Year:

  1.  10
    Shoemaker on Sentiments and Quality of Will.Christopher Bennett - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (4):573-584.
    In this comment, I raise a number of concerns about David Shoemaker’s adoption of the quality of will approach in his recent book, Responsibility from the Margins. I am not sure that the quality of will approach is given an adequate grounding that defends it against alternative models of moral responsibility; and it is unclear what the argument is for Shoemaker’s tripartite version of the quality of will approach. One possibility that might fit with Shoemaker’s text is that the tripartite (...)
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  2.  3
    Shoemaker on Sentiments and Quality of Will.Christopher Bennett - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (4):573-584.
    In this comment, I raise a number of concerns about David Shoemaker’s adoption of the quality of will approach in his recent book, Responsibility from the Margins. I am not sure that the quality of will approach is given an adequate grounding that defends it against alternative models of moral responsibility; and it is unclear what the argument is for Shoemaker’s tripartite version of the quality of will approach. One possibility that might fit with Shoemaker’s text is that the tripartite (...)
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  3.  8
    Adil Haque: Law and Morality at War.Alejandro Chehtman - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (4):673-680.
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  4.  9
    Two Models of Criminal Fault.R. A. Duff - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (4):643-665.
    I discuss two problems for the standard Anglo-American account of recklessness, and the distinctions between intention, recklessness, and negligence. One problem concerns the over-breadth of recklessness as thus defined—that it covers agents whose actions display different kinds of culpability. The other problem concerns the importance attached to awareness of risk in distinguishing recklessness from negligence—that one who is unaware of the risk that he takes or creates sometimes displays just the same kind of fault as an advertent risk-taker. We can (...)
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  5.  14
    Amnesty and Mercy.Patrick Lenta - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (4):621-641.
    I assess the justification for the granting of amnesty in the circumstances of ‘transitional justice’ advanced by certain of its supporters according to which this device is morally legitimate because it amounts to an act of mercy. I consider several prominent definitions of ‘mercy’ with a view to determining whether amnesty counts as mercy under each and what follows for its moral status. I argue that amnesty cannot count as mercy under any definition in accordance with which an act or (...)
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  6.  55
    Can a Woman Rape a Man and Why Does It Matter?Natasha McKeever - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (4):599-619.
    Under current UK legislation, only a man can commit rape. This paper argues that this is an unjustified double standard that reinforces problematic gendered stereotypes about male and female sexuality. I first reject three potential justifications for making penile penetration a condition of rape: it is physically impossible for a woman to rape a man; it is a more serious offence to forcibly penetrate someone than to force them to penetrate you; rape is a gendered crime. I argue that, as (...)
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  7.  2
    Can a Woman Rape a Man and Why Does It Matter?Natasha McKeever - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (4):599-619.
    Under current UK legislation, only a man can commit rape. This paper argues that this is an unjustified double standard that reinforces problematic gendered stereotypes about male and female sexuality. I first reject three potential justifications for making penile penetration a condition of rape: it is physically impossible for a woman to rape a man; it is a more serious offence to forcibly penetrate someone than to force them to penetrate you; rape is a gendered crime. I argue that, as (...)
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  8.  11
    Beyond Persecutory Impulse and Humanising Trace: On Didier Fassin’s The Will to Punish.Alan Norrie - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (4):681-688.
    This essay argues that Didier Fassin’s ‘The Will to Punish’ reveals the social grounds for a ‘persecutory impulse’ in modern punishment, which sits alongside a ‘humanising trace’. The challenge for a critical theory of modern penality is to think through this strange combination. The work of Melanie Klein and Freud, properly interpreted, can illuminate its conjunction and disjunction.
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  9.  9
    Review of Hannah Maslen: Remorse, Penal Theory and Sentencing: Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2015, 212 pp. [REVIEW]Jonathan Peterson - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (4):667-672.
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  10.  17
    Response to Bennett and Sommers.David Shoemaker - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (4):585-598.
    This paper is a response to Christopher Bennett’s and Tamler Sommers’ critical discussion of my book Responsibility from the Margins.
