Year:

  1.  6
    Processes of Criminalization in Domestic and International Law: Considering Sexual Violence.Michelle Madden Dempsey - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (4):641-656.
    This article explores some conceptual issues regarding criminalization at the domestic and international levels. It attempts to explain what it means to say that a particular kind of conduct has been criminalized, and considers how the processes of criminalization differ in domestic and international law. In unpacking these issues, the article takes the examples of rape and sex trafficking in domestic and international legal systems, explores whether these offenses are criminalized more broadly in international criminal law as compared to domestic (...)
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  2.  9
    Laws That Are Made to Be Broken.James Edwards - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (4):587-603.
    Criminal laws are created to achieve various ends. These include reducing the incidence of wrongdoing, and holding wrongdoers responsible for their wrongs. Some criminal laws are created to further the first of these ends by means of compliance. The second end is to be furthered only if, regrettably, some fail to comply. These criminal laws are made to be followed. Other criminal laws are not created with compliance in mind. Conviction, in these cases, is no regrettable fallback. It is the (...)
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  3.  3
    Criminal Law, Parental Authority, and the State.Shachar Eldar - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (4):695-705.
    In the recently published collection, Criminal Law and the Authority of the State, two contributions allude to an analogy with parental authority as a means to a better understanding of the institution of criminal punishment, but reach different conclusions. Malcolm Thorburn uses the parental authority analogy to justify the institution of state punishment as an assertion of robust authority over offenders. Antje du Bois-Pedain uses the same analogy to advocate the idea of punishment as an inclusionary practice, designed to reintegrate (...)
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  4.  95
    The Concept of Entrapment.Daniel J. Hill, Stephen K. McLeod & Attila Tanyi - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (4):539-554.
    Our question is this: What makes an act one of entrapment? We make a standard distinction between legal entrapment, which is carried out by parties acting in their capacities as (or as deputies of) law- enforcement agents, and civil entrapment, which is not. We aim to provide a definition of entrapment that covers both and which, for reasons we explain, does not settle questions of permissibility and culpability. We explain, compare, and contrast two existing definitions of legal entrapment to commit (...)
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  5.  1
    Criminalization and the Collateral Consequences of Conviction.Zachary Hoskins - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (4):625-639.
    Convicted offenders face a host of so-called “collateral” consequences: formal measures such as legal restrictions on voting, employment, housing, or public assistance, as well as informal consequences such as stigma, family tensions, and financial insecurity. These consequences extend well beyond an offender’s criminal sentence itself and are frequently more burdensome than the sentence. This essay considers two respects in which collateral consequences may be relevant to the question of what the state should, or may, criminalize. First, they may be relevant (...)
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  6.  3
    International Criminal Trials and the Circumstances of Justice.Colleen Murphy - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (4):575-585.
    Transitional justice is broadly understood to refer to formal efforts to deal with past wrongs in the midst of a transition from an extended period of conflict or repression to democracy. In this paper, I consider the role of international criminal trials in transitional justice. I argue that such trials may contribute to transitional justice, but such contributions are conditional on two main factors. The first factor is time. The second factor is what other transitional justice responses are adopted domestically.
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  7.  10
    Do Theories of Punishment Necessarily Deliver a Binary System of Verdicts? An Exploratory Essay.Federico Picinali - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (4):555-574.
    Scholars writing on theories of punishment generally try to answer two main questions: what human behaviour should be punished and why? Only cursorily do they concern themselves with the question as to how confident in the occurrence of criminal behaviour we must be prior to punishing—i.e., the question of the criminal standard of proof. Theories of punishment are ultimately theories about choices of action—in particular, about how to treat individuals. If this is correct, it seems that they should not overlook (...)
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  8.  20
    Corrective Justice as A Principle of Criminal Law: A Prolegomenon.Andrei Poama - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (4):605-623.
    This article argues that corrective justice is an adequate principle of criminalization. On my interpretation, corrective justice holds that, in order for an action to count as a crime, there needs to be a plausible normative story about an offender having violated the interests of a victim in a way that disturbs their relationship as equal persons and a subsequent story about responding to crime in a way that corrects this disturbance. More specifically, I claim that corrective justice is concerned (...)
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  9.  9
    Criminalization, Legitimacy, and Welfare.Dan Priel - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (4):657-676.
    A standard view about criminal law distinguishes between two kinds of offenses, “mala in se” and “mala prohibita.” This view also corresponds to a distinction between two bases for criminalization: certain acts should be criminalized because they are moral wrongs; other acts may be criminalized for the sake of promoting overall welfare. This paper aims to show two things: first, that allowing for criminalization for the sake of promoting welfare renders the category of wrongfulness crimes largely redundant. Second, and more (...)
