The idea that truth is eternal is an old one in philosophy, and I do not propose to survey its history here. Yet a sketch of the historical context is useful for my main purpose, which is to discuss the theme of truth and temporality in Martin Heidegger and Richard Rorty. Although both philosophers repudiate eternal truth, their reasons for doing so are different, and this difference reveals a probably irreconcilable opposition between Heidegger and the Pragmatist.

Truth is one of the main concepts of Philosophy, some even consider it the most important of all (W. Künne). This concept is also a foundation for other philosophical concepts. Some of them even depend intrinsically on it, such as the concepts of belief (to believe in something is to believe this something is true), knowledge (if you know something then that something is true), fact (facts are what make our statements true), existence (true reality is the external world that (...) exists) and modality (there are propositions that can be true in all possible worlds), among many others. Truth is also a crucial concept for other domains. Science is said to be the search for the truth of the Natural World and the good life is said to be the pursuit of the good (Aristotle). If one considers that the good and the just are objects of knowledge (R. Campbell), then, there could be no good or justice without truth, insofar as knowledge needs truth. Also, our confidence in the robustness of western political and social institutions has always rested on truth. Unfortunately, this basis, which is the foundation of trust and, therefore, of the robustness of our institutions, is being eroded by external forces, deniers and nihilists, by undermining the concept of Truth, endangering in that way the democratic model (H. Frankfurt). The troubled events we have recently experienced – the raise of populisms, conspiracy theories, pandemic skepticism, the conflict in Ukraine not only in the battleground but also in the info space – could, to some extent, make us question whether, in fact, there is still any theoretical interest in “truth”. As several authors have noted, it seems that today we live in a society of “post-truth” (A. Szakolczai) or “veritophobia” (A. Goldman), where lies are tolerated and facts ignored. Also, for this reason, understanding what truth is by reflecting on its nature and function, from the most sophisticated conceptual schemes to its most everyday uses, seems to be a philosophical task of the utmost importance. This is why the Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia has decided to dedicate this special issue to the subject of truth. (shrink)

Deflationism about truth is often said to be incompatible with truth-theoretic semantics. However, both of these labels are ambiguous, making the truth of the incompatibility claim dependent on interpretation. I provide one pair of natural interpretations, on which both views relate essentially to grounding and on which they are indeed incompatible. This result has some intrinsic interest as well as paving the way for further needed clarifications in the debate about the relationship between the views.

Descartes held that it is impossible to make true statements about what we perceive, but I go over alleged cases of illusory experience to show why such a skeptical conclusion (and recourse to God) is overblown. The overreaction, I contend, stems from an insufficient awareness of the habitual expectations brought to any given experience. These expectations manifest themselves in motor terms, as perception constantly prompts and updates an embodied posture of readiness for what might come next. Such habitual anticipations work (...) best when they efface themselves, so it is easy to blame perception when our expectations get frustrated. I illustrate this misdirected blame with the example of a stick partially in water: it is only because we expect the stick to be straight that its appearance as bent is deemed problematic. I thus conclude that, if we factor in the habitual interpretations operative in perception and switch to a processual view that allows practical engagement, we can deflate the worries that led Descartes to rule out perceptual truths. Distancing myself from the naïve “sign” of folk semiotics, my critique draws inspiration from the triadic semiotic model developed in some late medieval schools of Portugal. (shrink)

This article explores the philosophical complexities of asylum and refugee reception, critiquing both continental and analytical traditions while proposing a phenomenological method to bridge theory and praxis. It highlights the analytical tradition’s focus on formal rights and obligations, and contrasts this with insights from the continental tradition and Hannah Arendt’s experiential perspective on asylum. The paper advocates for a comprehensive theory of hospitality, aiming to reconcile formal rights with the lived experiences of refugees, ultimately striving for a balanced understanding and (...) better facilitation of mutual recognition and integration. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to propose a theory of pluralistic realism, i.e. a theory that presents an idea of reality that embraces multiplicity both at an ontological and epistemological level. The basic ideal of this theory is that reality is inexhaustibly multifaceted and that, therefore, the ways in which human beings can account for it are diverse and multiple. This idea of reality also implies an idea of plural truth, i.e. as an openness and acceptance of diversity and (...) difference which can act as an antidote to the resurgence of fundamentalisms and totalitarian visions of reality based on the refusal of diversity, on the lack of ethical recognition-political-social difference and on the tendency to believe that one’s own reality and therefore one’s culture, one’s nation, one’s country are objectively superior to other realities, nations, countries, cultures. In proposing the reasons for this theory we will try to integrate Mario De Caro’s philosophical proposal of a «liberalized naturalism» or «pluralistic realism» with the phenomenological perspective of Vincenzo Costa based on the idea that reality is determined on the basis of the experience of the human subject. (shrink)

In his lifetime, Bruno Latour (1947-2022) made many provocative and controversial arguments, such as about the nature of the practices of the natural sciences, and against standard social scientific forms of critique. Running through many of Latour’s interventions, aimed at what he took to be stultifying forms of academic and intellectual orthodoxy, was a concern with the nature of truth. Whether emphasising how science fabricates its ‘facts’, or in having to deal with uncomfortable similarities between that sort of analysis and (...) the attacks on the allegedly fraudulent nature of climate science by climate sceptics, or in presenting the societal bases of standard forms of social critique as fictitious, Latour was constantly engaged in battles about and polemics concerning what counts as truths and truthfulness. In this paper, we consider the nature of some of the main contours of Latour’s battles about and with truths. We present an account of his practice in a critical light. Sometimes that involves stepping outside of the ‘anti-critical’ frame of reference he sought to construct and impose on how philosophy, sociology and other ways of thinking are done, but it also sometimes involves using that apparatus, while turning it against the intentions of the author. The purpose of this paper is not to try out-do Latour in the dismissal of intellectual positions other than one’s own. Instead, we focus on other types and levels of failure in the career-long endeavours and engagements with matters of truth of this curious but undoubtedly unavoidable figure, ‘Bruno Latour’. We end by speculating if more ‘Bruno Latours’ will be fabricated in the service of new modes of truth-creation in the future. (shrink)

This paper aims to construct a picture of knowledge out of Frege’s comments on truth, judgment, assertion, and knowledge. Frege takes truth to be an object, and the act of judgment to be the act of non-judgmental identification of truth qua an object with the reference of a sentence. For him, the propositional knowledge that p is the non-propositional knowledge of the identity between truth and |p|. Propositional knowledge thusly understood is produced by our knowledge of truth qua an object, (...) which is constituted by our abilities to identify truth as such. The Fregean picture of knowledge provides a tight connection between knowledge-how, objectual knowledge, and propositional knowledge. (shrink)

