18 found

Year:

  1.  7
    Personal Identity and the Possibility of Autonomy.David B. Hershenov & Adam P. Taylor - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):155-179.
    We argue that animalism is the only materialist account of personal identity that can account for the autonomy that we typically think of ourselves as possessing. All the rival materialist theories suffer from a moral version of the problem of too many thinkers when they posit a human person that overlaps a numerically distinct human animal. The different persistence conditions of overlapping thinkers will lead them to have interests that conflict, which in many cases prevents them both from autonomously forming (...)
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  2.  2
    John MacFarlane, Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 362 Pp., £30 , ISBN 9780199682751. [REVIEW]Christos Kyriacou - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):322-332.
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  3.  52
    Against Brute Fundamentalism.Kerry McKenzie - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):231-261.
    In metaphysics, the fundamental is standardly equated with that which has no explanation – with that which is, in other words, ‘brute’. But this doctrine of brutalism is in tension with physicists’ ambitions to not only describe but also explain why the fundamental is the way that it is. The tension would ease were science taken to be incapable of furnishing the sort of explanations that brutalists are concerned with, given that these are understood to be of a distinctively ‘metaphysical (...)
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  4.  2
    Concerns and the Seriousness of Emotion.John M. Monteleone - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):181-207.
    Some philosophers have claimed that emotions are states of mind where an object is taken seriously. Seriousness, as this paper understands it, involves both a phenomenological change in attention and non-indifference towards an object. The paper investigates how contemporary theories of emotion can explain the seriousness of emotion. After rejecting explanations based on feeling, desire, and concern, the paper argues that the seriousness of an emotion can be explained as the manifestation of a concern in an outwardly directed feeling. Given (...)
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  5.  10
    How to Think of Emotions as Evaluative Attitudes.Jean Moritz Müller - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):281-308.
    It is popular to hold that emotions are evaluative. On the standard account, the evaluative character of emotion is understood in epistemic terms: emotions apprehend or make us aware of value properties. As this account is commonly elaborated, emotions are experiences with evaluative intentional content. In this paper, I am concerned with a recent alternative proposal on how emotions afford awareness of value. This proposal does not ascribe evaluative content to emotions, but instead conceives of them as evaluative at the (...)
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  6. Stephen Hetherington, How To Know: A Practicalist Conception of Knowledge, Oxford: Wiley‐Blackwell, 2011, 304 Pp., £28.99, €36.30 . ISBN: 978‐0‐470‐65812‐3. [REVIEW]George Pappas - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):309-311.
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  7.  5
    Should Reductive Physicalists Reject the Causal Argument?Bradford Saad - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):263-279.
    Reductive physicalists typically accept the causal argument for their view. On this score, Tiehen parts ways with his fellow reductive physicalists. Heretically, he argues that reductive physicalists should reject the causal argument. After presenting Tiehen's challenge, I defend the orthodoxy. Although not myself a reductive physicalist, I show how reductive physicalists can resist this challenge to the causal argument. I conclude with a positive suggestion about how reductive physicalists should use the causal argument.
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  8.  12
    Reasons Internalism and the Function of Normative Reasons.Neil Sinclair - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):209-229.
    What is the connection between reasons and motives? According to Reasons Internalism, there is a non-trivial conceptual connection between normative reasons and the possibility of rationally accessing relevant motivation. Reasons Internalism is attractive insofar as it captures the thought that reasons are for reasoning with and repulsive insofar as it fails to generate sufficient critical distance between reasons and motives. Rather than directly adjudicate this dispute, I extract from it two generally accepted desiderata on theories of normative reasons and argue (...)
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  9.  3
    Michael Huemer, Approaching Infinity. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, Xiv + 268, US$100 , ISBN 978‐1‐137‐56085‐8. [REVIEW]Biagio Gerard Tassone - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):312-322.
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  10.  9
    Categorical Norms and Convention‐Relativism About Epistemic Discourse.Cameron Boult - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):85-99.
    Allan Hazlett has recently developed an alternative to the most popular form of anti-realism about epistemic normativity, epistemic expressivism. He calls it “convention-relativism about epistemic discourse”. The view deserves more attention. In this paper, I give it attention in the form of an objection. Specifically, my objection turns on a distinction between inescapable and categorical norms. While I agree with Hazlett that convention-relativism is consistent with inescapable epistemic norms, I argue that it is not consistent with categorical epistemic norms. I (...)
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  11.  5
    Alan Bailey and Dan O'Brien , The Continuum Companion to Hume, London: Bloomsbury, 2015, 447 Pp., £24.99 , ISBN 9781474243933. [REVIEW]Kevin R. Busch - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):124-140.
  12.  4
    Wolfgang Spohn, The Laws of Belief: Ranking Theory and its Philosophical Implications, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 624 Pp., £87 , ISBN 9780199697502. [REVIEW]Jake Chandler - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):141-146.
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  13.  1
    Ted Poston, Reason and Explanation: A Defense of Explanatory Coherentism, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, 208 Pp., €88.39 , ISBN 9781137012258. [REVIEW]Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):117-124.
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  14.  2
    Christopher F. Zurn, Axel Honneth. Cambridge: Polity, 2015, 257 Pp., £55 , ISBN 978‐0‐7456‐4903‐0. [REVIEW]Timo Jütten - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):146-151.
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  15.  19
    The Epistemology of Emotional Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):57-84.
    This article responds to two arguments against ‘Epistemic Perceptualism’, the view that emotional experiences, as involving a perception of value, can constitute reasons for evaluative belief. It first provides a basic account of emotional experience, and then introduces concepts relevant to the epistemology of emotional experience, such as the nature of a reason for belief, non-inferentiality, and prima facie vs. conclusive reasons, which allow for the clarification of Epistemic Perceptualism in terms of the Perceptual Justificatory View. It then challenges two (...)
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  16.  23
    Rational Agency Without Self‐Knowledge: Could ‘We’ Replace ‘I’?Luke Roelofs - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):3-33.
    It has been claimed that we need singular self-knowledge to function properly as rational agents. I argue that this is not strictly true: agents in certain relations could dispense with singular self-knowledge and instead rely on plural self-knowledge. In defending the possibility of this kind of ‘selfless agent’, I thereby defend the possibility of a certain kind of ‘seamless’ collective agency; agency in a group of agents who have no singular self-knowledge, who do not know which member of the group (...)
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  17.  4
    Crossed Wires About Crossed Wires: Somatosensation and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Salje Léa - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):35-56.
    Suppose that the following describes an intelligible scenario. A subject is wired up to another's body in such a way that she has bodily experiences ‘as from the inside’ caused by states and events in the other body, that are subjectively indistinguishable from ordinary somatosensory perception of her own body. The supposed intelligibility of such so-called crossed wire cases constitutes a significant challenge to the claim that our somatosensory judgements are immune to error through misidentification relative to uses of the (...)
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  18.  4
    Psychological Closure Does Not Entail Cognitive Closure.Michael Vlerick & Maarten Boudry - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):101-115.
    According to some philosophers, we are “cognitively closed” to the answers to certain problems. McGinn has taken the next step and offered a list of examples: the mind/body problem, the problem of the self and the problem of free will. There are naturalistic, scientific answers to these problems, he argues, but we cannot reach them because of our cognitive limitations. In this paper, we take issue with McGinn's thesis as the most well-developed and systematic one among the so-called “new mysterians”. (...)
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