In public discourse trauma is predominantly framed as an overwhelming event undergone by the individual. In this article I first provide a brief genealogy to trace the emergence of what is now the dominant temporal framework of psychological catastrophe. I supplement this evental nosology with a durational consideration of trauma by drawing on the works of Henri Bergson and his articulation of duration, memory, and lived experience. Durational trauma accommodates liminal and ongoing experiences of the catastrophic that are equally devastating (...) to the paradigmatic exemplars of PTSD. This alternate account entails different modalities of reparation and responsibility to the systemic traumatization of others. For this I draw on Levinas and his intersubjective ethics drawing out the relevancy his work has for this concept of durational trauma. Levinas’s emphasis on expiation avoids the reification of the trauma of the other as spectacle and draws into focus one’s own participation in the circulation and continuation of ongoing traumatic networks. This contributes to the emergent alchemy of reading Bergson and Levinas together, but likewise, to philosophy of trauma and the ethical responsibility and temporality of ongoing systemic harm. (shrink)

This article is concerned with the status and stakes of Gilles Deleuze’s “break” with structuralism. With a particular focus on a transitional text of Deleuze, the 1967/1972 article “How Do We Recognize Structuralism?,” it asks how Deleuze understood structuralism and why, after his encounter with Félix Guattari and Guattari’s own transitional text, 1969’s “Machine and Structure,” Deleuze felt the need to break with structuralism. It argues that reading these two texts together allows us to see that Deleuze already perceived tensions (...) within the structuralist project, and argues that Guattari’s non-structural account of the machine allowed Deleuze to clarify this perception, and see it as necessitating a departure from structuralism. To close, however, it turns to recent work by philosophers such as Étienne Balibar and Patrice Maniglier that re-examines the structuralist moment and identifies an ongoing legacy that the “poststructuralism” of Deleuze and Guattari may be part of. By considering Deleuze and Guattari’s break with structuralism in light of this work, this article considers how the polemical rejection of structuralism by Deleuze and Guattari may not fully account for the ongoing legacy of the structuralist program and the persistence of a structuralist problematic in their thought. (shrink)

The aim of my paper is to put Ricœur’s philosophy in dialogue with human geography. There are at least two good reasons to do so. The first concerns the epistemological foundation of geography: Whereas humanistic or phenomenological geographers inspired by Heidegger or, to a lesser extent, by Merleau-Ponty have sometimes taken on an anti-scientific approach, the Ricœurian articulation of understanding and explanation may contribute to building a bridge between the experiential side of place-meanings and the scientific explanations of spatial elements (...) and their relationships. The second reason has to do with the application of the Ricœurian “model of the text” to landscape: It is a direction that Ricœur never explicitly took, but it is worth exploring, especially considering that “landscape as a text” was quite a popular metaphor among human geographers in the 1980s and 1990s. In this paper I will discuss both issues in order to outline a “Ricœurian path to geography,” which, while never explicitly developed by the philosopher, may represent an innovative and fruitful actualization of his thought. (shrink)

Edmund Husserl’s ultimate aim was to give an overall philosophical explanation of the totality of Being. In this endeavour, the term “absolute” was crucial for him. In this paper, I aim to clarify the most important ways in which Husserl used this notion. I attempt to show that, despite his rather divergent usages, eventually three fundamental meanings and coordinated levels of the “absolute” can be differentiated in his thought: the epistemological, the ontological, and the theological or metaphysical level. According to (...) Husserl, we can approach this ultimate level of the Absolute, through the method of phenomenological construction. A closer reading of Husserl’s texts shows that his conception of the absolute was astonishingly modern. The main features of the conception—on all three levels—were non-foundationalism, contextualism, openness, and circularity. Each level mutually founds and determines the others. It is a non-foundational Absolute, the moments of which constitute an organic and open totality which is essentially processual. In my interpretation, this theory opens a fruitful working area, which has enormous philosophical potential and is surprisingly up-to-date. (shrink)