This article intends to address the problem about God, consciousness and gnostic legacy to modernity, whose immanent nature leads to serious philosophical conclusions. Indeed, the most important concept of contemporary idealism, within philosophy of religion, is consciousness, which is related with human’s individualism and self-sufficiency. In a cosmic approach, this doctrine proposes a pantheistic view of the universe and a paradigm of man’s deification and self-redemption, whose mainstream is the New Era’s spirituality without religion. Finally, an outline of Thomist doctrines (...) on God’s transcendence and the human intellect is offered, as a proposal for a philosophy of religion based on common sense. (shrink)

The expressivist theory in metaethics has a historical lineage dating back to the work of the great philosopher David Hume. Among the major metaethical alternatives to expressivism are constructivist theories, theories that have an origin in the work of another great philosopher, Immanuel Kant. One of the best-known and most influential recent formulations of such a view is due to John Rawls. There has been a great deal of discussion of the relationship between expressivism and deflationary theories of truth. In (...) stark contrast, there has been very little discussion of the relationship between constructivist theories and deflationary theories of truth. I argue that Rawlsian constructivists should adopt a minimalist theory of truth. (shrink)

In reflective explorations of the nature of truth in the philosophical concern with truth (as conceived in people’s pre-theoretic understanding of truth), there are two seemingly opposed strategic directions of explaining the relationship between the two closely related but distinct basic semantic notions, truth (with sentential truth bearers) and reference (with referring terms at the subject position): by virtue of which to hook up to the world in the fundamental relationship between language, thought and the world; eventually which one is (...) more fundamental in this connection, explaining truth by virtue of reference or explaining reference by virtue of truth. In this essay, through elaborating a holistic double-reference explanatory basis of truth, I explain how our pre-theoretic “way-things-are-capturing” understanding of truth fundamentally plays its normative-basis role for a unifying pluralist account of truth through the complementary interplay of its vertical “double-reference-based” dimension and horizontal “sentential-predication-based” dimension. For illustration and for a relatively complete understanding, in Appendix, I present a sample version of the suggested unifying pluralist account of truth which consists of the referentially enhanced base account, as explained in this essay, and sample accounts of some distinct types of perspective elaborations. (shrink)

This essay has two parts: 1) a negative or destructive one, which consists of showing that there is no anomaly, even apparent, in the concept of ‘truth’ (and ‘falsehood’), so that the available theories of truth are not justified, either to solve or react to this alleged problem; 2) a positive or constructive one, which consists of proposing a characterization of truth (and falsehood) based solely on the “objective aspect” of this concept. Here, I will associate the concept of ‘truth’ (...) with the concept of ‘existence’, taking them as two different species of a common genus. Along the way, I will critically analyze the theories of truth “available on the market” and argue that truth only has an “objective aspect”. (shrink)

The primitivist theory of truth, i.e., the view that truth cannot be analysed in more fundamental terms, has been cleverly revamped by Jamin Asay, who has combined a primitivist approach to the concept of truth with a deflationary approach to the (metaphysical) property of being true. This paper aims to adjust Asay’s primitivist theory to consistently include the primitiveness of the (pre-theoretical) correspondence relation, grasped by our correspondence intuition, alongside the primitiveness of truth. In the process, I apply a thesis (...) by Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson, according to which the correspondence of beliefs to facts (broadly construed) can occur with no commitment to a correspondence theory of truth. Then I argue why Asay’s theory might not be able to account for the primitiveness of the pre-theoretical correspondence relation. Finally, I use a suggestion by André Kukla concerning the possible entailment between an ineffable insight and its effable consequences, to build a revised primitivist theory of truth. (shrink)

In contemporary philosophy, it is tempting to apply the metaphysics of properties to the specific case of truth, in the hope of making progress on the investigation of the latter. In this paper, I argue that a different approach, mostly independent from the metaphysics of properties and based on the naturalness, in Lewis’ sense, of semantic nations, is often a better alternative, both in general and in some specific cases. In particular, adopting the new perspective, I present a new problem (...) of combining logical validity and strong truth pluralism, and offer a way to sharply distinguish deflationism and primitivism about truth. The main original upshot of the paper is offering a perspective on philosophy of truth that sheds new light on the general problem of truth and on some particular issues. (shrink)

These reflections are devoted to a critical comparison of three distinct interpretations of Habermas’s theory of truth. The first, which is presented as the more adequate interpretation, takes Habermas’s theory as having a three-moment structure, whereas the two remaining interpretations are both based on his two-moment conception of “Janus-faced truth”. Whereas Steven Levine stresses the nonepistemic lifeworld pole of the two-sided concept and Alex Seemann the opposite epistemic discursive pole, the three-moment interpretation counters with a synthetic conception which emphasises the (...) role of the context-transcendent universalistic concept of truth. This overarching interpretation is inspired by a cognitive perspective concerned with the full circle of the sociocultural embodiment and realisation of reason. (shrink)

The question of truth is bound to the question of the relation between identity and difference. Historically, the bond between truth and the primacy of identity was forged through the conviction that to speak of truth is to speak of being, or what is (the case). Since Parmenides, being becomes intelligible solely in relation to identity, or the One, with difference either being excluded from “what is” altogether, or as in Plato and Aristotle, finding its subordinate “place” within being. After (...) Hegel, whose thought accomplishes this “placing” in an absolute way, philosophy has sought to reverse this priority, while still insisting, necessarily, on thinking and speaking about what is the case, and therefore of truth. This essay raises the question of the coherence of this reversal. Characterizing the past century as the one in which philosophy’s aim was the overcoming of the perennial priority of identity, it attempts to show not only that post-Hegelian thought was at multiple levels divided on this aim, but that what Gillian Rose called the “metaphysics of pure difference” went uniquely awry—both in terms of its consequences and in its failure to maintain a genuinely critical relation to so-called “philosophies of representation.”. (shrink)

On the correspondence theory of truth, a proposition is true if and only if it corresponds to fact. Criticisms of the correspondence theory of truth have argued that such a strict interpretation of the correspondence relation will not be able to account for the truth of statements about fiction or mathematics. This challenge has resulted in the introduction of more permissive correspondence relations, such as Austin’s correspondence as correlation or Tarski’s correspondence as reference satisfaction. Recently, some mediated correspondence theorists of (...) truth have proposed that the correspondence relation holds not only between thought and world but also between thought and language. In this paper, I argue that correspondence truth, direct or mediated, is not a monistic theory of truth, the view that there is one and only way for a proposition to be true. To argue for this position, I will have to show that each of the correspondence theories accept direct and indirect ways of understanding the correspondence relation as well as address potential objections to the view that correspondence theory is not singular and monolithic. (shrink)

