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  1.  25
    Metaphysical Vagueness Without Vague Objects.Ali Abasnezhad & C. S. I. Jenkins - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):278-283.
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  2.  15
    Solving a Mereological Puzzle.Claudio Calosi - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):271-277.
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  3.  13
    The Feeling of Sincerity: Inner Speech and the Phenomenology of Assertion.Daniel Gregory - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):225-236.
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  4.  5
    Conjunction Conditionalization and Irrelevant Semifactuals.Lars B. Gundersen & Eline Busck Gundersen - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):284-295.
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  5.  87
    Agency, Experience, and Future Bias.Antti Kauppinen - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):237-245.
    Most of us are hedonically future-biased: other things being equal, we prefer pains to be in the past and pleasures to be in the future. Recently, various authors have argued that future bias is irrational, and that we should be temporally neutral instead. I argue that instead of temporal neutrality, the putative counterexamples and the rationales offered for them only motivate a more narrow principle I call Only Action Fixes Utility: it is only when you act on the basis of (...)
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  6.  15
    Subjective Unpossessed Reasons.Artūrs Logins - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):262-270.
  7.  21
    Why Imagining Requires Content: A Reply to a Reply to an Objection to Radical Enactive Cognition.Luke Roelofs - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):246-254.
    ‘Radical enactivism’ (Hutto and Myin 2013, 2017) eschews representational content for all ‘basic’ mental activities. Critics have argued that this view cannot make sense of the workings of the imagination. In their recent book (2017), Hutto and Myin respond to these critics, arguing that some imaginings can be understood without attributing them any representational content. Their response relies on the claim that a system can exploit a structural isomorphism between two things without either of those things being a semantically evaluable (...)
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  8.  31
    The Hierarchy of Fregean Senses.Ori Simchen - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):255-261.
    The question whether Frege’s theory of indirect reference enforces an infinite hierarchy of senses has been hotly debated in the secondary literature. Perhaps the most influential treatment of the issue is that of Burge (1979), who offers an argument for the hierarchy from rather minimal Fregean assumptions. I argue that this argument, endorsed by many, does not itself enforce an infinite hierarchy of senses. I conclude that whether or not the theory of indirect reference can avail itself of only finitely (...)
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  9.  12
    Do Judgements About Risk Track Modal Ordering?Adam Michael Bricker - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (3):200-208.
    On the standard conception of risk, the degree to which an event is risky is the function of the probability of that event. Recently, Duncan Pritchard has challenged this view, proposing instead a modal account on which risk is conceived of in terms of modal ordering (2015). On this account, the degree of risk for any given event is a function of its modal distance from the actual world, not its likelihood. Pritchard's main motivation for this is that the probabilistic (...)
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  10.  4
    Infinitary Contraction‐Free Revenge.Andreas Fjellstad - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (3):179-189.
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  11.  55
    Tuples All the Way Down?Simon Thomas Hewitt - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (3):161-169.
  12.  40
    Fine's Trilemma and the Reality of Tensed Facts.Roberto Loss - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (3):209-217.
    Fine (2005, 2006) has presented a ‘trilemma’ concerning the tense-realist idea that reality is constituted by tensed facts. According to Fine, there are only three ways out of the trilemma, consisting in what he takes to be the three main families of tense-realism: ‘presentism’, ‘(external) relativism’, and ‘fragmentalism’. Importantly, although Fine characterises tense-realism as the thesis that reality is constituted (at least in part) by tensed facts, he explicitly claims that tense realists are not committed to their fundamental existence. Recently, (...)
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  13.  23
    Multilocation and Parsimony.Justin Mooney - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (3):153-160.
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  14.  9
    Paradoxes and Restricted Quantification: A Non‐Hierarchical Approach.Dustin Tucker - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (3):190-199.
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  15.  11
    The Colonized and the Wrong of Colonialism.Han van Wietmarschen - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (3):170-178.
    In “What’s Wrong with Colonialism,” Lea Ypi argues that the distinctive wrong of colonialism should be understood as the failure of the colonial relationship to extend equal and reciprocal terms of political association to the colonized. Laura Valentini argues that Ypi’s account fails. Her argument targets an ambiguity in Ypi’s account of the relata of the colonial relationship. Either Ypi’s view is that the members of the colonized group are, as individuals, denied an equal and reciprocal political relationship to the (...)
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  16.  14
    A Dilemma for ‘Selection‐for‐Action’.Denis Buehler - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):139-149.
  17.  22
    Hardcore Actualism and Possible Non‐Existence.Samuel Kimpton‐Nye - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):122-131.
    According to hardcore actualism (HA), all modal truths are grounded in the concrete constituents of the actual world. In this paper, I discuss some problems faced by HA when it comes to accounting for certain alleged possibilities of non‐existence. I focus particular attention on Leech (2017)'s dilemma for HA, according to which HA must either sacrifice extensional correctness or admit mere possibilia. I propose a solution to Leech's dilemma, which relies on a distinction between weak and strong possibility. It remains (...)
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  18.  64
    On a Purported Proof That the Mind Is Not a Machine.Peter Koellner - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):91-96.
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  19.  55
    In Defense of the Disunity of Grounding.Jon Erling Litland - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):97-108.
    Fine (2012) is a pluralist about grounding. He holds that there are three fundamentally distinct notions of grounding: metaphysical, normative, and natural. Berker (2017) argues for monism on the grounds that the pluralist cannot account for certain principles describing how the distinct notions of grounding interact. This paper defends pluralism. By building on work by Fine (2010) and Litland (2015) I show how the pluralist can systematically account for Berker's interaction principles.
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  20.  13
    Proving That the Mind Is Not a Machine?Johannes Stern - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):81-90.
