There are many different ways of dealing with the conditions of justice. In this paper I raise some basic questions about the foundations of justice, including whatare its central requirements and, especially, what it is about justice that underlies or explains its mandatoriness: why it is that justice is regarded as so morally necessary that any violation of it calls for the most severe condemnation and correction.

There are many different ways of dealing with the conditions of justice. In this paper I raise some basic questions about the foundations of justice, including whatare its central requirements and, especially, what it is about justice that underlies or explains its mandatoriness: why it is that justice is regarded as so morally necessary that any violation of it calls for the most severe condemnation and correction.

We citizens of the affluent countries tend to discuss our obligations toward the distant needy mainly in terms of donations and transfers, assistance and redistribution: How much of our wealth, if any, should we give away to the hungry abroad? Using one prominent theorist to exemplify this way of conceiving the problem, I show how it is a serious error — and a very costly one for the global poor.

Many scholars have argued that history embodies a different form of explanation than natural science. This paper provides an analysis of narrative conceived as the form of explanation appropriate to history. In narratives, actions, beliefs, and pro-attitudes are joined to one another by means of conditional and volitional connections. Conditional connections exist when beliefs and pro-attitudes pick up themes contained in one another, where the nature of such themes can be analysed by reference to the non-necessary and non-arbitrary nature of (...) conditionality. Volitional connections exist when agents command themselves to do something, having decided to do it because of a pro-attitude they hold. The paper uses examples to indicate how conditional and volitional connections can explain large-scale change as well as individual actions. (shrink)

This paper interrogates Hölderlin's effort to deconstruct the speculative matrix of tragedy, with a particular focus on his "Remarks on Antigone," which are appended to his translation of the Sophoclean tragedy. In focus are, firstly, the separative force of the caesura, which stems tragic transport and is here analyzed, in terms of Hölderlin's understanding of Greece in relation to "Hesperia," as an incipiently Hesperian poetic gesture. Secondly, Hölderlin's key thought of the mutual "unfaithfulness" of God and man is at issue: (...) the god here is revealed as sheer time, while man is thrown back upon the bare moment. This "unfaithfulness" must be tempered by a striving that turns back from the quest for transcendence to the measures of fmitude and to this world. By attentiveness to the singular (which is not the particular), the tragic poet, unlike the speculative philosopher, reveals time's agonal spacing. (shrink)

In order for the philosophy of history to be a really necessary methodological science in relation to theoretical and epistemological problems of history, it is quite necessary to get away from the practice of general discourse and from attempts to find universal solutions suitable for all times. On the contrary, it is desirable to focus on a search for principles and for methods of applying them to the problems of different levels, which, by no means predetermining the results of concrete (...) research, would play the role of (a) a convenient and capacious form of concentration of materials; (b) an effective tool of cognition; and (c) a "compass" preserving a scientists efforts in search of a true solution. For this it is necessary while building up theories, first, to try to combine distinct partially true approaches; secondly, to define clearly the boundaries of applicability of arguments; and thirdly, to formulate laws not in the form of absolute conclusions but according to the rules admitted in other sciences. The possibility of realizing these goals is illustrated by the example of the present theme, "on the role of personality in history," wherein the author introduces the notion of a "factor of a situation," which makes it possible to unify various points correlating personality roles and diverse states of society, and gives the typology of "roles," personalities, etc. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore a set of moral questions about the portrayal of evil characters in fiction: might the portrayal of evil in fiction ever be morally wrong? If so, under what circumstances and for what reasons? What kinds of portrayals are morally wrong and what kinds are not? I argue that whether or not imagining evil is morally wrong depends on the formal and structural properties of the work.

Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics belongs to the phenomenological tradition. What is striking then is that one of the central themes in phenomenology, the nature of time consciousness, receives no sustained treatment in Gadamer's writings. It's fair to say that Gadamer is the only major figure in phenomenology not to address the issue of time at length. In this paper I argue that Gadamer does have an account of time consciousness and it can be found most fully articulated in his account of (...) the aesthetic experience connected to festivals. Festivals, as models of epochal experiences, are the primordial experiences of time upon which other forms of time consciousness are constituted. Significantly, then, the reproduction of the meaning of tradition plays a role in the heart of Gadamer's theory of time and therefore his theory of experience. (shrink)

