In discussions about the Scientific Revolution, a key expression is “modern science”. Its traditional understanding – mathematization and experimentation – is too weak: Euclid’s geometry and Archimedes’ physics were both perfectly mathematical and were based on objective experience. And it is too strong: in natural sciences beyond physics, math is quite limited. Joseph Needham in his Grand Question actually focused on modern physics originating with Galileo. To make this question really historical, it is narrowed down to physics and expanded in (...) cultural time and space: Which feature of modern physics, absent in Greco-Roman and Medieval sciences, prevented the next major advance after Archimedes, and prevented non-Europeans to join modern science for centuries after Galileo and up to the 20th century? In modern physics, besides the tools of mathematics and experiment, no less important is the third tool, described by Einstein as "the boldest speculation [to] bridge the gaps between the empirical data." This tool implies belief in the hidden fundamental laws of the universe and the right to invent fundamental concepts that are not directly observable, but can be tested experimentally along with the theory based on them. Such a belief, or the postulate of modern science, is the key distinction of modern physics. Among the great modern physicists there were eight theorists who successfully invented new fundamental concepts. And each of these inventions led to breakthrough advances of modern physics. (shrink)

While recognizing the general fruitfulness of the concept of distributed scientific knowledge and the importance of the study of science from the point of view of epistemic (in)justice, we would like to present a number of doubts about the rationale for this synthesis. Of course, it is difficult to argue with the fact that the informant in ethnographic research can act as a co-author and at the same time as an object of research, “giving change”. Here we are obviously faced (...) with a diversity of epistemic positions and the resulting distributed knowledge. The only question is to what extent this exotic example allows generalization within the framework of social cognition, not to mention the natural sciences and mathematics. Can we expect a special kind of mathematics or natural scientific generalizations from the natives? That they are willing to share the accumulated data about native nature, which they understand better than visiting white researchers, is beyond doubt, but is not this inferior function of the provider of scientific data rather a vestige of the colonial worldview? (shrink)

This text is devoted to the question of using mixed methods in social sciences. The attention is paid to the positions of leaders in the field, articulated by the uplevel “Journal of Mixed Methods Research”. The main results and discussions on the journal’s pages will be outlined briefly. As scholars note, mixed methods provide an integrative methodology in social sciences and a third paradigm beyond quantitative and qualitative approaches within social research. The third methodological paradigm is distinguished by pluralism and (...) pragmatism, openness and flexibility of principles. Quantitative and qualitative methods in social cognition are well complemented by digital tools. In many methodological works one can find descriptions of software products by which mixed research is commonly produced. The purpose of the article is to review the important results and discussions published in JMMR, describe the philosophical and methodological principles that shape the basis for integrative research, and compare them with other traditions of reflection on methodology of social cognition. In conclusion, it is said that there is a continuum of different scientific studies, where quantitative and qualitative methodologies may be treated only as the basic types of design. A review helps to validate one more conclusion: there is no radical opposition between social and nomological sciences grounded in the nature of their methods, as philosophers presuppose. Finally, mixed methods research is highly relevant to philosophy, where qualitative analysis has always prevailed. (shrink)

Social philosophy of science views science as a public good in cognitive, political-economic and moral terms, and as a humanistic project. The author attempts to combine the economics of science and the social philosophy of science into a single exchange zone. The article discusses this problem in relation to technoscience with an emphasis on pragmatically oriented resource-efficient issues. The author transfers the experience of economics, management, engineering and industry to the level of philosophical reflections of science and technology. Innovative activity (...) in technoscience can be imagined using Aristotle's universal scheme of underlying causes. Science as a cognitive resource is involved in socio-cultural construction using material and cultural resources. The author poses the problem of resource efficiency, which means a balanced interconnected set of resources of social practices. The installation of resource efficiency in the engineering environment is thought as the basis of material culture. Economists identify five main types of resources – material, financial, labor, temporary, information. Information and communication resources play a key role in the digital society. Analyzing the problems of technoscience as a public good leads to the allocation of cognitive resources and moral resources. Cognitive resources in science are associated with the intellectual potential of teams of researchers, individual scientists and engineers. The author poses the problem of moral resources in the aspect of the ethics of science, the role of responsibility for the formation of ideas and projects, research and their consequences. The problem of material, financial, labor, temporary, information and communication, cognitive and moral resources in the field of science has a socio-philosophical dimension. The article discusses the criteria for effectively engaging the potential of a cognitive resource in science in social practices. The author considers the problem of cognitive resources using examples of cooperation between scientists and representatives of the tradition, the movement of scientific volunteers. (shrink)

The paper explores representationalist theories of mind in the context of the mind-body problem and the hard problem of consciousness. The mind-body problem is related to the substantial dualism, according to which there are two independent types of objects – physical and mental. For a materialistically oriented metaphysics, such a dualism was unacceptable. In the second half of the twentieth century. a new version of dualism appeared – the dualism of properties. Its essence lies in the fact that it is (...) not the existence of mental substances that is affirmed, but the existence of phenomenal properties of experience that are irreducible to physical and functional properties. The dualism of properties is associated with the hard problem of consciousness – why are certain neurophysiological processes accompanied by a qualitative experience? The problem of a naturalistic explanation of the phenomenal characteristics of experience has become a new threat to naturalistic metaphysics. The first part of the work analyzes the philosophical context of the formation of cognitive science. It is shown how functionalism and representationalism became the two main philosophical positions that underlie this discipline. The second part deals with an attempt to solve the mind-body problem through the naturalization of intentionality. It is shown that teleosemantic representationalism, within the framework of which this naturalistic project was implemented, is not able to explain the phenomenon of misrepresentation, which plays a crucial role for the idea of representation as such. The final part of the study evaluates an attempt to answer the hard problem of consciousness by reducing the phenomenal character of experience to representational content. The author demonstrates that such a reduction leads to an ontology with non-instantiated properties and non-existent objects, which is an undesirable consequence for a physicalism. (shrink)

The present paper aims to examine the biological works of Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis (1698–1759), a prominent French scientist and philosopher, on the problems of animal reproduction and heredity. His scientific career exemplifies how, in mid-eighteenth-century Europe, various scientific disciplines were intertwined with literature, art, and philosophy. In one of his major publications dealing with these issues, “Venus physique” (1745), from one role to another time and again, combining theory, observation, everyday experience, and literary narrative. His objections to preformationism unfold (...) in a stylized literary context that itself references the more personal context of salon conversation and flirtation. Maupertuis’s epigenetic conception of reproduction (with its origins in Antiquity) drew on a wide range of arguments from a variety of sources: anatomy and monster studies, observations of racial differences and family resemblance, analysis of the breeding experience of animal breeders, microscopic observations, and chemical insights. The French scientist presented the dynamics of processes in living nature in terms of naturalized desire and aversion, which function as guiding inclinations inherent in the smallest units of organic matter. In “Venus physique”, Maupertuis, in presenting his biological views, played on the appeal in certain Parisian circles of socially acceptable epathetics associated with philosophical texts, eroticism, unorthodox religious beliefs, and illicit sexual liaisons. (shrink)

The article is dedicated to the identification and analysis of existential dimensions of science, i.e., the dependence of consciousness, activity and communication of scientists on special forms of scientific culture – life-meaning universals (existentials). The article outlines the contours of the problem field of existential challenges rooted in the real life of modern science, in the crisis of the Enlightenment idea of scientific progress, in the mismatch of the norms and ideals of scientists with everyday ideas and needs. The origins (...) of the theoretical formulation of the existential problems of science are found in the dilemma of profession and vocation (M. Weber). This is a controversy that problematizes the relationship between the scientist’s desire for objective knowledge, on the one hand, and the human dimension of scientific activity and communication, on the other. The article singles out the particular types of existing, or boundary situations in science, in which the experiences of scientists are ordered and problematized in relation to archetypal values – freedom, objectivity, creativity, rationality, truth, success, as well as in relation to such ontological categories as space and time, which reveal their value-ladeness. The subjective dimension of science, in which a personality manifests herself as overcoming internal conflicts, a free and thinking being, qualifies as the subject of an emerging research trend – the existential philosophy of science. (shrink)

This text is a review of a collective monograph published in 2023 [Altshuler, 2023], dedicated to the areas of contact between philosophy and linguistics. By offering an overview of a number of representative works in the collection, the authors strive not only to attract the reader to the problems of the philosophy of language, but also to arouse interest in the methods of interdisciplinary analysis.