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  10.  9
    Review of Findlay Stark, Culpable Carelessness: Recklessness and Negligence in the Criminal Law. [REVIEW]Alexander Sarch - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (4):725-730.
    This book review sketches the main arguments of Findlay Stark’s book, and then goes on to develop an objection to Stark’s account of one of the core notions in the book—namely, awareness of risk.
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  11.  4
    Deferred Prosecution Agreements and the Presumption of Innocence.Roger A. Shiner & Henry Ho - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (4):707-723.
    A deferred prosecution agreement, or DPA, allows a corporation, instead of proceeding to trial on a criminal charge, to settle matters with the state by acknowledging the facts on which any charge would be based, pay a reduced fine, and agree to change the way they conduct business. Critics of DPAs have suggested that, because the defendant corporation must pay a fine and submit to structural reform without having been found guilty at trial, DPAs violate the Presumption of Innocence. This (...)
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  12.  3
    Right, Crime, and Court: Toward a Unifying Political Conception of International Law.Alain Zysset - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (4):677-693.
    It is widely acknowledged that human rights law and international criminal law share core normative features. Yet, the literature has not yet reconstructed this underlying basis in a systematic way. In this contribution, I lay down the basis of such an account. I first identify a similar tension between a “moral” and a “political” approach to the normative foundations of those norms and to the legitimate role of international courts and tribunals adjudicating those norms. With a view to bring the (...)
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  13.  17
    Is There a Case for Strict Liability?Larry Alexander - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (3):531-538.
    In this short paper, I shall answer the title’s question first in the context of criminal law and then in the context of tort law. In that latter section, I shall also mention in passing contractual and other forms of civil liability that are strict, although they will not be my principal focus. My conclusions will be that strict liability is never proper as the basis for retributive punishment; that it is a very crude device for achieving deterrence through nonretributive (...)
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  14.  6
    Does Fault Matter?Vera Bergelson - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (3):375-392.
    In this article, I try to go beyond the traditional objections to strict liability public welfare offenses and confront other possible justifications for punishing non-culpable conduct. Specifically, I consider the following arguments:Penalties for public welfare offenses are punishment by name only, thus traditional justifications for punishment are not needed;Even if those penalties are punishment, punishing those who produce or threaten significant harm to others is not necessarily unjust; andEven if such punishment is not entirely just, it is consistent with other (...)
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  15.  8
    The Responsibility Gap in Corporate Crime.Samuel W. Buell - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (3):471-491.
    In many cases of criminality within large corporations, senior management does not commit the operative offense—or conspire or assist in it—but nonetheless bears serious responsibility for the crime. That responsibility can derive from, among other things, management’s role in cultivating corporate culture, in failing to police effectively within the firm, and in accepting lavish compensation for taking the firm’s reins. Criminal law does not include any doctrinal means for transposing that form of responsibility into punishment. Arguments for expanding doctrine—including broadening (...)
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  16.  4
    Probing the Depths of the Responsible Corporate Officer’s Duty.Kimberly Kessler Ferzan - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (3):455-469.
    Many criminal law scholars have criticized the responsible corporate officer doctrine as a form of strict and vicarious liability. It is neither. It is merely a doctrine that supplies a duty in instances of omissions. Siding with Todd Aagaard in this debate, I argue that a proper reading of the cases yields that the responsible corporate officer doctrine is just duty supplying, and does not allow for strict liability when the underlying statute requires mens rea. After analyzing Dotterweich, Park, and (...)
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  17.  5
    Reflections on Prince, Public Welfare Offenses, American Cyanamid, and the Wisdom of the Common Law.John Hasnas - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (3):427-438.
    The fundamental requirement of Anglo-American criminal law is that crime must consist of the concurrence of a guilty mind—a mens rea—with a guilty act—an actus reus. And yet, the criminal law is shot through with discordant lumps of strict liability—crimes for which no mens rea is required. Ignoring the conventional normative objections to this aberration, I distinguish two different types of strict criminal liability: the type that arose at common law and the type associated with the public welfare offenses that (...)
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  18.  4
    Introduction to the Symposium on Crime Without Fault.John Hasnas - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (3):363-364.
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  19.  17
    Strict Liability and the Paradoxes of Proportionality.Leo Katz & Alvaro Sandroni - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (3):365-373.
