Thinkers from the Chinese and Greco-Roman traditions posit that disparate objects throughout the cosmos have mutual affinities. In the Stoic tradition, such affinities are explained through “sympathy.” In the Chinese tradition, the explanatory principle is often called ganying 感應 (resonance). In addition, both traditions use similar philosophical strategies when discussing these concepts. Thinkers cite natural correspondences, placing them in parallel lists as evidence for philosophical truths. On the surface, the analogous concepts and strategies hint that these thinkers share similar philosophical (...) goals. However, analysis of the role natural correspondences play in argumentation discovers fundamental differences between the two traditions. The focus on particular arguments instead of broader cosmological trends offers a different perspective for comparative research, and the conclusions raise questions concerning how scholarship should analyze philosophical trends in early China. (shrink)

The “happy fish” passage in the Zhuangzi 莊子 is often interpreted as endorsing some form of perspectivism which precludes objective claims of knowledge and displaces the significance of human perspectives. Relativism has gained particular currency in contemporary readings. However, this essay aims to show the limited explanatory power of such relativist positions, with focus on Chad Hansen’s “perspectival relativism” and Lea Cantor’s “species relativism.” I will also offer a new, “transitional contextualist” reading, which intends to demonstrate that Zhuangzi’s utterance is (...) grounded in his epistemic context and that Huizi’s 惠子 disputation arises from his changing of the epistemic context, from one with quotidian “low standards” to one with “high-standards” skeptical demands. I further argue that when “wandering” (you 遊) is understood as a freedom from one’s partial perspective, it becomes clear how Zhuangzi analogizes a parallel with the fish’s “wandering” through a continuity between his “world” and that of the fish. (shrink)

I apply the Zhuangzi 莊子 to assess the contemporary value of personal autonomy. Focusing on two concepts, wuwei 無為 and you 遊, I clarify the “wandering ideal” in the Zhuangzi to challenge the ideal of autonomy as central to a well-lived life. Drawing on Sneddon’s persuasive recent account of autonomy, the Inner Chapters of the Zhuangzi, as well as recent secondary scholarship on the text, I show that the wandering ideal suggests a stark move away from the controlled and self-reflective (...) life of the autonomous person. My goal is to draw on the Zhuangzi to contribute to dialogue on the ideal of autonomy, rather than to provide an innovative way of reading the Zhuangzi. I argue that both autonomy and wandering are higher-order ideals that can be applied to individual actions and to a person’s form of life, but at both levels, wandering and personal autonomy are in tension. The conclusion briefly reflects on the significance of the tension. (shrink)

This paper reflects on two ideas addressed in Benoît Vermander’s essay “Edit by Number.” First, how can we apply “coherence in structure” to the historical development of textual production and edition in ancient China? And second, what concept of number underlies the considerations in the Huáinán Zǐ 淮南子? To answer the first question, this article compares the different compositional patterns of texts that, as with the Lǎo Zǐ 老子and the Yì Jīng 易經, are available to us in different versions. The (...) result of the comparison shows that the differences seem to outweigh the coherent patterns, so we must assume that some texts have undergone very large changes historically. Regarding the concept of number, different views on number are highlighted in texts of the Warring States Period and the Hàn 漢 dynasty, which shows that the Huáinán Zǐ contains a very specific concept of number and its own theory of the One. (shrink)

The present article discusses remarks and suggestions made by Andrew Meyer and Dennis Schilling on a previous contribution of the author. It assesses the status of the root-branches analogy in the Huainanzi 淮南子, and the compatibility of the said analogy with the composition of the same work as a ring composition. It also discusses the numerology proper to the Huainanzi in view of the principles provided by the Yijing 易經. It compares the structural arrangements of the Huainanzi with the ones (...) found in the various versions of the Daodejing 道德經. It concludes on the relationship that these two works establish between the understanding the Way (dao 道) and knowledge about shapes and numbers. (shrink)

This essay accounts for Mengzi’s 孟子 failure in persuading King Xuan of Qi (Qi Xuan Wang 齊宣王) to act morally. We argue that the distinction between internal and external reasons in contemporary philosophy helps to highlight the nature of the failure. The problem of nontransmission of the compassionate impulse within a person despite moral persuasion, which Mencians need to address in order to enhance the success of moral conversion, is now explained as a result of misdirecting the advisee to the (...) lofty ideal of sagehood. We conclude by proposing a proleptic understanding of external reasons within a pragmatic model of giving moral advice. (shrink)