The “Stehr vector” is a metaphor associated with the name of the modern philosopher and sociologist of science Niko Stehr and designating the trajectory of movement towards a “knowledge society”, where intellectual achievements as a public good have the highest value – they are priceless and, therefore, are not sold or bought, and access to them is free. Since a number of obstacles are characteristic to the formation of the ascent to the knowledge society, the main one is the usurpation (...) of cognitive resources by digital giants with the help of legal coding tools for intellectual products. Knowledge is expropriated from its creators – scientists – and then sold, thereby further enriching the “knowledge monopolists”. The “Stehr vector”, overcoming such barriers, is aimed at the future, where different forms of social exchange are developing on the model of social communications among representatives of the “creative class” (R. Florida), concentrated in the centers of knowledge – cities with great scientific and educational potential. Since the “city of knowledge” is a cognitive generator, as a result, the ability to think scientifically becomes a property of every person. The article shows that certain analogies are possible between “cities of knowledge” as a “new utopia” developing in the algorithms of the “Stehr vector”, and the first university cities in Medieval Europe, which arose and developed as accumulators of knowledge and university life. These “new Middle Ages” promise to be more intellectually free than modern knowledge capitalism. Thus, the “Stern vector” makes it possible to design not the Berdyaev dystopian version of the “New Middle Ages”, but, on the contrary, more intellectually free version than modern knowledge capitalism. (shrink)

This article explores conventional implicatures and presuppusitions as the main parts of utterance’s content expressing its implied meaning. The article considers a discussion around taxonomy of meaning types, which is an important problem for the philosophy of language. The main shared properties of these semantic components are examined on various examples: projection, conventionality, and non-cancellability. The article provides a criteria for differentiation of these parts od meaning: implicatures are speaker-oriented. This unique semantic property is explained within the epistemic approach using (...) the concepts of common knowledge and agent’s beliefs. At the end, the logical explanation of the differences between conventional implicatures and presuppositions is compared with the theory of impositions and formal discursive approach. (shrink)

In this remark to the article by L.V. Shipovalova, doubts are expressed about the thesis about the insolvency of consensus in the conditions of distributed cognition. According to the author, distributed cognition does not imply rejection of consensus, but complements it. Using the example of the problems of technology management and their assessment, as well as the risk situations accompanying them, a more generalized interpretation of consensus is proposed that goes beyond communication in science. In this interpretation, consensus is a (...) dialogue between science and non-science and involves a large number of participants in the absence of a predetermined order or degree of significance of evaluating their arguments. The need to appeal to consensus is justified by the fact that the assessment of consequences and risks is carried out in a situation of epistemological uncertainty. Technology management is lagging, i.e. it is reactive, not projective. It is noted that following the principles of consensus allows you to include a significant amount of available knowledge in the discussion field and prevent undesirable consequences when making decisions. The author emphasizes the normative nature of consensus, which is a requirement for collective decision-making when assessing the consequences of technologies. (shrink)

In the article, I consider the problem of distributed scientific knowledge in two aspects: (1) from the point of view of distributed cognition as one of the ways for scientists to obtain scientific knowledge; (2) from the point of view of recruiting scientific personnel to the academy. I believe that in both the cases the problem of epistemic injustice in relation to new participants in the cognitive process remains. The concept of distributed cognition, in my opinion, is not able by (...) itself to solve the problem of epistemic injustice and unequal access to both the results of scientific research and the status of their participants, that is, to make a transition from epistemic asymmetry to epistemic balance or parity of the parties. The most productive implication of the concept of distributed cognition is that its application to scientific practice highlights situations of epistemic injustice, each time on an ever-increasing scale. Finally, I return to the concept of science as a public good and consider some of its implications from the perspective of the classical understanding of science and the possibilities for redressing epistemic injustice. (shrink)

The article analyzes the possibility of producing cognitive diversity through the unification of scientific knowledge. In the article under discussion, L.V. Shipovalova notes that the production of diversity is the most important task of science. It can be solved by constructing distributed cognition practices that can bridge the epistemic gap between scientists and lay people. In contrast to this position, it is shown that within the framework of modern technoscience, one of the mechanisms for the production of diversity can be (...) the unification of scientific knowledge. Before the formation of technoscience, it was assumed that the search for fundamental laws was the key task of scientific research. At the same time, a special role was assigned to the disciplinary structure of science. Only within the framework of a particular scientific discipline could these laws be found. As a result, one of the main mechanisms of “unification” could become scientific imperialism, which implies a large-scale use of ontological assumptions, methods and metaphors of one discipline in another. In this case, the unification of knowledge reduces its diversity. In modern technoscience, the solution of applied problems and the design of research equipment plays a key role. The result can be achieved only in the process of complex interdisciplinary research involving the interaction of scientists from various disciplines and other actors interested in the scientific result. In the process of joint work, an interdisciplinary synthesis of knowledge can be formed. Such unification leads to an increase in cognitive diversity. (shrink)

The author explores to the conditions for implementation of science as a public good and connects these conditions with the problem of epistemic injustice. She proposes the hypothesis that in order to implement science as a public good or actualize it as a source of diversity, it is necessary to focus theoretical attention on the concept of distributed scientific cognition and allow for the possibility of relevant practices. The rules of distributed scientific cognition practices can and should ensure both the (...) epistemic constructiveness of science and its epistemic justice, legitimizing the openness of access to scientific cognition distributed outside the scientific community. The text reveals the main characteristics of the concept of distributed cognition, introduced by E. Hutchins. The author proposes additionally take into account two meanings of distributed scientific cognition – extensive and intensive. The first refers to the possibility of unlimited addition of participants in cognition with a reasonable relevance of their positions. The second opens up the perspective of working on a distribution that has not yet happened and suggests that any epistemic position can be distributed. She also demonstrates the applicability of the concept to relevant scientific practices related to both professional scientific communication and public communication of science. (shrink)

The author consider critical remarks of opponents about the idea of distributed scientific cognition, its connection with the concept of science as a source of epistemic diversity. She notes the importance of the concept of consensus and unification of scientific disciplines, and emphasizes relevance the distribution of scientific cognition binding the diverse in situations of problematic unity.

Knowledge does not exist as an isolated “piece” of knowledge. Knowledge exists in an aggregated collective state. I define knowledge as a capacity for social action and as a model for reality, as the possibility to set “something in motion”, for example, to solve a task, to produce a material object such as a semiconductor chip or to be competent to prevent something from occurring, for example, the onset of an illness. In this sense, knowledge is a universal human phenomenon, (...) or an anthropological constant. This definition of the term “knowledge” is indebted to Francis Bacon’s famous observation that knowledge is power, a somewhat misleading translation of Bacon’s Latin phrase: scientia potential est. A basic assumption should be that knowledge is not a priori practical. The transformation of knowledge as an ability to act into practical knowledge requires congenial circumstances, such as power or authority that dictates the concrete conditions for action. In this con text, it is helpful to ask about the increasingly prominent role of algorithms (intellectual technology) in relation to knowledge such as ChatGPT software as well as contentious issue of the relation/difference between knowledge and information. (shrink)

В статье предложен новый взгляд на формирование экономики как науки, основанный на гипотезе сосуществования в XVII–XVIII вв. целого спектра проектов организации научного экономического знания, отразивших соответствующие научные программы проходившей в ту эпоху научной революции. Анализируются пять таких проектов: проект консервативной трансформации экономического знания Джеймса Стюарта; бэконианские проекты: статистический Уильяма Петти и инженерный Джона Ло; социально-философский проект Д. Юма и теоретический проект Ричарда Кантильона. Каждый проект рассматривается и в контексте его возникновения, и сквозь призму последующей судьбы его основной идеи. Делается вывод, (...) что признание в XIX в. экономики наукой в форме классической политической экономии было победой проекта Кантильона, развитого в трудах Кенэ и Адама Смита. Этот теоретический проект отвечал научным стандартам, утвердившимся во второй половине XVIII в., консолидировал тогдашнее экономическое знание вокруг универсальной онтологической схемы экономики как предмета новой науки и соответствовал идеологическим запросам эпохи. Однако рационалистическая траектория развития экономической науки имела и свою цену. Усложнение теоретического аппарата часто достигалось за счет абстрагирования от черт реальности, которые сложно измерить или смоделировать, а формы экономического знания, представленные в альтернативных проектах, остались на периферии внимания. (shrink)

