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  1. Can I Know That Anything Exists Unperceived?Aaran Burns - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (3):245-260.
    It is well known that G.E Moore brought about a revival of Realism with his classic “The Refutation of Idealism.” Three decades later W.T. Stace wrote an unfortunately less famous paper, “The Refutation of Realism.” In that paper, Stace claims that “we do not know that a single entity exists unperceived.” This paper provides an interpretation of Stace's argument and maintains that it has yet to be adequately addressed by contemporary epistemology.
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  2.  21
    The Seeming Account of Self-Evidence: An Alternative to Audian Account.Hossein Dabbagh - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (3):261-284.
    In this paper, I argue against the epistemology of some contemporary moral intuitionists who believe that the notion of self-evidence is more important than that of intuition. Quite the contrary, I think the notion of intuition is more basic if intuitions are construed as intellectual seemings. First, I will start with elaborating Robert Audi’s account of self-evidence. Next, I criticise his account on the basis of the idea of “adequate understanding”. I shall then present my alternative account of self-evidence which (...)
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  3. Against Boghossian’s Case for Incompatibilism.Simon Dierig - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (3):285-306.
    Two major objections have been raised to Boghossian’s discrimination argument for the incompatibility of externalism and self-knowledge. Proponents of the first objection claim that thoughts about “twin water” are not relevant alternatives to thoughts about water. Advocates of the second objection argue that the ability to rule out relevant alternatives is not required for knowledge. Even though it has been shown that these two objections to Boghossian’s argument are misguided, it will be argued in this essay that Boghossian’s discrimination argument (...)
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  4.  2
    E = K and Non-Epistemic Perception.Frank Hofmann - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (3):307-331.
    Quite plausibly, epistemic justification and rationality is tied to possession of evidence. According to Williamson, one’s evidence is what one knows. This is not compatible with non-epistemic perception, however, since non-epistemic perception does not require belief in what one perceives and, thus, does not require knowledge of the evidence – and, standardly, knowledge does require belief. If one non-epistemically perceives a piece of evidence, this can be sufficient for possessing it as evidence. Williamson’s arguments for the necessity of belief will (...)
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  5.  11
    No Epistemic Trouble for Engineering ‘Woman’.Robin McKenna - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (3):335-342.
    In a recent article in this journal, Mona Simion argues that Sally Haslanger’s “engineering” approach to gender concepts such as ‘woman’ faces an epistemic objection. The primary function of all concepts—gender concepts included—is to represent the world, but Haslanger’s engineering account of ‘woman’ fails to adequately represent the world because, by her own admission, it doesn’t include all women in the extension of the concept ‘woman.’ I argue that this objection fails because the primary function of gender concepts—and social kind (...)
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  6. Sosa’s Safety Needs Supplementing, Not Saving.John N. Williams - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (3):343-351.
    Juan Comesaña argues that Halloween Party shows that Sosa’s disjunctive safety condition on knowledge is too strong. Mark McBride agrees, and proposes a modification to that condition in order to evade Halloween Party. I show that that Halloween Party is not a counterexample to Sosa’s disjunctive safety condition. However the condition, as well as McBride’s modification to it, is insufficient for true belief to be knowledge. Sosa’s condition needs supplementing in some way that would yield a full analysis of knowledge.
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  7. Contextualism and Context Voluntarism.David Coss - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (2):125-136.
    Contextualism is the view that the word ‘knows’ is context sensitive. While contextualism developed as a response to skepticism, there’s concern that it’s too easy for skeptics to undermine ordinary knowledge attributions. Once skeptical hypotheses are made salient, the skeptic seems to win. I first outline contextualism and its response to skepticism. I then explicate the resources contextualists have for protecting ordinary knowledge claims from skeptical worries. I argue that the dominate strains of contexualism naturally lend themselves to a restricted (...)
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  8.  18
    The Basis-Access Dilemma for Epistemological Disjunctivism.Tammo Lossau - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (2):151-172.
    Epistemological disjunctivists such as Duncan Pritchard claim that in paradigmatic cases of knowledge the rational support for the known propositions is both factive and reflectively accessible. This position faces some problems, including the basis problem – how can our knowledge be based on such strong reasons that seem to leave no room for non-knowledge and therefore presuppose knowledge? – and the access problem – can disjunctivists avoid the implausible claim that we can achieve knowledge through inference from our introspective awareness (...)
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  9. Is Religious Experience a Solution to the Problem of Religious Disagreement?Kirk Lougheed - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (2):173-197.
    Many religious believers do not appear to take the existence of epistemic peer disagreement as a serious challenge to the rationality of their religious beliefs. They seem to think they have different evidence for their religious beliefs and hence aren’t really epistemic peers with their opponents. One underexplored potential evidential asymmetry in religious disagreements is based on investigations of religious experience attempting to offer relevant evidence for religious claims in objective and public terms. I conclude that private religious experience can (...)
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  10.  4
    Values and Credibility in Science Communication.Janet Michaud & John Turri - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (2):199-214.
