Gustav Radbruch’s contributions have significantly shaped our understanding of the science of criminal law. This paper analyzes the most decisive aspects of his work. In particular, his conception of the complex relationship between law, reality, and value, the consequences of his method and relativism for criminal law, his conception of the theory of crime, and the science of criminal law are discussed. Finally, the paper highlights the central aspects of the legacy that Gustav Radbruch has left to the science of (...) criminal law: the return to the value, the teleological orientation, the open system and the bridging of the gap between criminal law doctrine and criminal policy. (shrink)

In the digital sphere, users often find themselves in a situation described in Greek as idiotefsi (ιδιώτευση). They behave as “idiots” (idiotes/ιδιώτες), which in Greek means a private person. In this new structure of participation, the paper focuses on remoteness, on communication in the physical absence of the communicating parties, to make the point that the remote mode challenges the traditional understanding of an assembly, whether an Agora or a Parliament or even a party session, and at the same time (...) it challenges the constitutive myth of democracy. To illustrate this point, the paper uses Hannah Arendt’s approach of the public realm and action, i. e. a theory of civic participation with a strong deliberative ideal, relying on “visibility” and “appearance”. (shrink)

Fleeing is an act to which we have attributed different kinds of moral evaluations. It has been associated with virtues such as prudence. At the same time, it has often been seen as a sign of cowardice and irresponsibility. Law in our age sometimes restricts our freedom to flee from danger, even against an individual’s will, as we have all witnessed in the recent war in Ukraine. Here lies the dilemma of the right to flee. Every individual has an interest (...) in fleeing from danger to life and physical security. If so, then no one ought to be prevented from fleeing from danger. However, there are individuals who are unable to flee by themselves. Since life and physical security are equally valuable for all, including these vulnerable individuals, the government also has a positive duty of protecting all from the cause of danger. This could mean that the government needs to coerce its able-bodied citizens to sacrifice their lives and limbs to eliminate the cause of danger for the protection of their vulnerable compatriots. If so, then the right to flee would be a right only for the vulnerable. In this paper, I challenge a citizen’s duty to fight for his or her nation and defend the position that everyone (including able-bodied citizens) has the right to flee from danger. First, I clarify the ground and scope of the right to flee, which I defend here. Second, I examine possible arguments for the government’s restriction of the right to flee and coercion of its citizens to fight for their nation, which are based on two of the most promising contentions for political obligation (i. e., a natural duty of justice and fairness). Third, after showing the failure of these, I elaborate further on who ought to discharge what kind of responsibilities to enforce the protection of the right to flee for all in our international society. Finally, I respond to two possible objections to my position. (shrink)

The modern time regime was constituted by the common belief in an open future promising progress and growth. Modern law has been adapted to these temporalities and founded on similar paradigms. Positivist law is strictly separated from nature, subject to permanent change and legitimated solely by human will and ratio. Since the 1970s the modern time regime has been out of joint. Due to multiple crises societies now tend to expect a limited future, some even fear apocalyptic scenarios. This change (...) in future expectations has triggered cultural turns having an impact on the law. The Anthropocene demands law to be re-orientated to natural events. Digitalization raises legal debates about how to make future predictions and about the extent to which data about the past may be stored and when it should be forgotten. Since the future seems to hold no promise of improvement anymore, societies turn back to their past. The law is supposed to solve the arising conflicts over past injustice. This article aims to investigate these changes in legal paradigms and to elaborate on the role that the law could play in repairing the modern time regime. (shrink)

This article explores the issue of the elimination of state leaders, in particular in the context of armed conflict, with reference to the work of international lawyer Emer de Vattel (1714-1767). The article highlights the value of the Vattelian concepts of proportionality, necessity and state survival as tools for assessing targeted attacks on heads of state and government. It points out that the elimination of state leaders may produce unintended and indeterminate consequences, thereby increasing the complexity of proportionality and necessity (...) calculations. The impact of the targeting may be less unpredictable if the targeting entity carries out a fullfledged regime change, yet this practice is legally controversial on its own. (shrink)

The article considers the role of truth and objectivity in democracy. Democratic decisions usually take account of empirical truths and can be regarded as objectively correct according to various metaethical accounts such as moral realism, conventionalism, and majoritarianism. Epistemic theories of democracy aim to demonstrate the high reliability of democratic decisions. One of its main arguments rests on the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which can be applied if decision makers, e. g. members of parliaments, vote to some extent sincerely, independently, and (...) competently. However, under the assumption of moral realism, it is doubtful that they are sufficiently competent to track moral facts, since democratic legislatures make widely differing decisions. But even under the assumption of conventionalism or majoritarianism, we cannot expect decision makers to vote both competently and sincerely, because they often have differing motivations for voting the way they do. This casts doubts on the assumption that democracy is highly likely to reach objectively correct decisions. (shrink)