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  1.  2
    The Collapse Argument Reconsidered.Hamid Alaeinejad & Morteza Hajhosseini - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (4):413-427.
    According to Beall and Restall’s logical pluralism, classical logic, relevant logic, and intuitionistic logic are all correct. On this version of logical pluralism, logic is considered to be normative, in the sense that someone who accepts the truth of the premises of a valid argument, is bound to accept the conclusion. So-called collapse arguments are designed to show the incompatibility of the simultaneous acceptance of logical pluralism and the normativity of logic. Caret, however, by proposing logical contextualism, and Blake-Turner and (...)
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  2.  2
    On Contexts, Hinges, and Impossible Mistakes.Anna Boncompagni - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (4):507-516.
    In this commentary on Nuno Venturinha’s Description of Situations, after highlighting what in my view are the most significant and innovative features of his work, I focus on Venturinha’s infallibilist approach to knowledge. This topic allows for a wider discussion concerning the pragmatist aspects of the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy. I discuss this in three steps: first, by describing the general similarity between Wittgenstein and the pragmatists with respect to the emphasis on contexts; second, by focusing on the kind of fallibilism (...)
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  3.  3
    Inferential Internalism and the Causal Status Effect.Nicholas Danne - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (4):429-445.
    To justify inductive inference and vanquish classical skepticisms about human memory, external world realism, etc., Richard Fumerton proposes his “inferential internalism,” an epistemology whereby humans ‘see’ by Russellian acquaintance Keynesian probable relations (PRs) between propositions. PRs are a priori necessary relations of logical probability, akin to but not reducible to logical entailments, such that perceiving a PR between one’s evidence E and proposition P of unknown truth value justifies rational belief in P to an objective degree. A recent critic of (...)
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  4. Original Facticity and the Incompleteness of Knowledge.Modesto Gómez-Alonso - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (4):495-505.
    This article critically explores Nuno Venturinha’s project of capturing how we are situated in reality, a project grounded in the conviction that the closure of knowledge and the openness of experience are compatible. To this end, I will explore how an approach complementary to Venturinha’s method—one which regards the passive and the active in knowledge as rooted in a single, underlying original form of consciousness—would deal with the issue of justifying contingency without falling into either scepticism or empiricism.
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  5.  1
    Social Situations and Which Descriptions.Marcin Lewiński - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (4):517-526.
    In this paper, I approach Venturinha’s ideas on contextual epistemology from the perspective of linguistic practices of argumentation. I point to the “thick” descriptions of social situations as a common context in which our epistemic language-games take place. In this way, I explore promising connections of Venturinha’s work to key concepts in recent speech act theory, social ontology and social epistemology.
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  6.  11
    A Non-Puzzle About Assertion and Truth.John Turri - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (4):475-479.
    It was recently argued that non-factive accounts of assertoric norms gain an advantage from “a puzzle about assertion and truth.” In this paper, I show that this is a puzzle in name only. The puzzle is based on allegedly inconsistent linguistic data that are not actually inconsistent. The demonstration’s key points are that something can be improper yet permissible, and reproachable yet un-reproached. Assertion still has a factive norm.
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  7.  2
    Context-Sensitive Objectivism.Nuno Venturinha - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (4):481-494.
    This paper outlines the major topics addressed in my book Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology, anticipates some possible misunderstandings and discusses issues that warrant further investigation.
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  8. Replies to Critics.Nuno Venturinha - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (4):527-542.
    This text brings together replies to three commentaries on my Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology written by Modesto Gómez-Alonso, Anna Boncompagni and Marcin Lewiński.
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  9.  5
    Does Metaphilosophically Pragmatist Anti-Skepticism Work?Scott Aikin - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (3):391-398.
    Michael Hannon has recently given “a new apraxia” argument against skepticism. Hannon’s case is that skepticism depends on a theory of knowledge that makes the concept “useless and uninteresting.” Three arguments rebutting Hannon’s metaphilosophical pragmatism are given that show that the concept of knowledge that makes skepticism plausible is both interesting and useful.
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  10.  14
    Agrippan Problems.Robb Dunphy - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (3):259-282.
    In this article I consider Sextus’ account of the Five Modes and of the Two Modes in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism. I suggest that from these we can derive the basic form of a number of different problems which I refer to as “Agrippan problems,” where this category includes both the epistemic regress problem and the problem of the criterion. Finally, I suggest that there is a distinctive Agrippan problem present at the beginning of Hegel’s Science of Logic.
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  11.  3
    Group Testimony.Domingos Faria - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (3):283-304.
