This essay differs from Philström’s by offering a tinkering, not a full-blown critique. The alternative depends on a terminological distinction between ¨first-wave¨ Pragmatism and subsequent renditions. The thesis defended: Philström’s challenge depends on accepting first-wave Pragmatism´s formulations. These continued to foster a key ¨Modern¨ (Cartesian) assumption: that there was a rational, logical approach that could harmonize incompatibles. Such an approach invented a realm in which philosophers qua philosophers privileged intellectual purity and expelled incompatibles. Pragmatism moves away from this realm. It (...) does not seek method-related resolutions, but experiments with social transactions which mix and combine incompatibles. In this way Pragmatism rehabilitates metaphor which, eschewing purity, inevitably reveals and conceals. (shrink)

While I emphatically share Pihlström’s alarm about the “lunacy” of contemporary politics and the grave threat of fascistic, conservative, and authoritative movements presently wrecking democracy around the globe, I do not, however, accept Pihlström’s argument about the pragmatic method precisely as a method for reconciliation. I contend that pragmatism should not be consolidated to a method, for mediation and reconciliation are not pragmatically useful today. Moreover, I submit that instead of mediation and reconciliation, pragmatism should concern itself with experience and (...) transformation. I ultimately suggest we not depend on reifying methods that promise reconciliation; instead, embrace experience by attacking conflicts individually and look to transformation as a goal. (shrink)

In “Pragmatism as Mediator—Seeking an Illusory Harmony?” (2023) Sami Pihlström takes a critical stance on pragmatic mediation. While agreeing with how pragmatic mediation functions in the context of philosophical disagreement, I argue for extending its role to more practical and policy-oriented contexts. In this response I sketch out a pragmatic approach to the function of punishment within the US legal system.

Sami Pihlström argues that, for principled reasons, we have a duty not to listen to racists. Although this stance can seem admirable, I worry that by cutting itself off from evidence, a refusal to listen leaves wrongfully accused persons no means of exonerating themselves. Moreover, given that concepts like racism now encompass beliefs and acts that many rightly consider sensible, a policy of silence risks dismissing implausibly large numbers of people as immoral. Stressing that listening is not acquiescing, I urge (...) Pihlström to think more carefully about the consequences of his stance, especially since it would increase the likelihood of conflict. (shrink)

This article responds to the six essays critically commenting on my article, “Pragmatism as a Mediator – Seeking an Illusory Harmony?”.

This article is a prudent attempt to address what the author believes is political and philosophical lunacy in our contemporary world. I argue that philosophers, pragmatic or otherwise, should be more interested in explaining the significance of the lunacy, and being creative and meliorative in responding to it. The concern of the article seems to be not only that of purifying pragmatism, but also protecting the ideal of liberal democracy. I believe the world is so radically experimental that trying to (...) control the apparent lunacy reflects poorly on pragmatism. (shrink)

I argue that Pihlström’s advocacy of both/and mediation is inadequate for making sense of contemporary difficulties, such as racism vs. antiracism and democracy vs. antidemocracy. This is due to an unwarranted equivocation between two incompatible kinds of rapprochement, reconciliation and reconstruction. In challenging Pihlström to get over James and on to Dewey and beyond, I propose neither/nor reconstruction instead of both/and reconciliation. I suggest that the former fits with neuropragmatism, while the latter with transcendental pragmatism. From this, I challenge Pihlström’s (...) appeal to James’s hope for an eternal moral order. I appeal instead to Dewey’s sense of reconstruction’s task as creating a new moral order. Through neuropragmatism’s emphasis on reconstruction, there is hope that rapprochement is possible, without unthinkable compromises. (shrink)