In this paper, I tackle Aquinas’s notion of ‘natural inclinations’, specifically as it occurs in his seminal elaboration of the natural law in Summa Theologiae I-II. Question 94. Article 2. Maintaining that it constitutes a departure from Aristotle’s terminology, and is hence puzzling, I go on to investigate a raft of modern, mainly Anglophone, interpretations of the concept. Beginning with Jacques Maritain, I move through the broadly chronological sequence of John Finnis, Jean Porter, Steven Jensen, Justin Matchulat and Stephen Brock. (...) In each case, I argue that – despite these scholars’ philosophical ingenuity and textual facility – there are crucial problems with their respective approaches and construals. I end the paper by outlining my own construal of ‘natural inclinations’, which, even if not bolstered by heavy textual scholarship, is at least coherent and, moreover, avoids the philosophical pitfalls of the above interpretations. (shrink)

In the broadest sense of the term, “Thomism” refers to a set of ideas and principles, both in philosophy and theology that can be considered as derivations or representations of the thought of Thomas Aquinas. However, Thomism should not be considered as a mere conceptual body. It also represents a certain view and way of doing philosophy and theology. Alasdair MacIntyre, in his book Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, argues that the Thomistic approach provides a coherent and skillful point (...) of view for dealing creatively and critically with opposing views, contrasting this approach with the encyclopedic and the genealogical approaches. The former imposes a single worldview, enclosing knowledge and “truth” in a monolithic structure of “progress,” while the latter, following Nietzsche, devalues and relativizes knowledge, reducing it to a multiplicity of perspectives, each with its own claims to truth, leading to incommensurability and the consequent subjugation of “truth” to the law of the strongest. On the other hand, Thomists have adopted, from the end of the thirteenth century to the present day, different styles and ways of thinking while maintaining dialogue with their “predecessors” and at the same time with their contemporaries, that is, Thomists are capable of what MacIntyre called the “rationality of tradition”. (shrink)

I discuss Aquinas’s view of habit—the genus to which virtue belongs. The first article in both of Aquinas’s sustained treatments of the virtues in general (STh I.II.55-67 and QDV 1) asks whether virtues are habits. Thus, Aquinas’s pedagogical strategy is to elucidate the virtues in terms of their nature as habits. Following this strategy, I explore Aquinas’s discussion of habits in Questions 49-54 of the prima secundae by tracing three important topics: the essence of habits, the cause of habits, and (...) the increase of habits. By the end of this paper, the reader will have a strong grasp of the nature and types of habits and the different ways in which they can increase. (shrink)

This paper raises an uncommon question: What can studying Thomas Aquinas and Critical Race Theory teach us about failures to promote mercy across the color-line? I answer this question in five stages. After locating Thomas’s teachings on mercy and its impediments within his masterwork, the Summa theologiae, I excavate Thomas’s account of mercy’s impediments. Next, I address the question “What is CRT?” Then I examine a foundational CRT text’s analysis of mercy’s impediments. Lastly, I offer a proposal for further Thomas-CRT (...) collaborations. (shrink)

The primary objective of this study is to revisit Thomas Aquinas’ notion of justice in light of the author’s own considerations regarding false testimony, specifically in its relation to sin. The intention is to emphasize, within the philosopher, theologian, and advisor’s thinking, the non-sacrificial dimension of justice, which aligns with a testimonial view of cultural evolution and, consequently, philosophical and theological thought. These topics will be addressed through an examination of the discussion surrounding antisemitism in S. Thomas Aquinas, a discussion (...) conducted and explored by Hippolyte Gayraud in his book titled L’Antisémitisme de Saint Thomas D’Aquin (The Antisemitism of Saint Thomas Aquinas). (shrink)

Narratives relate salient connected events across some time and many particular details of the agents involved in those events. Whether fictional or true, historical or current, personal or cultural, they seem to pervade human experience and, according to theorists across different philosophical traditions, can be of some help to elucidate concerns in the moral life. Thomas Aquinas himself acknowledges the existence of such things, or at least their near analogues, in various places in his corpus. But he does not offer (...) a sustained explanation of how narratives are understood in terms of his psychology. In this paper, I claim that such an account lies in his thought on the functioning of two interior senses in particular – the cogitative power (vis cogitativa) and the memorative power (vis memorativa) – which have been the subject of more sustained study only more recently. With this account of how humans generate and process such narratives, Thomistic scholars will be positioned to explain how narratives may function in human experience, especially the moral life, on Thomistic terms. (shrink)

The 20th Century was a rich period for Thomism. Many commentaries to the First Way were written. One of the many points of disagreement between Thomists was the actual meaning of “motion.” In this paper, I try to argue that one should take for “motion” the broad meaning of “motus” (as equivalent to “mutatio”). I do so by reviewing the position of various prominent Thomists of the last century, many of which have disagreed with this position. I make the case (...) that Aristotle is not the best interpreter of the First Way, and similarly that other works by Aquinas should only be used when the Summa Theologiae itself is not clear enough—which is not the case. (shrink)

With this second dialogue, Salviati wants to remove Simplicio’s difficulties on the actual distinction of essence and being as well as on the notion of the act of being (actus essendi). Feeling that he had skipped stages in their first dialogue, he suggests going back to the determination of the exact subject of metaphysics according to Thomas Aquinas. He will progress in two steps: the transition from «first perceived being» to «common being» or «being as being» by a judgment of (...) separation, and then the definition of the subject of metaphysics as «being negatively or neutrally immaterial». With this conclusion, Salviati intends to lead Simplicio to understand the autonomy of the principles of metaphysics towards philosophy of nature. Simplicio remains curious but dubious. Is not the negatively immaterial being a simple dialectical notion that Salviati would take for a metaphysical one? Is the independence of metaphysics from physics therefore also ensured? And consequently, is there actually a difference between the first perceived being and the common being, subject of metaphysics? What is, actually, the subject of metaphysics? (shrink)

In this article, I focus on what emerges from Thomas Aquinas’s religious epistemology once taken into consideration in the light of the contemporary debates on Christian philosophy. I argue that Aquinas profitably explores what is specific to Christian faith – its being under the command of the will moved by God’s grace. According to Aquinas, it seems that it is precisely that which is specific to faith and distinguishes it from human reason that puts believers in an ideal condition to (...) develop intellectual activities. (shrink)

What unites Joseph Ratzinger / Benedict XVI to the French is ressourcement, a controversial movement that initiated a brilliant reorientation of Catholic thought and teaching in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In the light of the significant work that has already been done on Ratzinger’s original contribution to Vatican II, the objectives of the present paper are, first, to situate him as theologian and Christian humanist at the heart of the ressourcement movement and to evaluate his work for peace and (...) harmony in the confines between past and present. It attempts to illuminate a way forward for the Church, based on the anthropological, philosophical, and spiritual foundations of the new Christian humanism of the ressourcement project, championed by the French and their German allies. Secondly, the paper seeks to document the influence of notable, twentieth-century, French Catholic thinkers, theologians and philosophers, on Ratzinger’s thought and future contribution to Church and culture on a global stage, with particular attention to Yves Congar, Henri de Lubac, Jean Daniélou (1905-74), and Jacques Maritain (1882-1973). Thirdly, it presents a fresh consideration of his vision of the Church, his contribution to the ecclesiology of the Second Vatican Council, and of the turbulent post-conciliar period. The key goals in this domain are, therefore, to articulate Ratzinger’s spirituality and his preponderant contribution to theological anthropology, using the lens of Vatican II. This is a point of some considerable importance and fills a critical lacuna in Catholic theology. As a pertinent comment of Congar’s makes clear. “For there is little awareness of the values of anthropology; we have created an ecclesiology without any anthropology”. Like Congar, Ratzinger sought to construct a theological anthropology concerned to serve the pastoral needs of the Church but without neglecting its cultural and social elements. Spirituality and anthropology are then, unsurprisingly, as luminous, intricately interwoven threads that permeate and fortify his entire theological edifice. (shrink)