My paper aims at laying out the main tenets of Patočka’s unusual and highly provocative position with regard to the question of history, drawing essentially on his Heretical Essays on the Philosophy of History, while also gathering insights from other works such as Eternity and Historicity and Europe and post-Europe. In the first part, I set in place the overall framework of this analysis, and show that three distinct, yet entwined concepts of history are operative in Patočka’s work: the understanding (...) of history as a specific regime of meaning, as an existential possibility of the human Dasein, and as a “epochal” dynamic. In the second part, I reconstruct the criticism Patočka mounts against the classical philosophies of history and indicate that his rejection of a teleological account of history is compatible with the attempt of establishing an intrinsic correlation between meaning and history. In the final part, I stress the importance acquired by the experience of the “shattering of meaning” for Patočka’s threefold understanding of history and argue for the possibility of crafting a unitary framework which would encompass his analysis. (shrink)

This review of Bettina Bergo’s book, Anxiety, draws attention both to the interweaving method of her account and to the substance of its implications. Her evocative historical and textual analyses, I argue, result in a widening conception of the mind that challenges our attempts to locate anxiety merely in the body or in consciousness.

Martin Koci’s Thinking Faith after Christianity is a rigorous and nuanced study of Jan Patočka’s philosophy, ineluctable for researchers interested in post-Heideggerian phenomenology and philosophy of religion. Koci makes a unique contribution by reconstructing Patočka’s phenomenological insights into the meaning of faith such that Christianity can be rethought as a way to understanding the experience of transcendence in human existence without falling prey to Heidegger’s critique of onto-theology. This review emphasizes Koci’s interpretation of certain key texts in Patočka’s corpus that (...) sheds a new light on a cluster of Patočka’s concetps, such as supercivilization, responsibility and historicity. With Koci’s original interpretation of faith, one might further advance the question as to whether Patočka’s philosophy paves the way for a phenomenological understanding of the core experience of non-Christian religion. (shrink)

This review explores the complex and nuanced views of Hermann Levin Goldschmidt’s conception of “setting contradiction free” in order to allow for the improvement of human capability. This conception spans a number of issues—politics, ethics, religion, and history being the foremost among them. Goldschmidt’s view belongs to that constellation of thinkers that includes Levinas and Adorno in attempting to give voice to a plurality of viewpoints that may not agree with one another.

Violence, Slavery and Freedom between Hegel and Fanon is a volume of secondary literature that dispels common misconceptions about the relationship between Hegelian and Fanonian philosophy, and sheds new light on the connections and divergences between the two thinkers. By engaging in close textual analyses of both Hegel and Fanon, the chapters in this volume disambiguate the philosophical relation between Sartre and Fanon, scrutinize the conflation of Self-Consciousness in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit and subjectivity in Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy (...) of History in light of Hegel’s reception in decolonial thought, and flesh out the pivotal ontological role of violence in Fanon’s work. In particular, this volume underscores the necessity of Fanon scholars to pay heed to the distinction between Hegel’s dialectic of lordship and bondage and Kojève’s master-slave dialectic, as the latter—an anthropological interpretation of a Hegelian epistemological gestalt of consciousness—is what enables Fanon to engage with the former as a historical dialectic. This review emphasizes that Violence, Slavery and Freedom between Hegel and Fanon is a pedagogically significant text, and ultimately concludes that this volume is a vital resource for Continental Philosophical scholarship on Fanon and Hegel. (shrink)

One of Gadamer's largest and most characteristic concerns has been to show that hermeneutics is a form of practical philosophy. The central task of hermeneutics as practical philosophy for Gadamer is to reflectively appropriate the moral resources of our tradition in order to respond to the skepticism—characteristic of our age—about our ability to reach the truth in our normative judgments. Practical philosophy in this sense depends upon Gadamer’s conception of language as disclosive of truth. The form of disclosure that is (...) especially important in this regard is the uncovering of truth in the space between conversation partners, a space that is opened up and constituted by the merging of the horizons of the participants in a dialogue. The claim that truth is disclosed in the search for, and discovery of, a shared language in and through which the matter at issue between the participants in a conversation can come to presentation is grounded in Gadamer’s account of the “belonging together” of word and thing. Gadamer maintains in this respect that the thing itself is given in language. To help us understand this claim I turn to Gadamer’s discussion of the image, since—in a comparison that Gadamer explicitly makes—here, too, the image “gives” the thing. Notwithstanding this, the disclosure of things in language is always only partial. The concluding section of this essay brings into focus this finite and limited character of linguistic disclosure and hence of language itself. (shrink)

