Logos and Episteme

ISSNs: 2069-3052, 2069-0533

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  1.  24
    Against Coherence.Darren Bradley - 2025 - Logos and Episteme 16 (1):7-20.
    Some philosophers argue that coherence is a normatively significant type of rationality, over and above substantive rationality. The most detailed and substantive arguments are given by Alex Worsnip (2021, 2022). In this paper I will criticize his arguments. We are left with the thesis that the only type of rationality we need is substantive rationality.
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  2.  61
    Reasons to Doubt the Ambiguity Argument: Contrived Wittgensteinian Valuations Lead to a False Dichotomy.John C. Duff - 2025 - Logos and Episteme 16 (1):109-116.
    Scott Soames argued that Wittgenstein’s private language argument reveals ambiguity, presenting two possible conclusions, wherein either conclusion exhibits devastating implications for the private language argument. I contend that interpreting Wittgenstein’s reasoning holistically dissipates inclinations to infer ambiguity in the private language argument. In particular, I challenge Soames’ ambiguity argument by demonstrating its contrived limitations, resulting in a false dichotomy. However, allowing the dichotomy for argument’s sake adequately corresponds to Wittgenstein’s conclusion, raising further questions about the ambiguity argument’s veracity and redundancy. (...)
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  3.  4
    Credence 1 Cruxes.Eric Gilbertson - 2025 - Logos and Episteme 16 (1):21-50.
    Even if credence 1 is justified for many contingent propositions, it is not justified in cases where a disposition to revise in light of counterevidence is rationally required. First, credence 1 may be compatible with admission of fallibility, but this does not imply that it is compatible with a disposition to revise. Moreover, credence 1 entails being sure, which requires that one remain steadfast. Since steadfastness with respect to belief entails a disposition not to revise in light of counterevidence, credence (...)
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  4.  13
    Normativity of Logic: The Dialogical Account and the Ambiguity of 'Logic'.Deke Caiñas Gould - 2025 - Logos and Episteme 16 (1):51-63.
    In this paper, I will argue that the dialogical account of the normativity of logic does not succeed, and that a different direction will be required. I first present a recent challenge by Russell (2017), which argues that on a three-fold distinction of degrees of normative entanglement, logic is only normative in the weakest sense. I then examine Dutilh Novaes’s (2015) recent dialogical account of normativity, and I sketch an alternative account that relies on a distinction between the broadest possible (...)
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  5.  10
    What Is not Distinctive of Testimonial Knowledge.Jinhua He - 2025 - Logos and Episteme 16 (1):65-86.
    The views of epistemic buck-passing (also known as the deferral of epistemic challenge) has been used to argue for the epistemic distinctiveness of testimonial knowledge. The overall strategy for the argumentation is to demonstrate that the epistemic distinctiveness of testimonial knowledge depends on a distinctive feature of it, i.e., epistemic buck-passing, granted the truthfulness of any of these views of epistemic buck-passing. This paper examines these views and aims to reveal that, none of them successfully motivates the claim that epistemic (...)
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  6.  9
    Knowledge Is not Factually Grounded Belief.James Simpson - 2025 - Logos and Episteme 16 (1):117-122.
    Gualtiero Piccinini has recently proposed an interesting new solution to the Gettier Problem: Knowledge is factually grounded belief. But there is a problem with this purported solution: It is both too strong and too weak. In this paper, I provide two counterexamples to substantiate the claim that it is both too strong and too weak. Thus, the view that knowledge is factually grounded belief is inadequate as an account of knowledge.
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  7.  2
    Actionable Aspects of Agency.Izak Tait - 2025 - Logos and Episteme 16 (1):87-106.
    This paper proposes a comprehensive classification scheme for identifying agentic entities based on six essential aspects: perception, predictive capacity, decision-making capability, goal-content integrity, resource input and output, and manipulators. By systematically examining these aspects, this paper aims to distinguish true agents from nonagentic entities, including advanced tools and collective entities. The classification scheme addresses practical implications, such as legal liability and moral considerations for AI models and the potential identification of extraterrestrial life forms. Perception is identified as the foundational aspect, (...)
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