Year:

  1. Hume's Reflections on the Identity and Simplicity of Mind.Donald C. Ainslie - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):557-578.
    The article presents a new interpretation of Hume's treatment of personal identity, and his later rejection of it in the "Appendix" to the Treatise. Hume's project, on this interpretation, is to explain beliefs about persons that arise primarily within philosophical projects, not in everyday life. The belief in the identity and simplicity of the mind as a bundle of perceptions is an abstruse belief, not one held by the "vulgar" who rarely turn their minds on themselves so as to think (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Three Methods of Ethics.Marcia Baron, Philip Pettit & Michael Slote - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):721-723.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. A Subject with No Object: Strategies for Nominalistic Interpretation of Mathematics.John P. Burgess & Gideon Rosen - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):723-727.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Freud and the Question of Pseudoscience.Frank Cioffi - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):730-732.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. The Legacy of Nelson Goodman.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):679-690.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Knowledge in Action.John Gibbons - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):579-600.
    This paper argues that the role of knowledge in the explanation and production of intentional action is as indispensable as the roles of belief and desire. If we are interested in explaining intentional actions rather than intentions or attempts, we need to make reference to more than the agent's beliefs and desires. It is easy to see how the truth of your beliefs, or perhaps, facts about a setting will be involved in the explanation of an action. If you believe (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  7.  1
    Happiness and Pleasure.Daniel M. Haybron - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):501-528.
    This paper argues against hedonistic theories of happiness. First, hedonism is too inclusive: many pleasures cannot plausibly be construed as constitutive of happiness. Second, any credible theory must count either attitudes of life satisfaction, affective states such as mood, or both as constituents of happiness; yet neither sort of state reduces to pleasure. Hedonism errs in its attempt to reduce happiness, which is at least partly dispositional, to purely episodic experiential states. The dispositionality of happiness also undermines weakened nonreductive forms (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. On Nominalism.Geoffrey Hellman - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):691-705.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness.Pamela Hieronymi - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):529-555.
    I first pose a challenge which, it seems to me, any philosophical account of forgiveness must meet: the account must be articulate and it must allow for forgiveness that is uncompromising. I then examine an account of forgiveness which appears to meet this challenge. Upon closer examination we discover that this account actually fails to meet the challenge-but it fails in very instructive ways. The account takes two missteps which seem to be taken by almost everyone discussing forgiveness. At the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  10. From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):631-636.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Wittgenstein's Thought in Transition.Dale Jacquette - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):727-730.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. The Non-Conceptual Content of Perceptual Experience: Situation Dependence and Fineness of Grain.Sean D. Kelly - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):601-608.
    I begin by examining a recent debate between John McDowell and Christopher Peacocke over whether the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual. Although I am sympathetic to Peacocke's claim that perceptual content is non-conceptual, I suggest a number of ways in which his arguments fail to make that case. This failure stems from an over-emphasis on the "fine-grainedness" of perceptual content - a feature that is relatively unimportant to its non-conceptual structure. I go on to describe two other features of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  13.  1
    Phenomenology and Nonconceptual Content.Christopher Peacocke - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):609-615.
    This note aims to clarify which arguments do, and which arguments do not, tell against Conceptualism, the thesis that the representational content of experience is exclusively conceptual. Contrary to Sean Kelly's position, conceptualism has no difficulty accommodating the phenomena of color constancy and of situation-dependence. Acknowledgment of nonconceptual content is also consistent with holding that experiences have nonrepresentational subjective features. The crucial arguments against conceptualism stem from animal perception, and from a distinction, elaborated in the final section of the paper, (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  14. My Quarrels with Nelson Goodman.Israel Scheffler - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):665-677.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Vision and Cognition in Picture Perception.Robert Schwartz - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):707-719.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  1
    Ethical and Religious Thought in Analytic Philosophy of Language.Quentin Smith - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):732-735.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Cartesian Truth.C. Vinci Thomas - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):735-738.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Harmless Naturalism: The Limits of Science and the Nature of Philosophy.Robert Almeder - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):493-495.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Avowals and First-Person Privilege.Dorit Bar-on & Douglas C. Long - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):311-335.
