9 found

Year:

  1.  6
    Categorical Norms and Convention‐Relativism About Epistemic Discourse.Cameron Boult - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):85-99.
    Allan Hazlett has recently developed an alternative to the most popular form of anti-realism about epistemic normativity, epistemic expressivism. He calls it “convention-relativism about epistemic discourse”. The view deserves more attention. In this paper, I give it attention in the form of an objection. Specifically, my objection turns on a distinction between inescapable and categorical norms. While I agree with Hazlett that convention-relativism is consistent with inescapable epistemic norms, I argue that it is not consistent with categorical epistemic norms. I (...)
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  2.  5
    Alan Bailey and Dan O'Brien , The Continuum Companion to Hume, London: Bloomsbury, 2015, 447 Pp., £24.99 , ISBN 9781474243933. [REVIEW]Kevin R. Busch - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):124-140.
  3.  4
    Wolfgang Spohn, The Laws of Belief: Ranking Theory and its Philosophical Implications, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 624 Pp., £87 , ISBN 9780199697502. [REVIEW]Jake Chandler - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):141-146.
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  4. Ted Poston, Reason and Explanation: A Defense of Explanatory Coherentism, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, 208 Pp., €88.39 , ISBN 9781137012258. [REVIEW]Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):117-124.
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  5.  2
    Christopher F. Zurn, Axel Honneth. Cambridge: Polity, 2015, 257 Pp., £55 , ISBN 978‐0‐7456‐4903‐0. [REVIEW]Timo Jütten - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):146-151.
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  6.  13
    The Epistemology of Emotional Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):57-84.
    This article responds to two arguments against ‘Epistemic Perceptualism’, the view that emotional experiences, as involving a perception of value, can constitute reasons for evaluative belief. It first provides a basic account of emotional experience, and then introduces concepts relevant to the epistemology of emotional experience, such as the nature of a reason for belief, non-inferentiality, and prima facie vs. conclusive reasons, which allow for the clarification of Epistemic Perceptualism in terms of the Perceptual Justificatory View. It then challenges two (...)
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  7.  16
    Rational Agency Without Self‐Knowledge: Could ‘We’ Replace ‘I’?Luke Roelofs - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):3-33.
    It has been claimed that we need singular self-knowledge to function properly as rational agents. I argue that this is not strictly true: agents in certain relations could dispense with singular self-knowledge and instead rely on plural self-knowledge. In defending the possibility of this kind of ‘selfless agent’, I thereby defend the possibility of a certain kind of ‘seamless’ collective agency; agency in a group of agents who have no singular self-knowledge, who do not know which member of the group (...)
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  8.  3
    Crossed Wires About Crossed Wires: Somatosensation and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Salje Léa - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):35-56.
    Suppose that the following describes an intelligible scenario. A subject is wired up to another's body in such a way that she has bodily experiences ‘as from the inside’ caused by states and events in the other body, that are subjectively indistinguishable from ordinary somatosensory perception of her own body. The supposed intelligibility of such so-called crossed wire cases constitutes a significant challenge to the claim that our somatosensory judgements are immune to error through misidentification relative to uses of the (...)
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  9.  3
    Psychological Closure Does Not Entail Cognitive Closure.Michael Vlerick & Maarten Boudry - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):101-115.
    According to some philosophers, we are “cognitively closed” to the answers to certain problems. McGinn has taken the next step and offered a list of examples: the mind/body problem, the problem of the self and the problem of free will. There are naturalistic, scientific answers to these problems, he argues, but we cannot reach them because of our cognitive limitations. In this paper, we take issue with McGinn's thesis as the most well-developed and systematic one among the so-called “new mysterians”. (...)
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