The article is a critical reaction to the approach considered by V.A. Ladov in his work “On the principle of uniform solution of paradoxes”. It is assumed that the consideration of some of the eight classical logical-semantic paradoxes in the light of type theory eliminates the situation of contradiction, while maintaining the prospect of automatic references. It is also assumed that, based on this perspective, a unified idea of the essence of paradoxes and the mechanism for their solution is not (...) sufficiently thorough. (shrink)

In the XXth century naturalism and anti-naturalism, including the ideas of transcendentalism and a priori in Kant’s sense, considered as a kind of conceptual antipodes, conceptual oppositions in relation to the antagonism of their methodological attitudes and principles. However, at the turn of the XXIth century, the intensive development of cognitive studies, accompanied by the expansion of the empirical base, pushed the need to revise the traditionally accepted incompatibility of naturalism and anti-naturalism. The article has the goal to assess the (...) possibility of synthesis of naturalism and anti-naturalism in the context of the idea and methodology of biocultural co-constructivism. Such a synthesis presupposes the rejection of biophobia, inherent for social science and humanities, the recognition of the heuristic significance of the idea of activity-type transcendentalism developing original Kantian ideas, as well as ascribing the ontological status to the previously considered a priori categories (the discovery of the brain’s navigation system, neural networks responsible for the “sense of number”, etc.). We claim that non-biological and non-genetic – social and cultural in their status – factors have a noticeable effect on the functions of neural structures, and the activity of various areas of the brain as a whole. The biological trajectory of the evolution of living creatures, which has traditionally been described in terms of naturalism, turns out to be closely intersecting with the socio-cultural trajectory of its development, previously described in terms of anti-naturalism. Therefore, a synthesis of naturalism and anti-naturalism is quite acceptable, which does not allow the concept of “naturalized apriorism” to be considered an oxymoron. (shrink)

В статье рассматривается понятие «эпистемология незнания», определяемое авторами как оксюморон. Применение данного термина в философской литературе в первую очередь связано с исследованиями дистрибуции информации в межгрупповом взаимодействии (Л. Алькофф, Э. Малевски, Н. Джарамилло, Ч. Миллс). Однако, на взгляд авторов данной статьи, подобная трактовка сужает эпистемологический характер проблемы незнания. Одной из целей работы является попытка придания отмеченному словосочетанию понятийной нагрузки. Для этого, прежде всего, рассматривается вопрос о смысле понятия незнания, а затем приведено обоснование возможности гармоничного сочетания понятий «незнание» и «эпистемология». В (...) статье рассмотрены четыре тезиса, показывающие тесную взаимосвязь незнания и знания. На взгляд авторов, именно это является первичным обоснованием эпистемологического характера проблемы. Первый тезис широко известен в истории философии и науки и гласит, что незнание может выступать условием знания. Второй тезис защищает обратную связь: незнание реализуется через знание. Третий и четвертый тезисы обращены к состояниям, сочетающим в себе свойства знания и незнания: первое может иметь признаки второго, а второе – признаки первого. Это указывает на необходимость придания хорошо известному понятию «эпистемология» некоторых дополнительных аспектов, необходимых при такой взаимосвязи: ведь нужно признать, что такая форма, как оксюморон, нечасто встречается в гносеологических исследованиях. На основании этого делается вывод о том, каким образом эпистемологический анализ может быть осуществлен. Авторы видят здесь две возможные исследовательские задачи, а именно – анализ непроизводства знания и анализ производства незнания. (shrink)

В работе исследуется вариант такой современной теории восприятия, как дизъюнктивизм. Данная теория является версией прямого реализма. Ее суть заключается в том, что перцептивные состояния, обычно относимые к одному виду, предлагается рассматривать как дизъюнкцию двух видов опыта: достоверного и иллюзорного (галлюцинаторного). В случае достоверного восприятия содержанием перцептивного состояния является положение дел, на которое оно направлено. Иллюзорное восприятие не обладает подобным содержанием. Существуют две версии дизъюнктивизма – метафизический и эпистемологический. В статье анализируется эпистемологический дизъюнктивизм, прежде всего тезис Д. Притчарда о том, что (...) данная теория позволяет разрешить спор интерналистов и экстерналистов относительно обоснования знания. Именно поэтому Притчард называет этот подход Святым Граалем эпистемологии. Для того чтобы принять эпистемологический дизъюнктивизм в качестве теории, позволяющей разрешить этот спор, необходимо ответить на возражения скептика и решить проблему отличия достоверного опыта восприятия от иллюзорного. В первой части работы анализируется вариант эпистемологического дизъюнктивизма, предложенный Дж. Макдауэлом, и отмечается, что квиетистский подход, используемый философом, хотя и позволяет преодолеть картезианский скептицизм, тем не менее не предлагает конструктивного решения проблемы отличия. Во второй части статьи реконструируется решение данной проблемы, предложенное Притчардом, которое заключается в сохранении принципа эпистемического замыкания, отказе от стратегии релевантных альтернатив и замене при обосновании перцептивного знания принципа различения на принцип предпочтения. Свой подход Притчард обозначает как неомуреанизм. В заключительной части исследования анализируется опровержение скептицизма, предложенное Дж. Муром, и витгенштейновская критика стратегии Мура, а также отмечается, что эта критика может быть направлена против решения проблемы отличия, разрабатываемого Притчардом. (shrink)

The paper criticizes the semantic component in the conception of A.V. Smirnov presented in the monograph “The Logic of Sense as a Philosophy of Mind: An Invitation to Reflection” (Moscow, 2021) as a recent variant of an argument for linguistic relativity. The author presents arguments showing that the proposed conception is based on a false thesis about the absence of the copula in Arabic. Further conclusions made by A.V. Smirnov as well as the structure of his arguments are also critically (...) assessed. (shrink)

В статье обсуждается решение логико-семантических парадоксов, предложенное Б. Расселом и воспроизведенное в современной логической литературе Г. Пристом в качестве принципа единого решения. При этом Г. Прист считает, что разделение парадоксов на две принципиально разные группы (логические и семантические), которое ввел Ф. Рамсей, является неправомерным, и признает правоту именно Б. Рассела, рассматривавшего все парадоксы унифицированно. На основании исследования формальной структуры парадоксов автор статьи утверждает, что принцип единого решения нельзя назвать полностью релевантным проблеме, поскольку он опирается на недостаточно тщательную диагностику причин возникновения (...) парадоксов. (shrink)

The author presents answers to opponents to his article “On the principle of uniform solution of paradoxes” which was discussed within the framework of this discussion. The discussion was attended by both very authoritative domestic philosophers working within the framework of this problem, and young scientists. It should be noted that a significant role in the very initiation of the discussion of this topic was played by the recent translation into Russian of the monograph by the modern philosopher Graham Priest (...) [Priest, 2020], carried out by V.V. Tselishchev. This is the first major work on the paradoxes of a famous modern philosopher that has appeared in Russian in recent years. (shrink)

В этой статье я пытаюсь ответить на вопрос о том, какие наиболее общие семантические и прагматические условия должны выполняться, чтобы употребление пустых в действительном мире термов de re в естественном языке было осмысленным. Для этого я затрагиваю взаимосвязь универсума возможного миров с наиболее общими представлениями об объектах, рассматриваю семантические и прагматические условия знакомства с вымышленным объектом, привлекаю анализ высказываний о вымышленных объектах. Я прихожу к следующим выводам. Во-первых, для интерпретации фиктивных имен, употребляемых в модусе имагинативного de re, наиболее удачными являются (...) структуры возможных миров, образованные хронологически упорядоченными последовательностями миров (историями), среди которых так называемые лейбницевские истории отвечают некоторой «наивной» теории объекта. Она обеспечивает сводимость или несводимость историй друг к другу, а также распределение объектов по историям, в разной степени отдаленным от актуализированного мира. Это позволяет дать определение различным видам историй. Во-вторых, семантика терма при имагинативном de re должна оперировать психологическими состояниями агента, в частности некогнитивными. Они призваны удостоверять прозрачность истории и мира для знакомства в нем с вымышленным объектом. Такие состояния играют, однако, роль внешних данных. Это позволяет описать следующие прагматические предписания говорящему при употреблении термов в модусе имагинативного de re: имагинативная ясность, прозрачность и удержание агентности. В-третьих, сингулярные термы и в некоторых ситуациях индексные выражения в зависимости от контекста могут употребляться de re для обозначения как референта в актуальном мире, так и специфического знакового объекта, получающего название транспаренты. Этот объект актуального мира представляет собой знак вымышленного объекта в мире альтернативной истории. Его коммуникативное значение состоит в возможности описания дискурса развертывания такой истории. Прагматические правила сохраняются и тут: заданный транспарентой объект должен находиться по эту сторону порога прозрачности. (shrink)

В своей статье Всеволод Ладов ставит важный вопрос – могут ли парадоксы иметь единое решение? В качестве ответа я предлагаю обратить внимание на подход, в котором утверждается, что мы должны рассматривать предикат истины как простой аналог нечеткого предиката. Защитники данного подхода (В. МакГи, Дж. Таппенден, Х. Филд, Г. Прист и Д. Хайд) открыто настаивают на том, что между соритами и парадоксами самореференции существует структурная связь и они должны иметь единое решение.

