Since the work of John Cook Wilson (1926) several analyses have been proposed for the distinction between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ properties (cf. Ayer, 1952; Gale, 1970; Hirsch, 1989). These analyses have relied on the ‘specification’, the ‘incompatibility’, or the ‘strength’ of properties. Some have proposed, for example, that negative properties are those that do not specify other negative properties, or those that are not incompatible with other negative properties, or those that have ‘less strength’ that their complementary properties. Many difficulties (...) affect these analyses. Most of them rely on the concept of the ‘quality’ of a property, i. e., the fact that a property is either positive or negative. Many think that relying on this concept could be circular. Other analyses work under the supposition that there are structures of subordination, like genera-species or determinables-determinates, that seem to presuppose positive properties. David Hommen has proposed another analysis (2018) in terms of ‘minimal’ or ‘maximal’ properties. According to Hommen, a property is negative if and only if it has simple minimals in structures under certain conditions. This work discusses and criticizes Hommen’s proposal. It appears that it requires several qualifications. Even under them, nevertheless, it has fatal problems. (shrink)

The idea of pure perception —perception without any cognitive influence— is central to the science and philosophy of perception. For many, to be in a pure perceptual state is to be in a state whose content is nonconceptual, whose format is iconic, and whose phenomenology is unique. This paper explores this possibility and finds that the idea of pure perception, at least when defined in these terms, is untenable. Besides significant specific worries derived from the properties characterizing these states, I (...) have not found empirical grounds indicating the possibility of individuating these states: neither looking inside oneself (introspection), nor looking inside others (psychology), nor looking inside the brain (neuroanatomy), suggests the existence of pure perceptual mental states. (shrink)

This article puts forward two hypotheses about David Hume’s position on the epistemic status of consciousness. Firstly, it is argued that Hume does not offer any explicit argument in favor of the thesis that the mind cannot be mistaken about a mental state of which it is conscious, and some possible interpretations that could offer this argument are questioned. Secondly, it is argued that Hume is committed to the thesis that the mind is conscious of all its mental phenomena as (...) they occur, and the passages in which the philosopher seems to refer to non-conscious mental operations — which would contradict that thesis — are explained on the basis of a theory of degrees of consciousness according to the vividness of perceptions. (shrink)

La sentencia T-237/23 de la Corte Constitucional de Colombia responde a una acción de tutela realizada por un grupo de veintiséis personas mayores de 60 años, en situación de discapacidad y/o con enfermedad crónica contra el Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social colombiano. Allí se identifica la carencia de recomendaciones en triaje de carácter vinculante por parte del organismo, lo que habilitó, entre otros hechos, la elaboración y el uso de una serie de criterios de triaje sospechosos en relación con (...) los derechos de algunas poblaciones. Esta nota crítica pretende vincular los criterios de triaje cuestionados con la llamada “perspectiva estándar de la discapacidad” para mostrar los problemas éticos y epistémicos de establecer criterios de priorización o desempate en asignación de recursos de salud escasos a partir de puntuaciones relacionadas con la calidad de vida o la “independencia funcional” de una persona. Para ello me enfocaré en las recomendaciones éticas elaboradas por el Grupo Intensivistas Antioquia y la Alcaldía de Medellín que han sido cuestionadas por la acción de tutela y en el tercer apartado de la sentencia T-237/23. (shrink)

Faced with the impossibility of reaching any reductive analysis of the concept of lying, Tobies Grimaltos and Sergi Rosell have proposed a conception thereof that is based on its paradigmatic conditions. Among those conditions, the one of deceiving the listener is prominent. The relationship between lying and deceiving would be crucial in order to understand the paradigmatic cases of the concept, even if merely contingent — a thesis with important implications for its moral assessment. I present their proposal here and (...) advance three objections to it. First: that any theory of lying should be built on a theory of assertion, which already delimits what is properly said in parasitic uses of language (such as metaphor or irony). Second: that we should distinguish the uses of lying from its constituent aspects, among which the intention to lie, not the one to deceive, stands out. And third: that a paradigmatic model of lying should assume an epistemic condition, and not merely a doxastic one, according to which lying is, paradigmatically, saying something that one knows to be false. (shrink)