Many scholars have argued that history embodies a different form of explanation than natural science. This paper provides an analysis of narrative conceived as the form of explanation appropriate to history. In narratives, actions, beliefs, and pro-attitudes are joined to one another by means of conditional and volitional connections. Conditional connections exist when beliefs and pro-attitudes pick up themes contained in one another, where the nature of such themes can be analysed by reference to the non-necessary and non-arbitrary nature of (...) conditionality. Volitional connections exist when agents command themselves to do something, having decided to do it because of a pro-attitude they hold. The paper uses examples to indicate how conditional and volitional connections can explain large-scale change as well as individual actions. (shrink)

Tracing the historical and theoretical distinctions between labor and work from the early Greeks to the present, Hannah Arendt presents a compelling analysis of the nature of our technological crisis. Western culture has been formed through a dominant understanding of human existence and instrumental thinking that have inevitably led to a crisis in the way we understand ourselves and relate to the world. Owing much to her contemporary, Martin Heidegger, Arendt sees the roots of the environmental crisis to be embedded (...) in our inheritance of thinking and building. (shrink)

Tracing the historical and theoretical distinctions between labor and work from the early Greeks to the present, Hannah Arendt presents a compelling analysis of the nature of our technological crisis. Western culture has been formed through a dominant understanding of human existence and instrumental thinking that have inevitably led to a crisis in the way we understand ourselves and relate to the world. Owing much to her contemporary, Martin Heidegger, Arendt sees the roots of the environmental crisis to be embedded (...) in our inheritance of thinking and building. (shrink)

The philosophy of technology seems to be in a stagnant condition today, partly due to the lack of communication between several traditions in the field. Whereas science and technology are considered products of society in the STS programs, the approach in Latin American countries is just the opposite: a better society is sought after through the application of science and technology in development plans. A dialogue between these two opposite traditions might prove useful in overcoming stagnation in the field.

The philosophy of technology seems to be in a stagnant condition today, partly due to the lack of communication between several traditions in the field. Whereas science and technology are considered products of society in the STS programs, the approach in Latin American countries is just the opposite: a better society is sought after through the application of science and technology in development plans. A dialogue between these two opposite traditions might prove useful in overcoming stagnation in the field.

Die oberflächengrammatische Form einer Beschreibung der inten-tio-nalen Beziehung (eines intentionalen Kontextes) suggeriert, daß wir es mit einer Relation zwischen dem Subjekt und dem Objekt zu tun haben. Angesichts der logischen Anomalien der intentionalen Kontexte (das Scheitern der Regel der Existenz- Gene-rali--sierung) postulieren jedoch viele Philosophen spezielle Entitäten, die den intentionalen Zugang zum eigentlichen Referenzobjekt vermitteln. Wir untersuchen drei Intentionalitätstheorien dieser Art: (i) eine Meinongsche Theorie; (ii) eine Brentanosche Theorie; und (iii) eine Repräsentationstheorie sensu stricto. Alle Theorien akzeptie-ren die These, daß (...) die vermittelnden Entitäten nur in der Weise repräsentieren können, indem sie eine Beschreibung des (eventuellen) Referenzobjektes involvieren. Die Unterschiede zwischen ihnen betreffen drei Fragen: (i) ob zwischen den Eigenschaften, die die vermittelnden Entitäten haben, und den-jenigen, die den (eventuellen) Referenzobjekten zukommen, das Verhältnis der Identität besteht; (ii) ob die Weise, in der die Eigenschaften „gehabt" werden, in beiden Fällen die gleiche ist; und (iii) ob die Weise, in der es die betreffenden Entitäten gibt, immer ontologisch verpflichtend ist. (shrink)

Die oberflächengrammatische Form einer Beschreibung der inten-tio-nalen Beziehung suggeriert, daß wir es mit einer Relation zwischen dem Subjekt und dem Objekt zu tun haben. Angesichts der logischen Anomalien der intentionalen Kontexte postulieren jedoch viele Philosophen spezielle Entitäten, die den intentionalen Zugang zum eigentlichen Referenzobjekt vermitteln. Wir untersuchen drei Intentionalitätstheorien dieser Art: eine Meinongsche Theorie; eine Brentanosche Theorie; und eine Repräsentationstheorie sensu stricto. Alle Theorien akzeptie-ren die These, daß die vermittelnden Entitäten nur in der Weise repräsentieren können, indem sie eine Beschreibung (...) des Referenzobjektes involvieren. Die Unterschiede zwischen ihnen betreffen drei Fragen: ob zwischen den Eigenschaften, die die vermittelnden Entitäten haben, und den-jenigen, die den Referenzobjekten zukommen, das Verhältnis der Identität besteht; ob die Weise, in der die Eigenschaften „gehabt" werden, in beiden Fällen die gleiche ist; und ob die Weise, in der es die betreffenden Entitäten gibt, immer ontologisch verpflichtend ist. (shrink)

