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  1.  7
    ‘‘If the Cloak Doesn’T Fit, You Must Acquit’: Retributivist Models of Preventive Detention and the Problem of Coextensiveness.Darin Clearwater - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):49-70.
    Persons who are dangerous and legally responsible, but who have not yet committed any currently recognised criminal offence, fall within the gap left between the domains of criminal justice and civil commitment. Many jurisdictions operate legal regimes that permit the detention of such persons in order to prevent the occurrence of anticipated criminal harms. These regimes often either fail to respect the principle of proportionality or contradictorily treat a dangerous offender as both legally responsible and not responsible at the same (...)
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  2. Robotic Rape and Robotic Child Sexual Abuse: Should They Be Criminalised?John Danaher - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):71-95.
    Soon there will be sex robots. The creation of such devices raises a host of social, legal and ethical questions. In this article, I focus in on one of them. What if these sex robots are deliberately designed and used to replicate acts of rape and child sexual abuse? Should the creation and use of such robots be criminalised, even if no person is harmed by the acts performed? I offer an argument for thinking that they should be. The argument (...)
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  3.  29
    Disobedience, Civil and Otherwise.Candice Delmas - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):195-211.
    While philosophers usually agree that there is room for civil disobedience in democratic societies, they disagree as to the proper justification and role of civil disobedience. The field has so far been divided into two camps—the liberal approach on the one hand, which associates the justification and role of civil disobedience with the good of justice, and the democratic approach on the other, which connects them with the value and good of democracy. William Smith’s Civil Disobedience and Deliberative Democracy offers (...)
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  4.  6
    Reimagining the Unimaginable? Reflections on Mark A. Drumbl’s Vision of Child Soldiers.Steven Freeland & Pernille Walther - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):37-48.
    The existence of child soldiers is a problem of the ages, and there are no positive signs that it is abating. The difference now is that, with the development of modern weapons technology, children can be involved in large scale and horrific acts during conflicts. The circumstances surrounding the use of children to wage war will vary from situation to situation. Yet, it has been suggested that many people seem to have a ‘single focussed’ view of what child soldiers look (...)
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  5.  44
    On Blaming and Punishing Psychopaths.Marion Godman & Anneli Jefferson - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):127-142.
    Current legal practice holds that a diagnosis of psychopathy does not remove criminal responsibility. In contrast, many philosophers and legal experts are increasingly persuaded by evidence from experimental psychology and neuroscience indicating moral and cognitive deficits in psychopaths and have argued that they should be excused from moral responsibility. However, having opposite views concerning psychopaths’ moral responsibility, on the one hand, and criminal responsibility, on the other, seems unfortunate given the assumption that the law should, at least to some extent, (...)
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  6.  20
    Paternalism and Human Dignity.John Kleinig - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):19-36.
    This paper explores the possibility that some cases of criminal paternalism might include among their justifying reasons an appeal to human dignity.
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  7.  6
    Morse, Mind, and Mental Causation.Michael S. Pardo & Dennis Patterson - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):111-126.
    Stephen Morse’s illuminating scholarship on law and neuroscience relies on a “folk psychological” account of human behavior in order to defend the law’s foundations for ascribing legal responsibility. The heart of Morse’s account is the notion of “mental state causation,” in which mental states cause behavior. Morse argues that causation of this sort is necessary to support legal responsibility. We challenge this claim. First, we discuss problems with the conception of mental causation on which Morse appears to rely. Second, we (...)
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  8.  21
    Desert of What? On Murphy’s Reluctant Retributivism.Linda Radzik - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):161-173.
    In Punishment and the Moral Emotions, Jeffrie Murphy rejects his earlier, strong endorsements of retributivism. Questioning both our motivations for embracing retributivism and our views about the basis of desert, he now describes himself as a “reluctant retributivist.” In this essay, I argue that Murphy should reject retributivism altogether. Even if we grant that criminals have negative desert, why should we suppose that it is desert of suffering? I argue that it is possible to defend desert-based theories of punishment that (...)
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  9.  7
    Responsibility and Justificatory Defenses.Re’em Segev - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):97-110.
    Criminal prohibitions typically forbid harming people. Justificatory defenses, such as lesser evil, justifying necessity and justifying self-defense, provide exceptions to such prohibitions if certain conditions are met. One common condition is that the agent is not responsible for the conflict. The questions whether justificatory defenses should include such a condition, and if so what should be its content, are controversial. I argue that responsibility for a conflict counts against protecting the responsible person at the expense of a non-responsible or a (...)
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  10. What Does It Mean to Be a Mechanism? Stephen Morse, Non-Reductivism, and Mental Causation.Katrina L. Sifferd - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):143-159.
    Stephen Morse seems to have adopted a controversial position regarding the mindbody relationship: John Searle’s non-reductivism, which claims that conscious mental states are causal yet not reducible to their underlying brain states. Searle’s position has been roundly criticized, with some arguing the theory taken as a whole is incoherent. In this paper I review these criticisms and add my own, concluding that Searle’s position is indeed contradictory, both internally and with regard to Morse's other views. Thus I argue that Morse (...)
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  11.  25
    On Jonathan Quong’s Sectarian Political Liberalism.Kevin Vallier - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):175-194.
    Jonathan Quong’s book, Liberalism without Perfection, provides an innovative new defense of political liberalism based on an “internal conception” of the goal of public justification. Quong argues that public justification need merely be addressed to persons who affirm liberal political values, allowing people to be coerced without a public justification if they reject liberal values or their priority over comprehensive values. But, by extensively restricting members of the justificatory public to a highly idealized constituency of liberals, Quong’s political liberalism becomes (...)
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  12.  21
    On the Matter of Suffering: Derek Parfit and the Possibility of Deserved Punishment.Leo Zaibert - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):1-18.
    Derek Parfit has recently defended the view that no one can ever deserve to suffer. Were this view correct, its implications for the thorny problem of the justification of punishment would be extraordinary: age-old debates between consequentialists and retributivists would simply vanish, as punishment would only—and simply—be justifiable along Benthamite utilitarian lines. I here suggest that Parfit’s view is linked to uncharacteristically weak arguments, and that it ought to be rejected.
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