This article departs from a mereological conceptualization of the Daoist metaphysi- cal system in the Daodejing 道德經. I discuss what parthood status applies to dao 道. Whereas it is quite intuitive that you 有—the region of concrete objects—has parthood relationships and compositions (entities made from parts), the other, undif- ferentiated region, dao, poses a considerable problem. This problem can be charac- terized in the following way: (a) dao cannot be characterized as a particular com- position, which entails that it does (...) not include parts. However, (b) dao underpins compositions in you, which entails that it contains compositions or at least parts that make compositions in you. This generates a problem of how compositions are possi- ble with an undifferentiated ontological foundation. I focus on one possible approach to this problem––mereological nihilism, according to which no composition is pos- sible. Assuming nihilism entails dao composed of mereological simples––funda- mental entities, which are not parts. (shrink)

Given wuwei 無為 describes the life praxis of the sage and statecraft of the enlightened ruler while also denoting the comportment of the Dao 道—an alternating state of quiet dormancy and creative activity—are the standard translations of wuwei as “nonaction” or “effortless action” up to the task? They are not, it will be argued, in that they fail to convey the true profundity of wuwei. The objective of this essay is twofold: to show that wuwei is better understood as “abiding (...) harmony” than nonaction, and to demonstrate this via a close reading of the Lüshi Chunqiu 呂氏春秋 (Master Lü’s Spring and Autumn Annals) which makes wuwei the epicenter of its doctrine of “the Dao of the ruler.” Indeed, the Lüshi Chunqiu’s unique application of wuwei lies not only in its borrowing of Daoist and Legalist norms, but in having the ruler meet the following prerequisites: be without knowledge, keep the senses and heart-mind pure, be reliant on others, follow Yin 陰 and Yang 陽, and study the course of heaven and earth to know the ways of humanity. There is, therefore, more to wuwei than meets the eye. (shrink)

This essay focuses on A Brief Response on the Controversies over Shangdi, Tianshen and Linghun by Niccolò Longobardo (1559–1654), a text that played a crucial role in the formation of European understanding of Chinese philosophy. Taken historically, the text is an important vehicle for the transmission of Chinese concepts into early modern European philosophy as well as a key intervention in the debate shaping the ideological premises of the Jesuit mission in China. It contains one of the first systematic accounts (...) of Chinese philosophy written by a European author. More importantly, it presents a narrative that links Mediterranean and Chinese intellectual history into a single historical current. In this way Longobardo plays a role analogous to the mapmaker who distorts three-dimensional spaces in order to project them together onto a two-dimensional plane. We present some of the peculiar shifts and emphases made by Longobardo in his reading of what seems to him a transhistorical current linking the Chinese and ancient Mediterranean philosophical milieus. In particular, we examine (1) the relationship between Longobardo’s attempt to situate Chinese thought in a global context and the choice to place special emphasis on the philosophy of Shao Yong 邵雍, treating him as a figure of primary importance among Song 宋 Neo-Confucian authors, and (2) the focus on the monist and cosmogonic aspects of Chinese thought, summarized by the “ten thousand things forming one body” (wanwuyiti 萬物一體) “axiom.”. (shrink)

This essay is dedicated to exploring the experience of multiple, perhaps conflicting, emotions occurring at the same time. Though this experience is part of our common language, such as when we speak of feeling conflicted or torn, philosophical accounts of the emotions and the research on these accounts tends to approach emotion sequentially, as a process of one emotion after another. This essay thus offers an account of simultaneous emotions in the work of two thinkers, Thomas Aquinas and Zhuangzi 莊子, (...) focused on the coincidence of grief and joy as found in exemplary persons. I argue that both Aquinas and Zhuangzi offer accounts which acknowledge the reality of simultaneous emotions, and both offer different explanations of how this is possible, as well as how these emotions are moderated or forgotten. (shrink)

This essay suggests that a narrative genre of “kill stories” has a prominent philosophical function in the Zhuangzi 莊子. Kill stories depict the domestication and disciplining of “wild” living beings eventually resulting in their death. They typically show an incongruity between the moral attitude of the perpetrators and their destructive deeds. Thereby, they illustrate a critique of a broader sociopolitical “master narrative” associated with the Confucian tradition that had a strong impact on ideology and ethical values in early China. In (...) the diagnosis of the kill stories, ritual practice and civilizational ordering inevitably produce discontent and unease. A second narrative genre that I call “survival stories” corresponds to the kill stories and connects with the medicinal orientation of the Daoist tradition. As therapeutic allegories, the survival stories reflect strategies for maintaining sanity and ease within society. Rather than advocating escapism or a return to a primitivist state, they promote the cultivation of immunity against consumption by social demands and pressures based on an insight into the inescapability and contingency of social roles. (shrink)

