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  1.  10
    Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology in the Light of Kant’s Third Critique and Schelling’s Real-Idealismus.Sebastian Gardner - 2017 - Continental Philosophy Review 50 (1):5-25.
    In this paper I offer a selective, systematic rather than historical account of Merleau-Ponty’s highly complex relation to classical German philosophy, focussing on issues which bear on the question of his relation to transcendentalism and naturalism. I argue that the concerns which define his project in Phenomenology of Perception are fundamentally those of transcendental philosophy, and that Merleau-Ponty’s disagreements with Kant, and the position he arrives at in The Visible and the Invisible, are helpfully viewed in light of issues which (...)
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  2.  7
    Was Merleau-Ponty a ‘Transcendental’ Phenomenologist?Andrew Inkpin - 2017 - Continental Philosophy Review 50 (1):27-47.
    Whether or not Merleau-Ponty’s version of phenomenology should be considered a form of ‘transcendental’ philosophy is open to debate. Although the Phenomenology of Perception presents his position as a transcendental one, many of its features—such as its exploitation of empirical science—might lead to doubt that it can be. This paper considers whether Merleau-Ponty meets what I call the ‘transcendentalist challenge’ of defining and grounding claims of a distinctive transcendental kind. It begins by highlighting three features—the absolute ego, the pure phenomenal (...)
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  3.  11
    Introduction: Merleau-Ponty’s Gordian Knot.Andrew Inkpin & Jack Reynolds - 2017 - Continental Philosophy Review 50 (1):1-3.
  4.  13
    Measurement as Transcendental–Empirical Écart: Merleau-Ponty on Deep Temporality.David Morris - 2017 - Continental Philosophy Review 50 (1):49-64.
    Merleau-Ponty’s radical reflection conceptualizes the transcendental and the empirical as intertwined, emerging only via an écart. I advance this concept of transcendental empirical écart by studying the problem of measurement in science, in both general and quantum mechanical contexts. Section one analyses scientific problems of measurement, focusing on issues of temporality, to show how measurement entails a transcendental that diverges with the empirical. Section two briefly interprets this result via Merleau-Ponty’s concept of depth, to indicate how measurement reveals a temporality (...)
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  5.  13
    Other Minds Embodied.Søren Overgaard - 2017 - Continental Philosophy Review 50 (1):65-80.
    I distinguish three kinds of other minds problems—conceptual, epistemological and empirical. I argue that while Merleau-Ponty believes embodiment helps with tackling the conceptual and epistemological problems, he suggests that it is of no clear use in solving the empirical problem. I sketch some considerations that could lend support to Merleau-Ponty’s claims about the conceptual and epistemological problems, without claiming that these are conclusive. I then proceed to argue that Merleau-Ponty’s take on the empirical problem is essentially correct.
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  6.  21
    Merleau-Ponty's Gordian Knot: Transcendental Phenomenology, Empirical Science, and Naturalism.Jack Reynolds - 2017 - Continental Philosophy Review 50 (1):81–104.
    In this paper, I explore a series of fertile ambiguities that Merleau-Ponty's work is premised upon. These ambiguities concern some of the central methodological commitments of his work, in particular his commitment (or otherwise) to transcendental phenomenology and how he transforms that tradition, and his relationship to science and philosophical naturalism and what they suggest about his philosophical methodology. Many engagements with Merleau-Ponty's work that are more ‘analytic’ in orientation either deflate it of its transcendental heritage, or offer a "modest" (...)
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  7.  7
    The Primacy Question in Merleau-Ponty’s Existential Phenomenology.Bryan Smyth - 2017 - Continental Philosophy Review 50 (1):127-149.
    This paper takes up the question as to what has primacy within Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology as a way to provide insight into the relation between empirical science and transcendental philosophy within his account of embodiment. Contending that this primacy necessarily pertains to methodology, I show how Kurt Goldstein’s conception of biology provided Merleau-Ponty with a scientific model for approaching human existence holistically in which primacy pertains to the transcendental practice of productive imagination that generates the eidetic organismic Gestalt in terms (...)
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  8.  7
    Toward a Transcendental Account of Creativity. Kant and Merleau-Ponty on the Creative Power of Judgment and Creativity as Institution.Michela Summa - 2017 - Continental Philosophy Review 50 (1):105-126.
    Several works published in the last decades defend the claim that the concept of creativity should be demystified. With the aim of showing that creativity is not an obscure power owned by only few individuals and free from constraints, authors working at the intersection field between philosophy and cognitive science have notably focused on the structure and evolution of cognitive mechanisms underlying our creative capacities. While taking up the suggestion that we should try not to mystify creativity, this article argues (...)
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