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  1.  10
    Nicola Lacey: In Search of Criminal Responsibility: Ideas, Interests, and Institutions.Daniel Bansal - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (4):861-865.
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  2.  43
    Consequences Matter More: In Defense of Instrumentalism on Private Versus Public Prisons.Jason Brennan - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (4):801-815.
    Alon Harel wants to show that punishment is a kind of symbolic expression that, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, can only be performed by governmental agents. Contrary to Harel, I argue private agents can in fact realize those features he argues only public agents can realize. I also argue that, even if he were right that only public guards and wardens can punish, it’s unclear why we would have an all-things-considered rather than merely a pro tanto/prima facie duty to (...)
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  3.  14
    Bennett’s Expressive Justification of Punishment.Peter Chau - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (4):661-679.
    In this paper, I will critically assess the expressive justification of punishment recently offered by Christopher Bennett in The Apology Ritual and a number of papers. I will first draw a distinction between three conceptions of expression: communicative, motivational, and symbolic. After briefly demonstrating the difficulties of using the first two conceptions of expression to ground punishment and showing that Bennett does not ultimately rely on those two conceptions, I argue that Bennett’s account does not succeed because he fails to (...)
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  4.  8
    How to Think About Rape.Kimberly Kessler Ferzan & Peter Westen - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (4):759-800.
    From the American Law Institute to college campuses, there is a renewed interest in the law of rape. Law school faculty, however, may be reluctant to teach this deeply debated topic. This article begins from the premise that controversial and contested questions can be best resolved when participants understand the conceptual architecture that surrounds and delineates the normative questions. This allows participants to talk to one another instead of past each other. Accordingly, in this article, we begin by diffusing two (...)
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  5.  6
    Defending WhyLawMatters: Responses to Commentaries.Alon Harel - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (4):847-859.
    WhyLawMatters examines various legal and political institutions and procedures and argues that the desirability of these institutions and procedures is not contingent and does not hinge on the prospects that these institutions are conducive to the realization of valuable ends. Instead, various legal institutions and legal procedures that are often perceived as contingent means to facilitate the realization of valuable ends matter assuch.
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  6.  3
    Expediency, Legitimacy, and the Rule of Law: A Systems Perspective on Civil/Criminal Procedural Hybrids.Jennifer Hendry & Colin King - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (4):733-757.
    In recent years an increasing quantity of UK legislation has introduced blended or ‘hybridised’ procedures that blur the previously clear demarcation between civil and criminal legal processes, typically on the grounds of normatively-motivated political expediency. This paper provides a critical perspective on instances of procedural hybridisation in order to illustrate that, first, the reliance upon civil law measures to remedy criminal law infractions can raise human rights issues and, second, that such instrumental criminal justice strategies deliberately circumvent the enhanced procedural (...)
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  7.  16
    Against Personifying the Reasonable Person.Matt King - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (4):725-732.
    One way in which fact finders are supposed to determine the reasonableness of a defendant is via a counterfactual test that personifies the reasonable person. We are to imagine the reasonable person being in the defendant’s circumstances. Then we are to determine whether the reasonable person would have done as the defendant did. This paper argues that, despite its prevalence, the counterfactual test is a hopeless guide to determining defendant reasonability. In brief, the test is of the wrong sort to (...)
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  8.  13
    Punishment Drift: The Spread of Penal Harm and What We Should Do About It.Richard L. Lippke - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (4):645-659.
    It is well documented that the effects of legal punishment tend to drift to the family members, friends, and larger communities of convicted offenders. Instead of conceiving of punishment drift as incidental to legal punishment, or as merely foreseen but not intended by state authorities and thus permissible, I argue that efforts ought to be undertaken to limit or ameliorate it. Failure to confine punishment drift comes perilously close to punishment of the innocent and is at odds with other legal (...)
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  9.  3
    The Denial of Procedural Safeguards in Trials for Regulatory Offences: A Justification.Federico Picinali - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (4):681-703.
