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  1.  20
    Psychological Reflections in the Philosopher’s Mirror: Comments on Thomas Kelly’s Bias: A Philosophical Study.Jared B. Celniker & Nathan Ballantyne - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (3):229-233.
    In this brief commentary, we offer thoughts on Thomas Kelly’s Bias: A Philosophical Study. We focus on the book’s relevance to the study of cognitive biases, including Kelly’s discussion of naïve realism (in the psychologists’ sense). While we are largely enthusiastic about Kelly’s theorizing, we also provide some pushback against his notion of emergent biases. We hope that psychologists will engage with Kelly’s work and might consider how some philosophical refinements could improve the empirical study of biases.
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  2.  31
    Bias Defended.Thomas Kelly - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (3):234-258.
    In this paper, I clarify and defend some of the central ideas of Bias in response to commentators, with a special focus on the theme of skepticism. In response to Michael Veber, I defend the project of offering a modest as opposed to an ambitious response to the skeptic. In response to Jonathan Matheson, I defend my account of the way in which bias attributions function in contexts of interpersonal disagreement, as well as the claim that an unbiased believer will (...)
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  3.  12
    Bias, Knowledge, Skepticism, and Disagreement: Précis of Part iii of Bias: A Philosophical Study.Thomas Kelly - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (3):181-189.
    The third and final part of Bias: A Philosophical Study explores the connections between bias and some of the central topics of epistemology, including knowledge, skepticism, and disagreement. It defends the possibility of biased knowing: biased believers can sometimes know, even when they believe in accordance with their biases, and even if those biases guarantee that they would believe as they do even if the truth were otherwise. It argues that the possibility of biased knowing has significant implications for both (...)
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  4.  46
    Reason, Bias, and Inquiry: The Crossroads of Epistemology and Psychology, edited by Nathan Ballantyne and David Dunning.Christos Kyriacou - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (3):263-268.
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  5.  51
    (1 other version)Disagreement, Skepticism, and Begging the Question.Jonathan Matheson - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (3):201-217.
    In this paper, I examine Thomas Kelly’s account of the epistemic significance of bias presented in Bias: A Philosophical Study. Kelly draws a parallel between the skeptical threat from bias and the skeptical threat from disagreement, and crafts a response to these skeptical threats. According to Kelly, someone who is not biased can rely on that fact to conclude that their disagreeing interlocutor is biased. Kelly motivates this response by drawing several parallels to recent lessons in epistemology: that some question-begging (...)
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  6.  31
    The Skeptic and the Veridicalist: On the Difference Between Knowing What There Is and Knowing What Things Are, written by Yuval Avnur.Kevin McCain - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (3):259-262.
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  7.  19
    Biased Suspension of Judgment.Brett Sherman - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (3):218-228.
    According to Thomas Kelly, traditional skeptical arguments can be conceived in terms of bias. The main aim of this paper is not to challenge Kelly’s conclusions, but rather to draw some interesting consequences from them. Specifically, in addition to cases of biased judgments, which draw the ire of the skeptic, there are also cases of biased suspension of judgment. By examining cases of racially biased suspension of judgment and comparing them to cases of skepticism, I argue that we can help (...)
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  8.  39
    Biased Knowers, Biased Reasons, and Biased Philosophers.Michael Veber - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (3):190-200.
    In Bias: A Philosophical Study, Thomas Kelly offers a response to epistemological skepticism grounded in his account of bias. According to Kelly, the classic argument for skepticism is best understood as an attempt to show that our commonsense beliefs are biased against the skeptic. Kelly grants that this is true but argues that biased beliefs can still be knowledge. I offer two objections. First, if we are applying Kelly’s theory of bias to skepticism, it is best to think of the (...)
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  9. Simulations, Skepticisms, and Transcendental Arguments.Abraham Lim - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (2):123-153.
    I have developed transcendental arguments to refute several versions of Nick Bostrom’s simulation hypothesis. I called some of these arguments the SIM-style argument. In this paper, I have four main aims. First, I employ the SIM-style argument to remedy a defect in Hilary Putnam’s Brain-in-vat argument. Second, I show that the most radical skepticism, which Tim Button called the nightmarish Cartesian skepticism, can be refuted by the SIM-style argument or by another transcendental argument I develop here. Third, I compare my (...)
