74 found

Year:

  1.  16
    Review of Dale Dorsey, The Limits of Moral Authority. [REVIEW]Brian Berkey - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):235-240.
  2.  6
    Benjamin Eidelson, Discrimination and Disrespect.Boonin David - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):240-245.
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  3.  4
    Introduction.Andrew I. Cohen - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):69-74.
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  4.  3
    Alejandra Mancilla, The Right of Necessity: Moral Cosmopolitanism and Global Poverty.Garrett Cullity - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):260-264.
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  5.  18
    Hypothetical Consent and the Value of Autonomy.Enoch David - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):6-36.
    Hypothetical consent is puzzling. On the one hand, it seems to make a moral difference across a wide range of cases. On the other hand, there seem to be principled reasons to think that it cannot. In this article I put forward reasonably precise formulations of these general suspicions regarding hypothetical consent; I draw several distinctions regarding the ways in which hypothetical consent may make a moral difference; I distinguish between two autonomy-related concerns, nonalienation and sovereignty; and, utilizing these distinctions, (...)
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  6.  6
    Political Liberalism: A Kantian View.Rainer Forst - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):123-144.
    This article suggests a Kantian reading of Rawls’s Political Liberalism. As much as Rawls distanced himself from a presentation of his theory in terms of a comprehensive Kantian moral doctrine, we ought to read it as a noncomprehensive Kantian moral-political theory. According to the latter approach, the liberal conception of justice is compatible with a plurality of comprehensive doctrines as long as they share the independently defined and grounded essentials of that conception of justice—that is, as long as they are (...)
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  7.  6
    Consensus on What? Convergence for What? Four Models of Political Liberalism.Gerald Gaus & Chad Van Schoelandt - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):145-172.
    As we read his work, John Rawls was developing an innovative approach to political philosophy, and Political Liberalism struggles with different ways to model these new insights. This article presents four models of political liberalism, particularly focusing on understanding the nature of overlapping consensus and its relation to public reason. Beyond clarifying Rawls’s insights, we aim to spur readers to reassemble the rich elements of Political Liberalism to produce tractable and enlightening models of political life among free and equal citizens (...)
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  8.  2
    Jamie Mayerfeld, The Promise of Human Rights: Constitutional Government, Democratic Legitimacy, and International Law.Hessler Kristen - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):264-269.
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  9.  3
    Shannon Vallor, Technology and the Virtues: A Philosophical Guide to a World Worth Wanting.Jason Kawall - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):281-286.
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  10.  6
    The Historical Injustice Problem for Political Liberalism.Erin I. Kelly - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):75-94.
    Liberal political philosophers have underestimated the philosophical relevance of historical injustice. For some groups, injustices from the past—particularly surrounding race, ethnicity, or religion—are a source of entrenched social inequality decades or even hundreds of years later. Rawls does not advocate the importance of redressing historical injustice, yet political liberalism needs a principle of historical redress. Rawls’s principle of fair equality of opportunity, which is designed to prevent the leveraging of class privilege, could be paired with a supporting principle of historical (...)
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  11.  2
    Alexander Nehamas, On Friendship.Jeanette Kennett - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):274-276.
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  12.  3
    David Miller, Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration. [REVIEW]Matthew Lindauer - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):269-274.
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  13.  7
    Marcus Arvan, Rightness as Fairness: A Moral and Political Theory.Charlotte A. Newey - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):230-235.
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  14. Law, Morality, and Everything Else: General Jurisprudence as a Branch of Metanormative Inquiry.David Plunkett & Scott Shapiro - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):37-68.
    In this article, we propose a novel account of general jurisprudence by situating it within the broader project of metanormative inquiry. We begin by showing how general jurisprudence is parallel to another well-known part of that project, namely, metaethics. We then argue that these projects all center on the same task: explaining how a certain part of thought, talk, and reality fits into reality overall. Metalegal inquiry aims to explain how legal thought, talk, and reality fit into reality. General jurisprudence (...)
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  15.  3
    Shlomi Segall, Why Inequality Matters: Luck Egalitarianism, Its Meaning and Value.Preda Adina - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):276-281.
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  16.  16
    Some Tips About What We’Re Looking For.Henry S. Richardson - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):1-5.
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  17.  63
    Reasons or Fittingness First?Richard Rowland - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):212-229.
    Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way argue that we should put fittingness rather than reasons first because we can provide an account of the evaluative in terms of the normative only if we put fittingness rather than reasons first. I argue that it is no more difficult to provide an account of the evaluative in terms of the normative if we put reasons rather than fittingness first.
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  18.  1
    Douglas Husak, Ignorance of Law: A Philosophical Inquiry.Re’em Segev - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):245-250.
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  19.  6
    Rawls, Liberalism, and Democracy.Skorupski John - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):173-198.