    This essay explores the case against strict liability offenses as part of the more general debate about proportional punishment. This debate takes on a very different look in light of a formal result derived by the authors elsewhere, that is briefly summarized and whose implications are pursued here. Traditional objections that consequentialists have mounted against the deontologists’/retributivists’ defense of proportionality fall by the wayside, but a new threat to the proportionality requirement replaces it: the ease with which any such requirement (...)
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  20.  4
    The Trial of Joseph Dotterweich: The Origins of the “Responsible Corporate Officer” Doctrine.Craig S. Lerner - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (3):493-512.
    This article analyzes the origins of the “responsible corporate officer” doctrine: the trial of Joseph Dotterweich. That doctrine holds that an officer may be personally liable for the criminal act of a subordinate if the officer was, in some indefinite way, able to prevent the violation. Applying this doctrine, the prosecution of Dotterweich entailed strict liability for a strict liability offense. The underlying offenses—the interstate sale of one misbranded and adulterated drug and one misbranded drug—were said to be strict liability (...)
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  21.  14
    The Strictness of Strict Liability.Michael S. Moore - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (3):513-529.
    This article conceptualizes what strict liability is in the criminal law. Four properties are found to be individually necessary, only jointly sufficient, for there to be the kind of moral blameworthiness that must underlie any just punishment: prima facie wrongdoing, absence of justification, prima facie culpability, and absence of excuse. Whenever criminal liability is imposed without the presence of one or more of these properties, the liabuility is said to be strict.
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  22.  2
    Strict Liability’s Criminogenic Effect.Paul H. Robinson - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (3):411-426.
    It is easy to understand the apparent appeal of strict liability to policymakers and legal reformers seeking to reduce crime: if the criminal law can do away with its traditional culpability requirement, it can increase the likelihood of conviction and punishment of those who engage in prohibited conduct or bring about prohibited harm or evil. And such an increase in punishment rate can enhance the crime-control effectiveness of a system built upon general deterrence or incapacitation of the dangerous. Similar arguments (...)
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  23.  5
    Can Strict Criminal Liability for Responsible Corporate Officers Be Justified by the Duty to Use Extraordinary Care?Kenneth W. Simons - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (3):439-454.
    The responsible corporate officer doctrine is, as a formal matter, an instance of strict criminal liability: the government need not prove the defendant’s mens rea in order to obtain a conviction, and the defendant may not escape conviction by proving lack of mens rea. Formal strict liability is sometimes consistent with retributive principles, especially when the strict liability pertains to the grading of an offense. But is strict liability consistent with retributive principles when it pertains, not to grading, but to (...)
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  24.  8
    Mens Rea by the Numbers.Gideon Yaffe - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (3):393-409.
    Before the recent presidential election, a bipartisan congressional effort was made to pass a criminal justice reform bill. The bill faltered in part because of a proposed default mens rea provision: statutes silent on mens rea, that were not explicitly identified as strict liability by the legislature, would be taken to require for guilt proof of knowledge with respect to each material element. This paper focusses on a prominent line of disagreement about the default mens rea provision. Proponents argued that (...)
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  25.  3
    War Crimes: A Brief Road Map for Philosophical Inquiry.Alejandro Chehtman - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (2):267-270.
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  26.  2
    Justifying Extraterritorial War Crimes Trials.Margaret M. DeGuzman - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (2):289-308.
    The international community has yet to develop a broadly accepted philosophical rationale for the extraterritorial adjudication of war crimes. Instead, several justifications exist in a state of tension that produces uncertainties in the applicable legal doctrines and policies. This article explains how the competition between the “atrocities” approach on the one hand, and the statist and humanitarian rationales on the other, causes instability in the regime. It advocates for increased attention to the philosophical grounding of extraterritorial war crimes trials, particularly (...)
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  27.  5
    Killing in War: Unasked Questions-Ill-Founded Legitimisation.Albin Eser - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (2):309-326.
    Killing in war as a matter of course may be inferred from the fact that, as stated by Thomas Hobbes, “all laws are silent in the time of war”. Although this traditional law-suspending power of war has been restricted to a certain degree by modern humanitarian international law, it is still commonly assumed that killing in war, unless and as long as not explicitly forbidden, is per se permitted and thus does not require any further legitimisation. This is in fundamental (...)
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  28.  6
    The Deadly Serious Causes of Legitimate Rebellion: Between the Wrongs of Terrorism and the Crimes of War.Christopher J. Finlay - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (2):271-287.
