 - Constructivist Foundations 12 (2):206-208.
    Open peer commentary on the article “A First-Person Analysis Using Third Person-Data as a Generative Method: A Case Study of Surprise in Depression” by Natalie Depraz, Maria Gyemant & Thomas Desmidt. Upshot: The generative method outlined in the target article produces some interesting results, demonstrating the value of cardio-phenomenology. The proposed division of categories reflecting the structure of experience into sub-categories suggests that prior theoretical commitments may have influenced the process of analysis in ways the authors might not have foreseen (...)
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  19.  6
    A Newcomer to the Neurophenomenological Family?Roy J. -M. - 2017 - Constructivist Foundations 12 (2):180-182.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Modeling Subjects’ Experience While Modeling the Experimental Design: A Mild-Neurophenomenology-Inspired Approach in the Piloting Phase” by Constanza Baquedano & Catalina Fabar. Upshot: Demonstrating the relevance of collecting first-person data and of establishing reciprocal constraints between this these data and behavioral data to overcome the issue of behavioral data replication is an interesting result. However, this result, as such, falls short of offering any theoretical reorientation of the neurophenomenological project, strictly understood.
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  20.  4
    Refining the Model for Emotion Research: A 4E Perspective.D. Schyff - 2017 - Constructivist Foundations 12 (2):227-229.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Body Awareness to Recognize Feelings: The Exploration of a Musical Emotional Experience” by Alejandra Vásquez-Rosati. Upshot: While generally supportive of the aims of Vásquez-Rosati’s target article, I suggest that it contains some theoretical and methodological shortcomings that could be addressed in future work. I also argue that if the author wishes to produce research that properly engages the enactivist perspective, then a number of additional dimensions are required. With this in mind, I outline the (...)
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  21.  13
    What Is It Like to Be Conscious? Towards Solving the Hard Problem.J. Stewart - 2017 - Constructivist Foundations 12 (2):155-156.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Enaction as a Lived Experience: Towards a Radical Neurophenomenology” by Claire Petitmengin. Upshot: Mild” neurophenomenology does not solve the “hard problem” of consciousness; in a way it actually aggravates it. “Radical” neurophenomenology “dissolves” the hard problem. However, I suggest that it may be premature to give up on actually solving the hard problem; and indicate several lines of research that are still open.
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  22.  2
    On Mutual Enrichment Between First- and Third-Person Sciences and Phenomenological Methodology.T. Strle - 2017 - Constructivist Foundations 12 (2):208-210.
    Open peer commentary on the article “A First-Person Analysis Using Third Person-Data as a Generative Method: A Case Study of Surprise in Depression” by Natalie Depraz, Maria Gyemant & Thomas Desmidt. Upshot: In the first part of the commentary, I argue that the some of the main objectives of Depraz et al.’s target article remain somewhat unfulfilled. In the second part, I touch upon and briefly discuss the issue of what constitutes a valid method of researching experience.
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  23.  13
    Building a Science of Experience: Neurophenomenology and Related Disciplines.C. Valenzuela-Moguillansky, A. Vásquez-Rosati & A. Riegler - 2017 - Constructivist Foundations 12 (2):131-138.
    Context: More than 20 years ago Varela initiated a research program to advance in the scientific study of consciousness, neurophenomenology. Problem: Has Varela’s neurophenomenology, the solution to the “hard problem,” been successful? Which issues remain unresolved, and why? Method: This introduction sketches the progress that has been made since then and links it to the contributions to this special issue. Results: Instead of a unified research field, today we find a variety of different interpretations and implementations of neurophenomenology. We argue (...)
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  24.  6
    Author’s Response: Beyond the Boundaries of Third-Person Methods in Emotion Research: The Accuracy of the Micro-Phenomenological Interview.A. Vásquez-Rosati - 2017 - Constructivist Foundations 12 (2):233-238.
    Upshot: The micro-phenomenological interview is a methodology that enables us to accurately guide subjects in describing an emotional experience. With this guide, it is possible to know the structure of a particular experience, which is helpful to understand the different processes related to it. The incorporation of the micro-phenomenological interview into emotion research can extend the limits set until now by third-person methodologies and give an integral comprehension of emotions.
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  25.  5
    Body Awareness to Recognize Feelings: The Exploration of a Musical Emotional Experience.A. Vásquez-Rosati - 2017 - Constructivist Foundations 12 (2):219-226.
    Context: The current study of emotions is based on theoretical models that limit the emotional experience. The collection of emotional data is through self-report questionnaires, restricting the description of emotional experience to broad concepts or induced preconceived qualities of how an emotion should be felt. Problem: Are the emotional experiences responding exclusively to these concepts and dimensions? Method: Music was used to lead participants into an emotional experience. Then a micro-phenomenological interview, a methodology with a phenomenological approach, was used to (...)
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  26.  2
    Enacting Enaction: Conceptual Nest or Existential Mutation?S. Vörös - 2017 - Constructivist Foundations 12 (2):148-150.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Enaction as a Lived Experience: Towards a Radical Neurophenomenology” by Claire Petitmengin. Upshot: I reflect and expand upon three aspects of Petitmengin’s illuminating article. After contrasting existential and theoretical views of neurophenomenology, I embed Petitmengin’s account of the experiential dissolution of the hard problem of consciousness into a larger framework by drawing parallels with previous experiments on unitive/non-dual experiences raise the question of how seriously we are willing to take the pragmatics of investigating and (...)
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  27.  3
    Supersizing Third-Person, Downsizing First-Person Approaches?S. Vörös - 2017 - Constructivist Foundations 12 (2):210-212.
    Open peer commentary on the article “A First-Person Analysis Using Third Person-Data as a Generative Method: A Case Study of Surprise in Depression” by Natalie Depraz, Maria Gyemant & Thomas Desmidt. Upshot: In my commentary, I try to examine whether, and how, the approach presented by Depraz, Gyemant & Desmidt lines up with Varela’s neurophenomenology. I focus on the neural and phenomenological dimensions, respectively, arguing that the end result is somewhat of a mixed bag: if it paves the way for (...)
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  28.  4
    “A New Scientific Phenomenology”? Questions About the Evolution of a Phenomenological Endeavor.N. Zaslawski - 2017 - Constructivist Foundations 12 (2):212-213.
    Open peer commentary on the article “A First-Person Analysis Using Third Person-Data as a Generative Method: A Case Study of Surprise in Depression” by Natalie Depraz, Maria Gyemant & Thomas Desmidt. Upshot: Given the claims of Natalie Depraz regarding what she called in 2004 the “practical turn of phenomenology,” I ask the authors how they conceive the research they presented in their 2017 article, particularly regarding transcendental phenomenology.
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