I contend that Kant’s moral argument that postulates God and an afterlife in order to justify moral rationality counts strongly in favor of theistic ethics even though it cannot on its own justify that God exists. In moving toward this conclusion, I assess Kant’s moral argument and note how both Kant and the utilitarian Henry Sidgwick, in their own ways, recognize that morality cannot reasonably be seen as completely overriding if God and an afterlife are rejected. I then critique a (...) theistic moral rationality argument offered by C. Stephen Layman, as a flaw in this argument helps to reveal why arguments centering upon moral rationality likely cannot reach an ontological conclusion concerning theism; nevertheless, I contend that moral rationality arguments like Kant’s have apologetic significance for theism. They reveal a dilemma for secular ethics: either appeal to the possibility of theism in order to justify moral rationality or else accept that morality is not fully rational. (shrink)

In his 2016 book, Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity, Alasdair MacIntyre spends considerable time discussing how disputes between different moral theorists and different forms of practice might be adjudicated. A crucial addition to the tradition-constituted historical narrative approach of Whose Justice? Which Rationality? is his introduction of what he calls ‘sociological self-knowledge’. The present article outlines what MacIntyre means by this and suggests that his approach here dovetails well with Christian ethicists who have advocated the use of critical realist (...) sociology in Christian ethics. MacIntyre’s account stresses the importance of ‘a grasp of the nature of the roles and relationships in which one is involved’, a grasp helpfully conceptualized by critical realists. Daniel Finn also notes that the use of critical realism to analyze structures must be paired with a basic typology, and MacIntyre’s sociological self-knowledge, I argue, rests on precisely such a typology between two different types of moral practices. The article concludes by suggesting much more attention be paid to these ‘moral-social’ analyses when addressing apparently intractable disagreements in Christian social ethics. (shrink)

This article analyses and assesses the arguments opposing capital punishment put forward by Ján Kollár, a representative of Central European Evangelical/Lutheran Enlightenment rationalism, using the definition of criminal practice in Europe at the turn of the nineteenth century as the basis. Consequently, the author pays attention to the movement for reform in criminal law and practices, initiated in Europe in the second half of the eighteenth century by Cesare Beccaria, including his argumentation against capital punishment. In this context, the author (...) presents and investigates 13 arguments against capital punishment defined by Kollár in his 1815 diary. The author came to the conclusion that Kollár, in his arguments against capital punishment, followed, to a certain extent, the views of Beccaria and eighteenth -century adherents of the French Enlightenment; however, Kollár’s actual argumentation is rationalistically based on ethical values of humanity and justice with significant space also dedicated to utilitarian aspects of rejecting capital punishment adopted from reformists of criminal law. (shrink)

There is a lack of clarity in the literature about what constitutes the natural law approach to ethics and what is incompatible with it. The standard, and largely historical, way of understanding the natural law approach risks overlooking theoretical differences of fundamental importance regarding what the natural law approach is usually taken to uphold. Against Craig Paterson, I argue that a necessary condition for an ethical account to uphold fully the natural law approach is that it does not contain any (...) dependence upon the metaethical category of non-naturalism understood in non-supernaturalist terms. Using the ‘new natural law’ theory of John Finnis to illustrate my case, I also argue that an ethical theory can be largely in keeping with the natural law approach but nonetheless contain elements at odds with it: the issue is more complex than a simple binary. This is an under-explored possibility in natural law ethics. (shrink)

As the detrimental effects of human agency loom large in the ‘Anthropocene’, theologians and philosophers have called for restraint by invoking the concept of kenosis. Although a ‘self-emptying’ form of life helps to counter the ways that humans are increasingly driving other species to extinction, we argue that such calls are often compromised by relying on notions of the Creator’s own attenuated or self-limited agency. They therefore trade in a competitive construal that is susceptible to the tendency of human agency (...) to either displace, or project itself upon, all other agencies, inadvertently perpetuating the ‘human epoch’. In their place, we critically develop the new direction in kenotic theology that speaks of divine self-realization in history through ‘deep incarnation’. Our constructive proposal argues for a more thoroughgoing recognition of both the transcendence of divine agency and, as a corollary, the diverse agencies of our fellow creatures. (shrink)

The recent discovery and translation of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Ethics and the ongoing work on the sources and contours of his organic ontology create the impetus to relate these two trajectories together. The twin questions this article will be asking, precisely, are these: what is the logical relationship between Bavinck’s organic whole federalism, where ethical ties are ontologically constitutive, with his claim in the Reformed Ethics that sin’s organizing principle is the prioritization of the ego above all else? Further, how (...) does that organic whole anthropology inform his vision of renewal and the subsequent ethical imperative that flow from the Spirit’s regenerative work? This article traces Bavinck’s logic through the Ethics on these twin questions, while being cognizant of the rest of his oeuvre. With this exposition in hand, this article then relates Bavinck’s outlook to current discussions in Protestant theological ethics. (shrink)

The recent discovery and translation of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Ethics and the ongoing work on the sources and contours of his organic ontology create the impetus to relate these two trajectories together. The twin questions this article will be asking, precisely, are these: what is the logical relationship between Bavinck’s organic whole federalism, where ethical ties are ontologically constitutive, with his claim in the Reformed Ethics that sin’s organizing principle is the prioritization of the ego above all else? Further, how (...) does that organic whole anthropology inform his vision of renewal and the subsequent ethical imperative that flow from the Spirit’s regenerative work? This article traces Bavinck’s logic through the Ethics on these twin questions, while being cognizant of the rest of his oeuvre. With this exposition in hand, this article then relates Bavinck’s outlook to current discussions in Protestant theological ethics. (shrink)