    This article challenges the tendency exhibited in arguments by Michael Ignatieff, Jeremy Waldron, and others to treat the Law of Armed Conflict as the only valid moral frame of reference for guiding armed rebels with just cause. To succeed, normative language and principles must reflect not only the wrongs of ‘terrorism’ and war crimes, but also the rights of legitimate rebels. However, these do not always correspond to the legal privileges of combatants. Rebels are often unlikely to gain belligerent recognition (...)
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  29.  9
    Aspiration, Execution, and Controversy: Reply to My Critics.Douglas Husak - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (2):351-362.
    I respond to Michael Zimmerman and Gideon Yaffe, both of whom have written thoughtful and constructive criticisms of my “Ignorance of Law”. Zimmerman believes I do not go far enough in exculpating morally ignorant wrongdoers; he accuses me of lacking the courage of my convictions in allowing exceptions for reckless wrongdoers and for willfully ignorant wrongdoers. Yaffe, by contrast, thinks I rely on a defective foundation of moral blameworthiness. He proposes an alternative account he alleges to conform more closely to (...)
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  30.  7
    Incitement: A Study in Language Crime.Joseph Jaconelli - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (2):245-265.
    A person incurs inchoate criminal liability when he incites another person or other persons to commit a crime. The most salient characteristic of incitement, in comparison with the other forms of inchoate crime, is the existence of a communication that is made with a view to persuading the addressee to commit an offence. This article explores the question of why incitement should incur criminal liability, and the nature of such liability. It also identifies its distinctive features. The principal focus here (...)
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  31.  8
    Self-Control in Responsibility Enhancement and Criminal Rehabilitation.Polaris Koi, Susanne Uusitalo & Jarno Tuominen - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (2):227-244.
    Ethicists have for the past 20 years debated the possibility of using neurointerventions to improve intelligence and even moral capacities, and thereby create a safer society. Contributing to a recent debate concerning neurointerventions in criminal rehabilitation, Nicole Vincent and Elizabeth Shaw have separately discussed the possibility of responsibility enhancement. In their ethical analyses, enhancing a convict’s capacity responsibility may be permissible. Both Vincent and Shaw consider self-control to be one of the constituent mental capacities of capacity responsibility. In this paper, (...)
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  32.  7
    Desert as a Limiting Condition.Steven Sverdlik - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (2):209-225.
    I examine two related ideas about the role of desert judgments which say, roughly, that, if a punishment is undeserved, it is impermissible to impose it. These can both be taken to claim that desert is a ‘limiting condition’ on the pursuit of consequentialist aims. I discuss what considerations are supposed to support an offender’s desert claim. I first examine the major divide between contemporary retributivist theories: those that take an offender’s desert to supervene only on culpability considerations, and those (...)
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  33.  7
    Is Akrasia Necessary for Culpability? On Douglas Husak’s Ignorance of Law.Gideon Yaffe - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (2):341-349.
    This paper discusses Douglas Husak’s view that ignorance of the law always reduces culpability since the only fully culpable agents are those who are akratic—who act, that is, in a way that they judge to be wrongful, all things considered. The paper argues that this position is in tension with Husak’s avowed commitment to a reasons-responsiveness theory of culpability, given a plausible way of understanding what that means, and what a reason is.
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  34.  18
    Recklessness, Willful Ignorance, and Exculpation.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (2):327-339.
    In Ignorance of Law, Douglas Husak’s main thesis is that ignorance of the law typically provides an excuse for breaking the law, but in the case of recklessness he claims that the excuse it provides is only a partial one, and in the case of willful ignorance he claims that it provides no excuse at all. In this paper I argue that, given the general principle to which Husak appeals in order to support his main thesis, he should revise his (...)
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  35.  5
    Procedural Proportionality: The Remedy for an Uncertain Jurisprudence of Minor Offence Justice.Dat T. Bui - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (1):83-106.
    With a focus on the Common Law jurisdiction of England and Wales and the Civil Law jurisdiction of Vietnam, this article provides an analytical framework to address the uncertain jurisprudence of minor offence processes. The article’s approach is to seek an account of crime and criminal process that is most suitable for practice and most compatible with the broad notion of ‘criminal charge’ under international human rights instruments. It is argued that minor offences should be considered forms of less serious (...)
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  36.  78
    Self-Driving Cars in Dilemmatic Situations: An Approach Based on the Theory of Justification in Criminal Law.Ivó Coca-Vila - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (1):59-82.