Intelligibility relates to a person’s agency in guiding their behavior to be logical and reasonable, and it makes sense during action. However, it does not always happen. Sometimes, intelligibility fails, and the subject’s actions become distanced from what had previously made sense to them or others. At that moment, what I have called misunderstandings within the agency appear. When the emotional process interferes with the action process, it is one of the causes of misunderstandings within the agency. Then, emotions interfere (...) with the action and produce a cognitive dissociation that makes it difficult for the agents to interpret what is happening in the scene. It breaks between intelligibility and meaning. This also creates problems of understanding and communication. This is why the analysis of the misunderstandings within the agency is of such great importance. (shrink)

In population ethics, some appeal to certain lexical and critical level total views to avoid the repugnant conclusion. Since the very repugnant conclusion is a weaker adequacy condition, we may think that these views will also allow us to avoid this conclusion. In this paper I argue that this is not the case. First, I show that the idea that some popular lexical total views could allow us to avoid the very repugnant conclusion is mistaken. Then I demonstrate that the (...) same is true of critical range total views. Finally, I clarify which views allow us to avoid this conclusion. (shrink)

La presente nota crítica del libro de Juan Comesaña Being Rational and Being Right se divide en tres secciones. La sección I describe las caracteristicas fundamentales del “Experiencialismo”, que es la teoría de la racionalidad básica desarrollada y defendida a lo largo del libro; la sección II indica brevemente el contenido de los capítulos; y la sección III articula y discute una cuestión problemática acerca de cómo el Experiencialismo interactúa con el debate liberalismo/conservadurismo en la teoría de la justificación.

In this paper, we argue that the systems Basic Logic of Evidence (BLE) and Logic of Evidence and Truth (LETJ) suffer a kind of semantic incompleteness with respect to the informal notion of evidence. More especifically, we argue that the connective o of the logic LETJ fails to validate intuitive principles about conclusive evidence.

Review of Alberto Moretti, En sayos analíticos, SADAF, Buenos Aires 2020.

Faria (2021) presenta una extraordinaria discusión sobre temas que rara vez suelen entrelazarse en la tradición analítica: el cambio en el contenido mental, su relevancia para la validez inferencial y las consecuencias que esto tiene para la responsabilidad (tanto en la acción como en el pensamiento). La meta de Faria (2021) es defender que la impermanencia del contenido, la vulnerabilidad de nuestras inferencias, el azar y la falta de control en nuestros pensamientos y acciones forman parte ineludible de nuestra forma (...) de vida. En este trabajo argumentaré que dichos argumentos son exitosos, aunque pondré en duda las consecuencias específicas que Faria (2021) obtiene de estos, argumentando que si bien hay impermanencia, vulnerabilidad y azar, no son tan radicales como para afectar nuestra concepción intuitiva de contenidos, creencia y racionalidad. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo analizaremos la teoría de la sistematicidad propuesta por Paul Hoyningen-Huene desde una perspectiva crítica, anclada en el coherentismo, especialmente en la versión de Mario Bunge. La idea central es presentar algunos límites que posee la propuesta de Hoyningen-Huene para dar cuenta de la dinámica del progreso científico y también observar algunas dificultades en su instrumental analítico para demostrar la pseudocientificidad de algunas disciplinas de conocimiento. Se pretende también señalar algunas ideas complementarias que podrían utilizarse a fin (...) de superar tales límites. (shrink)

El presente trabajo identifica en la obra de Wilfrid Sellars dos tesis relevantes para el debate contemporáneo en ontología social. La primera dice que podemos entender la realidad social como estando compuesta parcialmente por estructuras causales o coercitivas. La segunda, que la realidad social se le presenta a los agentes como estando constituida por estructuras coercitivas. El trabajo defiende estas tesis interpretativas recurriendo a los escritos de filosofía práctica de Sellars, y especialmente a su explicación del funcionamiento de los imperativos (...) hipotéticos y categóricos. A su vez, contrasta esta interpretación de corte causal con las concepciones —de índole normativa— predominantes tanto en la ontología social contemporánea como entre los seguidores de Sellars. (shrink)

En su más reciente libro, Cuestiones de Filosofía del Lenguaje: Pragmática, David Pérez Chico (2022) nos presenta una muy interesante selección de artículos sobre diferentes temáticas actualmente trabajadas en filosofía del lenguaje. Personalmente, considero que este libro es una lectura imprescindible para cualquier lector de habla hispana que quiera introducirse en las temáticas más contemporáneamente discutidas en esa disciplina. En este marco, en el presente artículo me propongo realizar un análisis crítico de cuatro de los artículos de la compilación que (...) trabajan la temática de las emisiones evaluativas, i.e., emisiones cuya extensión depende de parámetros contextuales semánticamente no estándares. (shrink)