    Regulatory offences are a complex phenomenon, presenting problematic aspects both at the level of criminalisation and at the level of enforcement. The literature abounds in works that study the phenomenon. There is, however, an aspect that has remained largely unexplored. It concerns the relationship between the regulatory framework within which the crime occurs and the procedural safeguards that defendants normally enjoy at trial or at the pre-trial stage: defendants tried for regulatory offences are often denied safeguards that are generally considered (...)
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  10.  11
    Alon Harel on How to Deliberate Permissibly.Adam Slavny - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (4):833-846.
    Alon Harel defines extreme cases as those in which the only way to avert a destructive threat is to harm innocent people. He rejects traditional consequentialist and non-consequentialist approaches because of the type of reasoning they both employ. I interpret Harel as making two central objections to this form of reasoning. First, traditional approaches require comparisons to be made about the value of human life. Second, decisions in extreme cases, even if permissible, should not be made under the guidance of (...)
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  11.  3
    Online Grooming and Preventive Justice.Tom Sorell - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (4):705-724.
    In England and Wales, Section 15 of the Sexual Offences Act criminalizes the act of meeting a child—someone under 16—after grooming. The question to be pursued in this paper is whether grooming—I confine myself to online grooming—is justly criminalized. I shall argue that it is. One line of thought will be indirect. I shall first try to rebut a general argument against the criminalization of acts that are preparatory to the commission of serious offences. Grooming is one such act, but (...)
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  12.  9
    On the Value of Constitutions and Judicial Review.Laura Valentini - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (4):817-832.
    In his thought-provoking book, Why Law Matters, Alon Harel defends two key claims: one ontological, the other axiological. First, he argues that constitutions and judicial review are necessary constituents of a just society. Second, he suggests that these institutions are not only means to the realization of worthy ends, but also non-instrumentally valuable. I agree with Harel that constitutions and judicial review have more than instrumental value, but I am not persuaded by his arguments in support of this conclusion. I (...)
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  13.  43
    Mass Incarceration and the Theory of Punishment.Vincent Chiao - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):431-452.
    An influential strain in the literature on state punishment analyzes the permissibility of punishment in exclusively deontological terms, whether in terms of an individual’s rights, the state’s obligation to vindicate the law, or both. I argue that we should reject a deontological theory of punishment because it cannot explain what is unjust about mass incarceration, although mass incarceration is widely considered—including by proponents of deontological theories—to be unjust. The failure of deontological theories suggests a minimum criterion of adequacy for a (...)
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  14.  30
    Fairness-Based Retributivism Reconsidered.Göran Duus-Otterström - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):481-498.
    In this paper, I defend fairness-based retributivism against two important objections, the no-benefit objection and the social injustice objection. I argue that the theory can defeat the no-benefit objection by developing an account of how crimes can be sources of unfairness by inflicting losses on people, and that it can blunt the social injustice objection by toning down the theory’s distributive aspirations. I conclude that fairness-based retributivism, contrary to received wisdom, merits further attention from legal and political philosophers.
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  15.  3
    Lindsay Farmer: Making the Modern Criminal Law: Criminalization and Civil Order.Chloë Kennedy - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):637-644.
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  16.  14
    Are ‘Optimistic’ Theories of Criminal Justice Psychologically Feasible? The Probative Case of Civic Republicanism.Victoria McGeer & Friederike Funk - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):523-544.
    ‘Optimistic’ normative theories of criminal justice aim to justify criminal sanction in terms of its reprobative/rehabilitative value rather than its punitive nature as such. But do such theories accord with ordinary intuitions about what constitutes a ‘just’ response to wrongdoing? Recent empirical work on the psychology of punishers suggests that human beings have a ‘brutely retributive’ moral psychology, making them unlikely to endorse normative theories that sacrifice retribution for the sake of reprobation or rehabilitation; it would mean, for example, that (...)
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  17.  45
    Manipulation Arguments, Basic Desert, and Moral Responsibility: Assessing Derk Pereboom’s Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life.Michael McKenna - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):575-589.
    In this paper I critically assess Derk Pereboom’s book, Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. In it, I resist Pereboom’s manipulation argument for incompatibilism and his indictment of desert-based accounts of moral responsibility.
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  18.  48
    On Pereboom’s Disappearing Agent Argument.Alfred R. Mele - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):561-574.