The distinction between actus humanus and actus hominis is the best-known distinction in Thomas Aquinas’ theory of action. A human action (actus humanus) is a special case of an act of a human being (actus hominis). Several acts of our intellect and will form a human action and thereby put it from the realm of pure natural happenings (genus naturae) into the moral realm (genus moris). The paper at hand shows the character and main parameters of Thomas Aquinas’ action theory, (...) especially in the Summa theologiae I-II, quaestiones 6-17. Moreover, it presents Thomas Aquinas’ central idea of what is the essence of a human action. The analysis especially makes use of the element of command (imperium) It shows that, according to Aquinas, acting consists in the intellectually comprehensible self-disclosure of a person and therefore builds the basis for the moral evaluation of human actions. (shrink)

According to both Jaakko Hintikka and Simo Knuuttila, Aquinas’ third way to demonstrate that God exists presupposes the acceptance of the principle of plenitude, i.e., of the claim that all possibilities are realized at some time. Aquinas, however, maintained elsewhere that not all possibilities are always realized, and the coherence of his philosophical project may be called into question if one were to accept Hintikka’s and Knuuttila’s reading of the third way. In this paper, I argue that it is difficult (...) to present the third way without invoking the principle of plenitude in Hintikka’s formulation. The corollary of this claim is that third way cannot be a demonstration within the philosophical system outlined by Aquinas, despite his claim to the contrary. Against the backdrop of this exegetical discussion, it is possible to rephrase Aquinas’ third way as a probabilistic argument that shows that God’s existence is highly likely, although not necessarily proven. (shrink)

In the paper I discuss Geach’s rejection of volitions (inner acts of the will) both in the exegesis of Aquinas and in systematic action theory – a rejection followed by some analytical commentators of Aquinas (like Davies and Kenny). I claim that Geach’s interpretation of Aquinas’s action theory in terms of tendencies (treating the will as a special kind of tendency) enables – pace Geach – a sound defense of volitionism both in the exegesis of Aquinas and in the action (...) theory. In other words, I offer arguments in favour of volitions (inner acts of the will) starting from some insights to be found in Geach, and I response to some standard objections against volitionism. Moreover, I try to sketch a framework (based on an ontology of tendencies suggested by Geach) suitable to discuss some other volitionist claims. I proceed in four steps: first I introduce the definition of a volition or inner act of the will that may be ascribed to various camps in the volitionism debate; then I discuss three main arguments of Geach against volitionism – the argument from trying, the argument from voluntary omissions, and the argument from natural theology. I pay special attention to the issue of the timing of volitions. (shrink)

Thomists typically emphasize and defend Aquinas’s “realist” approach to knowledge as an alternative to modern skepticism, but Aquinas is attuned to the common experience of uncertainty, and gives principled reasons for the limits of knowledge across various domains, including especially in the realm of human action. Virtue in general, and Thomistic practical wisdom specifically, can be understood as a habit for responsibly managing choice in the face of imperfect knowledge, unpredictable circumstances, and risk. Several modern specialized disciplines – especially economics, (...) psychology, and various applied social sciences – have highlighted interesting questions about uncertainty and its practical significance, especially in evaluating risk. Emphasizing the role of uncertainty in life is thus not only an invitation for Thomists to notice neglected aspects of Aquinas’s thought, but an opportunity to bring Aquinas’s writings into conversations in other disciplines. Catholic social teaching presents a particularly promising area to engage and learn from those other disciplines in the ongoing elaboration of Thomistic thought. (shrink)

In this article, I would like to present a brief overview of Aquinas’s philosophy of mind. I try to express the cognitive processes that this model of the mind describes in more modern terminology (e.g., I interpret ‘an image’ [phantasm] as the binding effect of monomodal representations of a perceived object). Characteristic of this model is the postulation, in the case of the human mind, of intellectual abstraction leading to concepts, which requires assuming the existence of the intellect in its (...) active and passive aspects. In this context, a metaphysical conclusion can be drawn about the immortal nature of this intellect, according to Thomas. On the other hand, this model of the mind is not, to all appearances, a variant of Platonic-Cartesian dualism – Aquinas makes several arguments against dualism understood in this way, at least one of which was still raised by (non-Thomistic) critics of Descartes. In addition, Thomas points to the developmental aspect of the human mind and also attempts to describe the possible functioning of the intellect after death. (shrink)

More than ever do people seem entrenched in their intellectual positions despite a dearth of concerted and honest reflection upon them. This obstinacy presents a moral and rhetorical challenge—attempting persuasion through naked rational argumentation alone will prove fruitless. But we should not discount the role of the intellect in the fixation of even the least-reflectively formed beliefs. From the perspective of cognition, this fixation is proximately the result of interpretation. In the language of Thomism, this interpretive adherence to falsity consists (...) in a perverse process of discursive reasoning. To exposit the constitution of adherence to false interpretation, here we will draw on the traditions of Thomism, phenomenology, and semiotics. With the insights of these traditions, we will proceed: first, examining the process of interpretation itself; second, considering two different modes of interpretation; and third, situating interpretation in the context of the twofold movement of resolution. Through analyzing interpretation and resolution, we will demonstrate that obstinate intellectual insistence consists in two intellectual errors: adoption of the vague as sufficient for understanding; and reflexive confusions. In both cases, the error persists through the failure to pursue the twofold movement of resolution. (shrink)

The commemoration of the 700th anniversary of the canonization of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) as well as the fiftieth anniversary of the death of Jacques Maritain (1882-1973) present an opportunity to re-examine the neo-Thomism of the contemporary French philosopher. Our aim here will be to set out the philosophical argument from which Maritain establishes an inseparable link between human rights (i.e., the dignity of the human person) and natural law. We will thus seek to expose how Maritain supports democracy from the (...) horizon of Christian philosophy. In doing so, the Thomistic democracy that Maritain proposes will appear to be distant from both totalitarian collectivism and anarchistic individualism, two current threats to the establishment of an authentic and mature democracy. (shrink)