El artículo pretende evaluar la crítica de Robert Talisse a la noción de democracia de John Dewey según la cual dicha noción sería incompatible con el pluralismo razonable de corte rawlsiano y devendría opresiva pues se funda en el ideal moral del crecimiento. Para ello, se reconstruye la “objeción pluralista” de Talisse. Posteriormente, se consideran los argumentos centrales con que Dewey sostiene su perspectiva, a saber: el argumento experimentalista y el argumento formativo. En este marco, se sostiene que la idea (...) de democracia como cooperación social y la idea de crecimiento como fin moral, comprendidas en términos deweyanos, dan lugar al pluralismo por derecho propio. (shrink)

En el contexto de ofrecer lógicas alternativas que lidien no trivialmente con paradojas semánticas y superen a la vez la objeción de incoherencia que se alza habitualmente contra ellas, el BA-Plan propone una definición de lógica en el sentido de secuencia infinita de nociones de consecuencia que especifica estándares de validez para el nivel inferencial y para los metainferenciales. El presente trabajo argumenta que si se admite la conveniencia de esta definición de lógica es posible desacoplar la noción de coherencia (...) entre estándares de validez de la noción de uniformidad entre estándares de validez. (shrink)

Considero la propuesta reciente de Vicente, Fraser y Castroviejo según la cual hay (al menos) dos tipos distintos de lenguaje peyorativo en español, uno de los cuales (el que apela a términos neutros usados como insultos) no ha sido, según los autores, suficientemente apreciado y estudiado. Si bien concuerdo con la importancia de la distinción, sugiero una explicación alternativa a la que ellos dan del fenómeno de los términos neutros usados como insultos, que sugiere entenderlos como un caso particular de (...) uso metafórico, y del contenido peyorativo genérico transmitido, que apela a fenómenos generales de la interpretación de metáforas y de la acomodación de presuposiciones. (shrink)

An argument is presented against the claim by Eduardo Barrio and Federico Pailos according to which “to characterize a logic, not only the inferential level, but also every metainferential level is necessary”.

It is often assumed that analytic philosophy cannot be treated in a Kuhnian way, since what characterizes philosophical practice is not a disciplinary matrix with paradigmatic exemplars of theoretical and empirical problem solving. We propose to challenge this assumption by arguing that at least in some areas of analytic philosophy one can find disciplinary matrices in the Kuhnian sense and, above all, exemplary cases that give rise to a metatheoretical problem-solving program. In particular, we will focus on meta-theoretical structuralism and (...) its notion of T theoricity. We will show that the work of historical-philosophical analysis carried out by Lorenzano (2008) is a paradigmatic example that has been replicated by several subsequent works, extending the range of application of the disciplinary matrix. (shrink)

In this paper, I critically review Buacar’s and Moretti’s positions on the justification and normativity of logic. I argue that they rely on a transcendentalist move to account for the normativity of logic and that this has undesirable consequences, in particular for Buacar’s position. I propose a revised notion of normativity in order to lay the groundwork for an alternative proposal that takes up the general outlines of Buacar’s analysis while emphasizing the naturalistic component of her ideas.

Klimovsky (1984) and (1982) presents a dilemma against any semantics of natural language while offering an objection against the syntactist view of it. As a reply, Moretti (2011) offers a “minimally” syntactist solution to Klimovsky’s objections. In this paper I have two goals. First, I want to rescue Klimovsky’s general dilemma and his objections against syntactism. Second, I argue that Moretti’s way out of the dilemma does not fully succeed. The paper concludes by arguing that the dilemma is still standing (...) and should concern our best available semantic theories. (shrink)

In his article “La verdad y el éxito de la ciencia: A propósito de un artículo de P. Kyle Stanford” (2002), Manuel Comesaña addresses fundamental questions about the nature and success of science, taking P. Kyle Stanford’s article as a reference for his critical analysis. Although the central focus of both works is not specifically on the Copernican Revolution, it is relevant to analyse how both authors use this historical example from astronomy to illustrate their metaphysical commitments. Rigorous analysis of (...) this historiographical episode will provide better foundations for the broader discussion of the realism-anti-realism debate. It is for this reason that we will undertake a critical study and subsequent correction of the way in which both authors set up their accounts to exemplify their positions. What we have come to contribute with our commentary is not a position that attempts to account for the success of the anti-realist proposals that the authors are interested in debating, but rather we intend to shed light on the treatment given to the historical case in order to clarify certain obscure points in the debate. (shrink)