    This article is a critical discussion of Derk Pereboom’s “disappearing agent objection” to event-causal libertarianism in his Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. This objection is an important plank in Pereboom’s argument for free will skepticism. It is intended to knock event-causal libertarianism, a leading pro-free-will view, out of contention. I explain why readers should not find the objection persuasive.
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  19.  14
    A Defense of Free Will Skepticism: Replies to Commentaries by Victor Tadros, Saul Smilansky, Michael McKenna, and Alfred R. Mele on Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life.Derk Pereboom - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):617-636.
    This paper features Derk Pereboom’s replies to commentaries by Victor Tadros and Saul Smilansky on his non-retributive, incapacitation-focused proposal for treatment of dangerous criminals; by Michael McKenna on his manipulation argument against compatibilism about basic desert and causal determination; and by Alfred R. Mele on his disappearing agent argument against event-causal libertarianism.
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  20.  16
    ‘Drugs That Make You Feel Bad’? Remorse-Based Mitigation and Neurointerventions.Jonathan Pugh & Hannah Maslen - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):499-522.
    In many jurisdictions, an offender’s remorse is considered to be a relevant factor to take into account in mitigation at sentencing. The growing philosophical interest in the use of neurointerventions in criminal justice raises an important question about such remorse-based mitigation: to what extent should technologically facilitated remorse be honoured such that it is permitted the same penal significance as standard instances of remorse? To motivate this question, we begin by sketching a tripartite account of remorse that distinguishes cognitive, affective (...)
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  21.  10
    Double Effect and the Criminal Law.Alexander Sarch - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):453-479.
    American criminal law is committed to some version of the doctrine of double effect. In this paper, I defend a new variant of the agent-centered rationale for a version of DDE that is of particular relevance to the criminal law. In particular, I argue for a non-absolute version of DDE that concerns the relative culpability of intending a bad or wrongful state of affairs as opposed to bringing it about merely knowingly. My aim is to identify a particular feature of (...)
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  22.  28
    Pereboom on Punishment: Funishment, Innocence, Motivation, and Other Difficulties.Saul Smilansky - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):591-603.
    In Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, Derk Pereboom proposes an optimistic model of life that follows on the rejection of both libertarian and compatibilist beliefs in free will, moral responsibility, and desert. I criticize his views, focusing on punishment. Pereboom responds to my earlier argument that hard determinism must seek to revise the practice of punishment in the direction of funishment, whereby the incarcerated are very generously compensated for the deprivations of incarceration. I claimed that funishment is a (...)
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  23.  22
    Doing Without Desert.Victor Tadros - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):605-616.
    This paper examines Derk Pereboom’s argument against punishment on deterrent grounds in his recent book Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. It suggests that Pereboom’s argument against basic desert has not been shown to extend to the view that those who act wrongly lose rights against punishment for deterrent reasons. It further supports the view that those who act wrongly, if they fulfil compatibilist conditions of responsibility, do lose rights to avert threats they pose. And this, it is argued, (...)
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  24.  1
    Defense Categories and the De Minimis Defense.Valentine Melissa Beth - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):545-559.
    De minimis defenses are an understudied aspect of law, appearing in legal practice more often than in legal theory but rarely garnering any type of extensive analysis in either. This has led to an unfortunate state of affairs in which one term is applied to a set of practices that are, at best, only loosely connected. Using Paul Robinson’s system of defense types, this paper will illustrate the various roles and functions the de minimis defense plays in our legal system. (...)
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  25.  18
    The Wrongs of Unlawful Immigration.Ana Aliverti - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (2):375-391.
    For too long, criminal law scholars overlooked immigration-based offences. Claims that these offences are not ‘true crimes’ or are a ‘mere camouflage’ to pursue non-criminal law aims deflect attention from questions concerning the limits of criminalization and leave unchallenged contradictions at the heart of criminal law theory. My purpose in this paper is to examine these offences through some of the basic tenets of criminal law. I argue that the predominant forms of liability for the most often used immigration offences (...)