The article reconstructs the cosmic dimension of existence in Fink’s thought. It first analyses man’s openness to the world and then the basic phenomena of existence (eros, work, mastery, death, play). Following he explains human existence as the realisation of a responsive freedom, according to we do not exist from ourselves, but from a way of assuming the aforementioned fundamental phenomena on the basis of which we are born, reside and die in the world. In this sense, the explicitation concludes (...) that these phenomena constitute the cosmic insertion of our existence, since the development of existence from them reflects and symbolises the way in which the cosmos itself emerges and reigns in us. Finally, the article proposes a hermeneutic extension of Fink’s thought, determines the fundamental moods (Stimmungen) and attitudes proper to existence that fully assumes its cosmic character. In this sense, he concludes that a cosmic existence is characterised, first, by a responsible attitude towards the harmonious existence of all beings with whom it shares the world and with whom it realises the order that the world is. Secondly, by a serene attitude towards one’s own mortality, which is assumed as a necessary moment of the world’s becoming. Finally, as an grateful existence to the universe that has allowed it to be and has offered it the possibilities that it is. (shrink)

In Nicomachean Ethics IV Aristotle exposes the characteristics of the moral virtue of the μεγαλοψυχία and offers a detailed description of the conditions of the magnanimous. St. Thomas in his commentary on Ethics follows the Aristotelian text apparently without disagreeing with the Greek author, and completes this exposition with other texts found in the Summa Theologica. The aim of this paper is to highlight the differences, if there are any, between the Aristotelian conception of the μεγαλοψυχία and that of Saint (...) Thomas, considering also whether the virtue of humility that appears in the Thomist texts can be equated to the vice of the pusillanimity of which Aristotle speaks. (shrink)

This scientific article explores the notion of a Christian geopolitics and its compatibility with realpolitik and international relations. The analysis delves into the perspectives of Pope Francis, John Mearsheimer, and Catholic social thought principles to examine the moral implications of geopolitical strategies. Mearsheimer’s bait and bleed strategy in Ukraine is critiqued for its callousness and disregard for human life, while Francis’s emphasis on personal and social reform highlights the importance of ethics and the universal destination of goods. The article questions (...) whether Christians can engage in realpolitik strategies that perpetuate poverty and violate the principles of human dignity and mercy. It further considers the implications for Catholic leaders in government and military roles, particularly in the context of upcoming U.S. presidential contenders. The analysis ultimately challenges the notion that a Christian geopolitics is a category mistake, advocating for a higher moral road in international relations. (shrink)

As contemporary ethical discourse has highlighted, due to the world’s increasing connectedness, everyday actions can contribute to harmful consequences far removed from everyday experience. I argue that Aquinas’s treatment of consequences can give us insight into our responsibility for such effects of our actions on a global scale. In particular, Aquinas recognises that we are responsible for per accidens effects of good actions performed negligently. Even an unintended per accidens effect may follow with a degree of likelihood that makes it (...) foreseeable, even if not actually foreseen; thus the agent is responsible if he fails to take steps to prevent the negative per accidens effect from occurring. I argue that certain global effects of our actions fit this pattern, namely, they are per accidens effects that nonetheless follow from our actions with a high degree of likelihood. Thus, we have a responsibility to take steps to prevent them. (shrink)

This treatise delves into the construction and formalization of a precise theory to encapsulate a pivotal facet of Thomas Aquinas’s ontology. In particular, it focuses on the development of a formal language that is adequate for formulating Aquinas’s understanding of the simultaneous nature of divinity as both an object of subsistence and a universal, individual, and actuating form—a concept evocative of the original Platonic sense of form. The presented axiomatized theory as a medium for expounding the ontological principles enunciated by (...) Thomas Aquinas. A comprehensive set of axioms is systematically justified, exhibiting their congruence with Aquinas’s ontological doctrines. To elucidate this harmony, an extensive series of theorems is deduced, closely aligned with the verbal tenets of Aquinas’s teachings. The inherent consistency of the axiom system is proven by the provision of a geometrico-topological model tailored to support it. (shrink)

Aquinas’s characterization of sacra doctrina has received sustained engagement addressing its relation to contemporary conceptions of theology and Aristotelian conceptions of science. More recently, attention has been paid to Aquinas’s neo-Platonist influences, and the way they lead him to subvert purely Aristotelian categories. I therefore combine these themes by introducing the first study of whether sacra doctrina counts as a technê in Plato’s sense. After examining how Platonic technê relate to their ergon. epistasthai, gignôskein, and epistêmê and examining sacra doctrina’s (...) relationship to each of these Platonic categories, I suggest that sacra doctrina is an unqualified Platonic technê. (shrink)

Does the fine-tuning of the universe for life continue in the afterlife? Aquinas would answer yes. In his view, the cosmic conditions post-apocalypse are set to support the resurrected body and the sensible knowledge of God’s majesty as reflected in the renewed material creature. The renewed universe is, thus, fine-tuned for immortal human life. In the first part, I present Aquinas’ version of fine-tuning, referring to earthly life and the afterlife. I distinguish between two modes of fine-tuning: organic and cognitive. (...) In the second part, I analyze the characteristics of the universe post-apocalypse in connection with the resurrected body in general and the qualities of the blessed body in particular. (shrink)

This article critically examines the structure and implications of the argument in ST 1, Q2, A3, associated with Aquinas’ First Way. Our central endeavor is to discern whether a certain disambiguation of point 6 (“There is something that is not moving/changing that moves/changes other things”) can be logically inferred from points 1-5. Through a three-part proof, the article establishes that under specific conditions, it can indeed be inferred. However, this interpretation notably diverges from Aquinas’ intended conclusion and subsequent stronger interpretations (...) of the claim. The paper also engages in discussions surrounding the soundness of the argument, assessing the plausibility of its premises in light of physics and logical analysis. The contribution does not seek to speculate on Aquinas’ understanding or to dismiss his perspective but rather to delineate what follows from his First Way premises, highlighting discrepancies with contemporary views on the nature of existence, particularly the notion of God. (shrink)

From the perspective of Analytical Thomism, we show that astonishment is a cognitive emotion by which we can inquire into the cause of the effects at which we are astonished. Like Descartes after him, Thomas Aquinas remarks, however, that not all astonishment is good. It is therefore up to consider the epistemic virtues by requested we will be able to live a legitimate astonishment. We distinguish three: one by intellectual attention which causes astonishment; on the other hand, the intellectual docility (...) which directs it; and finally the intellectual benevolence which preserves it. (shrink)

African Philosophy and St Thomas Aquinas have both been taught in African universities, but the engagement between the continent’s indigenous philosophical tradition and the Catholic intellectual tradition’s preeminent strand, has not been thorough. Presupposing that plural philosophical traditions contribute to the search to better understand, this research embarks upon a comparative analysis of the perspectives of the African ubuntu philosophy and Thomist philosophical conceptualisations of human becoming and being. Through analysis of dimensions of both traditions, it is contended that human (...) fulness arises through relationality. It is argued that in centring on the interpersonal encounter and the consequent recognition of another’s being through mutual engagement, these philosophical traditions open to each other. Further, both traditions contribute toward the ontology of personhood in ubuntu and the good of mutual indwelling, respectively. (shrink)