    Understanding science requires appreciating the values it presupposes and its social context. Both the values that scientists hold and their social context can affect scientific communication. Philosophers of science have recently begun studying scientific communication, especially as it relates to public policy. Some have proposed “guiding principles for communicating scientific findings” to promote trust and objectivity. This paper contributes to this line of research in a novel way using behavioural experimentation. We report results from three experiments testing judgments about the (...)
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  11.  6
    Safety and the Preface Paradox.Michael J. Shaffer - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (2):215-219.
    In the preface paradox the posited author is supposed to know both that every sentence in a book is true and that not every sentence in that book is true. But, this result is paradoxically contradictory. The paradoxicality exhibited in such cases arises chiefly out of the recognition that large-scale and difficult tasks like verifying the truth of large sets of sentences typically involve errors even given our best efforts to be epistemically diligent. This paper introduces an argument designed to (...)
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  12.  3
    Peer Disagreement: Special Cases.Eric Wiland - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (2):221-226.
    When you discover that an epistemic peer disagrees with you about some matter, does rationality require you to alter your views? Concessivists answer in the affirmative, but their view faces a problem in special cases. As others have noted, if concessivism itself is what’s under dispute, then concessivism seems to undermine itself. But there are other unexplored special cases too. This article identifies three such special cases, and argues that concessivists in fact face no special problem.
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  13.  30
    Overcoming Intellectualism About Knowledge and Understanding: A Unified Approach.Eros Carvalho - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (1):7-26.
    In this paper I defend a unified approach to knowledge and understanding. Both are achievements due to cognitive abilities or skills. The difference between them is a difference of aspects. Knowledge emphasizes the successful aspect of an achievement and the exclusion of epistemic luck, whereas understanding emphasizes the agent's contribution in bringing about an achievement through the exercise of one's cognitive skills. Knowledge and understanding cannot be separated. I argue against the claim that understanding is distinct from knowledge because the (...)
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  14.  3
    Overcoming Intellectualism About Understanding and Knowledge.Eros M. de Carvalho - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (1):7-26.
    In this paper I defend a unified approach to knowledge and understanding. Both are achievements due to cognitive abilities or skills. The difference between them is a difference of aspects. Knowledge emphasizes the successful aspect of an achievement and the exclusion of epistemic luck, whereas understanding emphasizes the agent's contribution in bringing about an achievement through the exercise of one's cognitive skills. Knowledge and understanding cannot be separated. I argue against the claim that understanding is distinct from knowledge because the (...)
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  15.  1
    Mental Language: From Plato to William of Ockham. [REVIEW]Gaston G. LeNotre - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (1):101-107.
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  16.  1
    Explanatory Virtues Are Indicative of Truth.Kevin McCain - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (1):63-73.
    In a recent issue of this journal, Miloud Belkoniene challenges explanationist accounts of evidential support in two ways. First, he alleges that there are cases that show explanatory virtues are not linked to the truth of hypotheses. Second, he maintains that attempts to show that explanatoriness is relevant to evidential support because it adds to the resiliency of probability functions fail. I contest both of Belkoniene’s claims.
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  17.  41
    Gettier Cases, Mental States, and Best Explanations: Another Reply to Atkins.Moti Mizrahi - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (1):75-90.
    I have argued that Gettier cases are misleading because, even though they appear to be cases of knowledge failure, they are in fact cases of semantic failure. Atkins has responded to my original paper and I have replied to his response. He has then responded again to insist that he has the so-called “Gettier intuition.” But he now admits that intuitions are only defeasible, not conclusive, evidence for and/or against philosophical theories. I address the implications of Atkins’ admission in this (...)
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  18.  15
    Epistemic Trouble for Engineering ‘Woman'.Mona Simion - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (1):91-98.
    This paper puts forth a functionalist difficulty for Sally Haslanger’s proposal for engineering our concept of ‘woman.’ It is argued that the project of bringing about better political function fulfillment cannot get off the ground in virtue of epistemic failure.
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  19.  35
    Testimonial Insult: A Moral Reason for Belief?Finlay Malcolm - 2018 - Logos and Episteme (1):27-48.
    When you don’t believe a speaker’s testimony for reasons that call into question the speaker’s credibility, it seems that this is an insult against the speaker. There also appears to be moral reasons that count in favour of refraining from insulting someone. When taken together, these two plausible claims entail that we have a moral reason to refrain from insulting speakers with our lack of belief, and hence, sometimes, a moral reason to believe the testimony of speakers. Reasons for belief (...)
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  20.  7
    Lakatosian Particularism.Howard Sankey - 2018 - Logos and Episteme (1):49-59.
    This paper explores a particularist element in the theory of method of Imre Lakatos, who appealed to the value-judgements of élite scientists in the appraisal of competing theories of method. The role played by such value-judgements is strongly reminiscent of the epistemological particularism of Roderick Chisholm. Despite the existence of a clear parallel between the particularist approaches of both authors, it is argued that Lakatos’s approach is subject to a weakness that does not affect the approach of Chisholm.
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