    When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy what may be called "first-person privilege." If I now said: "I have a headache," or "I'm thinking about Venice," I would be taken at my word: I would normally not be challenged. According to one prominent approach, this privilege is due to a special epistemic access we have to our own present states of mind. On an alternative, deflationary approach the privilege merely reflects a socio-linguistic convention governing avowals. We (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Chalmers on the Justification of Phenomenal Judgments.Tim Bayne - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):407-419.
    We seem to enjoy a very special kind of epistemic relation to our own conscious states. In The Conscious Mind, David Chalmers argues that our phenomenal judgments are fully-justified or certain because we are acquainted with the phenomenal states that are the objects of such judgments. Chalmers holds that the acquaintance account of phenomenal justification is superior to reliabilist accounts of how it is that our PJs are justified, because it alone can underwrite the certainty of our phenomenal judgments. I (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Real History: Reflections on Historical Practice.Martin Bunzl - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):490-493.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Postmodernism's Use and Abuse of Nietzsche.Ken Gemes - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):337-360.
    I focus on Nietzsche's architectural metaphor of self-construction in arguing for the claim that postmodern readings of Nietzsche misunderstand his various attacks on dogmatic philosophy as paving the way for acceptance of a self characterized by fundamental disunity. Nietzsche's attack on essentialist dogmatic metaphysics is a call to engage in a purposive self-creation under a unifying will, a will that possesses the strength to reinterpret history as a pathway to "the problem that we are". Nietzsche agrees with the postmodernists that (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. Morality: Its Nature and Justification.Bernard Gert - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):441-446.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Trust Within Reason.Martin Hollis - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):487-490.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Contextualist Swords, Skeptical Plowshares.Bredo C. Johnsen - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):385-406.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  26. The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy.J. B. Schneewind - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):483-487.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Perception and Belief.A. D. Smith - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):283-309.
    An attempt is made to pinpoint the way in which perception is related to belief. Although, for familiar reasons, it is not true to say that we necessarily believe in the existence of the objects we perceive, nor that they actually have their ostensible characteristics, it is argued that the relation between perception and belief is more than merely contingent There are two main issues to address. The first is that `collateral' beliefs may impede perceptual belief. It is argued that (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  28. Blackburn's Problem: On Its Not Insignificant Residue.Jordan Howard Sobel - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):361-383.
    Moral properties would supervene upon non-moral properties and be conceptually autonomous. That, according to Simon Blackburn, would make them if not impossible at least mysterious, and evidence for them best explained by theorists who say they are not real. In fact moral properties would not challenge in ways Blackburn has contended. There is, however, something new that can be gathered from his arguments. What would the supervenience of moral properties and their conceptual autonomy from at least total non-moral properties entail (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Two Conceptions of the Physical.Daniel Stoljar - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):253-281.
    The debate over physicalism in philosophy of mind can be seen as concerning an inconsistent tetrad of theses: if physicalism is true, a priori physicalism is true; a priori physicalism is false; if physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true; epiphenomenalism is false. This paper argues that one may resolve the debate by distinguishing two conceptions of the physical: on the theory-based conception, it is plausible that is true and is false; on the object-based conception, it is plausible that is true (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30.  2
    Temporal Phase Pluralism.David Braddon-Mitchell & Caroline West - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):59-83.
    Some theories of personal identity allow some variation in what it takes for a person to survive from context to context; and sometimes this is determined by the desires of person-stages or the practices of communities. This leads to problems for decision making in contexts where what is chosen will affect personal identity. `Temporal Phase Pluralism' solves such problems by allowing that there can be a plurality of persons constituted by a sequence of person stages. This illuminates difficult decision making (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  31. Wishing It Were Now Some Other Time.William Lane Craig - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):159-166.
    One of the most serious obstacles to accepting a tenseless view of time is the challenge posed by our experience of tense. A particularly striking example of such experience, pointed out by Schlesinger but largely overlooked in the literature, is the wish felt by probably all of us at some time or other that it were now some other time. Such a wish seems evidently rational to hold, and yet on a tenseless theory of time such a wish must be (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. What Moore's Paradox Is About.Claudio de Almeida - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):33-58.