    Our aim in this paper is to defend the reductionist view on group testimony from the attacks of divergence arguments. We will begin by presenting how divergence arguments can challenge the reductionist view. However, we will argue that these arguments are not decisive to rule out the reductionist view; for, these arguments have false premises, assuming dubious epistemic principles that testimony cannot generate knowledge and understanding. The final part of this paper will be devoted to presenting the advantages of the (...)
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  12.  1
    Moral Realism and the Problem of Moral Aliens.Thomas Grundmann - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (3):305-321.
    In this paper, I discuss a new problem for moral realism, the problem of moral aliens. In the first section, I introduce this problem. Moral aliens are people who radically disagree with us concerning moral matters. Moral aliens are neither obviously incoherent nor do they seem to lack rational support from their own perspective. On the one hand, moral realists claim that we should stick to our guns when we encounter moral aliens. On the other hand, moral realists, in contrast (...)
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  13.  82
    The Subject’s Perspective Objection to Externalism and Why It Fails.Perry Hendricks - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (3):323-331.
    The subject’s perspective objection (SPO) is an objection against externalist theories of justification, warrant, and knowledge. In this article, I show that externalists can accommodate the SPO while remaining externalist. So, even if the SPO is successful, it does not motivate internalism, and the primary motivation for internalism has been lost. After this, I provide an explanation for why so many people find cases that motivate the SPO convincing.
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  14.  87
    Husserlian Eidetic Variation and Objectual Understanding as a Basis for an Epistemology of Essence.Robert Michels - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (3):333-353.
    Vaidya has recently argued that while Husserl’s method for acquiring knowledge of essence through use of our imagination is subject to a vicious epistemic circle, we can still use the method to successfully attain objectual understanding of essence. In this paper, I argue that the Husserlian objectual understanding-based epistemology envisaged by Vaidya suffers from a similar epistemic circularity as its knowledge-based foil. I argue that there is a straight-forward solution to this problem, but then raise three serious problems for an (...)
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  15.  1
    Empathy as a Tool for Learning About Evaluative Features of Objects.Diana Sofronieva - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (3):355-367.
    It is generally agreed that empathy can give us knowledge about others. However, the potential use of empathy as a tool to learn about features of objects in the world more generally, as opposed to learning only about others’ internal states, has not been discussed in the literature. In this paper I make the claim that empathy can help us learn about evaluative features of objects in the world. I further defend this claim by comparing empathy to testimony. Then I (...)
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  16.  8
    Truth Tracking and Knowledge From Virtual Reality.Billy Wheeler - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (3):369-388.
    Is it possible to gain knowledge about the real world based solely on experiences in virtual reality? According to one influential theory of knowledge, you cannot. Robert Nozick's truth-tracking theory requires that, in addition to a belief being true, it must also be sensitive to the truth. Yet beliefs formed in virtual reality are not sensitive: in the nearest possible world where P is false, you would have continued to believe that P. This is problematic because there is increasing awareness (...)
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  17.  2
    Scepticism Without Knowledge-Attributions.Aaran Burns - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (2):133-148.
    The sceptic says things like “nobody knows anything at all,” “nobody knows that they have hands,” and “nobody knows that the table exists when they aren't looking at it.” According to many recent anti-sceptics, the sceptic means to deny ordinary knowledge attributions. Understood this way, the sceptic is open to the charge, made often by Contextualists and Externalists, that he doesn't understand the way that the word “knowledge” is ordinarily used. In this paper, I distinguish a form of Scepticism that (...)
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  18.  55
    Casullo on Experiential Justification.R. M. Farley - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (2):179-194.
    In A Priori Justification, Albert Casullo argues that extant attempts to explicate experiential justification—by stipulation, introspection, conceptual analysis, thought experimentation, and/or appeal to intuitions about hypothetical cases—are unsuccessful. He draws the following conclusion: “armchair methods” such as these are inadequate to the task. Instead, empirical methods should be used to investigate the distinction between experiential and non-experiential justification and to address questions concerning the nature, extent, and existence of the a priori. In this essay, I show that Casullo has not (...)
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  19.  4
    Knowledge, Certainty, and Factivity.Jeffrey Hoops - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (2):237-243.
    In recent discussions in this journal, Moti Mizrahi defends the claim that knowledge equals epistemic certainty. Howard Sankey finds Mizrahi’s argument to be problematic, since, as he reads it, this would entail that justification must guarantee truth. In this article, I suggest that an account of the normativity of justification is able to bridge the gap between Mizrahi’s proposal and Sankey’s objections.
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  20.  2
    Justified by Thought Alone.Andrei Mărășoiu - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (2):195-208.