This article offers a critical overview of a set of normative theories, namely Tianxia 天下 (all-under-heaven), whose purpose is to provide a renewed conceptual framework for the improvement of the world system. First, the article introduces the origins, main features, and differences within Tianxia, before discussing two major criticisms leveled against it. The article then argues that the most powerful parts of these criticisms come from the challenges posed against Tianxia’s legitimacy. The article elaborates on this and introduces two additional (...) challenges of the same kind which were not discussed before. While the article leaves open the question of whether Tianxia is a realistic utopia, it insists that meaningful discussion of Tianxia must take legitimacy challenges seriously. It ends with a discussion concerning whether China can be understood as a civilization-state and how this understanding affects Tianxia’s reception as a realistic utopia. (shrink)

The last sentence of Chapter 10 of the Analects describes a brief encounter between Confucius and a hen-pheasant, and it does so in puzzling terms, ridden with lexical difficulties. At the same time, intertextual references insert this fragment into the context of Confucius’ life mission as well as of Chinese mythological narratives. This contribution assesses the fragment’s meaning and significance: Confucius’ reaction to the hen-pheasant unveils his evolving understanding of the Heavenly Mandate bestowed upon him. The fragment thus forcefully concludes (...) the chapter in which it is inserted. Additionally, I put forward a hypothesis: the focus of this narrative, coupled with its positioning at the end of Chapter 10, induce us to postulate that it may have been purposefully located at the very center of the Analects, a proposition that reverberates on the way we look at the composition of the book. (shrink)

The issue of human nature or xing 性 was a major philosophical topic of the mid- and late-Warring States period of ancient China. It was famously discussed, for example, in the Mencius. Zhuangzi 莊子 lived around the same time as Mencius and one might expect that he, too, would have discussed it. Surprisingly, the term xing is absent from the Inner Chapters of the Zhuangzi. There have been different responses to this, namely, that Zhuangzi: used different terms equivalent to xing; (...) believed that human nature is bad (despite not mentioning xing); was deliberately silent on xing as an oblique way of criticizing others such as Mencius. I review these claims and provide an analysis of how xing was mainly conceptualized during the Warring States period in essentialist terms. I shall read Zhuangzi’s philosophy as transcending this conceptual framework. Instead of a theory of human nature, Zhuangzi provides stories and descriptions of the different facets of human behavior and their psychological and other complexities. These often have an epistemic focus that stand independently of any theory of human nature. (shrink)

The use of the character _wang_ 忘 (forgetting) in the _Zhuangzi_ 莊子 has been widely recognized in traditional and contemporary Chinese scholarship, but its meaning remains unclear. This article reviews some notable studies in Sinophone academia concerning the notion of _wang_ in the _Zhuangzi_. The studies, though not necessarily focused on _wang_, shed light on different aspects of the concept, including its relation to self-cultivation, aesthetics, ethics, and ontology. While some scholars see _wang_ as a form of elimination, others stress (...) its relation to other concepts such as _shi_ 適 (fitting). The relation of these two concepts, however, is not yet clear. There are also debates over what makes _wang_ possible, with some linking it to _dao_ 道 and some directing our attention to our daily experience. Despite the limited attention paid to _wang_ to date, the studies reviewed show that it is a crucial aspect of Zhuangzian philosophy and deserves further study. (shrink)

This article discusses the phenomenon of emotional ambivalence, especially in the moral context. After a nuanced classification of the phenomenon that facilitates accurate evaluation and treatment, it argues that Zhu Xi 朱熹 acknowledges the phenomenon and can provide insights particularly into cases that involve conflicting moral emotions. In light of Zhu, the criterion of motivational harmony rather than motivational unity can more pertinently account for the motivational state of the virtuous persons facing moral emotional ambivalences. This can avoid a certain (...) mystery concerning the status of the nonoptimal emotion and its motivation to action in some of those cases. (shrink)

Is being virtuous good not only for others, but also for the virtuous person herself? Call the “yes” answer to this question “the eudaimonistic thesis.” In this essay, I argue that the most prominent explanation for why Confucius accepts the eudaimonistic thesis should be rejected; this explanation is that he accepts the thesis because he also accepts “naturalistic perfectionism” or that for something to be good for oneself is for it to realize one’s nature and that being a virtuous person (...) realizes human nature. In its place, I propose two alternative explanations: the “hedonistic explanation,” which justifies the eudaimonistic thesis in terms of pleasure, and the “desirability explanation,” which provides a justification rooted in the claims that virtuous people function as normative measures and that they desire that they themselves be virtuous. Finally, I discuss what may have motivated later Confucian philosophers to adopt naturalistic perfectionism. (shrink)