Corijn van Mazijk’s book is a critical exploration of the relations between Immanuel Kant’s, Edmund Husserl’s, and John McDowell’s transcendental philosophies. His primary aim is not to conduct a historical study, but “to show that history provides us with viable alternatives to McDowell’s theory of our perceptual access to reality.” The book covers a variety of McDowellian themes: the Myth of the Given, the space of reasons vs. the space of nature, conceptualism, disjunctivism, naturalism, and realism—uncovering the roots of McDowell’s (...) views and providing Kantian and Husserlian correctives where needed. (shrink)

This article retrieves Freud’s Paul as a forgotten predecessor and untapped critic of the “return to Paul” in contemporary political theology and continental philosophy. Given that Sigmund Freud published Moses and Monotheism in 1939 having barely escaped from Vienna, the text’s reception has justly been dominated by the question of Freud’s identification with Moses and the relationship between psychoanalysis and Judaism. However, I argue that this narrow focus has obscured the more fundamental problem of the connection between religion and Freud’s (...) enigmatic notion of “historical truth,” which he works out not through Moses but through Saint Paul. To do so, I first show how Freud’s genealogy of monotheism is modeled on the pathogenesis of hysterical symptoms. I then trace how Freud deepens his investigation into the etiology of symptom-formation until he arrives at the notion of historical truth and the archaic heritage that transmits it. Lastly, I demonstrate that Freud presents himself less as a Pauline figure than he does Paul as a proto-analyst. Through this staging, I contend that Freud parochializes the claims of Christianity as symptomatic of a more archaic historical truth that psychoanalysis alone is able to access. Freud’s Paul demonstrates that it is not a question of whether but how ostensibly modern secular discourses inherit the theological traditions in which they are imbedded. Reading Freud as a philosopher of religion ultimately offers an indictment of any philosophy or emancipatory politics naively modeled on theological universalism. (shrink)

Heidegger conceives Dasein’s death as a peculiar type of negation, i.e., a negation that is not simple disappearance, and so is, in some sense, survived by Dasein. This paper argues that Heidegger’s technical terminology for this type of negation is the “deficient mode.” The ontological structure of the deficient mode is characterized by Heidegger as a mode of the “nur noch,” which is a way of just being. And to just be, in the sense that deficient modes just are, is (...) grounded in the unique identity conditions characteristic of a being that can exist in deficient modes—its identity is an unnecessary necessity, and so its loss is a possible impossibility. Hence, the connection with Dasein’s death, which Heidegger defines as “the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein.” Death is Dasein in a deficient mode. This interpretation of Heideggerian death is then used to address the debated issue concerning Heidegger’s distinction between death and demise. (shrink)

What makes us the same person across time? The different solutions to this problem known as personal identity can be divided into two camps: A numerical and a practical approach. While the former asks for the conditions of identity based on the question “what is a person?,” the latter is concerned with what we identify with in everyday life as essential in order to form a narrative of one’s life as a whole based on the question “who am I?” However, (...) by emphasizing the cognitive and/or experiential capacities as the sole condition for self or personhood, both approaches fail to offer an adequate account of birth and death. The one being born is not yet someone with such cognitive capacities and the one who dies is unable to experience his or her own death. By invoking conceptual frameworks of Kierkegaard and Romano, I argue that birth and death must be considered both as events and conditions constitutive of personal identity rather than a set of derivative problems arising from an already established definition of self or person. (shrink)

Whereas classical Critical Theory has tended to view phenomenology as inherently uncritical, the recent upsurge of what has become known as critical phenomenology has attempted to show that phenomenological concepts and methods can be used in critical analyses of social and political issues. A recent landmark publication, 50 Concepts for Critical Phenomenology, contains no reference to psychiatry and psychopathology, however. This is an unfortunate omission, since the tradition of phenomenological psychiatry—as we will demonstrate in the present article by surveying and (...) discussing the contribution of Jaspers, Minkowski, Laing, Basaglia, and Fanon—from the outset has practiced critical thinking, be it at the theoretical, interpersonal, institutional, or political level. Fanon is today a recognized figure in critical phenomenology, even if his role in psychiatry might not yet have been appreciated as thoroughly as his anticolonial and antiracist contributions. But as we show, he is part of a long history of critical approaches in psychopathology and psychiatry, which has firm roots in the phenomenological tradition, and which keeps up its critical work today. (shrink)