    The new rationalists – BonJour and Bealer – have characterized one type of a priori justification as based on intellectual intuitions or seemings. I argue that they are mistaken in thinking that intellectual intuitions can provide a priori justification. Suppose that the proposition that a surface cannot be red and green all over strikes you as true. When you carefully consider it, you couldn't but realize that no surface could be both red and green all over. Ascertaining the truth of (...)
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  21.  9
    Numbers, Empiricism and the A Priori.Olga Ramírez Calle - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (2):149-177.
    The present paper deals with the ontological status of numbers and considers Frege´s proposal in Grundlagen upon the background of the Post-Kantian semantic turn in analytical philosophy. Through a more systematic study of his philosophical premises, it comes to unearth a first level paradox that would unset earlier still than it was exposed by Russell. It then studies an alternative path that, departing from Frege’s initial premises, drives to a conception of numbers as synthetic a priori in a more Kantian (...)
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  22.  5
    The Aporia of Omniscience.Daniel Rönnedal - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (2):209-227.
    This paper introduces a new aporia, the aporia of omniscience. The puzzle consists of three propositions: (1) It is possible that there is someone who is necessarily omniscient and infallible, (2) It is necessary that all beliefs are historically settled, and (3) It is possible that the future is open. Every sentence in this set is intuitively reasonable and there are prima facie plausible arguments for each of them. However, the whole set {(1), (2), (3)} is inconsistent. Therefore, it seems (...)
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  23.  6
    Harder, Better, Faster, Stronger: Epistemic Standards and Moral Beliefs.Nicole Dular - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):29-51.
    Much work in moral epistemology is devoted to explaining apparent asymmetries between moral and non-moral epistemology. These asymmetries include testimony, expertise, and disagreement. Surprisingly, these asymmetries have been addressed in isolation from each other, and the explanations offered have been piecemeal, rather than holistic. In this paper, I provide the only unified account on offer of these asymmetries. According to this unified account, moral beliefs typically have a higher epistemic standard than non-moral beliefs. This means, roughly, that it is typically (...)
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  24.  28
    Stakes-Shifting Cases Reconsidered—What Shifts? Epistemic Standards or Position?Kok Yong Lee - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):53-76.
    It is widely accepted that our initial intuitions regarding knowledge attributions in stakes-shifting cases are best explained by standards variantism, the view that the standards for knowledge may vary with contexts in an epistemically interesting way. Against standards variantism, I argue that no prominent account of the standards for knowledge can explain our intuitions regarding stakes-shifting cases. I argue that the only way to preserve our initial intuitions regarding such cases is to endorse position variantism, the view that one’s epistemic (...)
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  25. On Some Arguments for Epistemic Value Pluralism.Timothy Perrine - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):77-96.
    Epistemic Value Monism is the view that there is only one kind of thing of basic, final epistemic value. Perhaps the most plausible version of Epistemic Value Monism is Truth Value Monism, the view that only true beliefs are of basic, final epistemic value. Several authors—notably Jonathan Kvanvig and Michael DePaul—have criticized Truth Value Monism by appealing to the epistemic value of things other than knowledge. Such arguments, if successful, would establish Epistemic Value Pluralism is true and Epistemic Value Monism (...)
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  26.  7
    Gettier Beliefs and Serious Beliefs.James Simpson - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):113-118.
    In a recent exchange in the pages of this journal, John Biro responds to Gabor Forrai’s argument against Biro’s argument that in most, if not all, Gettier cases the belief condition, contra popular opinion, isn’t satisfied. In this note, I’ll argue that Biro’s response to Forrai satisfactorily resolves the first of Forrai’s two central objections to Biro’s argument that the belief condition isn’t satisfied in most, if not all, Gettier cases. But Biro’s response leaves mostly unaddressed the most plausible way (...)
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  27.  9
    Luck, Knowledge, and Epistemic Probability.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):97-109.
    Epistemic probability theories of luck come in two versions. They are easiest to distinguish by the epistemic property they claim eliminates luck. One view says that the property is knowledge. The other view says that the property is being guaranteed by a subject’s evidence. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen defends the Knowledge Account. He has recently argued that his view is preferable to my Epistemic Analysis of Luck, which defines luck in terms of evidential probability. In this paper, I defend EAL against Steglich-Petersen’s (...)
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  28.  27
    On Contexts, Hinges, and Impossible Mistakes.Anna Boncompagni - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 4 (11):507-516.
    In this commentary on Nuno Venturinha’s Description of Situations, after highlighting what in my view are the most significant and innovative features of his work, I focus on Venturinha’s infallibilist approach to knowledge. This topic allows for a wider discussion concerning the pragmatist aspects of the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy. I discuss this in three steps: first, by describing the general similarity between Wittgenstein and the pragmatists with respect to the emphasis on contexts; second, by focusing on the kind of fallibilism (...)
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