La metaphysique-dogmatique pose des structures essentielles, des valeurs absolues qui existent "en soi et pour soi", et qui surpassent l'homme, tout en s'appuyant sur la dichotomie des valeurs. Nietzsche, au contraire, se tient dans rimmanence et pour cela il s'appuie sur le concept de Volonte de puissance. Autrement dit, i l se rattache ä des penseurs comme Heraclite d'Ephese, dans sa tentative de reintegrer l'homme dans le tout /nature iphusis) duquel i l est sorti. Et pourtant, cette realite, due au (...) fait qu'il est toujours en devenir, ne se laisse pas emprisonner dans ces cadres. Et c'est dans ce sens que la dimension esthetique apparait comme essentielle: l'existence s'affirme comme creation et seulement en tant que telle. En conclusion, la Volonte de puissance est en elle-meme artiste, pouvoir de transfiguration du reel, que Nietzsche justement designe sous le nom de dionysiaque. Ces premisses etant donnees, il ne sera pas difficile d'etablir des rapports entre les concepts nietzscheens et la production artistique actuelle dans le but de tracer une nouvelle vision et/ou une nouvelle perspective de la realite comme un tout. (shrink)

La metaphysique-dogmatique pose des structures essentielles, des valeurs absolues qui existent "en soi et pour soi", et qui surpassent l'homme, tout en s'appuyant sur la dichotomie des valeurs. Nietzsche, au contraire, se tient dans rimmanence et pour cela il s'appuie sur le concept de Volonte de puissance. Autrement dit, i l se rattache ä des penseurs comme Heraclite d'Ephese, dans sa tentative de reintegrer l'homme dans le tout /nature iphusis) duquel i l est sorti. Et pourtant, cette realite, due au (...) fait qu'il est toujours en devenir, ne se laisse pas emprisonner dans ces cadres. Et c'est dans ce sens que la dimension esthetique apparait comme essentielle: l'existence s'affirme comme creation et seulement en tant que telle. En conclusion, la Volonte de puissance est en elle-meme artiste, pouvoir de transfiguration du reel, que Nietzsche justement designe sous le nom de dionysiaque. Ces premisses etant donnees, il ne sera pas difficile d'etablir des rapports entre les concepts nietzscheens et la production artistique actuelle dans le but de tracer une nouvelle vision et/ou une nouvelle perspective de la realite comme un tout. (shrink)

This paper interrogates Hölderlin's effort to deconstruct the speculative matrix of tragedy, with a particular focus on his "Remarks on Antigone," which are appended to his translation of the Sophoclean tragedy. In focus are, firstly, the separative force of the caesura, which stems tragic transport and is here analyzed, in terms of Hölderlin's understanding of Greece in relation to "Hesperia," as an incipiently Hesperian poetic gesture. Secondly, Hölderlin's key thought of the mutual "unfaithfulness" of God and man is at issue: (...) the god here is revealed as sheer time, while man is thrown back upon the bare moment. This "unfaithfulness" must be tempered by a striving that turns back from the quest for transcendence to the measures of fmitude and to this world. By attentiveness to the singular (which is not the particular), the tragic poet, unlike the speculative philosopher, reveals time's agonal spacing. (shrink)

In order for the philosophy of history to be a really necessary methodological science in relation to theoretical and epistemological problems of history, it is quite necessary to get away from the practice of general discourse and from attempts to find universal solutions suitable for all times. On the contrary, it is desirable to focus on a search for principles and for methods of applying them to the problems of different levels, which, by no means predetermining the results of concrete (...) research, would play the role of a convenient and capacious form of concentration of materials; an effective tool of cognition; and a "compass" preserving a scientists efforts in search of a true solution. For this it is necessary while building up theories, first, to try to combine distinct partially true approaches; secondly, to define clearly the boundaries of applicability of arguments; and thirdly, to formulate laws not in the form of absolute conclusions but according to the rules admitted in other sciences. The possibility of realizing these goals is illustrated by the example of the present theme, "on the role of personality in history," wherein the author introduces the notion of a "factor of a situation," which makes it possible to unify various points correlating personality roles and diverse states of society, and gives the typology of "roles," personalities, etc. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore a set of moral questions about the portrayal of evil characters in fiction: might the portrayal of evil in fiction ever be morally wrong? If so, under what circumstances and for what reasons? What kinds of portrayals are morally wrong and what kinds are not? I argue that whether or not imagining evil is morally wrong depends on the formal and structural properties of the work.