This essay was born out of two astonishments: an admiration and a perplexity. On the one hand, this essay was born out of our admiration for the text of the question De aeternitate mundi, written by St. Thomas Aquinas in the full maturity of his thought (1271). It is a philosophically exemplary text, in terms of construction and discernment, in which the author argues that there is no contradiction between the theology of creation and the possibility of an eternal world, (...) in accordance with Aristotelian physics. On the other hand, we were also motivated by our perplexity with the difficulty that even today the Christian faith in creation experiences in dealing with the Darwinian theory of evolution. It occurred to us, then, to elaborate a question of evolution, entirely analogous, in construction and in discernment, to the question of the eternity of the world, as it had been thought of by St. Thomas Aquinas. Thus, we also argue here that there is no contradiction between the theology of creation and the possibility of a world in evolution, according to Darwin’s biological theory. And we do this by following the structure of the Thomasian question step by step. (shrink)

At his last conference in France, on 8 June 2004, in Strasbourg, under the title “Le souverain bien – ou l’Europe en mal de souveraineté”, Jacques Derrida (1930-2004), always very concerned about Europe and about the future of Europe, dared to admit that he dreamed, without the slightest Eurocentrism or identitarianism, of “a Europe whose universal hospitality and new laws of hospitality or the right of asylum would make it the Noah’s Ark of the 21st century” – since the Bible (...) (Gen. 6-9), Noah’s Ark [Tevat Noah] symbolizing the covenant, that is, Elohim’s alliance with Noah and “every living being” (Gen. 9, 15). Through the problematic of unconditional hospitality – which, as we try to point out, translates the singularity of this biblical alliance as well as underlines the singularity of Deconstruction as a philosophical idiom –, it is the silhouette of this dream of Derrida, as well as its juridical and political scope and implications not only in the European scene but also in the so-called Globalization scene, that we try to sketch here, showing how such a dream deconstructs, that is, denounces and critically re-thinks presumption and violence of the carno-fallo-logo-centric register of philosophical-cultural Westernity. (shrink)

Philosophy is a paradoxical form of knowledge, and its contradictions can only be resolved by invoking the idea of a hospitality offered to every philosopher. It can itself be defined, in its way of operating, as radical hospitality offered to whatever is not itself.

The path articulated in this paper has as its background and horizon the question of hospitality. In order to propose a re-thinking of this concept and the practices related to it, in this paper an attempt will be made to analyze the phenomenology of hostility starting from the analysis of the concepts of the stranger and the foreigner, and then focusing on the concept of community in order to outline the assumptions of a philosophy of hospitality. The thesis of this (...) work is that identity can only be defined in relation to otherness and that the latter does not come from an external dimension but from an internal dimension. In this sense, the stranger who must be welcomed is the one who is always on the verge of arriving and who in his coming always crosses the threshold, the limit that establishes the division between the inside and the outside, between the proper and the foreign. (shrink)

Since antiquity, there have been different philosophical and scientific theories about erotic desire and sexual experience. In this work, we will identify the metaphysics of sexuality in the Judeo-Christian perspective of creation and in the irrationalist perspective of Schopenhauer’s atheistic pessimism. Christian theology sacralizes heterosexuality, rejecting the Gnostic antagonism between matter and spirit. In dialogue with contemporary feminist movements, we will try to present the different rational models that justify sexual differentiation and gender identity. We will develop an empathetic and (...) non-homophobic dialogue with constructivist and existentialist theories that separate gender difference from the deterministic biologism of sexual difference. We will seek to verify the contribution of Christian personalist models to a spirituality of gender identity that reconciles culturalist theses and essentialist theses in the intelligibility of gender identity. (shrink)

The multiple tensions of the present time reverberate on identity compositions, translating norms endorsed in the games of economic globalization which stress coexistence, producing inclusion and exclusion at the same time. This context refers to the action of two antagonistic forces, the first being mixophobia, strongly disruptive and excluding, the second, on the other hand, moves towards inclusion, towards respect for otherness, acceptance of the other who is identified as mixophilia. Therefore, thinking about hospitality in the contemporary context leads us (...) to the analysis of the tensioning of assumptions, values ​​and models which normalize some identities and exclude others. The methodological course of reflection referenced in the arguments of Zygmunt Bauman’s thought gathers data from documentary research on political mobility guidelines, as well as data from a bibliographic review study on hospitality in education. The results demonstrate the urgency of strengthening studies on the construction of a culture of hospitality for different identities, via intercultural education. (shrink)

This text aims to initiate a dialogue between the works of Martin Buber and Jacques Derrida with regard to the notion of ‘reciprocity’. It is my contention that a reexamination of Buber’s notion of relation will reveal a reflection, devoid of any notions of ‘symmetry’, which strongly indicates a point of continuity with Derrida’s late thinking on hospitality. The following text, therefore, aims to provoke a reexamination of Buber’s thinking on the home, at the centre of which stands the notion (...) entirely opposed to ‘symmetry’: namely, ‘reciprocity’. The hypothesis of this text, then, is that when it comes to thinking of dwelling, Buber and Derrida share a ‘relational’ way of thinking, which foregrounds the relation between – in Buber’s case – the relations between man and God, man and man, and man and the Land, and – in Derrida’s case – between guest and host; in addition, I will attempt to show that Derrida’s work on hospitality – in particular, his introduction of a notion of ‘identity’ – produces a necessary contribution, or response, to Buber’s notion of ‘dwelling as reciprocity’. I will conclude by reflecting upon the reciprocity of this dialogue between the work of Martin Buber and Jacques Derrida. (shrink)

Philosophical issues of hospitality are bound up with broader issues of cosmopolitanism in thought and in practice. This paper considers the interplay of human faces, masks, forms of hospitality, and cosmopolitanizing and anti-cosmopolitanizing socio-political dynamics in the time of Covid-19. Despite confident assertions by some interested parties that it is now finished and past history, Covid-19 remains a major challenge across the globe, and so reflections on the interplay of masking, cosmopolitanism, and hospitality remain pertinent today and are not merely (...) a quaint feature of life during the early years of the pandemic. Voluntary acts of self-masking are argued to be more than just mundane forms of micro-level action and interaction among persons. Instead, freighted sometimes with political meaning, and certainly loaded with ethical force, the donning of a face mask can operate as a small but compelling quotidian act of cosmopolitan concern and hospitableness towards other people, including those perceived to be very unlike oneself. (shrink)

