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  1. Practical Reasons for Belief Without Stakes☆.N. G. Laskowski & Shawn Hernandez - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 63 (1):16-27.
    Analytic Philosophy, Volume 63, Issue 1, Page 16-27, March 2022.
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  2.  4
    Priority Monism and Junk.Jamie Taylor - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 63 (1):44-61.
    Priority Monism—the position that what is fundamental is one object, the Cosmos—has recently been brought to the fore by Jonathan Schaffer, who has put forward a variety of arguments in its favour. However, Priority Monism has been criticised on the grounds that junk—where for some structure to be junky is for every object in it to be a proper part of another object in the structure—is metaphysically possible. The aim of this paper is to investigate how the monist can deal (...)
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  3.  62
    Perceptual Illusionism.Brian Cutter - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (4):396-417.
    Perceptual illusionism is the view that perceptual experience is, in general, radically illusory. That is, perceptual experience presents objects as having certain sensible properties and standing in certain sensible relations, but nothing in the subject’s environment has those properties or stands in those relations. This paper makes the case for perceptual illusionism by showing how a broad set of philosophical and scientific considerations converge to support illusionism about the full range of sensible properties and relations. After clarifying the illusionist thesis, (...)
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  4. Slurs, Neutral Counterparts, and What You Could Have Said.Arianna Falbo - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (4):359-375.
    Analytic Philosophy, Volume 62, Issue 4, Page 359-375, December 2021.
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  5.  88
    Grounding, Metaphysical Laws, and Structure.Martin Grajner - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (4):376-395.
    According to the deductive-nomological account of ground, a fact A grounds another fact B in case the laws of metaphysics determine the existence of B on the basis of the existence of A. Accounts of grounding of this particular variety have already been developed in the literature. My aim in this paper is to sketch a new version of this account. My preferred account offers two main improvements over existing accounts. First, the present account is able to deal with necessitarian (...)
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  6. That’s the Guy Who Might Have Lost.Tristan Grøtvedt Haze - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (4):418-426.
    In an influential passage of Naming and Necessity Kripke argues, with the help of a fictional dialogue, that de re metaphysical modal distinctions have intuitive content. In this note I clarify the workings of the argument, and what it does and does not support. I conclude that Kripke’s argument does not, despite possible appearances, support the view that metaphysical modal distinctions are made in common sense discourse. The argument does however support the view that if metaphysical modal distinctions make sense (...)
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  7.  45
    Teleological Powers.Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (4):336-358.
    In this article I develop a metaphysical account of final causes grounded on contemporary powers metaphysics. After having presented some key elements of an Aristotle-inspired teleology, i.e., the study of final causes within Aristotelian tradition, I introduce powers. Moreover, I present some theses about their nature and features. Afterwards, I distinguish between two kinds of powers that are expected to play the roles traditionally attributed to final causes: weakly teleological powers and strongly teleological powers. Weakly teleological powers are those powers (...)
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  8. Should Agents Be Immodest?Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (3):235-251.
    Epistemically immodest agents take their own epistemic standards to be among the most truth-conducive ones available to them. Many philosophers have argued that immodesty is epistemically required of agents, notably because being modest entails a problematic kind of incoherence or self-distrust. In this paper, I argue that modesty is epistemically permitted in some social contexts. I focus on social contexts where agents with limited cognitive capacities cooperate with each other (like juries).
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  9.  53
    Against Normativism About Mental Attitudes.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (3):295-311.
    Analytic Philosophy, Volume 62, Issue 3, Page 295-311, September 2021.
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  10. Wittgenstein, Peirce, and Paradoxes of Mathematical Proof.Sergiy Koshkin - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (3):252-274.
    Wittgenstein's paradoxical theses that unproved propositions are meaningless, proofs form new concepts and rules, and contradictions are of limited concern, led to a variety of interpretations, most of them centered on rule-following skepticism. We argue, with the help of C. S. Peirce's distinction between corollarial and theorematic proofs, that his intuitions are better explained by resistance to what we call conceptual omniscience, treating meaning as fixed content specified in advance. We interpret the distinction in the context of modern epistemic logic (...)
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  11.  19
    A Troublesome Case of Backward Causation for Lewis’s Counterfactual Theory.George Seli - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (3):275-294.
    Analytic Philosophy, Volume 62, Issue 3, Page 275-294, September 2021.
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  12.  25
    Experiencing Left and Right in a Non-Orientable World.Jonathan A. Simon - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (3):201-222.
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  13.  8
    Experiencing Left and Right in a Non‐Orientable World.Jonathan A. Simon - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (3):201-222.
    Analytic Philosophy, Volume 62, Issue 3, Page 201-222, September 2021.
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  14.  35
    Dual Carving and Minimal Rationalism.D. Gene Witmer - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (3):223-234.