Drawing on insights of W ang Yangming 王陽明, Yong H uang proposes an account of a phenomenon that has in recent times suffered neglect. This neglect has been relieved only by the idea of a “besire,” a mental attitude that combines features of both beliefs and desires. I accept the insightfully discerned phenomenon, but offer a different account of its nature and importance. The phenomenon is real, though, and different from the familiar phenomena of knowledge that and knowledge how.

In his seminal essay “Two Concepts of Liberty,” Isaiah Berlin categorized freedom into positive or negative liberty: “freedom to” or “freedom from.” He provided a powerful critique against the metaphysical nature of positive liberty, arguing that it is oppressive, in contrast to the conception of negative freedom, defined as lack of interference. Meanwhile, conversations around the concept of freedom in Daoist philosophy often hover around categorizing it as either positive liberty in its spiritual form—what Berlin calls the “retreat to the (...) inner citadel”—or a type of negative liberty, being free from society’s interference. In this work, I argue that it may instead be more fruitful to explore the Chinese commentarial tradition for two reasons: (1) the problem of Berlin’s liberalist framework is problematic due to its inherently Anglo-European context, and concurrently, (2) there have been rich discussions of the sociopolitical aspects of the _Zhuangzi_ 莊子, especially by its leading Chinese commentator G uo Xiang 郭象, which have not been accounted for. Drawing from G uo Xiang, I render a reading of the concept of “free and easy wandering” (_xiaoyao_ 逍遙) in the _Zhuangzi_ as it directly relates to self-realization (_zide_ 自得) and having no heart-mind (_wuxin_ 無心), which makes for a more holistic understanding of freedom as self-determination. In particular, I argue that freedom in the philosophy of the _Zhuangzi_ can be more aptly understood as “freedom in,” which is more viable and just than both “freedom to” and “freedom from.”. (shrink)

Recently, most of the discussions in Confucian political theory have concentrated on whether Confucianism is compatible with local political practices, such as liberal democracy. The question of how Confucians view global distributive justice has not yet received critical attention. This essay aims to fill this gap. I will first describe a contractualist methodology, which aims at deriving substantial political principles from a formal conception of the person. Then I will discuss what conception of the person Confucianism assumes. Finally, I will (...) use the contractualist methodology to derive three principles of global distributive justice. These three principles form a distinctive conception based on ideas that are usually ignored in the current discussions of global justice, such as virtues, community, and rituals. (shrink)

In recent decades, many researchers set out to draw links between Western anarchism and ancient Chinese Daoism. The present work aims at adding to this ongoing debate by answering the question of whether the Guodian _Laozi_’s 郭店老子 sayings can be labelled as “anarchism.” It defends the claim that the text endorses a unique kind of anarchist theory based on a distinctive theory of political authority grounded in Daoist moral commitments. To do so, this essay first offers an overview of the (...) scholarly debate surrounding this topic. Second, it provides an account of the necessary and sufficient feature any theory must secure in order to be argued to be anarchist, as well as a framework that underlines potential differences between various anarchist theories. Third, a rigorous textual analysis of the Guodian Laozi is conducted to extrapolate its political advice, before analyzing it in light of the anarchist framework mentioned above. This essay concludes with an assessment of several objections that may be raised against its claims. (shrink)

The Dao Companion to Xuanxue (Neo-Daoism), edited by David Chai, is a wideranging volume. Covering both historical backgrounds and philosophical intricacies of the xuanxue 玄學 period in Chinese intellectual history, this volume provides the reader with a well-rounded understanding of one of the most fertile “schools” of Chinese thought, known as the xuanxue or Neo-Daoism. Chai has done an admirable job of bringing together a wide variety of scholars well-versed in one or more aspects of this important period in Chinese (...) philosophy, and the volume even branches out into the historical periods before and after, to provide us with an understanding not only of xuanxue thought, but also of its origins, its place in Chinese intellectual history, and its lasting infuences. (shrink)

Ten years after the publication of “Heng Xian and the Problem of Studying Looted Artifacts” in Dao, this rejoinder to critics begins by recapitulating my original argument, then considers the leading objections that have appeared in the interim. After dispensing with two trivial and ad hominem responses (that I am a hypocrite and an imperialist), the discussion focuses on the one serious objection, namely, that the benefits of studying looted artifacts outweigh the costs. I conclude with my reasons for disagreeing (...) with this judgment. (shrink)