En celebración de sus 50 años de vida, las socias y socios de SADAF participaron de dos instancias de encuentro. Una, que ya es tradición institucional, tuvo como objetivo favorecer el diálogo y la discusión de trabajos de investigación en curso entre profesionales de diferentes campos de la filosofía. La otra, que presentamos en este volumen, es en alguna medida novedosa para SADAF y pretendió promover tanto una revisión crítica como un diálogo intergeneracional, si se quiere, a través de la (...) relectura de artículos publicados en Análisis Filosófico desde su primer número. La fecha de programación de ambas instancias de encuentro era muy significativa por el “peso cultural del sistema decimal” (como solía decir con humor Gregorio Klimovsky): se cumplía medio siglo desde la fundación de SADAF en 1972. La ocasión ameritaba revisitar la “tradición” institucional y al propio tiempo enfocar en conjunto su presente y futuro. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to compare Carlos Nino’s (1992) stance on the right to a healthy environment as a collective right to M. Florencia Saulino’s (2015) interpretation. Saulino considers that, in view of the current environmental situation, Nino’s opinion about this crucial issue disrupts a legal system conceived for the protection of private goods. Nino’s notion of the environment as a collective good was included two years later when the Argentine Constitution was reformed in 1994, in Article 41. (...) It binds State authorities to protect the environment, make a rational use of the natural environment and biological diversity, provide information and environmental education. After that date, several laws and projects aimed to favour care for the environment, environmental education, the protection of forests and the rights of indigenous peoples. Added to that, the Escazú Agreement (2018), endorsed by Argentina, establishes the right of participation and access to information. This paper upholds Nino’s stance, underscoring its persistence in the current legal system. It also highlights the substantial character of social license and the government’s duty to provide the citizenry with information about decisions that may compromise common goods, and heed questions and objections. (shrink)

The Adoption Problem (AP) was a postponed issue for some years (Kripke, 2024; Padró, 2015; Birman, 2024). This problem highlights certain difficulties surrounding the adoption of rules of inference: If anti-exceptionalism is wrong, is it possible to adopt an alternative logic? What is the point of the revision of logic in epistemology? During 2022 Kripke, Padró and Barrio held seminars on AP. The latter two edited the first thematic section on this subject in the journal Análisis Filosófico. It contains “What (...) the Adoption Problem Does Not Show” by Camilo Fiore, subject of this critical note, in which Fiore holds two theses: 1) AP is compatible with the thesis that logica utens is revisable; 2) to assess whether an agent can revise their logic, it is best to consider a different definition of adoption, e.g. weak adoption, according to which Universal Instantiation and Modus Ponens are sometimes adoptable. It then states that (1) and (2) are independent. In this article I will criticize the independence between (1) and (2). To this end, I will point out that thesis (1) and (2) are supported by the examples of Carrie and Barry, respectively, and that the type of logical revision involved in both is the same and local. Therefore, (1) and (2) are not independent. Next, I argue that it is impossible to satisfy another kind of logical revision, e.g. global revision. Therefore, the interdependence between (1) and (2) is not due to the examples proposed. (shrink)

La celebración del quincuagésimo aniversario de la Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico se dio en el marco, como es usual en estos casos especiales, de la realización de una edición extraordinaria del tradicional Coloquio Anual de la institución. Para tales fines, la Comisión Directiva conformó un Comité Organizador, del cual tuve el honor de formar parte junto con Leandro Giri, Nicolás Lo Guercio, Andrea Melamed, Danila Suárez Tomé, Damián Szmuc y Paula Teijeiro. Desde el inicio pensamos que el coloquio debía (...) tener un cariz diferente, que fuera la ocasión para que la Sociedad hiciera una revisión de su historia y proyectara su continuidad. En función de tales objetivos se decidió que el Coloquio estuviera conformado por tres instancias. La primera sería una serie de paneles en los que representantes de los diversos grupos de investigación activos de la sociedad dieran cuenta de su visión acerca del pasado, el presente y el futuro en SADAF del área de la filosofía en la que se han especializado. La segunda instancia se desplegaría a través de diversas mesas redondas donde se reflexionaría sobre la historia de diversos aspectos institucionales de la sociedad. Por último, habría una convocatoria abierta que tenía una particularidad: los trabajos a presentar debían ser comentarios críticos de artículos originalmente publicados en la revista de la institución: Análisis Filosófico. De esta manera se pretendía generar las condiciones para una autorreflexión colectiva del significado de SADAF en sus 50 años de existencia como punto de partida para pensar los desafíos filosóficos, metafilosóficos e institucionales por venir. (shrink)

The goal of this note is to analyze the ideas presented by Alberto Moretti (1984) in his article “Gentzen y la naturalidad de la deducción” regarding the importance of sequent calculi. My goal is to argue that the difference between these systems and those of natural deduction lies fundamentally in the way in which structural rules can be implicit in them, and that, unlike what Moretti proposes, natural deduction calculi are particularly appropriate for characterizing the notion of consequence.