En regardant en arriere ä l'itineraire philosophique de Ricceur, nous sommes tentes d'y saisir une logique de developpement qui semble decrire un mouvement en Spirale. C'est pourquoi dans des ouvrages les plus tardifs nous trouvons un retour de cette recherche sur la volonte - inscrite en fait dans le cadre d'une anthropologic philosophique - qui avait inspire son projet de jeunesse. Appelons-le 'mouvement en Spirale' et non : retour circulaire aux origines, car entre le debut et la fin i l (...) n'y a pas de coincidence mais enrichissement apres un long detour ä travers l'univers du langage et de la textualite. II ne s'agit pas pour autant d'imaginer une suite du genre : Philosophie de la volonte, hermeneutique, ä nouveau Philosophie de la volonte ou de Taction. Le terrain de l'hermeneutique, une fois conquis, n'est en realite jamais abandonne, dans la mesure oü i l est impossible de se passer de la mediation du langage. Le phenomene se donnant grace au pouvoir revelatif du langage nous permet de saisir les multiples aspects de l'homme agissant et souffrant. La Philosophie de Ricceur, est, plus qu'une "Philosophie du langage", une "philosophie ä travers le langage", c'est-ä-dire qu'elle traverse le phenomene du langage dans toute sa richesse sans jamais oublier qu'ä travers le langage nous parlons de quelque chose et que le langage ne doit pas devenir - si non pour une abstraction deliberee et consciente - un Systeme clos en lui-meme sans reference au monde et aux interlocuteurs du discours : cette consideration reste valable meme par rapport au dernier ouvrage oü la dialectique entre memoire et histoire est toujours liee ä la dialectique entre discours oral et discours ecrit et done au double travail de l'ecriture et de la lecture. Notre hypothese de travail est qu'on pourrait retrouver dans cette traversee du langage une sequence ä la fois historique (selon l'ordre de la decouverte) et theorique (selon un certain ordre hermeneutique) de trois paradigmes : Symbole, texte, traduction, qui nous donnent une sorte de boussole pour nous orienter au cours du long voyage. (shrink)

En regardant en arriere ä l'itineraire philosophique de Ricceur, nous sommes tentes d'y saisir une logique de developpement qui semble decrire un mouvement en Spirale. C'est pourquoi dans des ouvrages les plus tardifs nous trouvons un retour de cette recherche sur la volonte - inscrite en fait dans le cadre d'une anthropologic philosophique - qui avait inspire son projet de jeunesse. Appelons-le 'mouvement en Spirale' et non : retour circulaire aux origines, car entre le debut et la fin i l (...) n'y a pas de coincidence mais enrichissement apres un long detour ä travers l'univers du langage et de la textualite. II ne s'agit pas pour autant d'imaginer une suite du genre : Philosophie de la volonte, hermeneutique, ä nouveau Philosophie de la volonte ou de Taction. Le terrain de l'hermeneutique, une fois conquis, n'est en realite jamais abandonne, dans la mesure oü i l est impossible de se passer de la mediation du langage. Le phenomene se donnant grace au pouvoir revelatif du langage nous permet de saisir les multiples aspects de l'homme agissant et souffrant. La Philosophie de Ricceur, est, plus qu'une "Philosophie du langage", une "philosophie ä travers le langage", c'est-ä-dire qu'elle traverse le phenomene du langage dans toute sa richesse sans jamais oublier qu'ä travers le langage nous parlons de quelque chose et que le langage ne doit pas devenir - si non pour une abstraction deliberee et consciente - un Systeme clos en lui-meme sans reference au monde et aux interlocuteurs du discours : cette consideration reste valable meme par rapport au dernier ouvrage oü la dialectique entre memoire et histoire est toujours liee ä la dialectique entre discours oral et discours ecrit et done au double travail de l'ecriture et de la lecture. Notre hypothese de travail est qu'on pourrait retrouver dans cette traversee du langage une sequence ä la fois historique (selon l'ordre de la decouverte) et theorique (selon un certain ordre hermeneutique) de trois paradigmes : Symbole, texte, traduction, qui nous donnent une sorte de boussole pour nous orienter au cours du long voyage. (shrink)

