Una concepción del enojo difundida tanto en el ámbito académico como fuera de él propone interpretarlo (junto a otras emociones) como una respuesta adaptativa frente a ciertos problemas recurrentes en nuestro pasado evolutivo, lo cual implica interpretar al enojo como una emoción discreta, básica, innata y adaptativa. Ante la crisis que atraviesa la tesis de las Emociones Básicas, y teniendo en cuenta una serie importante de objeciones que han sido formuladas a la idea de que el enojo represente una emoción (...) discreta, sugeriré que el abandono definitivo del concepto de enojo (y sus parientes más próximos, la ira y la indignación) posee ventajas hermenéuticas importantes, entre las cuales se cuenta la posibilidad de abordar el problema de la filogénesis de nuestro sentido de justicia desde una perspectiva que evite los extremos rupturistas y continuistas que se apoyan en una concepción discreta de las emociones. -/- A widespread conception of anger both within and outside academia proposes to interpret it (along with other emotions) as an adaptive response to certain recurrent problems in our evolutionary past, which implies interpreting anger as a discrete, basic, innate and adaptive emotion. In view of the crisis that the Basic Emotions thesis is going through, and taking into account a number of important objections that have been raised to the idea that anger represents a discrete emotion, I will suggest that the definitive abandonment of the concept of anger (and its close relatives, rage and indignation) has important hermeneutical advantages, including the possibility of approaching the problem of the phylogenesis of our sense of justice from a perspective that avoids the rupturist and continuist extremes that rely on a discrete conception of the emotions. (shrink)

The term ideology is usually used in three different senses, each of which alludes to a different concept: ideology in the sense originally proposed by Marx and Engels; ideology as a political thought, which ended up being the most frequently used notion; and ideology as a bias that affects the positions that can be adopted in the field of theory. This last notion will be analyzed here; trying to show its difference, but also its relationships, with the other two notions. (...) An attempt will also be made to establish a difference between the notions of _ideological bias_ and of _political position in theory_. (shrink)

El presente escrito, Wollen und Lassen [Querer1 y dejar], nace fruto de una disertación presentada en el invierno de 2017/18 en la Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg y, por otro lado, forma parte de la serie Beiträge zur Schelling-Forschung [Contribuciones a la investi- gación sobre Schelling]. Se trata de un estudio sobre el concepto de voluntad [Wille] en la filosofía de F. W. J. Schelling y aquí radica, entre otras cosas, su importancia, pues amplía la perspectiva al lector, acostumbrado a referir dicha noción (...) a Schopenhauer o Nietzsche. La obra está compuesta por una introducción y cuatro partes: la primera, se dedica al análisis del primer Schelling y se discute la cuestión de la voluntad en una tensión que se configura entre Kant, Fichte, por citar unos nombres; la segunda, se concentra en una diversificación de la voluntad, (en plural) en los años 1809-1826, que se configura como una crítica y ampliación del concepto mismo por parte de Schelling; la tercera, estudia el lugar que ocupa la voluntad en los periodos de Berlín y Múnich (1827-1842); la cuarta y última, también la más extensa, examina la interpretación heideggeriana de Schelling en el contexto de una primera recepción positiva y posterior crítica a la luz de la metafísica... (shrink)

This paper analyses Etienne Balibar’s thesis of an “ontology of relation”, considering two moments of his theoretical production: his reading of Marx’s 6th thesis on Feuerbach as the grounds for a relational ontology or a thought on transindividuality; and an analysis of the development of this thesis in terms of what Balibar calls “anthropological differences”. Following Balibar, in this paper I suggest that the basic theoretical elements of a thought on transindividuality can be found in both Althusser and Balibar’s contributions (...) to _Lire Le Capital _(1965), which opens the possibility of conceiving a “Marxist principle of individuation”. I conclude by discussing the limits and the effects of Balibar’s proposal. (shrink)

Naturalism is the philosophical thesis that holds the following assumptions: the rejection of the supernatural and the transcendent; the acceptance of science as knowledge of high epistemic value, for some philosophers it is the only valid knowledge, and the rejection of all first or _a priori_ philosophy. The problem addressed is that_ prima facie_ it seems problematic to explain the theses of naturalism without violating some of its assumptions. This paper will show that, starting from liberal naturalism and the notions (...) of niche construction, as well as some theses of the articulation of thought through language, it is possible to define naturalism without defending premises that violate its methodology. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, to investigate and evaluate the current state of the experimental philosophy of language. For this purpose, I will present the two principal methodologies in the field: questionnaires and corpus methods, indicating the common and specific problems. Second, to argue that corpus methods represent a new methodological horizon for research in experimental philosophy of language for two reasons. On the one hand, because they have fewer problems than questionnaires. On the other hand, they (...) have certain additional advantages: i) they consider a greater amount of evidence; ii) in employing them, we have the possibility of having additional information that can illuminate other aspects of the research; iii) the count with greater replicability. (shrink)

The motif of literature abandoned by Foucault in the 70s can find new possibilities and resurface transformed from an ethical perspective that continues focusing on the language. Language and subject are not two vertebral topics in Foucault’s reflection, but a single framework in which literature, disappearance of the subject and ethics are linking different paths of the same journey. Western man largely questioned in Foucault’s works appears together with other subjectivities that challenge him and make us think about the limits (...) and possibilities of the subject. In this sense, we propose literature as a practice of subjectivation in which language frees from imposed limits, literature as an ethical practice. (shrink)