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  26.  49
    Liberty and Insecurity in the Criminal Law: Lessons From Thomas Hobbes.Henrique Carvalho - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (2):249-271.
    In this paper, I provide an extensive examination of the political theory of Thomas Hobbes in order to discuss its relevance to an understanding of contemporary issues and challenges faced by criminal law and criminal justice theory. I start by proposing that a critical analysis of Hobbes’s account of punishment reveals a paradox that not only is fundamental to understanding his model of political society, but also can offer important insights into the preventive turn experienced by advanced liberal legal systems. (...)
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  27.  25
    Prison on Appeal: The Idea of Communicative Incarceration.Alasdair Cochrane - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (2):295-312.
    In the classic abolitionist text, Prison on Trial, Thomas Mathieson argues that imprisonment cannot be justified by appeal to any standard punitive aim: rehabilitation, deterrence, incapacitation, or retribution. The aim of this paper is to give prison an ‘appeal hearing’: to examine whether it can be justified by a set of punitive aims not considered by Mathieson. In particular, it asks whether imprisonment can be justified by the ‘communicative’ theory of punishment proposed by Antony Duff. Duff sees imprisonment as having (...)
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  28.  3
    Seumas Miller and Ian A. Gordon: Investigative Ethics: Ethics for Police Detectives and Criminal Investigators.Adam Henschke - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (2):427-429.
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  29.  13
    Exploring Moral Desert.Shelly Kagan - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (2):407-426.
    In The Geometry of Desert I used graphs to explore two common ideas about moral desert, namely, that people differ in terms of how deserving they are, and that it is a good thing if people get what they deserve. I argued that desert is a more complex value than we normally recognize, and I laid out a number of alternative possible views, defending some of them. In a pair of critical discussions published in this journal, Victor Tadros and Kasper (...)
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  30.  39
    Legitimating Torture?Gerald Lang - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (2):331-349.
    Steinhoff defends the moral and legal permissibility of torture in a limited range of circumstances. This article criticizes Steinhoff’s arguments. The analogy between ordinary defensive violence and defensive torture which Steinhoff argues for is partly spoiled by the presence, within defensive torture, of opportunistic harm, in addition to eliminative harm. Steinhoff’s arguments that the mere legalization of defensive torture would not metastasize into a more full-fledged institutionalization of torture are also found wanting. As a minimal form of institutionalization, the mere (...)
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  31.  11
    Posthumous ‘Punishment’: What May Be Done About Criminal Wrongs After the Wrongdoer’s Death?Emmanuel Melissaris - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (2):313-329.
    The commission of criminal wrongs is occasionally revealed after the wrongdoer’s death. In such cases, there seems to be a widely-shared intuition, which also frequently motivates many people’s actions, that the dead should still be blamed and that some response, not only stemming from civil society but also the state, to the criminal wrong is necessary. This article explores the possibility of posthumous blame and punishment by the state. After highlighting the deficiencies of the pure versions of retributivism and general (...)
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  32.  10
    A Just Criminalization of Irregular Immigration: Is It Possible?Alessandro Spena - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (2):351-373.
    The aim of this paper is to question, from the perspective of a principled theory of criminalization, the legitimacy of making irregular immigration a crime. In order to do this, I identify three main ways in which the political decision to introduce a crime of IM may be defended: according to the first, IM is a malum in se the wrongness of which resides in its being a violation of states’ territorial sovereignty; according to the second, IM is a justified (...)
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  33.  26
    Moving Mountains: Variations on a Theme by Shelly Kagan.Victor Tadros - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (2):393-405.
    My response to Shelly Kagan’s book, The Geometry of Desert, is to raise both general and more specific issues. I criticise Kagan’s way of setting up his project. I will suggest many factors other than desert better explain Kagan’s cases. I then examine more particular aspects of the project. I investigate Kagan’s discussion of what he calls the V-shaped skyline. According to Kagan, the V-shaped skyline represents the idea that it is more important that the very vicious and the very (...)
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  34.  29
    Punishment and the Appropriate Response to Wrongdoing.Victor Tadros - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (2):229-248.