В статье обсуждаются аспекты программы философии математики неологицизма, связанные с существованием парадоксов. Отмечается недостаточная тематизированность проблематики парадоксов в программе неологицизма. Несмотря на это, использование в неологицизме методологии введения понятий с помощью принципов абстракции ограничено существованием принципов абстракции, приводящих к противоречию. Основная проблема неологицизма, «проблема плохой компании», связана с обсуждением таких принципов. Автор статьи показывает, что поиск единого критерия для демаркации приемлемых и неприемлимых принципов абстракции не приводит к необходимому результату.

The article responds to the critical review by P. Kusliy [Kusliy, 2023] of my latest book [Smirnov, 2021]. In order to show the false and unscientific nature of my position, P. Kusliy puts forward three basic theses: I proceed from the Sapir – Whorf hypothesis of linguistic relativity; I assert that the Arabic literary language (ALA) lacks a copula; ALA has no native speakers in the modern world, which means that ALA is not relevant for discussing the relationship between language (...) and thought. Those three theses of P. Kusliy are fake assersions having zero correspondence in my theoretical texts and language situation in the Arab-speaking world, therefore his statements cannot be considered as justified at least to some extent and serving to eliminate the shortcomings of my theoretical position. I argue that a single metalanguage is impossible for European languages and ALA: their analysis and description should be done in two different (meta)languages having diverse logical basis and content and therefore directly untranslatable into each other. The inadequacy of P. Kusliy’s interpretation of my position is caused by his non-reflective acceptance of the collective cognitive unconscious of the European big culture as having no alternative and, consequently, as universal. (shrink)

The article deals with the arguments of V.A. Ladov regarding to the principle of uniform solution of logical and semantical paradoxes proposed by G. Priest. V.A. Ladov thinks that in addition to self-referentiality negation is necessary element for the occurrence of paradoxes. However, negation is a merely syntactical analogue of the basic semantical concepts of truth and falsehood. Science truth and falsehood are the main characteristics of the objects in relation to which paradoxes are formulated, selfreferentiality is the only reason (...) for occurrence of them. (shrink)

Среди неоднозначностей, наблюдаемых в высказываниях о пропозициональных установках, некоторые связаны с возможностью понять то или иное слово в общепринятом значении или же в идиолекте носителя установки, которую передает высказывание. Хотя этот факт известен уже около двух десятилетий, первой работой, где на этом в известной мере основана вся теория интерпретации высказываний об установках, можно назвать недавнюю статью [Tancredi, Sharvit, 2022]. Значительная гибкость ее формального аппарата обусловлена тем, что выражающее установку придаточное рассматривается как еще не проинтерпретированный языковой объект, так что его интерпретация (...) в высказывании об установке может отличаться от его интерпретации в качестве отдельного высказывания и денотативно (в мирах, совместимых с содержанием установки, у входящих в него выражений могут быть не те же денотаты, что в реальном мире), и сигнификативно (в отношении смыслов, или толкований, этих выражений). Настоящая статья, помимо исторического очерка (§1) и краткого представления идей К. Танкреди и Я. Шарвит (§2), критикует такие аспекты их теории, как отсутствие в ней возможности прямо отсылать к возможным мирам (§3) и нужда в синтаксическом передвижении для предсказания невозможности некоторых интерпретаций (§4). С другой стороны, мы показываем, как подобная теория, разделяющая сигнификативный и денотативный аспекты интерпретации, позволяет развить представление о шкалах, связанных с высказываниями об установках, и, соответственно, о порождаемых ими скалярных импликатурах (§5). (shrink)

The article discusses Ladov’s proposals for a uniform solution of classical set-theoretic and semantic paradoxes. It is shown that Ladov’s approach faces two difficulties. Firstly, the method of eliminating negation from the formulations of paradoxes leads to new paradoxes, which is demonstrated by the example of Loeb’s theorem. Secondly, the appeal in Ladov’s argumentation to the “Russell scheme” adopted by G. Priest is not significant, due to Priest's dialetheism, according to which contradictions are allowed. The latter circumstance prevents a uniform (...) solution of the paradoxes proposed by Ladov. (shrink)

Economics as a science emerged during the Enlightenment, but the impact of the specific general scientific environment of that era on the transformation of pre-scientific economic knowledge into scientific knowledge has not been adequately covered in the historiography of economic thought. The formation of economic science took place in the period of the scientific revolution of the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries. These were two interrelated but different processes. First of all, the transformation of economic knowledge followed fundamental changes in the (...) economy itself – the formation of a market-type economy. At the same time, the emergence of a new discipline in the structure of scientific knowledge could not help but be guided by established standards of scholarship. However, at the time of the scientific revolution, science was in a state of turbulence: the old medieval norms of scholarship were losing their legitimacy, and the new ideals of scholarship had not yet attained the status of an accepted standard. The scientific programs associated with the names of Bacon, Descartes, Leibniz and Newton, as well as the new socio-philosophical doctrines, played different roles in different countries and at different stages of the scientific revolution. The article analyzes the peculiarities of the intellectual environment, in which scientific economic knowledge was shaped, and shows that it was much more diverse than the standard versions of the history of economic thought and earlier attempts (M. Foucault, F. Mirowski) to identify the influence of scientific ideals on its first schools of science suggest. Thus, the prerequisites for the formation of an alternative picture of the emergence of economic science as a result of the rivalry between its various concepts are created. (shrink)

The article raises the problem of functionality and rational explanation of large arrays of communicative and unclaimed scientific knowledge. To solve the problem and explain this phenomenon, the resources of the system-communicative theory of scientific communication and social-evolutionist approaches are involved. The ability of the system-communicative theory itself to explain this phenomenon is considered as a possibility of its verification. In conclusion, a working hypothesis is proposed linking the existence of a class of unclaimed research and researchers with the function (...) of meta-observation: through their online network reactions on appropriate electronic platforms (downloads, citations, readings, reviews, recommendations, etc.), the distribution of scientific reputations of science leaders and selection of the best scientific knowledge is ensured. This function, according to the author, compensates for the lack of an external audience or public capable of understanding and adequately evaluating scientific achievements in the scientific communication system. It is concluded that the past “collegial and deliberative” assessment of scientific achievements, the appropriate distribution of reputations and support for research projects is incompatible with the dynamic conditions of the “publication market”. (shrink)

Philosophy is an abstract theoretical discipline. However, a new trend that develops experimental methods in philosophical research has recently been gaining popularity extending to the fields of philosophical research that have not seen experimental methods earlier. This article addresses the question of whether it is possible to investigate philosophical questions with empirical methods. Two areas of research are considered – philosophy of language and semantics and epistemology. In these subfields of philosophy, the application of experimental methods has recently lead to (...) a noticeable progress. Empirical methods are justified in those disciplines in which arguments in favor of a particular theory are based on the study of our intuitions. Experiments only serve to obtain more objective representations of our intuitions, and philosophical argumentation is built further based on these intuitions. The authors argue that the use of experimental methods in semantics is compatible with anti-psychologism about meaning. The latter point is particularly controversial because linguistic intuitions or intuitions about the meaning have often been viewed as something that speakers have clear cognitive access to. However, when experimental research (even when it is a collection of controlled judgments) shows results that are different from what the field has been previously assuming, a revision is called for. The authors review several cases of such refutations calling for further revisions and argue that such experimental work helps arguments in philosophy of language and epistemology gain more sound ground with respect to the empirical data that they build on. In philosophy of language and theoretical linguistics, the cases explored in this article relate to the differences between languages with and without articles and to the predictions about the availability of certain interpretations of such expressions or lack thereof. It is further shown how a similar method of identifying the existent or non-existent interpretations was used in the studies of the meaning of “most”. In epistemology, the article discusses the results of some recent experimental work relating to the knowledge ascriptions. The speakers’ intuitions about the famous Barn-examples have recently been shown to diverge from what philosophers have claimed, building their far-reaching arguments on the data that was arguably incorrect. (shrink)

