In contrast to the widespread assumption that the state has the monopoly on violence and on the legal use of force, this essay draws attention to forms of violence which cannot be sublated in any political form of life that lays claim to the legitimate use of violence and force. The author asserts that any way of legitimization of violence is suspect of concealing reverse sides of new forms of violence that possibly escape political attention. This insight refers back to (...) the “political paradox” as it was described in Paul Ricoeur’s political philosophy. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that the legal protection of children must be recognised as a priority. The moral rights of children are fundamental rights with different degrees of generality. They not only reflect the fact that children merit justice, but are also indispensable for the promotion of justice in society in general, thus allowing other rights, including those of adults, to be safeguarded appropriately. The rule of law and its role in reducing violence go hand in (...) hand with protecting children from harm. A childhood that is free of violence is an essential prerequisite of a just society. (shrink)

A number of attempts have been made to conceptualise legal reasoning along falsificationist lines. This paper criticises a recent one by Bernhard Schlink. After familiarising the reader with falsificationism, I argue that falsificationism is premised on an epistemological asymmetry between singular observation statements and universal hypotheses, and that absent such an asymmetry in the context of statutory interpretation, framing jurisprudence in falsificationist terms is unwarranted and misleading. To get off the ground, legal falsificationism would need to combine with some kind (...) of broadly intuitionist moral cognitivism, but even then, it would still misrepresent what is going on in legal reasoning. The arguments in this paper apply mutatis mutandis to all falsificationist theories of legal and ethical reasoning. I point to some by Albert, Canaris and Larenz. (shrink)

Until recently, the prevailing view has been that moral duties to global aid can only be justified from the spirit of utilitarianism. Martha Nussbaum attempted to show that these duties can be developed from Stoic ethics. This essay shows that Nussbaum’s attempt has failed. What Nussbaum considers as stoic is in fact based on a religious myth.

In recent literature, material theories of criminalization, such as the Rechtsgutslehre, are often criticized as undemocratic. The article shows that this critique is based on a simplistic majority model of democracy. Using human dignity-oriented (deliberative) counter-models, in particular Ronald Dworkin’s integrity concept of democracy, the paper explains how the Rechtsgutslehre can be defended and further developed in a liberal democracy.