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  1. Naïve Realism and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Dan Cavedon‐Taylor - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):391-412.
    Perceptual experience has representational content. My argument for this claim is an inference to the best explanation. The explanandum is cognitive penetration. In cognitive penetration, perceptual experiences are either causally influenced, or else are partially constituted, by mental states that are representational, including: mental imagery, beliefs, concepts and memories. If perceptual experiences have representational content, then there is a background condition for cognitive penetration that renders the phenomenon prima facie intelligible. Naïve realist or purely relational accounts of perception leave cognitive (...)
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  2.  7
    Why Parfit Cannot Generalize From Fission.Douglas Ehring - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):413-425.
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  3.  41
    The Razor and the Laser.Mark Fiddaman & Gonzalo Rodriguez‐Pereyra - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):341-358.
    The Razor says: do not multiply entities without necessity! The Laser says: do not multiply fundamental entities without necessity! Behind the Laser lies a deep insight. This is a distinction between the costs and the commitments of a theory. According to the Razor, every commitment is a cost. Not so according to the Laser. According to the Laser, derivative entities are an ontological free lunch: that is, they are a commitment without a cost. Jonathan Schaffer (2015) has argued that the (...)
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  4. Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism.Berislav Marušić & John Schwenkler - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):309-340.
    We argue that intentions are beliefs—beliefs that are held in light of, and made rational by, practical reasoning. To intend to do something is neither more nor less than to believe, on the basis of one’s practical reasoning, that one will do it. The identification of the mental state of intention with the mental state of belief is what we call strong cognitivism about intentions. It is a strong form of cognitivism because we identify intentions with beliefs, rather than maintaining (...)
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  5.  32
    Kind‐Dependent Grounding.Alex Moran - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):359-390.
    Are grounding claims fully general in character? If a is F in virtue of being G, does it follow that anything that’s G has to be F for that reason? According to the thesis of Weak Formality, the answer is ‘yes’. In this paper, however, I argue that there is philosophical utility in rejecting this thesis. More exactly, I argue that two outstanding problems in contemporary metaphysics can be dealt with if we maintain that there can be cases of what (...)
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  6.  38
    The Regress Objection to Reflexive Theories of Consciousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):293-308.
  7.  35
    Normalizing Slurs and Out‐Group Slurs: The Case of Referential Restriction.Justina Diaz Legaspe - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (2):234-255.
    The relation between slurs and their neutral counterparts has been put into question recently by the fact that some slurs can be used to refer to subsets of the referential classes determined by their associated counterparts. This paper aims to reinforce this relation by offering a way of explaining referential restriction that distinguishes between two kinds of slurs: those performing a normalizing role upon (some) individuals inside a class (mostly, a gender) and those used to derogate a marginalized out- group.
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  8.  15
    Because There Is a Reason to Do It: How Normative Reasons Explain Action.Susanne Mantel - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (2):208-233.
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  9.  20
    What's Wrong With Brute Supervenience? A Defense of Horgan on Physicalism and Superdupervenience.Kevin Morris - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (2):256-280.
    This paper offers a qualified defense of Terry Horgan’s view of brute, inexplicable supervenience theses as physically unacceptable—as having no place in physicalist metaphysics—and his corresponding emphasis on the importance of “superdupervenience”, metaphysical supervenience that can be explained in a “materialistically acceptable” way. I argue, in response to Tom Polger, that it may be possible to ground the physical unacceptability of brute supervenience in its relation physically unacceptable properties supervening on physical properties; moreover, I argue that Horgan’s emphasis on the (...)
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  10.  31
    Normative Judgment and Rational Requirements: A Reply to Ridge.Francesco Orsi - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (2):281-290.
    I examine and rebut Ridge’s two arguments for Capacity Judgment Internalism (simply qua their particular character and content, first person normative judgments are necessarily capable of motivating without the help of any independent desire). First, the rejection of the possibility of anormativism (sec. 2), second, an argument from the rational requirement to intend to do as one judges that one ought to do (sec. 3). I conclude with a few remarks about the nature of this requirement and about verdicts of (...)
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  11.  37
    Essence with Ground.Justin Zylstra - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (2):193-207.
  12.  23
    Discussion of Susanna Siegel's “Can Perceptual Experiences Be Rational?”.Ori Beck, Mazviita Chirimuuta, Raja Rosenhagen, Susanna Siegel, Declan Smithies & Alison Springle - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (1):175-190.
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  13.  21
    Discussion of James Pryor's “The Merits of Incoherence”.Ori Beck, Anil Gupta, Adrian Haddock, James Pryor & Declan Smithies - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (1):142-148.
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  14.  13
    Perceptual Experience and Empirical Reason.Bill Brewer - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (1):1-18.
    What is the role of conscious experience in the epistemology of perceptual knowledge: how should we characterise what is going on in seeing that o is F in order to illuminate the contribution of seeing o to their status as cases of knowing that o is F? My proposal is that seeing o involves conscious acquaintance with o itself, the concrete worldly source of the truth that o is F, in a way that may make it evident to the subject (...)
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  15.  16
    Discussion of Bill Brewer's “Perceptual Experience and Empirical Reason”.Bill Brewer, David de Bruijn, Chris Hill, Adam Pautz, Raja Rosenhagen, Miloš Vuletić & Wayne Wu - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (1):19-32.
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  16.  21
    Discussion of Anil Gupta's “Outline of an Account of Experience”.Alex Byrne, Charles Goldhaber, Anil Gupta, Adam Pautz & Raja Rosenhagen - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (1):75-88.
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  17.  41
    Discussion of John McDowell's “Perceptual Experience and Empirical Rationality”.David de Bruijn, Charles Goldhaber, Andrea Kern, John McDowell, Declan Smithies, Alison Springle & Bosuk Yoon - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (1):99-111.
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  18.  10
    Outline of an Account of Experience.Anil Gupta - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (1):33-74.
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  19.  98
    Perceptual Experience and Empirical Rationality.John McDowell - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (1):89-98.
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  20.  43
    The Merits of Incoherence.James Pryor - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (1):112-141.
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  21.  18
    Can Perceptual Experiences Be Rational?Susanna Siegel - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (1):149-174.
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