In this article, we will show how Derrida’s deconstruction of modern individualism, exemplified by Robinson Crusoe’s attitude toward nature, addresses the contemporary debate on the Anthropocene. Through Hadot’s genealogy of modern “prometheanism,” we will discuss how a different gaze by human beings on themselves and nature can lead us out of the modern self-conception of the human person, that is resulting in the Anthropocene era, its catastrophic results endangering the very survival of humankind. Through Morton’s conception of hospitality and Haraway’s (...) notion of Chthulucene, we argue that a new individual and collective conversion to nature may result in an era in which human beings can conceive of themselves as ethical parts of nature. Hence, a new view on the reciprocal interdependence between human beings and nature can be affirmed, creating a feeling of hospitality without hostility. We conclude by considering Agamben’s recovery of Franciscanism, as a form-of-life, preceding modernity, in which this ethical, natural civilization was firstly foreseen. (shrink)

The imperative to practice hospitality constitutes a mark of Western civilization. Already in Homer’s Odyssey, the hero Ulysses punishes Polyphemus for not having respected the obligation of hospitality towards him and his companions. In fact, hospitality has been a constitutive element of the West, marked by linguistic, cultural, and religious differences, in a world whose borders are supposed to be well defined. In his discussion of hospitality, Derrida shows how Socrates, in Plato’s dialogue The Apology of Socrates, places himself in (...) the position of a foreigner. In fact, Socrates presents himself as foreigner, that is, someone who is alien to the language and procedures of the court that is judging him. According to Derrida, he shows, in this way, the extent to which the foreigner is forced to ask for hospitality in a language he does not know. The court reduces Socrates to the other, the different. Moreover, the court forces him to deny his difference, his own identity, asking him to adapt himself to a system that he does not control. The paradox arises when Socrates, who regrets being regarded as a foreigner, asks the court to treat him at least as a foreigner. He feels so outraged that he asks to be granted at least the rights of a non-national. In doing so, Socrates shows how recognizing the rights of the foreigner generates hospitality but, at the same time, also limits it. Whenever a human being is recognized as human being, he or she will necessarily be seen as another, as someone different. This person will have to adapt him or herself to a system, culture or world that will define him or her as a foreigner. In short, in the phenomena that we tend to see as hospitality there is always a certain hostility. In a world of ongoing migratory crises, and in the context of a return to nationalisms of exclusion combined with populisms of prejudice and aversion to those who are different, it becomes imperative to rethink the ethics and politics of hospitality. In this context, Derrida’s distinction between conditioned and unconditioned hospitality can be useful. (shrink)

The recognition of self as other and others as self continues to be one of the greatest challenges to the ethos necessary for institutions, public and private, engaged in hospitality. Indeed, hospitality is an intrinsic part of the recognition of the common and communal bond in which each human person can rediscover a sense of belonging and his or her own specific creaturality, the fruit of mutual and diverse encounters in the relationship between peoples and among peoples. Inspired by papal (...) words and documents, as well as philosophical and political debates of jus, here we defend the value of experiences of mutual bonds of memory and humanitarian revelation, in which a clear distinction between demos and ethnos can be established. By questioning globalization in its economic and financial promises, unrelated to human dignity and hospitality, it reveals how paths to peace are sustained by the synodal consolidation of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Thus, a distinction must be made between claims of ethnic recognition, on the one hand, and the promises of global recognition of civil rights and pseudo-cultural acquisitions, which have in recent years risen to legal protection and political guarantee; on the other hand, it is pointed out that true recognition of the human person as constituted in a relational, social and community dignity is only beyond the economic-financial constraints of globalization. (shrink)

Between “the one who arrives” (and triggers the new age of migrations), and “what happens” (an expression used in some instances by Derrida to refer to deconstruction), there is an eventuality to think about. This brings out a concept of unconditional hospitality which is defined as “hospitality to reality,” “hospitality to the event.” The ethical and political analyses that criticize this notion are far from tackling within this perspective, an aspect on which Derrida himself has not been always clear enough. (...) Furthermore, the “arrivant” (Derrida) shall be understood in the light of the “arrivage” (Marion). The phenomenality expressed by the phenomenon of migration calls for a description to the extent of unconditional eventuality that seems to saturate such phenomenon. (shrink)

In the last two decades, we have seen an increasing display of gestures and language of forgiveness in the public realm. Forgiveness has become a secular phenomenon. What do we mean by forgiveness? What is the role of forgiveness in the public place? Does it have the capacity to enhance the political life and well-being of a community? In The Human Condition, first published in 1958, Hannah Arendt offers an unapparelled reading of political forgiveness, described as a quintessential human faculty (...) for the revitalization of the public and political realm. This paper seeks to investigate the implications of Arendt’s understanding of action and forgiveness for the life of the polis, in particular the promotion of a more hospitable public space. Situated within human capacity to act and to love the other in their uniqueness and despite their trespasses and failures, forgiveness contributes, as this paper seeks to demonstrate, to the enhancement of the political sphere by opening this space to “new beginnings.”. (shrink)

Considering Michel Foucault’s two main courses on the general theme of biopolitics, namely, Il faut défendre la société (1997; 1999), a course for the academic year of 1976, and La naissance de la biopolitique (2004; 2008), taught by his turn in 1978/1979, I intend to consider that we are experiencing a new form of racism, this time no longer a state type, as already considered by Foucault, but a type of racism provoked and economically fomented, therefore, a market racism. Racism (...) whose traces must be sought not exactly in economic theories, but among the historical agents par excellence of the market, that is, entrepreneurs in the exercise of their businesses. For this, I will focus, for the moment, on presenting market racism from the perspective of German business during the Third Reich, in Germany. (shrink)

This paper develops a new understanding of hospitality on the basis of an anarchist philosophy of cosmopolitanism. It is argued that anarchism – in its radical critique of the principle of sovereignty and sovereign ipseity – is primarily a philosophy and politics of hospitality. The argument proceeds in five key steps. Firstly, the relationship between ontological anarchism (Schürmann and Levinas) and political anarchism (Bakunin, Kropotkin, Proudhon, Godwin) is explored. Secondly, anarchism’s critique of nation state sovereignty is linked to a radical (...) cosmopolitanism based on cross-border solidarity, mutual aid, and human rights activism, including the defence of the rights of migrants and asylum seekers. Thirdly, I show how the anarchic subject cannot be reduced to a fixed or definable identity with closed borders, but, rather, embodies an attitude of hospitality towards the Other and an openness to being transformed by this encounter. On this basis, I aim to develop an anarchist ethics formulated around the idea of care – for the other, both human and non-human, for the world, for the natural environment (Four) – and an alternative cosmopolitan ethical and political horizon (Five). (shrink)

