Some philosophers argue that coherence is a normatively significant type of rationality, over and above substantive rationality. The most detailed and substantive arguments are given by Alex Worsnip (2021, 2022). In this paper I will criticize his arguments. We are left with the thesis that the only type of rationality we need is substantive rationality.

Scott Soames argued that Wittgenstein’s private language argument reveals ambiguity, presenting two possible conclusions, wherein either conclusion exhibits devastating implications for the private language argument. I contend that interpreting Wittgenstein’s reasoning holistically dissipates inclinations to infer ambiguity in the private language argument. In particular, I challenge Soames’ ambiguity argument by demonstrating its contrived limitations, resulting in a false dichotomy. However, allowing the dichotomy for argument’s sake adequately corresponds to Wittgenstein’s conclusion, raising further questions about the ambiguity argument’s veracity and redundancy. (...) As such, Wittgenstein’s private language argument withstands charges of ambiguity, demonstrating reasons to doubt Soames’ ambiguity argument. (shrink)

Even if credence 1 is justified for many contingent propositions, it is not justified in cases where a disposition to revise in light of counterevidence is rationally required. First, credence 1 may be compatible with admission of fallibility, but this does not imply that it is compatible with a disposition to revise. Moreover, credence 1 entails being sure, which requires that one remain steadfast. Since steadfastness with respect to belief entails a disposition not to revise in light of counterevidence, credence (...) 1 entails a disposition not to revise. Finally, since there are closure of inquiry defeaters for a wide range of contingent propositions, and since having credence 1 in p entails closure of inquiry about p, it is not justified to have credence 1 in such cases. (shrink)

In this paper, I will argue that the dialogical account of the normativity of logic does not succeed, and that a different direction will be required. I first present a recent challenge by Russell (2017), which argues that on a three-fold distinction of degrees of normative entanglement, logic is only normative in the weakest sense. I then examine Dutilh Novaes’s (2015) recent dialogical account of normativity, and I sketch an alternative account that relies on a distinction between the broadest possible (...) conception of logic and the narrower study of the many artificial language systems that tend to occupy most logicians’ attention. I urge that a conflation of these two activities is the source of many disputes concerning the normativity of logic. My primary objective in this paper is to show that accounts of the normativity of logic require a clarification of what logic is about. (shrink)

The views of epistemic buck-passing (also known as the deferral of epistemic challenge) has been used to argue for the epistemic distinctiveness of testimonial knowledge. The overall strategy for the argumentation is to demonstrate that the epistemic distinctiveness of testimonial knowledge depends on a distinctive feature of it, i.e., epistemic buck-passing, granted the truthfulness of any of these views of epistemic buck-passing. This paper examines these views and aims to reveal that, none of them successfully motivates the claim that epistemic (...) buck-passing is a distinctive feature of testimonial knowledge. Hence, if we aim to argue that testimonial knowledge is an epistemically distinctive kind of knowledge, some other approach is needed. (shrink)

Gualtiero Piccinini has recently proposed an interesting new solution to the Gettier Problem: Knowledge is factually grounded belief. But there is a problem with this purported solution: It is both too strong and too weak. In this paper, I provide two counterexamples to substantiate the claim that it is both too strong and too weak. Thus, the view that knowledge is factually grounded belief is inadequate as an account of knowledge.

This paper proposes a comprehensive classification scheme for identifying agentic entities based on six essential aspects: perception, predictive capacity, decision-making capability, goal-content integrity, resource input and output, and manipulators. By systematically examining these aspects, this paper aims to distinguish true agents from nonagentic entities, including advanced tools and collective entities. The classification scheme addresses practical implications, such as legal liability and moral considerations for AI models and the potential identification of extraterrestrial life forms. Perception is identified as the foundational aspect, (...) enabling the acquisition and processing of environmental information. Predictive capacity and decision-making capability allow entities to anticipate outcomes and select optimal actions, respectively. Goal-content integrity ensures sustained commitment to intended goals, while resource input and output highlight the necessity of resource management. Manipulators are essential for the physical realisation of intentional actions. The paper emphasises the interconnectedness of these aspects, demonstrating that their integration is required for an entity to be classified as an agent. This framework provides valuable insights for diverse fields, from legal and ethical discussions surrounding AI to philosophical debates on personhood and agency, enhancing our understanding of intelligent entities across various contexts. (shrink)