    My main aims in this paper are to further clarify and defend the Duty View of punishment, outlined in my book The Ends of Harm, by responding to some objections to it, and by exploring some variations on that view. I briefly lay out some steps in the justification of punishment that I defend more completely in Chapter 12 of The Ends of Harm. I offer some further support for these steps. They justify punishment of an offender for general deterrence (...)
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  35.  9
    Infidelity and the Possibility of a Liberal Legal Moralism.Jens Damgaard Thaysen - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (2):273-294.
    This paper argues that according to the influential version of legal moralism presented by Moore infidelity should all-things-considered be criminalized. This is interesting because criminalizing infidelity is bound to be highly controversial and because Moore’s legal moralism is a prime example of a self-consciously liberal legal moralism, which aims to yield legislative implications that are quite similar to liberalism, while maintaining that morality as such should be legally enforced. Moore tries to make his theory yield such implications, first by claiming (...)
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  36.  6
    Reconsidering Illegal Hunting as a Crime of Dissent: Implication for Justice and Deliberative Uptake.Erica von Essen & Michael P. Allen - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (2):213-228.
    In this paper, we determine whether illegal hunting should be construed as a crime of dissent. Using the Nordic countries as a case study where protest-driven, illegal hunting of protected wolves is on the rise, we reconsider the crime using principles of civil disobedience. We invoke the conditions of intentionality, nonevasion, dialogic effort, non-violence and appeal to parameters of reasonable disagreement about justice and situate the Nordic illegal hunting phenomenon at a nexus between conscientious objection, assisted disobedience and everyday resistance. (...)
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  37.  9
    ‘‘If the Cloak Doesn’T Fit, You Must Acquit’: Retributivist Models of Preventive Detention and the Problem of Coextensiveness.Darin Clearwater - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):49-70.
    Persons who are dangerous and legally responsible, but who have not yet committed any currently recognised criminal offence, fall within the gap left between the domains of criminal justice and civil commitment. Many jurisdictions operate legal regimes that permit the detention of such persons in order to prevent the occurrence of anticipated criminal harms. These regimes often either fail to respect the principle of proportionality or contradictorily treat a dangerous offender as both legally responsible and not responsible at the same (...)
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  38. Robotic Rape and Robotic Child Sexual Abuse: Should They Be Criminalised?John Danaher - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):71-95.
    Soon there will be sex robots. The creation of such devices raises a host of social, legal and ethical questions. In this article, I focus in on one of them. What if these sex robots are deliberately designed and used to replicate acts of rape and child sexual abuse? Should the creation and use of such robots be criminalised, even if no person is harmed by the acts performed? I offer an argument for thinking that they should be. The argument (...)
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  39.  39
    Disobedience, Civil and Otherwise.Candice Delmas - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):195-211.
    While philosophers usually agree that there is room for civil disobedience in democratic societies, they disagree as to the proper justification and role of civil disobedience. The field has so far been divided into two camps—the liberal approach on the one hand, which associates the justification and role of civil disobedience with the good of justice, and the democratic approach on the other, which connects them with the value and good of democracy. William Smith’s Civil Disobedience and Deliberative Democracy offers (...)
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  40.  9
    Reimagining the Unimaginable? Reflections on Mark A. Drumbl’s Vision of Child Soldiers.Steven Freeland & Pernille Walther - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):37-48.
    The existence of child soldiers is a problem of the ages, and there are no positive signs that it is abating. The difference now is that, with the development of modern weapons technology, children can be involved in large scale and horrific acts during conflicts. The circumstances surrounding the use of children to wage war will vary from situation to situation. Yet, it has been suggested that many people seem to have a ‘single focussed’ view of what child soldiers look (...)
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  41.  52
    On Blaming and Punishing Psychopaths.Marion Godman & Anneli Jefferson - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):127-142.
    Current legal practice holds that a diagnosis of psychopathy does not remove criminal responsibility. In contrast, many philosophers and legal experts are increasingly persuaded by evidence from experimental psychology and neuroscience indicating moral and cognitive deficits in psychopaths and have argued that they should be excused from moral responsibility. However, having opposite views concerning psychopaths’ moral responsibility, on the one hand, and criminal responsibility, on the other, seems unfortunate given the assumption that the law should, at least to some extent, (...)