This paper’s central argument is that Michel Henry’s phenomenology of Life can be used to establish an ethic of hospitality. Henry recalls, by establishing the relationship to the other inside the Life’s community, that the stranger is not primarily an invader, but rather a brother, but in the meaning of the African term “ndeko”, derived from Lingala, spoken in both Congo. It is a phenomenology that asks us to transcend geographical, biological, cultural, etc. contingencies, in order to (re)discover what unites (...) us and must be fostered and protected: our humanity. In the era of humanitarian dramas of immigration in the Mediterranean Sea and in the face of identity withdrawals following the growth of extreme beliefs, the phenomenology of Life shows itself as a vital contribution, notably on the topic of the foreigner’s status and reception. (shrink)

The focus on this article is to analyze the concept of beauty in Kierkegaard’s thought, starting from some questions that I try to answer in these pages: How does Kierkegaard understand beauty? What role does beauty play in the inner constitutive process? All this to argue that, as regards beauty, Kierkegaard recovers the Greek concept of kalokagathia to give it a modern interpretation; thus, distancing himself from the modern understanding of beauty as a mere object of study of aesthetics or (...) the mere contemplation of an ideal; beauty is defined as the telos of the inner self and is related to freedom and choice. It is, therefore, as I will argue, an ethical beauty, rather than an aesthetic one. (shrink)

This explorative study contributes to the theoretical debate on political incivility beyond the domination of Western-centric approaches while connecting the bodies of literature in political philosophy and media research. It offers empirical evidence of Bolsonaro’s delegitimizing criticisms and uncivil expressions toward the press, some specific news outlets, and individual journalists during the first two years of his presidential mandate in Brazil. It concludes that Bolsonaro displayed the complete repertoire of the defining elements of political incivility in liberal democracies vis à (...) vis the delegitimization of the press. He also unprecedently pushed the limits of civility in political discourse by employing the entire arsenal of verbal manifestations of impoliteness. (shrink)

This article pursues the aim of pointing out the occidental Personalism (that developed in Europe between the XVIIIth and the XXth century) as probably the most appropriate basis for justify the concept of “hospitality” together with the possible relative doctrine and praxis. We discuss the thought of many personalist thinkers and the thought of those thinkers that are near to the Personalism (but always taking as basis the thought of Edith Stein and Nikolaj Berdjaev). With this aim we attempt to (...) propose a new concept of person along the global personalist thinking, toward the ethical demanded by the concept of “hospitality”. Thus the concept of person seems to us the best way to approach “hospitality”. In fact this new concept of person and the rise of “hospitality” enables a view free of ideological extremisms. (shrink)

This paper aims at delving further into historical and philosophical assumptions underlying Jose Gaos’s notion of “transtierro”. After going into exile and being settled in México in 1938, the Spanish philosopher coined the term “transtierro” so as to grasp the nature of Spanish diaspora in the new country. By bringing light into the extent to which the Mexican authorities support the arrival and settlement of the refuges after the Spanish Civil War, “transtierro” contributes to reframing the exile as a non-traumatic (...) experience. Moreover, due to the bonds between Spain and Mexico, the experience “transtierro” is shaped by Gaos as the transition between one fatherland to the other. Against the backdrop of such reading, this paper goes further into the flaws and historical bias underlying the concept of “transtierro”. By echoing different readings and through the lens of trauma theory this paper provides both an interpretation and a critique of “transtierro”’s potentiality when it comes to underscore new collective identities in the exile and to overcome the traumatic legacies enforced migration use to bring about. (shrink)

According to Derridean thought, unconditioned hospitality would be the only one in the name of which any hospitality can be offered. On the other hand, conditioned hospitality would be the only real practice of it. This article, based on a contrastive hermeneutic between Derridean and Levinasian thought on the question of hospitality and reception, aims to show how the constant and irresolvable dialectical tension between unconditioned hospitality and conditioned hospitality, as presented by Derrida from the “logic of symmetrical opposites”, it (...) can receive a new reading from the “phenomenological logic of the symbol”. Our proposal, centered on this symbolic perspective, affirms that the absoluteness or unconditionality of the ethical dimension of hospitality can be present in every concrete act of this, which continuously refers to the beyond of the given conditions. (shrink)

Diotima’s speech in the Symposium, which defines the erotic function as an act of procreation in the beautiful, is generally regarded as the most faithful account of the philosopher’s views on the nature of love. While this definition has received much attention from commentators, few studies pay attention to the literal aspect that is veiled behind the rhetorical effect Plato seeks to install. This neglect is even more striking given that the theory of reproduction that underlies the metaphor contains several (...) ambiguities that are unfamiliar to contemporary biology. In the present paper I propose to read Diotima’s argumentation by focusing on the biological conception of procreation that gives structure to the metaphor. I will focus my analysis on the statement that “the sexual union (synousía) between man and woman is a childbirth (tókos).” I will argue that this sentence not only condenses the general sense of the metaphor of intellectual procreation, but also hints at the embryological conception that underlies the metaphor, and that explains to some extent the ambiguity of the Platonic lexicon considering what the philosopher states in Timaeus 91c. I will also argue that the Symposium’s discourse on conception and childbirth, by effacing the female experience, contributes to the tradition of obliteration of the political transcendence of motherhood that prevails in the civic discourses of the time, and therefore to the reinforcement of the exclusion of women from citizenship and from the political sphere in general. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to offer a concise and faithful account of Rawls’ theory of international justice, in an effort, first, to elucidate the structure of the argument that is advanced in that theory and, second, to present a critical assessment of it. The critical assessment section attempts, on the one side, to cope with crucial methodological issues, which have a more general bearing upon Rawls’ overall political philosophical position, including the constructivist perspective of theory making and the (...) division between a political conception and a comprehensive doctrine; on the other side, to weigh up a set of substantive claims made in the Rawlsian theory of international justice, including the recognition of peoples as the fundamental subjects of international law, the toleration of the so-called decent peoples and the considerably thin construal of human rights encompassed in The Law of Peoples. The paper attempts to provide a series of reasons that could be well-suited to explicate its author’s doubts about the soundness of the Rawlsian theoretical perspective with regard to both its formal methodological features and its more content-oriented convictions. (shrink)

The history of the philosophical exchanges between China and the West is the history of the translations between the two traditions. On the western side, after the Jesuits, the range of translators became gradually broader. On the Chinese side, many intellectuals introduced Western classics in their language in the twentieth century. This led several historians to argue that Chinese philosophy took off with the translation-comparison of both traditions. However, not all comparisons are of equal value. Thus, translation in philosophy implies (...) comparing concepts or arguments and considering all the cultural references involved. This means taking a risk and accepting a limit. A risk is to be taken because translating interprets a “foreign thought” according to one’s context. This implies disclosing one’s presuppositions. There is a limit because transitioning from one set of references to another implies welcoming a part of “untranslatable” that always remains. According to Ricoeur’s words, “linguistic hospitality” is required here. This article first presents two interpretations of the translation-comparison processes. In the last part, it describes the necessity of linguistic hospitality in the context of Comparative Philosophy. (shrink)