There has been little considered reflection by Catholic theologians on the concepts of gender identity, gender dysphoria and gender transition. Seeking inspiration in the Scriptures, some Catholic thinkers have interpreted the first three chapters of Genesis and especially the text ‘male and female he created them’ as requiring all human beings to live in the gender role congruent with their biological sex, and have viewed the biology of sex as self-evident. This article argues that these chapters constitute an appropriate locus (...) for reflection on theological anthropology but that they need to be taken together with other texts and especially with the explicit teaching of Jesus Christ. In the Gospel according to Matthew, the one occasion in which Jesus invokes this passage from Genesis is when he draws attention to exceptional examples in nature and, in a striking phrase, states that some ‘have made themselves eunuchs for the sake of the kingdom of heaven’. If the Genesis text is interpreted in the light of the words of Christ, the binary division of the sexes, while ordained by God and the basis for a vocation to marry and procreate, admits of exceptions both natural and supernatural. (shrink)

David Clough’s two-volume work On Animals claims to be the first systematic Christian theological reflection on the place of nonhuman animals within creation which also provides an ethical reflection on what that might mean for our relationship with nonhuman animals in contemporary society. In this extended review, we provide a summary of the cumulative arguments across both volumes of On Animals before offering our reflections. While we agree with many though not all of Clough’s theological conclusions, we ultimately conclude that (...) Clough’s ethical solutions are too radical in places, and too optimistic without economic and systemic changes as to how humans relate to the nonhuman world. (shrink)

Of the many futuristic prospects offered by neuroscience, one of the more controversial is ‘brain reading’: the use of functional neuroimaging to gain information about subjects’ mental states or thoughts. This technology has various possible applications, including ‘neuromarketing’ and lie detection. Would such applications violate subjects’ privacy rights? Conversely, if God knows and judges all our secret thoughts, do Christians have any stake in defending a right to mental privacy? This article argues that God’s knowledge of us is different not (...) only in degree but in kind from the knowledge sought through brain reading. This view of divine knowledge supports a theological account of privacy, richer and broader in scope than standard accounts of privacy rights, which can aid the ethical analysis of the use of brain reading technology for purposes such as marketing and lie detection. (shrink)

Of the many futuristic prospects offered by neuroscience, one of the more controversial is ‘brain reading’: the use of functional neuroimaging to gain information about subjects’ mental states or thoughts. This technology has various possible applications, including ‘neuromarketing’ and lie detection. Would such applications violate subjects’ privacy rights? Conversely, if God knows and judges all our secret thoughts, do Christians have any stake in defending a right to mental privacy? This article argues that God’s knowledge of us is different not (...) only in degree but in kind from the knowledge sought through brain reading. This view of divine knowledge supports a theological account of privacy, richer and broader in scope than standard accounts of privacy rights, which can aid the ethical analysis of the use of brain reading technology for purposes such as marketing and lie detection. (shrink)

According to one influential narrative, a significant root of our ecological crisis is to be found in the Christian appropriation of teleology, undergirding the anthropocentrism endemic to Western thought. This article challenges this argument in three steps. First, I present the Aristotelian understanding of teleology, which is intrinsic to living organisms, and which has been suggested as a resource for ecological ethics. Second, I argue that the rejection of intrinsic teleology in favour of an extrinsic teleology first occurs with modern (...) philosophy, in tandem with a new pragmatic conception of knowledge. Third, I provide an alternative construal of the early Christian understanding of teleology, through the figure of Maximus the Confessor, arguing that his understanding of the contemplation of nature is a key resource to be recovered for ecological ethics. I end with a sketch of such a recovery, as articulated by Thomas Merton. (shrink)

The article sets out a critical assessment of recent public reactions in Germany upon taking in large numbers of refugees since 2015, which have been swaying between moralisation and resentment. In this situation, public theology should ask how hospitality is linked to the perceived identity of a society and to its perception of who belongs, and what role Christianity might play in these debates. Drawing on a phenomenological perspective within contemporary German philosophy, and contrasting this perspective with historical and contemporary (...) voices on migration within political philosophy, the article explores what the concepts of stranger, member and guest imply for the relation of ‘us’ to ‘the other’. From this, I derive a suggestion as to how Christian theology could contribute to a change in the self-perception of society, centred around the seemingly paradoxical concept of ‘belonging in not-belonging’. (shrink)

Nicholas Wolterstorff has presented an account of justice that has important implications for disability. He does not ground rights in intellectual capacities. Instead, rights are justly owed by virtue of the inherent worth bestowed by God to humanity, thereby protecting those with severe intellectual disabilities. Wolterstorff’s aesthetics, I claim, offer a vision for how these rights are rendered. By describing art as a social practice wherein justice can be rendered, and by describing justice as essential to Christian liturgy, Wolterstorff allows (...) liturgy to be a site where justice can and ought to be rendered to the disabled. Liturgy then becomes a social practice where one can learn to see those with disabilities differently, not as inherently ugly but as beloved by God and owed certain goods by right. (shrink)

Nicholas Wolterstorff has presented an account of justice that has important implications for disability. He does not ground rights in intellectual capacities. Instead, rights are justly owed by virtue of the inherent worth bestowed by God to humanity, thereby protecting those with severe intellectual disabilities. Wolterstorff’s aesthetics, I claim, offer a vision for how these rights are rendered. By describing art as a social practice wherein justice can be rendered, and by describing justice as essential to Christian liturgy, Wolterstorff allows (...) liturgy to be a site where justice can and ought to be rendered to the disabled. Liturgy then becomes a social practice where one can learn to see those with disabilities differently, not as inherently ugly but as beloved by God and owed certain goods by right. (shrink)