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  11.  24
    Strawson, Shoemaker, and the Hubris of Theories.Tamler Sommers - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (4):561-572.
    David Shoemaker’s Responsibility from the Margins is chock full of valuable insights on the nature of our responsibility, and it has more in common with P.F. Strawson’s approach in “Freedom and Resentment” than the accounts of most philosophers who call themselves Strawsonians. On one central issue of interpretation, however, Shoemaker gets Strawson wrong. Like many interpreters, Shoemaker sees Strawson as defending a “quality of will” theory of responsibility. This idea fundamentally misunderstands Strawson’s aims in “Freedom and Resentment.” Strawson does not (...)
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  12.  6
    Strawson, Shoemaker, and the Hubris of Theories.Tamler Sommers - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (4):561-572.
    David Shoemaker’s Responsibility from the Margins is chock full of valuable insights on the nature of our responsibility, and it has more in common with P.F. Strawson’s approach in “Freedom and Resentment” than the accounts of most philosophers who call themselves Strawsonians. On one central issue of interpretation, however, Shoemaker gets Strawson wrong. Like many interpreters, Shoemaker sees Strawson as defending a “quality of will” theory of responsibility. This idea fundamentally misunderstands Strawson’s aims in “Freedom and Resentment.” Strawson does not (...)
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  13.  53
    On Wrongs and Crimes : Does Consent Require Only an Attempt to Communicate?Tom Dougherty - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (3):409-423.
    In Wrongs and Crimes, Victor Tadros clarifies the debate about whether consent needs to be communicated by separating the question of whether consent requires expressive behaviour from the question of whether it requires “uptake” in the form of comprehension by the consent-receiver. Once this distinction is drawn, Tadros argues both that consent does not require uptake and that consent does not require expressive behaviour that provides evidence to the consent-receiver. As a result, Tadros takes the view that consent requires an (...)
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  14.  23
    Consent, Rights, and Reasons for Action.Richard Healey - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (3):499-513.
    The normative power of consent plays a central role in enabling individuals to permissibly interact with one another. However, in the philosophical literature, the relationship between consent and permissible action is not always well understood. In this article I outline an account of the normative effect of valid consent, in order to clarify this relationship. I first argue that consent’s primary moral significance lies in its effect upon our interpersonal moral relationships. Specifically, I argue that valid consent serves to cancel (...)
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  15.  18
    Wrongs, Crimes, and Criminalization.Douglas Husak - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (3):393-407.
    I will focus on Tadros’s general views about criminalization and how he contends philosophers should not think about it. Misguided approaches, according to Tadros, include attempts to identify principles that constrain the scope of the criminal law, as well as efforts to establish that given considerations constitute reasons for or against the use of the penal sanction. In what follows, I begin with a few general remarks about the connections between Tadros’s treatment of criminal justice and the real world. Next, (...)
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  16.  25
    Review of Carolina Sartorio’s Causation and Free Will. [REVIEW]Alex Kaiserman & Daniel Kodsi - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (3):551-559.
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  17.  11
    Review of Colleen Murphy, The Conceptual Foundations of Transitional Justice: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017. [REVIEW]Catherine Lu - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (3):545-550.
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  18.  22
    Duties, Desert, and the Justification of Punishment.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (3):425-438.
    In this essay, I assess what I call the “Duty View,” subtly articulated and defended by Victor Tadros in Wrongs and Crimes. According to the Duty View, wrongdoers incur enforceable duties, including the duty to be punished in some circumstances, in virtue of their wrongdoing; therefore, punishment can be justified simply on the ground that wrongdoers’ duties are being legitimately enforced. I argue that, while wrongdoers do incur important duties, these are not necessarily fulfilled by providing protection against future offenses, (...)
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  19.  16
    Animals Who Think and Love: Law, Identification and the Moral Psychology of Guilt.Alan Norrie - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (3):515-544.