It is sometimes assumed that the best people—those whom it would be appropriate to admire and emulate—ought to be free of all moral defects. Numerous contemporary scholars have attributed this assumption to the early Confucian philosophers with moral perfection said to be a necessary condition for sagehood. Drawing upon the early Confucian literature I will argue in support of two claims. The first is that the early Confucians did not insist on the moral perfection of the sage; on the contrary, (...) the sage was explicitly understood to be morally fallible. The second claim is that the early Confucians were right to reject moral perfection as a suitable ideal. I conclude with a discussion of the relative merits of taking “love of learning” (haoxue 好學)—rather than moral perfection—as one’s ideal. (shrink)

Extant discussions of Buddhist mereology give minimal attention to the soteriological significance of denying the reality of wholes. This is unfortunate, because the connection between mereology and soteriological is both significant and problematic. The connection is significant, because it supports an argument for the unreality of composite wholes that does not depend upon any claim about the nature of wholes. The connection is also problematic, because some Buddhists endorse the soteriological relevance of mereology despite admitting that composite wholes are real. (...) I address these issues by reviewing early Pāli Buddhist attitudes toward the soteriological significance of mereology, developing an argument for the unreality of wholes from the work of Buddhaghosa, and explicating an alternative approach from the Chinese tradition of Huayan 華嚴 Buddhism that calls into question some common assumptions about parts and wholes. (shrink)

The “social-political-hierarchical” qualifications have long been identified as the essential features of the Confucian golden rule. This essay challenges this prevailing characterization by revealing the relation and differences between Confucius’ original shu 恕 and a series of post-Confucius reformulations in ancient Confucianism. Specifically, the premise of equality, which underlies Confucius’ formulation of shu in correlation with ren 仁, rendered shu incompatible with asymmetrical relationships. Besides the advantage of overcoming this limitation by adapting the golden rule structure of shu to specified (...) asymmetrical relationships, the post-Confucius formula, especially “the measuring square” in the Great Learning, was devised to guide one to infer universalizable rules of conduct for various roles in diverse relationships. On this basis, I demonstrate a pivotal shift in the golden rule practice of ancient Confucianism—a shift of focus from its correlation with ren to its conformity with li 禮 as the system of rules of conduct and the principle of “discriminations.”. (shrink)

The notion of respect is central to many moral requirements in daily life. In the Western philosophical tradition, there is a tendency to explore the nature of respect based on the nature of the object of respect. The Kantian account of respect for the moral law is one representative of this approach. In contrast, the classical Confucian notion of jing 敬 not only has a meaning similar to the Western notion of respect but also emphasizes the value of having a (...) respectful state of mind. Both Sin Yee Chan and Pengbo Liu argue that jing, the Confucian conception of respect, has significant theoretical and practical value for obtaining an adequate understanding of the role of respect in moral life (Chan 2006, Liu 2019). However, their discussions primarily focus on the distinction between Western and Eastern views of respect. In this essay, I will focus on revealing the theoretical and practical value of combining the two perspectives on respect. I aim to demonstrate that by borrowing insights from each side, we will gain a deeper understanding of the nature of respect and what it requires in terms of proper treatment of other individuals. (shrink)

Xunzi 荀子 provided naturalistic answers to questions regarding human sociality and our characteristic “groupishness” (qun 羣). Central to his theories were so-called “social divisions and righteousness” (fenyi 分義), which can be interpreted as a uniquely human package of “cultural technology” produced via cultural evolution to suppress intragroup conflict stemming from what Xunzi calls “the mind of covetous comparison” (liangyi zhi xin 兩疑之心). For Xunzi, fenyi is the uniquely human attribute which kickstarts a salutary causal chain which facilitates prosociality and the (...) upscaling of cooperation, and ultimately results in human ecological dominance. This essay will argue that an incipient form of cultural evolution is discoverable in the Xunzi, and moreover that a solution to the problem of the origin of the “ritual and righteousness” (liyi 禮義) cultural package derives neatly from the incipient cultural evolution of the Xunzi. That is to say, while this solution is not explicitly adduced in the Xunzi, it is nonetheless consistent with Xunzian ideas and is an improvement on the much-lambasted solution Xunzi actually gives, according to which “the former kings hated … chaos, and so they established rituals and righteousness.”. (shrink)