    This article offers a critique of John Rawls’s great work, Political Liberalism, from a non-Rawlsian liberal standpoint. It argues that Rawlsian political liberalism is influenced as much by a comprehensive view I call “radical-democracy” as by comprehensive liberal views. This can be seen in Rawls’s account of some of political liberalism’s fundamental ideas—notably the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation, the “liberal” principle of legitimacy, and the idea of public reason. I further argue that Rawls’s impressive attempt (...)
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  20.  6
    Errol Lord and Barry Maguire, Eds., Weighing Reasons.Justin Snedegar - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):255-260.
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  21.  5
    Autonomy and Disagreement About Justice in Political Liberalism.Paul Weithman - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):95-122.
    Rawls says in Political Liberalism that “the focus of an overlapping consensus is [more likely to be] a class of liberal conceptions” than a single one. In conceding that members of the well-ordered society are unlikely to live up to justice as fairness, Rawls would seem to have conceded that they are also unlikely to live autonomously. This is exactly the conclusion some commentators have drawn. I contend that the likelihood of “reasonable pluralism about justice” does not have the implication (...)
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  22.  6
    Uri D. Leibowitz and Neil Sinclair, Eds., Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability.J. Werner Preston - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):250-255.
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  23.  5
    A Dilemma for Neo-Aristotelian Supererogation.Alan T. Wilson - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):199-211.
    It has recently been argued that virtue ethics cannot accommodate the possibility of supererogation. In response, Rebecca Stangl proposes a neo-Aristotelian account of supererogation that, she argues, generates plausible verdicts, while also being compatible with the doctrine of the mean. I argue that Stangl’s response is unsuccessful. First, I demonstrate that the proposal in its current form is problematically indeterminate, meaning that we cannot know what verdicts would be produced in response to classic examples. Second, I argue that anyone attempting (...)
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  24.  6
    Scott Sehon, Free Will and Action Explanation: A Non-Causal, Compatibilist Account.Maria Alvarez - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):958-963.
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  25.  3
    Scott Sehon, Free Will and Action Explanation: A Non-Causal, Compatibilist Account.Maria Alvarez - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):958-963.
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  26. Properly Proleptic Blame.Benjamin Bagley - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):852-882.
    Crucially, blame can be addressed to its targets, as an implicit demand for recognition. But when we ask whether offenders would actually appreciate this demand, via a sound deliberative route from their existing motivations, we face a puzzle. If they would, their offense reflects a deliberative mistake, and blame’s hostility seems unnecessary. If they wouldn’t, addressing them is futile, and blame’s emotional engagement seems unwarranted. To resolve this puzzle, I develop an account of blame as a proleptic response to indeterminacy (...)
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  27. Toby Svoboda, Duties Regarding Nature: A Kantian Environmental Ethic.Emily Brady - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):967-972.
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  28.  2
    Toby Svoboda, Duties Regarding Nature: A Kantian Environmental Ethic.Emily Brady - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):967-972.
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  29.  17
    Rossian Conceptual Intuitionism.Robert Cowan - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):821-851.
    In this article I assess Rossian Intuitionism, which is the view that the Rossian Principles of Duty are self-evident. I begin by motivating and clarifying a version of the view—Rossian Conceptual Intuitionism—that hasn’t been adequately considered by Rossians. After defending it against a series of significant objections, I show that enthusiasm for Rossian Conceptual Intuitionism should be muted. Specifically, I argue that we lack sufficient reason for thinking that the Rossian Principles are self-evident, and that insisting that they are self-evident (...)
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  30.  1
    Rossian Conceptual Intuitionism.Robert Cowan - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):821-851.
    In this article I assess Rossian Intuitionism, which is the view that the Rossian Principles of Duty are self-evident. I begin by motivating and clarifying a version of the view—Rossian Conceptual Intuitionism—that hasn’t been adequately considered by Rossians. After defending it against a series of significant objections, I show that enthusiasm for Rossian Conceptual Intuitionism should be muted. Specifically, I argue that we lack sufficient reason for thinking that the Rossian Principles are self-evident, and that insisting that they are self-evident (...)
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  31.  1
    Rossian Conceptual Intuitionism.Robert Cowan - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):821-851.
    In this article I assess Rossian Intuitionism, which is the view that the Rossian Principles of Duty are self-evident. I begin by motivating and clarifying a version of the view—Rossian Conceptual Intuitionism—that hasn’t been adequately considered by Rossians. After defending it against a series of significant objections, I show that enthusiasm for Rossian Conceptual Intuitionism should be muted. Specifically, I argue that we lack sufficient reason for thinking that the Rossian Principles are self-evident, and that insisting that they are self-evident (...)