    How does the human animal who thinks and loves relate to criminal justice? This essay takes up the idea of a moral psychology of guilt promoted by Bernard Williams and Herbert Morris. Against modern liberal society’s ‘peculiar’ legal morality of voluntary responsibility, it pursues Morris’s ethical account of guilt as involving atonement and identification with others. Thinking of guilt in line with Morris, and linking it with the idea of moral psychology, takes the essay to Freud’s metapsychology in Civilization and (...)
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  20.  20
    Self-Defense, Deterrence, and the Use Objection: A Comment on Victor Tadros’s Wrongs and Crimes.Derk Pereboom - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (3):439-454.
    In Wrongs and Crimes, Victor Tadros argues that wrongdoers acquire special duties to those they’ve wronged, and from there he generates wrongdoers’ duties to contribute to general deterrence by being punished. In support, he contends that my manipulation argument against compatibilism fails to show that causal determination is incompatible with the proposed duties wrongdoers owe to those they’ve wronged. I respond that I did not intend my manipulation argument to rule out a sense of moral responsibility that features such duties, (...)
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  21.  7
    Responses to Wrongs and Crimes.Victor Tadros - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (3):455-478.
    This is a response to the four essays on Wrongs and Crimes.
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  22.  21
    Biomarkers for the Rich and Dangerous: Why We Ought to Extend Bioprediction and Bioprevention to White-Collar Crime.Hazem Zohny, Thomas Douglas & Julian Savulescu - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (3):479-497.
    There is a burgeoning scientific and ethical literature on the use of biomarkers—such as genes or brain scan results—and biological interventions to predict and prevent crime. This literature on biopredicting and biopreventing crime focuses almost exclusively on crimes that are physical, violent, and/or sexual in nature—often called blue-collar crimes—while giving little attention to less conventional crimes such as economic and environmental offences, also known as white-collar crimes. We argue here that this skewed focus is unjustified: white-collar crime is likely far (...)
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  23.  51
    Who Can Blame Whom? Moral Standing to Blame and Punish Deprived Citizens.Gustavo A. Beade - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (2):271-281.
    There are communities in which disadvantaged groups experience severe inequality. For instance, poor and indigent families face many difficulties accessing their social rights. Their condition is largely the consequence of the wrong choices of those in power, either historical or more recent choices. The lack of opportunities of these deprived citizens is due to state omissions. In such communities, it is not unusual for homeless members of these particular groups to occupy abandoned lands and build their shelters there. However, almost (...)
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  24.  23
    The Nature and Significance of Culpability.David O. Brink - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (2):347-373.
    Culpability is not a unitary concept within the criminal law, and it is important to distinguish different culpability concepts and the work they do. Narrow culpability is an ingredient in wrongdoing itself, describing the agent’s elemental mens rea. Broad culpability is the responsibility condition that makes wrongdoing blameworthy and without which wrongdoing is excused. Inclusive culpability is the combination of wrongdoing and responsibility or broad culpability that functions as the retributivist desert basis for punishment. Each of these kinds of culpability (...)
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  25.  70
    Hypocrisy, Inconsistency, and the Moral Standing of the State.Kyle G. Fritz - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (2):309-327.
    Several writers have argued that the state lacks the moral standing to hold socially deprived offenders responsible for their crimes because the state would be hypocritical in doing so. Yet the state is not disposed to make an unfair exception of itself for committing the same sorts of crimes as socially deprived offenders, so it is unclear that the state is truly hypocritical. Nevertheless, the state is disposed to inconsistently hold its citizens responsible, blaming or punishing socially deprived offenders more (...)
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  26.  20
    The Practice of Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide Meets the Concept of Legalization.Golan Luzon - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (2):329-345.
    This article explores attempts at legalization of the practice of euthanasia and assisted suicide. Although in many countries there have been high levels of public support for euthanasia and assisted suicide, in most of them, no legislative activity has taken place concerning these practices, and there is a lack of clarity about what is permitted and what is not. I argue that accurate definition of the relevant concepts and a clear delineation of the territory of the debate would help draw (...)
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  27.  11
    The Bête Noire and the Noble Lie: The International Criminal Court and Politics.Christof Royer - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (2):225-246.