    This article puts forward solutions to some of the ethical and legal dilemmas posed in the current discussion on how to program crash algorithms in autonomous or self-driving cars. The first part of the paper defines the scope of the problem in the criminal legal field, and the next section gives a critical analysis of the proposal to always prioritise the interest of the occupant of the vehicle in situations with conflict of interests. The principle of minimizing social damage as (...)
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  37.  9
    Retributivism and Public Opinion: On the Context Sensitivity of Desert.Göran Duus-Otterström - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (1):125-142.
    Retributivism may seem wholly uninterested in the fit between penal policy and public opinion, but on one rendition of the theory, here called ‘popular retributivism,’ deserved punishments are constituted by the penal conventions of the community. This paper makes two claims against this view. First, the intuitive appeal of popular retributivism is undermined once we distinguish between context sensitivity and convention sensitivity about desert. Retributivism in general can freely accept context sensitivity without being committed to the stronger notion of convention (...)
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  38.  24
    The Duty to Disregard the Law.Michael Huemer - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (1):1-18.
    In the practice of jury nullification, a jury votes to acquit a defendant in disregard of the factual evidence, on the grounds that a conviction would result in injustice, either because the law itself is unjust or because its application in the particular case would be unjust. Though the practice is widely condemned by courts, the arguments against jury nullification are surprisingly weak. I argue that, pursuant to the general ethical duty to avoid causing unjust harms to others, jurors are (...)
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  39. Could There Ever Be an App for That? Consent Apps and the Problem of Sexual Assault.Danaher John - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (1):143-165.
    Rape and sexual assault are major problems. In the majority of sexual assault cases consent is the central issue. Consent is, to borrow a phrase, the ‘moral magic’ that converts an impermissible act into a permissible one. In recent years, a handful of companies have tried to launch consent apps which aim to educate young people about the nature of sexual consent and allow them to record signals of consent for future verification. Although ostensibly aimed at addressing the problems of (...)
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  40.  7
    The Philosophy of Criminalisation: A Review of Duff Et Al.'s Criminalisation Series. [REVIEW]Paul McGorrery - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (1):185-207.
    The philosophy of criminalisation has been a neglected topic for some time now. A considerable amount of modern criminal justice literature is dedicated to preventing crime and punishing crime, but precious little attention is dedicated to the preliminary question: what should be a crime? Over the last decade, five editors and dozens of authors published a four-part series of edited essays in an attempt to answer that question. The present article is a hybrid of sorts: in one sense, it is (...)
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  41.  16
    Culpability and Irresponsibility.Martin Montminy - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (1):167-181.
    I defend the principle that a person is blameworthy for her action only if that action was morally wrong. But what should we say about an agent who does the right thing based on bad motives? I present three types of cases that have these features. In each, I argue, the agent is not culpable for her action; however, she violates the norm of moral responsibility, and thus acts in a morally irresponsible way. This analysis, I show, has several virtues. (...)
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  42.  13
    Ignorance Lost: A Reply to Yaffe on the Culpability of Willful Ignorance.Alexander Sarch - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (1):107-124.
    In a recent paper in this journal, Gideon Yaffe provides an expected utility model of culpability in order to explain why willfully ignorant misconduct sometimes is just as culpable as knowing misconduct. Although promising, I argue here that challenges remain for Yaffe’s view. First, I argue that Yaffe’s proof of the equal culpability of willful ignorance and knowledge is not watertight in certain realistic cases. Next, I argue that Yaffe’s view of culpability is motive-sensitive in a way that sits uncomfortably (...)
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  43.  20
    The Wrong of Mass Punishment.Hamish Stewart - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (1):45-57.
    The increase in incarceration of offenders in the United States over the last 40 years has created a system of mass incarceration or mass punishment. While consequentialist theories of punishment may generate considerable doubts about the value of this system, it seems that retributive theories of punishment lack the resources to criticize mass punishment. Because of their focus on individual desert, it seems that they can say nothing about punishment in the aggregate. Nevertheless, there are good reasons for a certain (...)
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  44.  6
    Erratum To: Defense Categories and the De Minimis Defense.Melissa Beth Valentine - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (1):183-183.
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  45.  27
    The Point of Mens Rea: The Case of Willful Ignorance.Gideon Yaffe - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (1):19-44.
    Under the “Willful Ignorance Principle,” a defendant is guilty of a crime requiring knowledge he lacks provided he is ignorant thanks to having earlier omitted inquiry. In this paper, I offer a novel justification of this principle through application of the theory that knowledge matters to culpability because of how the knowing action manifests the agent’s failure to grant sufficient weight to other people’s interests. I show that, under a simple formal model that supports this theory, omitting inquiry manifests precisely (...)
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