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  21.  8
    Currying Omnipotence: A Reply to Beall and Cotnoir.Andrew Tedder & Guillermo Badia - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):119-121.
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  22. A Simple Escape From Moral Twin Earth.Pekka Väyrynen - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):109-118.
    This paper offers a simple response to the Moral Twin Earth (MTE) objection to Naturalist Moral Realism (NMR). NMR typically relies on an externalist metasemantics such as a causal theory of reference. The MTE objection is that such a theory predicts that terms like ‘good’ and ‘right’ have a different reference in certain twin communities where it’s intuitively clear that the twins are talking about the same thing when using ‘good’. I argue that Boyd’s causal regulation theory, the original target (...)
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  23.  10
    Emerging Determinacy.Benjamin Eva - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):31-39.
    In recent years, a number of authors have defended the coherence and philosophical utility of the notion of metaphysical indeterminacy. Concurrently, the idea that reality can be stratified into more or less fundamental ‘levels’ has gained significant traction in the literature. Here, I examine the relationship between these two notions. Specifically, I consider the question of what metaphysical determinacy at one level of reality tells us about the possibility of metaphysical determinacy at other more or less fundamental levels. Towards this (...)
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  24.  5
    Contrastivism and Negative Reason Existentials.Eric Gilbertson - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):69-78.
    Snedegar offers a contrastivist solution to the puzzle about negative reason existentials, which he argues is preferable to Schroeder's own pragmatic solution. The proposed solution however raises a difficulty for contrastivism, as it suggests an alternative according to which the relevant contrast classes are determined not by the semantics of reason ascriptions but rather by pragmatic effects of contrastive stress. Nevertheless, I suggest there is a contrastivist-friendly solution to the puzzle. In what follows, I explain the problem for Snedegar's account, (...)
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  25.  70
    The Cut‐Free Approach and the Admissibility‐Curry.Ulf Hlobil - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):40-48.
    The perhaps most important criticism of the nontransitive approach to semantic paradoxes is that it cannot truthfully express exactly which metarules preserve validity. I argue that this criticism overlooks that the admissibility of metarules cannot be expressed in any logic that allows us to formulate validity-Curry sentences and that is formulated in a classical metalanguage. Hence, the criticism applies to all approaches that do their metatheory in classical logic. If we do the metatheory of nontransitive logics in a nontransitive logic, (...)
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  26.  57
    The Role of Judgment in Doxastic Agency.David Jenkins - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):12-19.
    We take it that we can exercise doxastic agency by reasoning and by making judgments. We take it, that is, that we can actively make up our minds by reasoning and judging. On what I call the ‘Standard View’ this is so because judgment can yield belief. It is typical to take it that judgments yield beliefs by causing them. But on the resultant understanding of the Standard View, I argue, it is unclear how judgment could play its role in (...)
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  27.  81
    Against Existential Grounding.Damian Melamedoff - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):3-11.
    Existential grounding is the thesis that all existential generalizations are grounded in their particular instances. This paper argues that existential grounding is false. This is because it is inconsistent with two plausible claims about existence: the claim that singular existence facts are generalizations and the claim that no object can be involved in a fact that grounds that same object's existence. Not only are these claims intuitively plausible, but there are also strong arguments in favour of each of them.
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  28.  7
    Seeing the Forest and the Trees: A Response to the Identity Crowding Debate.Adrienne Prettyman - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):20-30.
    In cases of identity crowding, a subject consciously sees items in a figure, even though they are presented too closely together for her to shift attention to each item. Block uses such cases to challenge the view that attention is necessary for consciousness. I argue that in identity crowding cases, subjects really do attend to the items. Specifically, they attend to the figure as a global object that contains the individual items as parts. To support this view, I provide evidence (...)
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  29.  12
    The Logic of the Knowledge Norm of Assertion.Julian J. Schlöder - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):49-57.
    The knowledge norm of assertion is the subject of a lively debate on when someone is in a position to assert something. However, not much has been said about the logic that underlies such debate. In this paper, I propose a formalisation of the knowledge norm in a deontic logic that aims to be explanatory and conceptually sound. Afterwards, I investigate some problems that this formalisation makes visible. This reveals some significant limitations of the underlying logic: it can neither contain (...)
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  30. Intertranslatability, Theoretical Equivalence, and Perversion.Jack Woods - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):58-68.
    I investigate syntactic notions of theoretical equivalence between logical theories and a recent objection thereto. I show that this recent criticism of syntactic accounts, as extensionally inadequate, is unwarranted by developing an account which is plausibly extensionally adequate and more philosophically motivated. This is important for recent anti-exceptionalist treatments of logic since syntactic accounts require less theoretical baggage than semantic accounts.
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  31.  11
    Out of Nothing.Daniele Sgaravatti & Giuseppe Spolaore - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy (2):132-138.
    Graham Priest proposed an argument for the conclusion that ‘nothing’ occurs as a singular term and not as a quantifier in a sentence like (1) ‘The cosmos came into existence out of nothing’. Priest's point is that, intuitively, (1) entails (C) ‘The cosmos came into existence at some time’, but this entailment relation is left unexplained if ‘nothing’ is treated as a quantifier. If Priest is right, the paradoxical notion of an object that is nothing plays a role in our (...)
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  32. Avoid Certain Frustration—Or Maybe Not?Neven Sesardić - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy.
    In the situation known as the “cable guy paradox” the expected utility principle and the “avoid certain frustration” principle (ACF) seem to give contradictory advice about what one should do. This article tries to resolve the paradox by presenting an example that weakens the grip of ACF: a modified version of the cable guy problem is introduced in which the choice dictated by ACF loses much of its intuitive appeal.
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