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  32.  6
    The Ideal, the Neighborhood, and the Status Quo: Gaus on the Uses of Justice.Estlund David - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):912-928.
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  33.  3
    The Ideal, the Neighborhood, and the Status Quo: Gaus on the Uses of Justice.Estlund David - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):912-928.
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  34.  1
    William R. Shaw, Utilitarianism and the Ethics of War.Ryan Jenkins - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):963-967.
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  35.  1
    William R. Shaw, Utilitarianism and the Ethics of War.Ryan Jenkins - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):963-967.
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  36.  2
    Fred Feldman, Distributive Justice: Getting What We Deserve From Our Country.Joseph Mendola - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):929-934.
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  37.  2
    Fred Feldman, Distributive Justice: Getting What We Deserve From Our Country.Joseph Mendola - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):929-934.
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  38.  2
    Tim Mulgan, Purpose in the Universe: The Moral and Metaphysical Case for Ananthropocentric Purposivism. [REVIEW]Thaddeus Metz - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):944-949.
  39. Priority, Not Equality, for Possible People.Jacob M. Nebel - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):896-911.
    How should we choose between uncertain prospects in which different possible people might exist at different levels of wellbeing? Alex Voorhoeve and Marc Fleurbaey offer an egalitarian answer to this question. I give some reasons to reject their answer and then sketch an alternative, which I call person-affecting prioritarianism.
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  40.  9
    Fichte's Ethical Thought. [REVIEW]Nomer Nedim - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):972-978.
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  41.  13
    Review of Allen W. Wood's "Fichte's Ethical Thought". [REVIEW]Nedim Nomer - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):972-978.
  42. Allen W. Wood, Fichte’s Ethical Thought.Nedim Nomer - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):972-978.
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  43.  2
    Allen W. Wood, Fichte’s Ethical Thought.Nedim Nomer - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):972-978.
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  44.  1
    Christopher Kutz, On War and Democracy.Jonathan Parry - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):934-938.
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  45.  2
    Christopher Kutz, On War and Democracy.Jonathan Parry - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):934-938.
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  46.  1
    Gender Identity and Exclusion: A Reply to Jenkins.Andler Matthew Salett - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):883-895.
    A theory of gender ought to be compatible with trans-inclusive definitions of gender identity terms, such as ‘woman’ and ‘man’. Appealing to this principle of trans-inclusion, Katharine Jenkins argues that we ought to endorse a dual social position and identity theory of gender. Here, I argue that Jenkins’s dual theory of gender fails to be trans-inclusive for the following reasons: it cannot generate a definition of ‘woman’ that extends to include all trans women, and it understands transgender gender identity through (...)
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  47.  1
    Gender Identity and Exclusion: A Reply to Jenkins.Andler Matthew Salett - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):883-895.
    A theory of gender ought to be compatible with trans-inclusive definitions of gender identity terms, such as ‘woman’ and ‘man’. Appealing to this principle of trans-inclusion, Katharine Jenkins argues that we ought to endorse a dual social position and identity theory of gender. Here, I argue that Jenkins’s dual theory of gender fails to be trans-inclusive for the following reasons: it cannot generate a definition of ‘woman’ that extends to include all trans women, and it understands transgender gender identity through (...)
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  48.  2
    Michael A. Neblo, Deliberative Democracy Between Theory and Practice.Kai Spiekermann - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):949-953.
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  49. Michael A. Neblo, Deliberative Democracy Between Theory and Practice.Kai Spiekermann - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):949-953.
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  50.  2
    Carolyn Price, Emotion.Christine Tappolet - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):953-958.
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  51.  1
    Carolyn Price, Emotion.Christine Tappolet - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):953-958.
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  52.  2
    Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Luck Egalitarianism.Kristin Voigt - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):939-943.
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  53.  1
    Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Luck Egalitarianism.Kristin Voigt - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):939-943.
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  54.  9
    New Trouble for “Reasons as Evidence”: Means That Don’T Justify the Ends.Schmidt Eva - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):708-718.
    In this article, I argue against Kearns and Star’s reasons-as-evidence view, which identifies normative reasons to ɸ with evidence that one ought to ɸ. I provide a new counterexample to their view, the student case, which involves an inference to the best explanation from means to end or, more generally, from a derivative to a more foundational “ought” proposition. It shows that evidence that one ought to act a certain way is not in all cases a reason so to act. (...)
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  55.  8
    Schroeder, Mark. Expressing Our Attitudes: Explanation and Expression in Ethics. Vol. 2.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. Pp. 272. $70.00. [REVIEW]Christopher Howard - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):806-812.
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  56.  1
    Chandhoke, Neera. Democracy and Revolutionary Politics.London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015. Pp. 192. $114.00 ; $29.95.Mattias Iser - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):767-771.
