In this paper, I raise some doubts about Nicole Hassoun's account of the obligations of states, pharmaceutical firms, and consumers with regard to global health, presented in Global Health Impact. I argue that it is not necessarily the case, as Hassoun claims, that if states are just, and therefore satisfy all of their obligations, then consumers will not have strong moral reasons, and perhaps obligations, to make consumption choices that are informed by principles and requirements of justice. This is because (...) there may be justice-based limits on what states can permissibly and feasibly do both to promote access to existing drugs for all of those who need them, and to promote research and development for new drugs that could treat diseases that primarily affect the global poor. One important upshot of my argument is that there can be reasons for organizations like the Global Health Impact Organization to exist, and to do the kind of work that Hassoun argues is potentially valuable in our deeply unjust world, even in much less unjust worlds in which states and firms largely, or even entirely, comply with their obligations. (shrink)

Many believe the existence of a moral right to some good should lead to recognition of a corresponding legal right to that good. If, for instance, there is a moral right to healthcare, it is natural to believe countries should recognize a legal right to healthcare. This article demonstrates that justifying legal rights to healthcare is more difficult than many assume. The existence of a moral right is insufficient to justify recognition of a corresponding justiciable constitutional right. Further conditions on (...) when it is appropriate to recognize constitutional rights are rarely satisfied in the healthcare case. And focusing on aspirational or statutory rights presents costs for those seeking to justify legal rights on the basis of corresponding moral ones while maintaining empirical challenges for justifying constitutional rights. This suggests movement from a moral right to a corresponding legal one is far from straightforward and justifies examining alternative means of realizing moral socio‐economic rights such as the proposed moral right to healthcare. (shrink)

Should people have a legal human right to health? And, if so, what exactly does protecting this right require? This essay defends some answers to these questions recently articulated in Global Health Impact. It explains how these answers depend on a particular way of thinking about health and the minimally good life, how quality of life matters at and over time, what various agents should do to help people who are unable to live well enough, and many other things. Moreover, (...) it suggests some ways of improving common metrics for measuring and advancing our collective global health impact. (shrink)

In Global Health Impact, Nicole Hassoun joins the ranks of those defending a right to health. Unlike the World Health Organization, which views this right expansively, Hassoun would limit the right to the health needed to enjoy a minimally good life. This essay argues that this right is difficult to specify and insufficient to support the policies Hassoun defends. The essay sketches an alternative view of the obligations of institutions to address health problems that derives from imperfect individual duties to (...) aid those who are doing badly or who are at risk of harm. (shrink)

This paper addresses normative issues that arise in relation to indicators and measures of health impact. With inspiration from Nicole Hassoun's recent proposal, the paper argues and illustrates that those interested in measuring global health impact face questions about how to prioritize among those with ill-health, how to weigh benefits to those who cannot lead minimally good lives against benefits to the better off, and how to think about whether someone is badly off.

In Global Health Impact: Extending Access to Essential Medicines, Nicole Hassoun argues that the concept of a minimally good life grounds the human right to health, which in turn implies the human right to access essential medicines in developing countries. This article argues that Hassoun's argument must be revised. If the temporal unit of a minimally good life is identified, her argument faces a substantive problem, which undermines an important part of her argument. This article then proposes a solution to (...) this problem. If this proposed solution is accepted, Hassoun's project turns out to be more radical than her argument is supposed to be. (shrink)