    For the traditional legalistic discourse on the International Criminal Court, “politics” is a bête noire that compromises the independence of the Court and thus needs to be avoided and overcome. In response to this legalistic approach, a burgeoning body of literature insists that the Court does not exist and operate “beyond politics”, arguing that the ICC is an institution where law and politics are intimately connected. The present article seeks to contribute to this “non-traditional” literature by addressing two of its (...)
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  28.  13
    Review of Jens David Ohlin and Larry May, Necessity in International Law: Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016. [REVIEW]Henry Shue - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (2):375-383.
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  29.  33
    Anger, Provocation and Loss of Self-Control: What Does ‘Losing It’ Really Mean?Sarah Sorial - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (2):247-269.
    Drawing on recent research in the philosophy of the emotions and empirical evidence from social psychology, this paper argues that the concept of loss of self-control at common law mischaracterises the relationship between the emotions and their effects on action. Emotions do not undermine reason in the ways offenders describe ; nor do they compel people to act in ways they cannot control. As such, the idea of ‘loss of self-control’ is an inaccurate and misleading description of the psychological mechanisms (...)
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  30.  19
    Review of Catherine Lu: Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, 309 Pp, £75.00. [REVIEW]Anna Stilz - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (2):385-392.
    Catherine Lu’s recent book argues that we should conceive colonial wrongs not as unjust interactions between individuals or states, but rather as structural injustices of the international system. I review her book and raise some questions about her approach.
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  31.  18
    Nulla Poena Sine Lege in Continental Criminal Law: Historical and Theoretical Analysis.Evgeny Tikhonravov - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (2):215-224.
    Multiple viewpoints have been expressed regarding the principle nulla poena sine lege. Some scholars advocate the inviolability of this maxim because it safeguards personal freedom—an opportunity to do everything not prohibited by law. However, its critics assert that rigid adherence to the principle nulla poena sine lege may do more harm than good. They argue that the maxim, while prohibiting judges from punishing non-criminal acts, makes it impossible for courts to deter them in a timely manner, which, in certain cases, (...)
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  32.  25
    Justifying and Excusing Sex.Jesse Wall - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (2):283-307.
    This article aligns two complementary claims: that sexual penetration should be considered a wrong and that consent requires express words and conduct that manifest a person’s willingness or acquiescence towards the specific act. If sexual penetration is a wrong, it will only be justified if there are reasons that permit the action and if these were the ones that the defendant acted on. A person’s internal attitude of willingness or acquiescence towards the specific act can provide the necessary guiding reasons (...)
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  33.  31
    Crime Victims and the Right to Punishment.David Alm - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (1):63-81.
    In this paper, I consider the question of whether crime victims can be said to have a moral right to see their victimizers punished that could explain why they often feel wronged or cheated when the state fails to punish offenders. In the first part, I explain what I mean by a “right to punishment” and what it is for such a right to “explain” the frustrated crime victim’s reaction. In the second part, I distinguish such a right from a (...)
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  34.  17
    Hoskins’s New Benefit-Fairness Theory of Punishment.Peter Chau - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (1):49-61.
    The benefit-fairness theory of punishment, which is one of the most prominent retributive justifications of punishment, appeals to some benefits received by an offender in explaining why it is fair to impose punitive burdens on him. However, many see the two traditional versions of the theory, found in the works by writers such as Herbert Morris, Jeffrie Murphy, and George Sher, as being susceptible to fatal objections. In a recent paper, “Fairness, Political Obligation, and Punishment,” Zachary Hoskins offers a new (...)
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  35.  26
    Retributarianism: A New Individualization of Punishment.Hadar Dancig-Rosenberg & Netanel Dagan - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (1):129-147.
    This article seeks to reveal, conceptualize, and analyze a trend in the development of the retributive theory of punishment since the beginning of the 21st century. We term this trend “retributarianism.” It is reflected in the emergence of retributive approaches that through expanding the concepts of censure and culpability extend the relevant time-frame for assessing the deserved punishment beyond the sentencing moment. These retributarian approaches are characterized by the individualization of retributivism. On one hand, retributarianism shares with classic retributivism the (...)