The author considers the Digital Humanities as a tendency towards a constructive synthesis of computer technology and humanitarian science in the context of their claim to make a paradigm shift in the humanities. As part of this review, the author raises a question about the role of interactive multimedia tools in the humanities, and tried to evaluate the novelty and content that scientific and educational projects receive with their help. The author develops and justifies the principle of systematization of Digital (...) Humanities projects, based on the priority of distinguishing projects by the nature of the relationship between their humanitarian and computer (technological) components. Considering both the actual digital projects and the academic publications devoted to them in the context of their systematization, the author observes that many projects are largely experimental in nature due to the use of ever new multimedia tools, so it is premature to talk about a meaningful transformation of humanitarian science. Focusing on the issue of a successful synthesis of digital technologies and the humanities, the author notes that new technological tools (multimedia, AI or neural networks, etc) allow raising new questions, updating additional objects of research and creating new methods. However, new tools do not always set the completeness of the new content, only supplementing it, and the acquired interactivity does not always directly work for scientific character. In this case, we face with the reverse situation, when the claims of technologically determined disciplines to be scientific are intertwined with the claims of disciplinary science to manufacturability. As a result, the author concludes that the direction of Digital Humanities is significantly influenced by technoscience with its dissolution of the boundaries between fundamental and applied research and the desire for new technologies that transform the processes under study, which makes McLuhan’s concept especially relevant. (shrink)

Understanding has usually been seen as a method of hermeneutics. Until recently, philosophers of science paid little attention to the topic of scientific understanding because they came to the conclusion that understanding can be nothing more than a psychological by-product of scientific activity. However, many scientists believed that understanding was an important aim of science. The article states that understanding is a universal cognitive phenomenon applicable to the knowledge of not only cultural and historical phenomena, but also natural objects and (...) processes. Understanding does not oppose explanation; some types of the latter produce scientific understanding. In the course of criticism of the standard model of scientific explanation, the first concepts of “scientific understanding” arose – unifying and causal-mechanistic. A pragmatic approach to scientific understanding is also considered, linking it to the cognitive skills of a scientist or a group of scientists. (shrink)

This text represents comments to the article by T.D. Sokolova “Conceptualization of scientific progress. A Case of Historical Epistemology”. Her article combines the concepts of differentiation and integration of scientific knowledge, on the one hand, and the concept of the progress of science interpreted by the historical epistemology of G. Bachelard, on the other, which ultimately is designed to solve the “paradox of interdisciplinarity” and the problem of disciplinary separation of scientific knowledge. The problem posed is highly significant for understanding (...) modern science. At the same time, its formulation can be elaborated and even reformulated, and its premises clarified, since they themselves are the subject of extensive discussions. To do this, it is necessary to revise the widely known definitions of interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity in such a way as to detect the value-worldview content relevant to science as a socio-cultural system that includes the idea of progress. (shrink)

Modern analytical metaphysics contains many theories and approaches regarding the problem of personal identity. This diversity inevitably leads to the emergence of various classifications, the authors of which are trying to develop a compact way of typologizing existing views. Most of the classifications involve a significant simplification of the theories and approaches under consideration, and some of them are not taken into account at all. As such global classifications, one can single out an approach based on the identity criterion used (...) in the theory (psychological, biological, narrative views). However, numerous local classifications allow one to point out potential differences in theories, even if formally they use a common criterion of identity. Other possible classifications are the division into endurantism and perdurantism, as well as simple (non-reductionist) and complex (reductionist) theories of identity. Special attention is paid to M. Shechtman‘s approach, which offers a local classification of narrative theories. Its main classification is the presentation of the views of researchers in the form of a possible spectrum. The place of a particular philosopher on this spectrum characterizes his views in relation to other supporters of the narrative approach. The purpose of this article is, based on the classification of narrative theories proposed by Shechtman, to propose a classification option for all theories and approaches to the problem of personal identity, which would be sensitive to conceptual details and differences that are important to them. (shrink)

A study of the relationship of trends towards specialization and universalization of scientific knowledge is most fruitful when sociological and epistemological methods are compared. Sociological methods describe the growth of scientific knowledge quantitatively as an increase in volume, whereas epistemological methods do it qualitatively in terms of an increase in the level of generalization. The sociological explanation of the specialization of researchers is based on the limited resources of the study time, the epistemological explanation of the differentiation of disciplines is (...) in the ontological differences of the objects of research. On the contrary, epistemological universalization – the formulation of generalizing theories is conditioned by the social need to ensure the connectivity of the network of technical practices. The history of the development of natural sciences shows a tendency towards absorption of the less developed paradigms by more developed ones. In other words, scientific knowledge increases cumulatively both in quantitative and qualitative terms. (shrink)

In this article, I want to show that the concept “rationality”, which is important for the French school of epistemology of science, has a dual content and is not very successful. This is the main point of my polemic with Tatyana Sokolova. On the one hand, there seems to be general rationality in it, understood as a preference (in the broad sense) for benefits over costs. Benefits include true knowledge. On the other hand, there is a historical socio-cultural context in (...) which scientific knowledge arises and in which the parameters of practice are determined, which serves as the final instance for testing knowledge. At the same time, there are many such contexts in society, which I call human interfaces. The world, for its part, offers many of its interfaces as collections of interaction tools. When some interface of a person and some interface of the world assimilate each other, knowledge arises, that is confirmed by practice. It can be considered rational. But with a change in the sociocultural context, the human interface also changes, so that a search for new assimilation takes place. It is carried out by science. I agree with Tatyana Sokolova’s characterization of the progress of science, but I suggest at least differentiating the levels of rationality. One operates in the historical sociocultural locus, the other ensures the change of such loci and the adaptation of knowledge to them. I consider the progress of science to be an evaluative characteristic; no objectively recorded phenomenon corresponds to it. The disciplinary distinction of science is derived from the concepts of “object” and “method”, which have a performative content. (shrink)

The article presents a detailed consideration of the arguments from the symposium “Verifiability”, which was held on July 14, 1945 in London, proposed by Scottish philosopher and theologian Donald MacKinnon, Austrian logician and mathematician Friedrich Waismann and English logician and philosopher of science William Kneale. MacKinnon’s approach to verifiability was based on the metaphysics of fact, while Waismann and Kneale’s approach was based on the semantic specificity of empirical concepts (“open texture” and context of use) and on the truth-values of (...) empirical propositions. The symposium in question is interesting primarily because it is the last meaningful discussion on the concept of verifiability in the form in which it was understood by the Vienna Circle. Despite the fact that, in the coming years, this concept received a completely different interpretation, which stands away from the original source, the 1945 symposium could be rightfully treated as a canonical discussion on verifiability in the sense that nothing like this has ever happened in the philosophy after. (shrink)

Mandelstam’s criticism of the Rayleigh theory of the blue color of the sky (1907) and his polemic with M. Planck (1907–1908) did not become notable events in the history of physics. However, the method of their coverage in the Soviet and in the post-Soviet physics literature is remarkable. Most of Soviet physicists and historians of physics supported Mandelstam's point of view in his criticism of both Raleigh and Planck. The situation changed only at the beginning of the 21st century: in (...) the Russian literature the publications appeared emphasizing that in the Raleigh–Mandelstam and Planck–Mandelstam controversies Mandelstam was not right, Raleigh and Planck were closer to the truth. Which presumptions of this trend can be noted? This was patriotism of the scientific school peculiar to Mandelstam’s graduate students and the former graduate students, the patriotism connected with solidarity which helped Mandelstam’s community to survive in the Soviet totalitarian regime and in the totalitarian organization of science. This was also progressionism which was popular among academics and among men in the street. The phenomenon of common knowledge, mutual knowledge among the members of a scientific community should be taken under consideration. Common knowledge is connected with the non-thematized anonymous inclusion of the ideological terminology into scientific discourse. (shrink)

In the polemic with T.D. Sokolova’s article the issue is discussed addressing the question whether there is anything new that we can get from the methodology of interdisciplinarity and trans-disciplinarity for determination of scientific rationality and scientific progress. The solution of this question is connected with the intensions of a historical and social-cultural epistemologies. These intentions consist in a complex or “multidimensional” approach to the creation of conceptual designs that define the application of these concepts. None of the "measurements” (methodological, (...) psychological, social, etc.) provides them with a universal definition, but a “stereometric” image “restored” from them is capable to approximate to real use of these concepts of an epistemology and philosophy of science. It is necessary to remember that progress in science in one dimension can be regression in another just as the scientific rationality in a sociological dimension can be in no correspondence with the interpretation of rationality given to it by a certain methodological conception. Philosophy of science must avoid a dogmatic universalization of the criteria of rationality as well as the extremes of of relativism in this question. (shrink)