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  10.  41
    Problems for Moral Debunkers: On the Logic and Limits of Empirically Informed Ethics, written by Peter Königs.Olle Risberg - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (2):1-6.
    Problems for Moral Debunkers : On the Logic and Limits of Empirically Informed Ethics, written by Peter Königs.
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  11.  36
    The Debasing Demon Resurrected.Mikael Janvid - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (1):28-50.
    The aim of this paper is to strike a blow for the relevance of the debasing demon originally summoned by Jonathan Schaffer. I do so by, first, defending this skeptical hypothesis against critics and, second, by noting important similarities between the workings of this demon and implicit bias. Along the way, I elucidate the structure of this skeptical argument by comparing it to other better-known skeptical arguments. I also clarify the kinds of access the debasing skeptical scenario, as well as (...)
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  12.  39
    Hegel’s Criticism of Pyrrhonism.Joris Spigt - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (1):1-27.
    This paper presents Hegel’s criticism of two central ideas of Pyrrhonism: the importance of stating only how things appear and Pyrrhonism as a way of life. After providing a sketch of the main features of Pyrrhonism, the paper lays out and critically evaluates Hegel’s largely unexamined argument against Pyrrhonism in his early 1802 essay on skepticism. Hegel claims that the Pyrrhonist’s appeal to appearance renders Pyrrhonism philosophically vacuous: insofar as Pyrrhonism merely describes the subjective contents of the Pyrrhonist’s mind, it (...)
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  13.  55
    The Curious Case of the Disappearance of Pyrrhonism from Continental Philosophy.Robb Dunphy - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-27.
    In this article, evidence is briefly presented for three facts that together point to something puzzling. (1) That major continental philosophers of the nineteenth century tended to engage in some detail, as part of a broader preoccupation with ancient Greek thought, with Pyrrhonian scepticism. (2) That major continental philosophers of the twentieth century tended to engage in some depth with their nineteenth-century forebears and maintained their tendency to engage significantly with ancient Greek thought. (3) That twentieth-century continental philosophers demonstrate little (...)
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  14. Navigating Skepticism: Cognitive Insights and Bayesian Rationality in Pinillos’ Why We Doubt.Chad Gonnerman & John Philip Waterman - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-20.
    Pinillos’ Why We Doubt presents a powerful critique of such global skeptical assertions as “I don’t know I am not a brain-in-a-vat (biv)” by introducing a cognitive mechanism that is sensitive to error possibilities and a Bayesian rule of rationality that this mechanism is designed to approximate. This multifaceted argument offers a novel counter to global skepticism, contending that our basis for believing such premises is underminable. In this work, we engage with Pinillos’ adoption of Bayesianism, questioning whether the Bayesian (...)
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  15.  18
    Suspension of Judgment as a Doxastic Default.Mark Satta - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-25.
    In Outlines of Skeptical-Dogmatism, Mark Walker argues for Skeptical-Dogmatism about philosophical views—i.e., he argues that we should disbelieve most philosophical views. Walker argues for Skeptical-Dogmatism over both Dogmatism and Skepticism. In response, I defend Skepticism—i.e., the view that we should neither believe nor disbelieve most philosophical views. I argue that Walker’s arguments overlook some of the most plausible forms of philosophical Skepticism where the Skeptic suspends judgment about most disputed philosophical views without assigning a credence of 0.5 to those views. (...)
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  16.  11
    Remarks on Ángel Pinillos’ Treatment of Global Skepticism in Why We Doubt.Mark Walker - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-15.
    Ángel Pinillos’ Why We Doubt offers an error theory for at least some versions of global skepticism: skeptical doubts are based on a faulty heuristic. Once this heuristic is replaced by a more apt principle inspired by Bayesian approaches to epistemology, the skeptical doubts are shown not to be motivated. I argue contra Pinillos that skeptical doubts may remain even if we grant the main line of Pinillos’ argument. Skeptical doubts might be generated by disagreement even when we accept Pinillos’ (...)
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