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  1.  6
    The Hidden Links Between Real, Thought and Numerical Experiments.Margherita Arcangeli - 2018 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):3-22.
    The scientist’s toolkit counts at least three practices: real, thought and numerical experiments. Although a deep investigation of the relationships between these types of experiments should shed light on the nature of scientific enquiry, I argue that it has been compromised by at least four factors: a bias for the epistemological superiority of real experiments; an almost exclusive focus on the links between either thought or numerical experiments, and real experiments; a tendency to try and reduce one kind to another; (...)
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  2. The Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments. [REVIEW]Mia Biturajac - 2018 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):219-229.
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  3.  1
    The ‘Arguments Instead of Intuitions’ Account of Thought Experiments.Ana Butković - 2018 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):191-203.
    After decades of receiving a lot of attention on the epistemological level, the so-called ‘problem of intuitions’ is now in the center of debates on the metaphilosophical level. One of the reasons for this lies in the unfruitfulness of the epistemological discussions that recently subsided without producing any significant or broadly accepted theory of intuitions. Consequently, the metaphilosophical level of discussion of the ‘problem of intuitions’ inherits the same difficulties of the epistemological level. The significance of Max Deutsch’s book The (...)
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  4.  3
    Intuiting Intuition: The Seeming Account of Moral Intuition.Hossein Dabbagh - 2018 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):117-132.
    In this paper, I introduce and elucidate what seems to me the best understanding of moral intuition with reference to the intellectual seeming account. First, I will explain Bengson’s quasi-perceptualist account of philosophical intuition in terms of intellectual seeming. I then shift from philosophical intuition to moral intuition and will delineate Audi’s doxastic account of moral intuition to argue that the intellectual seeming account of intuition is superior to the doxastic account of intuition. Next, I argue that we can apply (...)
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  5. Perspectives on the Self. [REVIEW]Marko Delić - 2018 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):244-248.
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  6.  1
    On Understanding a Theory on Conscious Experiences.Erhan Demircioğlu - 2018 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):75-86.
    McGinn claims, among other things, that we cannot understand the theory that explains how echolocationary experiences arise from the bat’s brain. One of McGinn’s arguments for this claim appeals to the fact that we cannot know in principle what it is like to have echolocationary experiences. According to Kirk, McGinn’s argument fails because it rests on an illegitimate assumption concerning what explanatory theories are supposed to accomplish. However, I will argue that Kirk’s objection misfires because he misapprehends McGinn’s argument. Further, (...)
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  7.  4
    Mais la Fantaisie Est-Elle Un Privilège des Seuls Poètes?Daniel Dohrn - 2018 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):87-99.
    Ever since the term ‘thought experiment’ was coined by Ørsted, philosophers have struggled with the question of how thought experiments manage to provide knowledge. Ernst Mach’s seminal contribution has eclipsed other approaches in the Austrian tradition. I discuss one of these neglected approaches. Faced with the challenge of how to reconcile his empiricist position with his use of thought experiments, Moritz Schlick proposed the following ‘Sinnkriterium’: a thought experiment is meaningful if it allows to answer a question under discussion by (...)
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  8. The Function and Limit of Galileo’s Falling Bodies Thought Experiment.Rawad el Skaf - 2018 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):37-58.
    The ongoing epistemological debate on scientific thought experiments revolves, in part, around the now famous Galileo’s falling bodies TE and how it could justify its conclusions. In this paper, I argue that the TE’s function is misrepresented in this a-historical debate. I retrace the history of this TE and show that it constituted the first step in two general “argumentative strategies”, excogitated by Galileo to defend two different theories of free-fall, in 1590’s and then in the 1638. I analyse both (...)
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  9.  5
    Is the Antipathetic Fallacy Responsible for the Intuition That Consciousness is Distinct From the Physical?François Kammerer - 2018 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):59-73.
    Numerous philosophers have recently tried to defend physicalism regarding phenomenal consciousness against dualist intuitions, by explaining the existence of dualist intuitions within a purely physicalist framework. David Papineau, for example, suggested that certain peculiar features of some of our concepts of phenomenal experiences led us to commit what he called the “Antipathetic Fallacy”: they gave us the erroneous impression that phenomenal experiences must be distinct from purely physical states, even though they are not. Papineau’s hypothesis has been accepted, though under (...)
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  10.  2
    Moral Thought-Experiments, Intuitions, and Heuristics.Friderik Klampfer - 2018 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):133-160.
    Philosophical thought-experimentation has a long and influential history. In recent years, however, both the traditionally secure place of the method of thought experimentation in philosophy and its presumed epistemic credentials have been increasingly and repeatedly questioned. In the paper, I join the choir of the discontents. I present and discuss two types of evidence that in my opinion undermine our close-to-blind trust in moral thought experiments and the intuitions that these elicit: the disappointing record of thought-experimentation in contemporary moral philosophy, (...)
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  11.  1
    Thought Experiments in the Theory of Law.Miomir Matulović - 2018 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):101-116.
    H. L. A. Hart’s The Concept of Law is an important and infl uential work in the modern philosophy and theory of law. In it, Hart introduced and discussed three imaginary scenarios: the absolute monarchy under the Rex dynasty; the pre-legal society governed by primary rules of obligation; and the worlds in which rules would be different from those in our actual world. Although Hart did not use the expression “thought experiments” in his work, some of his interpreters refer to (...)
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  12.  1
    The Myth of the Moral Brain. The Limits of Moral Enhancement. [REVIEW]Tomislav Miletić - 2018 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):230-236.
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  13. Introduction.Nenad Miščević - 2018 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):1-1.
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  14.  2
    Simulation and Thought Experiments.Nenad Miščević - 2018 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):161-190.
    The paper investigates some mechanisms of thought-experimenting, and explores the role of perspective taking, in particular of mental simulation, in political thought-experiments, focusing for the most part on contractualist ones. It thus brings together two blossoming traditions: the study of perspective taking and methodology of thought-experiments. How do contractualist thought-experiments work? Our moderately inflationist mental modelling proposal is that they mobilize our imaginative capacity for perspective taking, most probably perspective taking through simulation. The framework suggests the answers to questions that (...)
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  15. Knowledge Through Imagination. [REVIEW]Nenad Miščević - 2018 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):237-241.
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  16. Thought Experiments Between Nature and Society: A Festschrift for Nenad Miščević. [REVIEW]Davor Pećnjak - 2018 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):241-244.
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  17.  2
    “The Brain in Vat” at the Intersection. [REVIEW]Danilo Šuster - 2018 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):205-217.
    Goldberg 2016 is a collection of papers dedicated to Putnam’s (1981) brain in a vat (‘BIV’) scenario. The collection divides into three parts, though the issues are inter-connected. Putnam uses conceptual tools from philosophy of language in order to establish theses in epistemology and metaphysics. Putnam’s BIV is considered a contemporary version of Descartes’s skeptical argument of the Evil Genius, but I argue that deception (the possibility of having massively false belief) is not essential, externalism does all the anti-skeptical work. (...)
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  18.  2
    The Mathematics-Natural Sciences Analogy and the Underlying Logic.Majda Trobok - 2018 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):23-36.
    The aim of this paper is to point to the analogy between mathematical and physical thought experiments, and even more widely between the epistemic paths in both domains. Having accepted platonism as the underlying ontology as long as the platonistic path in asserting the possibility of gaining knowledge of abstract, mind-independent and causally inert objects, my widely taken goal is to show that there is no need to insist on the uniformity of picture and monopoly of certain epistemic paths in (...)
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