The article draws a conceptual distinction the (French) structuralism of the 50’s–60’s and the post-structuralism of the 70’s, which are discussed as overlapping in their intellectual paths; their mutual dynamics is defined as a reaction of the intelligence to the pressure of depersonalized unified schemes within the logic of structuralism against free improvisation and loose interpretation instead of total explanations in the post-structuralism interpretation. The article establishes a conceptual identity of the paradoxical nature between post-structuralism (and deconstructionism, which is homogeneous (...) and identical thereto in a number of aspects), on the one hand, and constructionism with its specific process of language dismantling – social/ideological languages, social group dialects, on the other hand, which naturally leads the authors to the analysis of the paradoxicality principles, defined by post-structuralism (five principles of paradoxicality of Gilles Deleuze – paradox of regress, paradox of sterile reiteration, paradox of neutrality, paradox of absurd, paradox of Levi-Strauss); poststructuralists’ paralogisms are examined through paradoxical denotation; the late Roland Barthes’ phenomenon of paradoxicality, becoming a plot-forming principle of narration, is analyzed. Poststructuralism is conceptualized in the article as the first decisive step of post-modernism; the affinity of post-structuralist and postmodernist commitment to parody, game and irony is stated; the theory of language games in post-modern interpretation is explored; one of those games – a game of carnival – is explored within the diachronic retrospective; the affinity of parody and carnival tradition of post-structuralism and post-modernism to the romantic irony of the XIXth century and its inconsistency with the popular culture of laugh is established. The genesis of poststructuralism and post-modernism is connected with the ideological restart of the Western society before the “very end” of the Resistance ideas and the disappointment of the left European intellectuals in the “great legends” and illusions of Marxism. The blurred concepts of relativism are connected with the mutual disproportion of different layers of historical experience. (shrink)

Overcoming disciplinary separation, organizing and conducting successful inter- and transdisciplinary research is a growing trend in contemporary scientific practices, which is viewed as a necessary condition for the progress of scientific knowledge, and therefore requires philosophical reflection. If it is the growing scientific specialization that has been considered as a constant identification of the progress of science since the 19th century, it is a disciplinary separation that has become an obstacle for the study of complex objects since the end of (...) the XX century. As an epistemological platform for overcoming disciplinary separation, one can consider historical epistemology in its French version. The classical approach within historical epistemology, proposed by Gaston Bachelard, considers progress as an integral property of scientific knowledge, arising from the very essence of science. Scientific progress is due to the historicity of which, which means a rejection of the interpretation of scientific truths as timeless, absolute and universal. In this article, I discuss (1) disciplinary separation as a philosophical problem; (2) approaches to the conceptualization of scientific progress; and (3) French historical epistemology as a possible philosophical setting for resolving disciplinary separation. (shrink)

The critical remark within the framework of the panel discussion problematizes three provisions of the article proposed for discussion. The first is the dual nature of the concept of “scientific progress”, which is both descriptive and normative. The remark criticizes the descriptive understanding of scientific progress and argues for the adequacy of the description of this concept exclusively in a normative way. The second provision concerns the possibility of accepting “rationality” as a universal criterion for scientific progress. The doubt about (...) the applicability of this criterion to the assessment of the achievements of scientific knowledge in general is asserted and substantiated, at the same time, the application of this criterion to particular sciences seems possible. The third provision is the uniqueness of the historical situation in which science found itself at the end of the XX century, when disciplinary separation becomes an obstacle to the study of complex objects. The uniqueness of this historical situation is disputed, as an alternative view it is argued that the attitude to the phenomenon of specialization of science from the moment of its appearance was ambivalent. Separately, the need to consider the extensive historical experience of creating various epistemological platforms to overcome disciplinary separation is stipulated. A proposal is made to further study and clarification of the possible advantages of French historical epistemology as a platform for the formation of new interdisciplinary areas of research over competing platforms (ANT, STS, strong programme of SSK). (shrink)

This paper analyzes Kent Bach’s representational theory of action, one of the causal theories of action. Bach’s theory sets requirements not only for the cause of an action, but also for how it unfolds in time and transitions into another action. These requirements suggest a sequential emergence of two components of the agent’s action awareness: the representation of the prepared movement and the perception of its sensory consequences. Bach introduces the concepts of “effective representation” (ER) and “receptive representation” (RR) to (...) denote these components of awareness. According to representational theory, action has a cyclic three-step causal structure, where ER is the cause of a movement, the movement is the cause of RR, and RR is the cause of ER of subsequent movement. In constructing his theory, Bach tries to take into account the problem of deviant causal chains and to introduce the so-called minimal actions into the purview of the philosophy of action. Relying on the behavioral data on blindfolded deafferentated patients, in this paper I argue that RRs are not a necessary element of action. I also analyze Bach’s distinction between ER and RR and compare it with J. Searle’s approach, placing Bach’s theory within the context of studies of the structure of intentional states. I show that Bach’s theory occupies a unique position among views on the structure of action awareness. At the same time, I conclude that the frameworks of Bach and Searle are insufficient for describing the metaphysical difference between the two kinds of intentional states, and I also point out the difficulties facing the notion of ER. Based on this reasoning and the data on deafferentated patients, I propose a modification of the causal structure of action proposed by Bach, making a remark about the inadequate definition of ER. In the proposed modification, RR and the agent’s prior intention serve as alternative components of action awareness. (shrink)

This is a reply to the article by A.M. Dorozhkin, S.V. Shibarshina “Epistemological Randomization, or On Creativity in Science”. The comprehension of the general philosophical problems of scientific rationality is inextricably linked with the creative development of the world. An actual philosophical position can be formed on the basis of the intersection of several alternative approaches. The first is connected with the understanding of rationality as a special style of thinking of the epoch, in which the coordinate system of the (...) worldview is set. Such rationality sets general ideas about the cognizability of the world, and forms methodological and theoretical scientific strategies. Rationality outlines the boundaries of a scientist’s creative thought. Addressing the problem of the rationality of scientific creativity involves the use of a second approach, on the basis of which we can talk about the use of a variety of logics in describing the world. At the same time, confidence in their connection with reality allows us to hope for the formation of a holistic description of the problem in the future. In this case, we are dealing with an act of cognitive activity, as a result of which our consciousness throws a rational construct as a network on a situation of uncertainty, explaining and mastering it – the picture of the world is ordered. According to the third position, the evaluation of scientific results is flexible, plastic in nature: what is perceived as methodologically erroneous today may turn out to be a scientific discovery tomorrow. Thus, it can be stated that the creative thinking of the researcher is inscribed in certain cultural conditions of understanding reality, and this situation has a rationally given meaning. At the same time, the human mind always strives beyond the limits of the definable and categorically set, with the help of rationality, progressively groping the boundaries of the unknown and going beyond the limits of the possible. (shrink)

This article attempts to comprehend the problem within the methodology of science. The authors compare the concepts of creativity and heuristics and suggest a semantic differentiation between them, and also offer their own viewpoint on the main types of activity corresponding to these concepts. The problem of creativity is associated with the characteristics that a person must have in order to solve tasks and problems. The authors consider the relationship between the problem and the task, as well as some major (...) techniques to tackle them. Here they substantiate the idea of a wider adaptation of randomization as a special tactic, that is, going beyond the narrow framework of mathematical statistics and empirical research. In this context, the authors introduce the notion of “epistemological randomization”, designed to denote the following of open rationality without abandoning the rational way of solving scientific problems. This technique is viewed as a phenomenon related to the counterfactual thinking. The last part of the article proposes a typology of personalities as problem and task solvers – adaptive, heuristic and creative personalities. It is assumed that the “heuristic” personality aims to complete tasks, which, unlike problems, have a final solution, while the “creative” personality aims to expand the problem field. The latter type is characterized as capable and inclined to use the “epistemological randomization”, the techniques of lateral thinking and other techniques that suggest several methods of solving problems and tasks at once. (shrink)