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  36.  27
    Crimes, Public Wrongs, and Civil Order.R. A. Duff & S. E. Marshall - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (1):27-48.
    The idea that crimes can usefully be understood as ‘public wrongs’, and that this can generate a plausible principle of criminalisation, has found some support in recent years; it has also been subjected to some sharp criticism. This paper aims to sketch the most plausible version of that idea, and to show how, once properly explained, it is not vulnerable to those criticisms. After a brief defence of the negative principle, that we may not criminalise conduct that does not constitute (...)
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  37.  79
    Hitting Retributivism Where It Hurts.Nathan Hanna - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (1):109-127.
    Many philosophers think that, when someone deserves something, it’s intrinsically good that she get it or there’s a non-instrumental reason to give it to her. Retributivists who try to justify punishment by appealing to claims about what people deserve typically assume this view or views that entail it. In this paper, I present evidence that many people have intuitions that are inconsistent with this view. And I argue that this poses a serious challenge to retributivist arguments that appeal to desert.
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  38.  22
    Provocateurs and Their Rights to Self-Defence.Lisa Hecht - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (1):165-185.
    A provocateur does not pose a threat of harm. Hence, a forceful response to provocation is generally considered wrongful. And yet, a provocateur is often denied recourse to a self-defence justification if she defends herself against such a violent response. In recent work, Kimberly Ferzan argues that a provocateur forfeits defensive rights but this forfeiture cannot be explained in the same way as an aggressor’s rights forfeiture. Ordinarily, one forfeits the right not to be harmed and to self-defend against harm (...)
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  39.  13
    Spare No One? A Review Essay.Adam Omar Hosein - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (1):187-203.
    This essay considers some central arguments given by Helen Frowe and Seth Lazar regarding the permissibility of killing civilians in war. It raises some objections to their views and defends some alternative bases for weighing harms to combatants against harms to civilians.
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  40.  15
    The Citizen Victim: Reconciling the Public and Private in Criminal Sentencing.Jeffrey Kennedy - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (1):83-108.
    In recent decades, increased attention has been given to the place of the victim within criminal justice systems. Advocates have called for recognition and participation for victims of crime, and widespread political support throughout common law jurisdictions has resulted in a number of reforms. While some have proven uncontroversial, the question of victim input into sentencing decisions has emerged as a highly contentious issue within scholarship. Scholars have been concerned with the potentially corrupting influence of victims’ private preferences and dispositions (...)
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  41.  24
    Can Corporations Experience Duress? An Examination of Emotion-Based Excuses and Group Agents.Sylvia Rich - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (1):149-163.
    This article considers the question of whether corporate entities can benefit from the criminal-law defence of duress. The excuse of duress is accorded in recognition of the defendant’s extreme fear of a threatened consequence, and it is unclear whether corporate entities—as distinct from their members—can experience fear. Many proponents of corporate rationality deny that corporations can have emotional states. I argue that corporations can experience the fear that is necessary to ground a claim of duress, but that the law should (...)
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  42.  21
    Review of Oona A. Hathaway and Scott J. Shapiro, The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World 608 Pp. $30.00. [REVIEW]Arthur Ripstein - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (1):205-214.
    The thesis of The Internationalists is that the Kellogg Briand Pact of 1928 fundamentally reshaped the international legal order. By outlawing war, the Pact replaced one basic norm of international legal ordering with another. Hathaway and Shapiro present their argument in the form of a narrative, including biographical details about the central protagonists and vignettes about key meetings. They present it all with an eye not only to the importance of particular characters, but also to sheer coincidence. Underneath the sweeping (...)
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  43.  61
    Wild Goose Chase: Still No Rationales for the Doctrine of Double Effect and Related Principles.Uwe Steinhoff - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (1):1-25.
    I focus on the question as to what rationale could possibly underlie the doctrine of double effect or related principles. I first briefly review the correct critiques of the claim that people who intend some evil as a means to a good must be “guided by evil,” and that this is allegedly always wrong. I then argue that Quinn’s claim that violations of the DDE express certain negative attitudes of the agent and that agents violating the DDE must make an (...)
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