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  42.  21
    Paternalism and Human Dignity.John Kleinig - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):19-36.
    This paper explores the possibility that some cases of criminal paternalism might include among their justifying reasons an appeal to human dignity.
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  43.  7
    Morse, Mind, and Mental Causation.Michael S. Pardo & Dennis Patterson - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):111-126.
    Stephen Morse’s illuminating scholarship on law and neuroscience relies on a “folk psychological” account of human behavior in order to defend the law’s foundations for ascribing legal responsibility. The heart of Morse’s account is the notion of “mental state causation,” in which mental states cause behavior. Morse argues that causation of this sort is necessary to support legal responsibility. We challenge this claim. First, we discuss problems with the conception of mental causation on which Morse appears to rely. Second, we (...)
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  44.  28
    Desert of What? On Murphy’s Reluctant Retributivism.Linda Radzik - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):161-173.
    In Punishment and the Moral Emotions, Jeffrie Murphy rejects his earlier, strong endorsements of retributivism. Questioning both our motivations for embracing retributivism and our views about the basis of desert, he now describes himself as a “reluctant retributivist.” In this essay, I argue that Murphy should reject retributivism altogether. Even if we grant that criminals have negative desert, why should we suppose that it is desert of suffering? I argue that it is possible to defend desert-based theories of punishment that (...)
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  45.  7
    Responsibility and Justificatory Defenses.Re’em Segev - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):97-110.
    Criminal prohibitions typically forbid harming people. Justificatory defenses, such as lesser evil, justifying necessity and justifying self-defense, provide exceptions to such prohibitions if certain conditions are met. One common condition is that the agent is not responsible for the conflict. The questions whether justificatory defenses should include such a condition, and if so what should be its content, are controversial. I argue that responsibility for a conflict counts against protecting the responsible person at the expense of a non-responsible or a (...)
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  46. What Does It Mean to Be a Mechanism? Stephen Morse, Non-Reductivism, and Mental Causation.Katrina L. Sifferd - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):143-159.
    Stephen Morse seems to have adopted a controversial position regarding the mindbody relationship: John Searle’s non-reductivism, which claims that conscious mental states are causal yet not reducible to their underlying brain states. Searle’s position has been roundly criticized, with some arguing the theory taken as a whole is incoherent. In this paper I review these criticisms and add my own, concluding that Searle’s position is indeed contradictory, both internally and with regard to Morse's other views. Thus I argue that Morse (...)
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  47.  28
    On Jonathan Quong’s Sectarian Political Liberalism.Kevin Vallier - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):175-194.
    Jonathan Quong’s book, Liberalism without Perfection, provides an innovative new defense of political liberalism based on an “internal conception” of the goal of public justification. Quong argues that public justification need merely be addressed to persons who affirm liberal political values, allowing people to be coerced without a public justification if they reject liberal values or their priority over comprehensive values. But, by extensively restricting members of the justificatory public to a highly idealized constituency of liberals, Quong’s political liberalism becomes (...)
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  48.  29
    On the Matter of Suffering: Derek Parfit and the Possibility of Deserved Punishment.Leo Zaibert - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):1-18.
    Derek Parfit has recently defended the view that no one can ever deserve to suffer. Were this view correct, its implications for the thorny problem of the justification of punishment would be extraordinary: age-old debates between consequentialists and retributivists would simply vanish, as punishment would only—and simply—be justifiable along Benthamite utilitarian lines. I here suggest that Parfit’s view is linked to uncharacteristically weak arguments, and that it ought to be rejected.
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    Criminalization and the Collateral Consequences of Conviction.Zachary Hoskins - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-15.
    Convicted offenders face a host of so-called “collateral” consequences: formal measures such as legal restrictions on voting, employment, housing, or public assistance, as well as informal consequences such as stigma, family tensions, and financial insecurity. These consequences extend well beyond an offender’s criminal sentence itself and are frequently more burdensome than the sentence. This essay considers two respects in which collateral consequences may be relevant to the question of what the state should, or may, criminalize. First, they may be relevant (...)
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