The article provides a reply to critical remarks made during the discussion about creativity and scientific knowledge. The authors propose to consider their concept of creativity not as antagonistic or incommensurable with the alternative, but rather co-existing through the complementarity principle. Responding to a comment about the socio-cultural conditionality of a particular cognitive situation, the authors question whether globalization seriously influence this matter in science. They support the statement about the importance of the interaction between science and art, science and (...) philosophy as an opportunity to consider scientific problems from the outside, in an unusual way. Regarding the comment about serendipity, the authors note that in certain cases we need exactly epistemological randomization, since we cannot consciously induce serendipity. In conclusion, thanks are expressed to all participants in the discussion. (shrink)

Modal constitution theory is one of the most influential solutions to the paradoxes of coincidence, and the problem of personal identity. It rests on three fundamental premises: common-sense objects exist; sometimes objects coincide in space; the coincidence of objects in space requires explanation. In this article, the author offers a critique of the modal theory of constitution. First, the definition of the constitution is examined and a new argument is offered that modal theory either does not provide asymmetry of the (...) constitution or leads to an infinite series of constitutive objects, unsatisfactorily extending ontology. Also, the author demonstrates that possible additions to the constitutive definition, which can make the definition sufficient for asymmetric relation, lead to additional theoretical difficulties, leading to the logical impossibility of constitution relation. Second, the author demonstrates that the theory of constitution offers an unsatisfactory theory of identity because it faces three problems: the overpopulation problem, the epistemic problem, and the personal problem. All of these considerations lead the author to conclude that modal constitution theory is not metaphysically satisfactory. (shrink)

The central problem of the article is the paradox in the history of Newton’s mechanics: prominent researchers of the genesis of the Principia did not believe Newton’s words about the origin of the idea of universal gravity. They did not believe that he could have come up with this idea as early as 1666, considering circular orbits, and believed that Newton invented the story of the falling apple. The article proposes a “subjunctive” scenario leading to the law of universal gravity (...) and feasible at the level of Galileo’s knowledge and skills in 1611. The basis for such a scenario is the description of a thought experiment in Newton’s manuscript “The System of the World”, preceding the creation of Principia. The proposed reconstruction helps to consider and clarify the concept of “modern physics”, the birth of which was the main event of the Scientific Revolution of the XVI–XVII centuries. The traditional understanding reduces the essence of modern physics to a reliance on experience and on the language of mathematics. Such a definition, however, is not sufficient. The geometry of Euclid and the physics of Archimedes were mathematically perfect, and their axioms were based on objective experience. Despite the importance of the tools of mathematics and experiment, the key innovation of modern physics has become the belief in the hidden fundamental laws of the Universe and in the right of the researcher to invent invisible, “illogical”, “absurd” concepts and postulates, experimentally verifiable only together with the theory based on them. This postulate of fundamental cognitive optimism combines bold ingenuity with a humble need for empirical verification. (shrink)

The article offers a socio-historical approach to the problem of creative personality in polemic with the article by A.M. Dorozhkin and S.V. Shibarshina. Creative activity is considered not as a psychological process or an expression of cognitive abilities, but as a result evaluated by the professional scientific community and even by the entire society. The distinction between the psychological, historical and historical-epistemological interpretation of creativity is discussed. The authors argue that although the proposed approach has an explanatory potential for creativity (...) as a socio-historical phenomenon, it reduces the nature of individual personalities and their role in scientific research to a public response to a new result. The personality of an author is getting vanished in this result, becoming only a label of some social achievement. Using the terminology of J.-P. Sartre, the essence of the author as a unique individual is reduced to his social existence as a scientist. The purpose of this existence is not the fulfillment of a vocation, but the implementation of a professional mission to promote science as a public good, which consists, among other things, in creating a field of intellectual tension. The scientist ensures the objective increase of public awareness of the painful points of history and modernity; critically analyzes global risks from ecology to security; and presents images of a possible and required future. Thus, creative science acts as a source for development through problematization, a factor of cognitive dissonance, a troublemaker, a potential violator of social stability. (shrink)

This article is devoted to the analysis of arguments from empirical science against free will. Its main purpose is to reveal their deep anti-naturalism. This anti-naturalism lies in the use of a concept of free will that cannot be the subject of naturalistic consideration, as well as in the various explanatory and ontological paradoxes that arguments from empirical science lead in case when someone is trying to generalize the explanatory principles underlying them. At the beginning of the article, the author (...) gives a general notion of the free will problem, a working definition of naturalism and the place of arguments from empirical science in discussions about free will. To achieve the main goal of the article, the author suggests a classification of arguments from empirical science, which includes five types: from prediction, from manipulation, from the brain, from illusion, from the substitution of concepts. In accordance with this classification, the structure of the article is defined, where each of the presented types is sequentially considered. The logic of considering each type of argument is approximately the same: explication of the essence of the argument of a particular type, its analysis, identification of basic principles and their generalization, demonstration of the negative consequences that it leads to, and answers to possible objections. In the course of the consideration, the author formulates an ontologically neutral concept of free will as a set of abilities associated with the agent’s control over his actions. At the end of the article, the main points is summed up, the idea of naturalistic compatibilism is proposed, the role of arguments from empirical science in discussions about free will is clarified, as is the problem of free will itself, the question of the sources of “chimerization” of naturalism is briefly highlighted, and the problem of completeness of the proposed reasoning is touched upon. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the consideration of the relationship of T. Kuhn (and his followers) with representatives of the school of internal realism. Theses of the article: Kuhn’s teaching does not contain an unambiguous understanding of the basis on which ideas within the paradigm are acceptable to a scientist; post-Kuhn discussions in the field of epistemology of scientific knowledge acquire not historical, but “human” character; they are conducted around the concept of “rational acceptability”; theoretical positions as epistemological anarchism, similarly, (...) internalism can equally be deduced from Kuhn’s teaching; the essentialist program of internal realists is excessively focused on criticizing the relativistic consequences of the doctrine of the paradigm; the revealed contradictions of Kuhn’s relativistic and internalist receptions prompt rejection of both these receptions. It is shown that Kuhn’s theory initially disposes to its transformation into a more consistent one in two ways: either due to radical antirealism, or due to an internalist approach, when its own epistemology is built within the framework of the paradigm with a mandatory definition of what is considered real and objective. Rational acceptability regulates the “value” aspect, i.e. preference for a certain theoretical model. Conclusions of the study: in internalism, the idea of the intersubjective nature of scientific knowledge is not lost; rational acceptability in internalism plays a restraining role in relation to the individual wills of scientists, acting as a collective form of intentionality that precedes any private scientific research with epistemological prerequisites; the criterion of rational acceptability is conservative, since it allows us to restrain the tendency of any language to lock itself in its own context; rational acceptability in internalism successfully balances between dogmatism and skepticism; the realistic and rational nature of the concept of “acceptability” allows us to reject the relativistic thesis about the closeness of science within a particular paradigm and assume that there is always “not-paradigmatic” component, rooted in the philosophical understanding of science. (shrink)

After Copernicus (1473–1543) and the ongoing development of contemporary cosmization, a new epistemological paradigm of post-religious humility is replacing religious versions. In the 100th year of Kuhn/Lakatos, this article explores the differences between religious and post-religious paradigms of humility as a formative aspect of human knowing. Although post-religious humility does not necessarily strive to criticize earlier paradigms of humility, an implicit critique is often present. In accordance with Kuhnian/Lakatosian theory, this article is not about psychological traits or personality characteristics; rather, (...) both types of humility as epistemological paradigms exist at the nascent stage of knowledge development. In retrospect, various thinkers throughout the Renaissance and Enlightenment demonstrate flux and conflict between the two paradigmatic humilities, and various theorists also struggle to articulate the emerging paradigm. The overall trajectory radicalizes the abandonment of anthropomorphism and positivistic assumptions about certainty. Historically, post-religious humility also intersected with society’s perception of science’s “progress” and a deeper embrace of finitude and mortality than was possible earlier. Movements like transhumanism, as well as phenomena of technological prowess and remarkable achievements in modern scientific research, do not contradict the new humility’s role. Whether religious or post-religious, postpositivistic civilization increasingly experiences that the new paradigm repositions the sociological and cognitive place where humility can now comfortably reside. (shrink)