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  57.  4
    Sartorio, Carolina. Causation and Free Will.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. 208. $65.00.Stephen Kearns - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):802-806.
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  58.  80
    Taking Risks Behind the Veil of Ignorance.Buchak Lara - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):610-644.
    A natural view in distributive ethics is that everyone's interests matter, but the interests of the relatively worse off matter more than the interests of the relatively better off. I provide a new argument for this view. The argument takes as its starting point the proposal, due to Harsanyi and Rawls, that facts about distributive ethics are discerned from individual preferences in the "original position." I draw on recent work in decision theory, along with an intuitive principle about risk-taking, to (...)
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  59.  6
    Deontological Decision Theory and Agent-Centered Options.Lazar Seth - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):579-609.
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  60. Moral Reasoning in a Pluralistic World. [REVIEW]Uri D. Leibowitz - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):792-797.
  61.  2
    Katsafanas, Paul. The Nietzschean Self: Moral Psychology, Agency and the Unconscious.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. 272. $74.00. [REVIEW]Jonathan Mitchell - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):777-783.
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  62.  5
    New Trouble for “Reasons as Evidence”: Means That Don’T Justify the Ends.Schmidt Eva - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):708-718.
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  63.  33
    Moral Understanding as Knowing Right From Wrong.Paulina Sliwa - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):521-552.
    Moral understanding is a valuable epistemic and moral good. I argue that moral understanding is the ability to know right from wrong. I defend the account against challenges from nonreductionists, such as Alison Hills, who argue that moral understanding is distinct from moral knowledge. Moral understanding, she suggests, is constituted by a set of abilities: to give and follow moral explanations and to draw moral conclusions. I argue that Hills’s account rests on too narrow a conception of moral understanding. Among (...)
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  64. Leif Wenar, Blood Oil. [REVIEW]David Wiens - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):813-817.
  65.  14
    Indeterminate Oughts.J. Robert G. Williams - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):645-673.
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  66.  3
    Finlay, Christopher J. Terrorism and the Right to Resist: A Theory of Just Revolutionary War.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Pp. 339. $99.00. [REVIEW]Saba Bazargan-Forward - 2017 - Ethics 127 (2):481-486.
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  67.  31
    Stanley, Jason. How Propaganda Works. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015. Pp. 376. $29.95 (Cloth); $19.95 (Paper). [REVIEW]Renee Jorgensen Bolinger - 2017 - Ethics 127 (2):502-507.
  68.  12
    On Being Content with Imperfection.Cheshire Calhoun - 2017 - Ethics 127 (2):327-352.
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  69. Audi, Robert. Means, Ends, and Persons: The Meaning and Psychological Dimensions of Kant’s Humanity Formula.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. Pp. 192. $45.00. [REVIEW]Jeanine M. Grenberg - 2017 - Ethics 127 (2):466-470.
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  70.  1
    Haji, Ishtiyaque. Luck’s Mischief: Obligation and Blameworthiness on a Thread.New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. 376. $74.00. [REVIEW]Marcela Herdova - 2017 - Ethics 127 (2):491-496.
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  71.  13
    The Problem with Sexual Promises.Hallie Liberto - 2017 - Ethics 127 (2):383-414.
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  72.  20
    Ethics and Practical Reasoning.Matthew Silverstein - 2017 - Ethics 127 (2):353 - 382.
    How is practical reasoning related to ethical reasoning? The most common view is that they are identical: practical reasoning just is ethical reasoning. I criticize this view and then propose an alternative account of the relation between ethical thought and practical thought: ethical reasoning is reasoning about sound practical reasoning. I argue that this account of the relation between ethics and practical reasoning explains various phenomena that more familiar views leave unexplained. It also entails that the philosophy of action bears (...)
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  73.  72
    Gender Identity and Exclusion: A Reply to Jenkins.Matthew Andler - 2017 - Ethics 127.
    A theory of gender ought to be compatible with trans-inclusive definitions of gender identity terms, such as ‘woman’ and ‘man’. Appealing to this principle of trans-inclusion, Katharine Jenkins argues that we ought to endorse a dual social position and identity theory of gender. Here, I argue that Jenkins’ dual theory of gender fails to be trans-inclusive for the following reasons: (i) it cannot generate a definition of ‘woman’ that extends to include all trans women, and (ii) it understands transgender gender (...)
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  74.  59
    Action, Deontology, and Risk.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2017 - Ethics 123 (3):674-707.
    Deontological theories face difficulties in accounting for situations involving risk; the most natural ways of extending deontological principles to such situations have unpalatable consequences. In extending ethical principles to decision under risk, theorists often assume the risk must be incorporated into the theory by means of a function from the product of probability assignments to certain values. Deontologists should reject this assumption; essentially different actions are available to the agent when she cannot know that a certain act is in her (...)
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