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  1.  4
    Philosophy as The Articulation of Absolute Presuppositions.R. T. Allen - 2016 - Collingwood and British Idealism Studies 22 (1):41-61.
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  2.  2
    Introduction.G. D'Oro - 2016 - Collingwood and British Idealism Studies 22 (1):1-14.
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  3. Deriving Collingwood's Metaethics: Absolute Presuppositions as Fundamental Principles of Morality.S. Daniel - 2016 - Collingwood and British Idealism Studies 22 (1):63-85.
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  4.  3
    Dialectics and Typology: Narrative Structure in Hegel and Collingwood.R. Diaz-Maldonado - 2016 - Collingwood and British Idealism Studies 22 (1):113-138.
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  5.  1
    Collingwood, Wittgenstein, Strawson: Philosophy and Description.V. Kindi - 2016 - Collingwood and British Idealism Studies 22 (1):15-39.
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  6.  23
    Collingwood and Manipulability-Based Approaches to Causation: Methodological Issues.E. Popa - 2016 - Collingwood and British Idealism Studies 22 (1):139-166.
    This paper discusses methodological similarities between Collingwood's approach to causation and contemporary manipulability-based views. Firstly, I argue that on both approaches there is a preoccupation with the origin of causal concepts which further connects to the aim of establishing the priority of a certain concept/sense of causation as more fundamental. The significant difference lies in Collingwood's focus on the logical and historical priority (Collingwood's sense I) while in more recent theories the focus has been on psychology (i.e., on different philosophical (...)
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  7. Against Adversarial Discussion.Maarten Steenhagen - 2016 - Collingwood and British Idealism Studies 22 (1):87-112.
    Why did R.G. Collingwood come to reject the adversarial style of philosophical discussion so popular among his Oxford peers? The main aim of this paper is to explain that Collingwood came to reject his colleagues’ specific style of philosophical dialogue on methodological grounds, and to show how the argument against adversarial philosophical discussion is integrated with Collingwood’s overall criticism of realist philosophy. His argument exploits a connection between method and practice that should be taken seriously even today.
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