In this reply to the article by A.M. Dorozhkin and S.V. Shibarshina, the question of the creative nature of the randomization technique is considered, which is understood as a rejection of logically obvious ways to solve scientific problems, and involves the inclusion of an element of randomness, or uncertainty, in the scientific search procedure. Some doubt is expressed about the consequences of introducing the technique of epistemological randomization into the tactics of solving scientific problems. The author of the article emphasizes (...) the fact that an attempt to solve scientific problems by an inclusion of other, non-scientific elements in the area of science may be a case of randomization. The author determines the areas which are subject to an uncertainty factor. Art and culture are regarded as such non-science areas. However, the appeal to uncertainty is an indication of a fundamental inability to describe in quantitative terms the origin of creativity. This position can be characterized as “misterianism” in the interpretation of creativity, by analogy with misterianism in the understanding of consciousness by K. McGinn. In this case, the randomization technique is nothing more than one of the possible conditions for creativity, which cannot guarantee the appearance of an original result. (shrink)

This paper continues the analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of ontic structural realism, which begun in the first part of the paper. Non-eliminative versions of this approach are considered, which try to find a compromise between the ontology of structures and the ontology of objects. It is shown that the semirealism of A. Chakravartti and the constructive structural realism of T. Cao have a number of limitations caused by the authors’ desire to strictly distinguish between the nature of the (...) existence of objects and structures. Then the version of the relationship between structures and entities is presented. Firstly, two concepts are divided according to their content: “object” and “entity”. Second, to solve the problem of causality, I suggest that the nature of entities and structures lie in their ability to act. It is this ability that I propose to use instead of the popular concepts of “causal powers”, “causal properties” or “dispositions”. Third, instead of a rigid alternative to ontological primitives – either essence, or causal relations, or structures – the concept of ontological pluralism and inherited existence is proposed. There each entity is represented as a derivative of another structure and, in turn, creates other entities and structures. Thus, both structures and entities at each level of the complexity hierarchy partially inherit the ability to act and a certain degree of existence from the structures and entities of the previous levels. Finally, I am trying to clarify the modal aspects of the ontic structural realism. Following the popular interpretations of quantum theory, the ability to act, and hence the existence of structures and entities, are considered separately in two worlds – potential and actual ones. The potential world is associated with a set of possible objects and structures of quantum theory, and the actual world is associated with a set of real (observable) objects and structures of classical physical theories. The transition from the potential to the actual world is proposed to be considered as a primitive metaphysical event. The proposed concept partially overcomes the objections to ontic structural realism, thereby strengthening its position in the discussion about the reality of quantum objects. (shrink)

This paper continues the analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of ontic structural realism, which begun in the first part of the paper. Non-eliminative versions of this approach are considered, which try to find a compromise between the ontology of structures and the ontology of objects. It is shown that the semirealism of A. Chakravartti and the constructive structural realism of T. Cao have a number of limitations caused by the authors’ desire to strictly distinguish between the nature of the (...) existence of objects and structures. Then the version of the relationship between structures and entities is presented. Firstly, two concepts are divided according to their content: “object” and “entity”. Second, to solve the problem of causality, I suggest that the nature of entities and structures lie in their ability to act. It is this ability that I propose to use instead of the popular concepts of “causal powers”, “causal properties” or “dispositions”. Third, instead of a rigid alternative to ontological primitives – either essence, or causal relations, or structures – the concept of ontological pluralism and inherited existence is proposed. There each entity is represented as a derivative of another structure and, in turn, creates other entities and structures. Thus, both structures and entities at each level of the complexity hierarchy partially inherit the ability to act and a certain degree of existence from the structures and entities of the previous levels. Finally, I am trying to clarify the modal aspects of the ontic structural realism. Following the popular interpretations of quantum theory, the ability to act, and hence the existence of structures and entities, are considered separately in two worlds – potential and actual ones. The potential world is associated with a set of possible objects and structures of quantum theory, and the actual world is associated with a set of real (observable) objects and structures of classical physical theories. The transition from the potential to the actual world is proposed to be considered as a primitive metaphysical event. The proposed concept partially overcomes the objections to ontic structural realism, thereby strengthening its position in the discussion about the reality of quantum objects. (shrink)

The author analyzes the phenomenon of denialism (denial of scientific consensus out of the normative boundaries of scientific discussion). The intellectual origins (including connection with P. Feyerabend’s post-positivism), sociocultural characteristics and political aspects of this phenomenon are discussed. The author defends the thesis that denialism is associated with scientism – non-reflexive trust in science, which is used for unscrupulous manipulations for the purpose of political influence. As an example, she considers the South African expert case related to HIV denial in (...) the early 2000s. The author believes that denialism needs a comprehensive analysis that takes into account the interdependence of its intellectual and socio-political foundations. (shrink)

The structure of Russian science of the XIX century was dominated by state forms of its organization. At the same time, there were also a few private (non-governmental) forms of research communities. One of the little-studied phenomena of scientific privacy is the so-called “kruzhok” (a little circle in Russian). The article examines the history of the formation and activity of one of such “kruzhoks”, formed in the 1880s–1890s around Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich, who was seriously engaged in research in the (...) field of lepidopterology (the branch of entomology studying butterflies, Lepidoptera). The role and significance of this “kruzhok” for the development of descriptive entomology in the situation of its weak institutionalization in Russia at the end of the XIX century are briefly considered, the course of scientific research of the Grand Duke and his entourage and the reasons for the termination of their activity are discussed. The history of this informal association is interpreted by us as a manifestation of the purposeful life-making of the Grand Duke, who thus tried to professionalize his hobby and enter the scientific community of entomologists on an equal footing, without breaking with his social environment and without going beyond the behavioral norms established by society for persons of his status. It is shown that the Nikolai Mikhailovich’s “kruzhok” became not only an instrument of his life-making, but also an influential center of Russian lepidopterology, the development of which was thereby given a powerful impetus. (shrink)

This paper was motivated by reflections on what makes our argument convincing and persuasive. The substantive answer in my view suggests the examination of the cognitive grounds of argumentation. In the introductory section, I consider various approaches to identifying the cognitive component in argumentation. That way, I briefly observe recent relevant publications, which I classify into two groups: those directly addressing cognitive grounds of argumentation; and papers on formal models of argumentation that take cognitive nature of persuasion as a premise. (...) In the second section, I argue for phenomenologicaly inspired approach to cognitive activity as one which provides an adequate cognitive interpretation of the latter. In so doing, I touch upon key some phenomenological concepts and focuses on an analogizing apperception (appresentation). The third section accumulates all the above. I proceed from the interpretation of the argumentation as discursive activity aimed at a deliberate change in an opposite party’s position, which may not be explicitly presented in the course of arguing. It makes us turn to cognitive procedure of appresentation as it was presented by Husserl for an adequate interpretation of transfer and grasping of argumentative message’s meaning. (shrink)

In their article, A.M. Dorozhkin and S.V. Shibarshina focus on the concepts of problem, task, and features of a creative personality as a single isolated agent. To a certain extent, such view is “opposed” by the socio-epistemic approach, since today it is extremely difficult to consider a person outside the socio-cultural context. In my paper, I discuss the distinctive features of the concepts of tasks and problems in connection with the fields of science and education. As an example of a (...) kind of creative adaptation practice, to which modern scientists are forced to resort (taking into account difficult socio-economic realities), I consider “tayloring” – a type of activity of “creative” written justification of the importance and usefulness of basic research (J. Calvert). The collective and institutional aspects of modern science, which play a role in the possible limitation of the process of generating new (creative) ideas in science, are discussed (P. Stanford). I agree with A.M. Dorozhkin and S.V. Shibarshina, that the method of epistemological randomization is most specific for the field of philosophy. Following C. Rovelli, it is emphasized that philosophy can serve as an important “creative resource” for scientific activity. (shrink)

The article considers the concept of serendipity (the ability to make unexpected discoveries) in comparison with the concept of “epistemological randomization” introduced by A.M. Dorozhkin and S.V. Shibarshina. The genesis and content of the concept of “serendipity” in the interpretation of American sociologists R. Merton and E. Barber are revealed. The division of serendipity into three types is considered depending on the source and result of an unexpected scientific discovery. The first type of serendipity refers to a situation of random (...) observation, when neither the observation itself nor the conclusions drawn from it are part of the research already being carried out. The second type of serendipity is associated with the process of finding a solution to one problem, which suddenly leads to a solution to another. A third type of serendipity can arise when investigating a familiar problem, when the solution comes from an unexpected source. It is concluded that epistemological randomization, which is introduced into an existing study, is similar to the second and third types of serendipity, where the randomness factor is limited. In conclusion, it is emphasized that, in contrast to the principle of epistemological randomization, serendipity is an emergent phenomenon and cannot be caused consciously. Serendipity is manifested where an unexpected phenomenon meets a special type of subject who is able to notice and fruitfully interpret an unusual phenomenon. (shrink)