Ante la imposibilidad de alcanzar un análisis reductivo del concepto de mentira, Tobies Grimaltos y Sergi Rosell han propuesto una concepción basada en sus condiciones paradigmáticas, entre las que destaca la de engañar al oyente. La relación entre la mentira y el engaño sería, si bien fundamental para entender los casos prototípicos del concepto, meramente contingente —una tesis que tiene importantes implicaciones para su valoración moral—. Presento aquí su propuesta y avanzo tres objeciones a la misma: primero, que la teoría (...) de la mentira debería de construirse sobre una teoría de la aserción, que ya de por sí delimita lo propiamente dicho en los usos parasitarios del lenguaje (como la metáfora o la ironía). Segundo, que es preciso distinguir los usos de la mentira de sus aspectos constitutivos, entre los cuales destaca la intención de mentir, y no la de engañar. Y tercero, que un modelo paradigmático de la mentira debería de asumir una condición epistémica, y no meramente doxástica, según la cual mentir es, paradigmáticamente, decir algo que uno sabe falso. (shrink)

Algumas abordagens antirrepresentacionalistas da cognição têm se tornado cada vez mais populares, e muitos de seus defensores as veem como promissoras de um novo paradigma para a ciência cognitiva. Neste manuscrito, concentro-me em duas dessas abordagens para argumentar que elas não contêm uma explicação adequada das ilusões perceptuais - e que talvez não possam fornecê-la. Minha alegação é que, sem um tratamento adequado de um fenômeno perceptual tão comum, elas dificilmente podem ser vistas como parte de um novo paradigma. Começo (...) descrevendo o contexto em que essas abordagens surgiram e se desenvolveram e, na segunda parte, apresento três tratamentos de ilusões perceptuais provenientes das abordagens em questão. A terceira parte faz um desvio sobre a noção de ilusão perceptual, já que a avaliação dessas explicações das ilusões parece exigir isso. Em seguida, a quarta parte é dedicada à avaliação dessas explicações das ilusões, discutindo a introdução da linguagem normativa, o apelo a noções como propriedade “dependente da situação” e se uma definição proposta de ilusão se ajusta à nossa compreensão atual delas, bem como a rejeição de inferências de comportamento inadequado que parecem abdutivamente legítimas. Argumento que esses relatos de ilusões perceptuais não atingem seu objetivo. Traduzido com a versão gratuita do tradutor - DeepL.com. (shrink)

Robert Brandom’s theory of discursive practice regards all linguistic activity as taking place within a social normative framework. The normative structure of this framework is described by means of an ideal model of linguistic game: the game of giving and asking for reasons. The main elements of this model account for the fundamental relations that characterise linguistic practice: responsibility and authority. Although the semantic development of the theory is inferentialist and hence deflationist about truth, it is useful to use this (...) concept to distinguish an elementary precondition for discursive practice. On the basis of this conceptual expedient, it is possible to analyse the transformation of such practice induced by the emergence of social networking services with particular rules and the speech production through the use of artificial intelligence in the context of those media. Thus, the aim of this paper is to outline the general features of the transformation in the normative vocabulary of Brandom’s communication model in order to achieve a better understanding of the phenomenon and to suggest possible consequences for discursive practice. (shrink)

This article offers a critical evaluation of Revelationism, primarily defended by Philip Goff, which asserts that introspection fully reveals the essential nature of phenomenal properties and guarantees exceptional justification of introspective judgments and beliefs. From a different viewpoint, the discussion hinges around two main axes: First, based on the conceptual and propositional nature of revelation, the aim is to refute the allegedly infallibility of Revelationism, highlighting instead its vulnerability to error, confusion, and disagreement. Second, it is argued that Revelation is (...) insufficient to access the totality of the essential facts of phenomenal properties, focusing on aspects related to grounding, the qualitative and quantitative relationships between properties and causal dispositions. Based on these critiques, it is concluded that Revelationism does not provide a solid and plausible support for anti-physicalism. (shrink)