Generics express generalizations in the linguistic form «Ks are F», where K denotes a category or its members and F a property (for instance, «Tigers are striped» or «Women are emotional»). Generics seem to play a key role in fostering the belief that the members of certain categories share properties and dispositions due to a supposed common essence. It has then been argued that generics concerning discriminated social categories are especially insidious because they could favor prejudice on the same. However, (...) it is still debated whether generics lead to essentialize more than quantified generalizations, such as «Most Ks are F». In this paper, we argue that we nonetheless have good reasons to consider generics as more problematic than quantified generalizations: if, on the one hand, there is no conclusive evidence that generics and quantified sentences lead to essentialize to a different extent, on the other hand, generics are particularly difficult to counter. Moreover, the properties predicated in generics are interpreted as widespread even though generics are also accepted based on limited evidence. This asymmetry in the interpretation of generics highlights a distinctive mechanism through which stereotypes can be transmitted and proliferate. (shrink)

In this article, we explore the impact of non-epistemic factors, such as social identity and cultural biases, on the formation and revision of beliefs. This type of impact is evident in contexts of opinion polarisation where the acceptance of scientific theses by groups of non-experts is at stake. Im these contexts digital media and social networks often play a central role. To analyse the impact of non-epistemic factors from an epistemological perspective, we employ a non-ideal approach to epistemology that takes (...) into account some key non-epistemic factors through the concept of epistemic filter. By means of this concept we explain the selective acceptance of information, and we show how background assumptions and social values which are deeply rooted in an inquiring subject influence the selection and evaluation of evidence and sources of information. Through this non-ideal approach, we analyse the dynamics of scientific denialism, framing it as an epistemic phenomenon in which social and cultural influences shape and distort epistemic practices. We conclude that understanding these underlying mechanisms is crucial to addressing the challenges posed by misinformation and the deep social divisions that result from it. (shrink)

This paper is dedicated to the relationship between ordinary moral thought and ethical theory in Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics. I suggest that different contents of ordinary moral thought play different roles and are lent different philosophical weight in Sidgwick’s arguments. I start by showing how Sidgwick appeals to certain features of ordinary moral thought, deduced from moral language and experience, both in criticising rival metaethical positions and in establishing his own claims. I then turn to the notion of common-sense (...) morality. After clarifying what Sidgwick means by this expression, I argue that common-sense morality has neither probative value in Sidgwick’s argument for the utilitarian principle nor independent validity, and that its authority is ultimately motivated on utilitarian grounds. Pointing out how different contents of ordinary moral thought play different argumentative roles in the foundation and defence of Sidgwick’s utilitarianism enables to ac- count more comprehensively for Sidgwick’s arguments and moral methodology and provides with a more articulated account of the dialectic between his utilitarian theory and ordinary moral thought. (shrink)

This article introduces the most recent debates on the relationship between theory and action in normative political theory. We first discuss non ideal theory, radical realism and engaged political theory. Then, we outline the main features of pragmatic reformism, prefigurative politics, and a progressive approach to normative theorizing.