Disputatio

ISSN: 0873-626X

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  1.  6
    Calibrating and Bootstrapping Modal Judgment.Felipe Morales Carbonell - 2023 - Disputatio 15 (69):250-266.
    In this paper, I consider the question of whether calibration is required for modalizing mechanisms to be reliable, that is, whether it is necessary for modalizing mechanisms to be adjusted to prevent overgeneration and undergeneration of modal beliefs. I first argue that the calibration requirement affects differently what I call bootstrapping and ordinary cases. Identifying different ways in which a modalizing mechanism could be calibrated, I argue that not all of them are effective or even viable in bootstrapping cases. Then, (...)
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  2.  15
    Categories First.M. J. García-Encinas - 2023 - Disputatio 15 (69):203-222.
    Vaidya and Wallner [2021] claim that most relevant theories in recent epistemology of modality, that is, Conceivability-Theory, Counterfactual-Theory, and Deduction-Theory, face what they name “the problem of modal epistemic friction”, in a nutshell, the need to add some relevant information about the nature of the world that is not provided by the theories as such. Their proposal is that essences supply the needed information. In this paper I will agree with Vaidya and Waller’s detection of the problem of modal epistemic (...)
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  3.  15
    Perceptual Modal Justification.Michael Omoge - 2023 - Disputatio 15 (69):223-249.
    Can experience justify modal beliefs? A long tradition dating back to Descartes, Hume, and Kant, which denies that experience plays a justificatory role in modal justification, says ‘no’. Here, I answer ‘yes’. Specifically, I argue that perception justifies some of our modal beliefs, namely the perceptual ones. Using a naturalized reliabilist framework for perceptual justification, I argue that one of the assumptions perception makes about the world, which enables it to organize itself, is modal—namely, ‘objects presented within peripersonal space are (...)
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  4.  18
    Inductive Knowability of the Modal.Sonia Roca-Royes - 2023 - Disputatio 15 (69):151-178.
    This paper scrutinises the limits of a posteriori induction in acquiring modal knowledge. I focus on my similarity-based account (Roca-Royes [2017]); an inductive, non-rationalist epistemology of modality about concrete entities. Despite the explanatory merits of the account in relation to a vast range of modal claims, this inductive epistemology has been found incapable of yielding knowledge of a certain, other range of modal claims. Here, two notions of knowability are distinguished which reveal some of these limitations to be not only (...)
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  5.  19
    The Epistemology of Modality.Pablo Rychter & Ezequiel Zerbudis - 2023 - Disputatio 15 (69):135-150.
    We describe the main issue debated at the IV Blasco Disputatio: whether our knowledge of metaphysical possibility and necessity rests on knowledge of essence. But before getting to this specific issue, we offer a broader introduction to the more general problems in the epistemology of modality. In this way, we establish a background against which the contributions to this SI can be better appreciated.
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  6. The Problem of Modal Epistemic Friction, Similarity, Essence and Induction.Michael Wallner - 2023 - Disputatio 15 (69):179-202.
    Vaidya & Wallner [2021] have recently formulated the Problem of Modal Epistemic Friction (PMEF) for three of the most discussed accounts in the epistemology of modality: conceivability-based, counterfactual-based and deduction-based accounts. They propose essentialist solutions in all three cases, arguing that all three discussed accounts should be supplemented by a suitable epistemology of essence. In this paper I argue that the PMEF also applies to Roca-Royes’ similarity-based account in the epistemology of modality. I also discuss if or to what extent (...)
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  7.  32
    Limits of Commitments.Martin Dominik - 2023 - Disputatio 15 (68):39-54.
    In this paper, I examine Brandom’s notion of a de re reading of a tradition and question its legitimacy under certain circumstances. Specifically, I argue that within the language game of giving and asking for reasons, commitments should be ascribed to the utterer within reasonable limits, with the utterer only responsible for intentional or negligent breaches of duty. Even if we were to include an ideal speaker who knows all facts available at the time of her utterance, she cannot be (...)
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  8.  27
    Phenomenal Intentionality and the Temporal Shape of Experience.Christopher M. Stratman - 2023 - Disputatio 15 (68):55-89.
    This paper argues for the claim that the mental ontology required for what has been called the “Phenomenal Intentionality Theory” (PIT) should be understood in terms of mental events or episodes, not mental states that instantiate phenomenal properties because the former but not the latter has a kind of temporal shape. I begin by laying out the basic commitments of PIT. I then introduce the notion of “temporal shape” and defend the following simple but powerful argument: (1) If conscious experiences (...)
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  9.  18
    Aristotle’s Notion of Deduction.Marta Vlasáková - 2023 - Disputatio 15 (68):90-114.
    Aristotle’s notion of deduction (syllogism) differs from the conception of logical consequence in classical logic in two essential features, which are required by Aristotle’s definition of syllogism and are incorporated into his formalisation of deduction: in addition to the standard necessary truth-preservation, Aristotle requires relevance of premises for the conclusion and non-repetition of premises in the conclusion. These requirements, together with Aristotle’s conception of simple propositions, lead to the result that valid deductive steps (syllogisms) must have very specific forms, namely (...)
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  10.  36
    Is There Basic A Priori Knowledge of Necessary Truth?Crispin Wright - 2023 - Disputatio 15 (68):1-38.
    Following Kant, Frege took the idea that there is such a thing as bona fide a priori knowledge of a large range of necessary propositions for granted. In particular he assumed that such is the character of our knowledge of basic logic and arithmetic. This view is no longer orthodoxy. The idea that pure (for Frege, logical) intellection can provide for substantial knowledge of necessary features of the world is widely regarded with suspicion. However it is fair to say that (...)
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  11.  18
    Phenomenal Powers or a Power of the Self?John Wright - 2023 - Disputatio 15 (68):115-134.
    One argument against epiphenomenalism arises from the theory of evolution. A particularly powerful form of this argument was developed by William James. James argued against epiphenomenalism on the grounds that, if it were correct, it would be inexplicable why the things that we find pleasurable are mostly beneficial to us while the things we find painful are mostly harmful. The aim of the present paper is to defend and extend James’s argument. James’s argument is here defended against criticisms due to (...)
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