    In his Consciousness and Fundamental Reality (2017) Philip Goff defends his anti-physicalist argument against what he calls the "Dual Carving" objection—the idea that two representations of the very same fact could both be conceptually independent and "transparent," that is, revealing of the essences of the entities in question. His defense invokes a thesis he calls "Minimal Rationalism." I explore exactly how Minimal Rationalism is supposed to turn aside the objection and argue that the formulation of Minimal Rationalism on offer is (...)
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  15.  40
    The Problem of Peer Demotion, Revisited and Resolved.Endre Begby - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (2):125-140.
    In any domain of inductive reasoning, we must take care to distinguish between (i) which hypothesis my evidence supports, and (ii) the level of confidence I should have in the hypothesis, given my evidence. This distinction can help resolve the problem of peer demotion, a central point of contention in the epistemology of peer disagreement. It is true that disagreement does not provide evidence that I am right and you are wrong. But it need not, in order to lead to (...)
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  16.  36
    Neither Pardon nor Blame: Reacting in the Wrong Way.Daniel Coren - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (2):165-183.
    Why does someone, S, deserve blame or reproach for an action or event? One part of a standard answer since Aristotle: the event was caused, at least in part, by S’s bad will. But recently there’s been some insightful discussion of cases where the event’s causes do not include any bad will from S and yet it seems that S is not off the hook for the event. Cheshire Calhoun, Miranda Fricker, Elinor Mason, David Enoch, Randolph Clarke, and others include (...)
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  17.  60
    Response to Schwenkler.Jonathan Dancy - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (2):195-200.
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  18. How Can There Be Reasoning to Action?John Schwenkler - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (2):184-194.
    In general we think of reasoning as a way of moving from some body of evidence to a belief that is drawn as a conclusion from it. But is it possible for reasoning to conclude in action, i.e., in a person’s intentionally doing one thing or another? In PRACTICAL SHAPE Jonathan Dancy answers 'Yes', on the grounds that "when an agent deliberates well and then acts accordingly, the action done is of the sort most favoured by the considerations rehearsed, taken (...)
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  19.  38
    Supervaluationism and Branching Indeterminacy.David E. Taylor - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (2):141-164.
    One of the most popular and enduring approaches to indeterminacy phenomena (e.g., vagueness) over the past several decades has been some form or another of supervaluationism. I argue that supervaluationism is inadequate as a model of indeterminacy: There is an entire class of examples of indeterminacy, characterized by a common “branching” structure, that cannot be modeled in the way supervaluationism proposes. I demonstrate my conclusion explicitly with respect to two specific examples—indeterminate personal identity and indeterminate reference—showing how supervaluationism can model (...)
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  20.  94
    The KK Principle and Rotational Symmetry.Timothy Williamson - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (2):107-124.
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  21.  37
    Self and World Revisited.Quassim Cassam - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (1):61-69.
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  22.  21
    Introduction: Sensing the Self in World.Tony Cheng - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (1):57-60.
    Analytic Philosophy, Volume 62, Issue 1, Page 57-60, March 2021.
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  23. Two Sorts of Constitutivism.Jeremy David Fix - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (1):1-20.
    Some things, but only some things, are by nature subject to standards. Why? I explain and develop what I call nature-first constitutivism, which says that what something is determines what it should be. Nature is the basis of normativity. I explain this view in terms of a unique type of property which particulars of a genus can lack even though those properties partially determines the nature of the genus. Such properties partially describe the nature of a genus and are thereby (...)
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  24. Unity and Objectivity in Strawson and Cassam.Anil Gomes - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (1):84-96.
    Some comments on Quassim Cassam’s Self and World written for a conference at the Institute of Philosophy in 2017. I consider the objection that Cassam raises to Strawson’s argument from unity to objectivity in The Bounds of Sense and raise some general questions about Cassam’s problem of misconception and its application to transcendental arguments.
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  25.  33
    Revisiting Quassim Cassam’s Self and World.Béatrice Longuenesse - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (1):70-83.
    Analytic Philosophy, Volume 62, Issue 1, Page 70-83, March 2021.
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  26.  81
    If Time Can Pass, Time Can Pass at Different Rates.Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (1):21-32.
    According to the No Alternate Possibilities argument, if time passes then the rate at which it passes could be different. Thus, time cannot pass, since if time passes, then necessarily it passes at a rate of 1 second per second. One response to this argument is to posit hypertime, and to argue that at different worlds, time passes at different rates when measured against hypertime. Since many A-theorists think we can make sense of temporal passage without positing hypertime, we pursue (...)
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  27.  49
    Objectually Understanding Informed Consent.Daniel A. Wilkenfeld - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (1):33-56.
    Analytic Philosophy, Volume 62, Issue 1, Page 33-56, March 2021.
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  28.  41
    Embodied Subjectivity and Objectifying Self‐Consciousness: Cassam and Phenomenology.Dan Zahavi - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (1):97-105.
    Analytic Philosophy, Volume 62, Issue 1, Page 97-105, March 2021.
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