    On the basis of arguments showing that none of the most influential analyses of Moore's paradox yields a successful resolution of the problem, a new analysis of it is offered. It is argued that, in attempting to render verdicts of either inconsistency or self-contradiction or self-refutation, those analyses have all failed to satisfactorily explain why a Moore-paradoxical proposition is such that it cannot be rationally believed. According to the proposed solution put forward here, a Moore-paradoxical proposition is one for which (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Object and Property.Arda Denkel - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):238-240.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  1
    The Kinds of Things: A Theory of Personal Identity Based on Transcendental Argument.Frederick C. Doepke - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):240-243.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Mental Causation Versus Physical Causation: No Contest.L. Elder Crawford - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):111-127.
    Common sense supposes thoughts can cause bodily movements and thereby bring about changes in where the agent is or how his surroundings are. Many philosophers suppose that any such outcome is realized in a complex state of affairs involving only microparticles; that previous microphysical developments were sufficient to cause that state of affairs; hence that, barring overdetermination, causation by the mental is excluded. This paper argues that the microphysical swarm that realizes the outcome is an accident or a coincidence and (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy.Don Garrett - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):191-196.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Does Freudian Theory Resolve "The Paradoxes of Irrationality"?Adolf Grunbaum - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):129-143.
    This paper consists of two related parts: I. A detailed critique of Donald Davidson's thesis-in his "The Paradoxes of Irrationality"-that "...any satisfactory [explanatory] view [of irrationality] must embrace some of Freud's most important theses". I argue that this conclusion is doubly flawed: Davidson's case for it is logically ill-founded, and its Freudian plaidoyer is also factually false. II. Relatedly, in the second part, I confute the recent arguments given by Marcia Cavell, Thomas Nagel, et al. to establish that psychoanalytic causal (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Causal Asymmetries.Daniel M. Hausman - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):243-246.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Putting the Image Back in Imagination.Kind Amy - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):85-109.
    Despite their intuitive appeal and a long philosophical history, imagery-based accounts of the imagination have fallen into disfavor in contemporary discussions. The philosophical pressure to reject such accounts seems to derive from two distinct sources. First, the fact that mental images have proved difficult to accommodate within a scientific conception of mind has led to numerous attempts to explain away their existence, and this in turn has led to attempts to explain the phenomenon of imagining without reference to such ontologically (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  40.  1
    Comment on Richard Schantz, "The Given Regained".John Mcdowell - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):181-184.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Varieties of Vagueness.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):145-157.
    According to one account, vagueness is "metaphysical." The friend of metaphysical vagueness believes that, for some object and some property, there can be no determinate fact of the matter whether that object exemplifies that property. A second account maintains that vagueness is due only to ignorance. According to the epistemic account, vagueness is explained completely by and is nothing over and above our not knowing some relevant fact or facts. These are the minority views. The dominant position maintains that there (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Dispositions.Stephen Mumford - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):246-248.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. Beyond Evolution: Human Nature and the Limits of Evolutionary Explanation.Anthony O'hear - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):235-238.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. The Paradox of Perspectivism.Bernard Reginster - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):217-233.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. The Given Regained. Reflections on the Sensuous Content of Experience.Richard Schantz - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):167-180.
    The major part of our beliefs and our knowledge of the world is based on, or grounded in, sensory experience. But, how is it that we can have perceptual beliefs that things are thus and so, and, moreover, be justified in having them? What conditions must experience satisfy to rationally warrant, and not merely to cause, our beliefs? Against the currently very popular contention that experience itself already has to be propositionally and conceptually structured, I will rehabilitate the claim that (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Understanding Alien Morals.Gopal Sreenivasan - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):1-32.
    Anthropologists often claim to have understood an ethical outlook that they nevertheless believe is largely false. Some moral philosophers-e.g., Susan Hurley-argue that this claim is incoherent because understanding an ethical outlook necessarily involves believing it to be largely true. To reach this conclusion, they apply an argument of Donald Davidson's to the ethical case. My central aim is to defend the coherence of the anthropologists' claim against this argument. To begin with, I specify a candidate-language that contains a significant number (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
 Previous issues
  
Next issues