In meinem Aufsatz möchte ich die Ästhetik auf ihre Möglichkeit hin überprüfen, eine grundlegende Theorie des „Sinnlichen" innerhalb der menschlichen kulturellen Tätigkeiten zu sein. Dieses Vorhaben werde ich damit beginnen, Heideggers Kritik an der traditionellen Ästhetik zu behandeln. Dem überlieferten Ästhetikverständnis liegt nach Heidegger offenbar diesselbe vorstellend-vergegenständlichende Denkweise zugrunde, die der ganzen abendländischen Geschichte eigen ist. Doch lässt sich nach Heidegger mittels der auf dem metaphysischen Denken basierenden Ästhetik das Wesen der Kunst niemals erschöpfend behandeln, da die Kunst als das (...) Ins-Werk- Setzen der Wahrheit verstanden werden muss.Freilich nimmt Heidegger immer eine kritische Haltung gegenüber der sogenannte „Ästhetik" ein, aber man kann dadurch auch die Möglichkeit einer anderen erweiterten Ästhetik finden, die die anfängliche Wahrheitsfunktion der aisthesis als Wahr-nehmung ins Auge zu fassen versucht. Von diesem grundlegenden Standpunkt aus möchte ich mich mit einem gegenwärtigen Versuch des ästhetischen Denkens (Wolfgang Welsch) und mit einer nicht-europäischen traditionellen Ästhetik (Shüzö Kuki) beschäftigen. (shrink)

In meinem Aufsatz möchte ich die Ästhetik auf ihre Möglichkeit hin überprüfen, eine grundlegende Theorie des „Sinnlichen" innerhalb der menschlichen kulturellen Tätigkeiten zu sein. Dieses Vorhaben werde ich damit beginnen, Heideggers Kritik an der traditionellen Ästhetik zu behandeln. Dem überlieferten Ästhetikverständnis liegt nach Heidegger offenbar diesselbe vorstellend-vergegenständlichende Denkweise zugrunde, die der ganzen abendländischen Geschichte eigen ist. Doch lässt sich nach Heidegger mittels der auf dem metaphysischen Denken basierenden Ästhetik das Wesen der Kunst niemals erschöpfend behandeln, da die Kunst als das (...) Ins-Werk- Setzen der Wahrheit verstanden werden muss.Freilich nimmt Heidegger immer eine kritische Haltung gegenüber der sogenannte „Ästhetik" ein, aber man kann dadurch auch die Möglichkeit einer anderen erweiterten Ästhetik finden, die die anfängliche Wahrheitsfunktion der aisthesis als Wahr-nehmung ins Auge zu fassen versucht. Von diesem grundlegenden Standpunkt aus möchte ich mich mit einem gegenwärtigen Versuch des ästhetischen Denkens (Wolfgang Welsch) und mit einer nicht-europäischen traditionellen Ästhetik (Shüzö Kuki) beschäftigen. (shrink)

The underlying premise of this essay is that the essential contribution of the hermeneutic turn in contemporary philosophy is the acknowledgment of a historical criterion of thinking, whereby the philosophical tradition is claimed by the question of its own truth. Philosophy, historically established by founding experience in truth, thus finds itself facing the open experience of truth, i.e. the truth as the coming about of the openness. Philosophical hermeneutics, as differing from hermeneutic philosophy, cannot limit itself solely to interpretative criticism. (...) Rather, it must follow the opening of truth primarily happening in transit from thinking to language. And the moment of this transit is the question of ourselves. (shrink)

The underlying premise of this essay is that the essential contribution of the hermeneutic turn in contemporary philosophy is the acknowledgment of a historical criterion of thinking, whereby the philosophical tradition is claimed by the question of its own truth. Philosophy, historically established by founding experience in truth, thus finds itself facing the open experience of truth, i.e. the truth as the coming about of the openness. Philosophical hermeneutics, as differing from hermeneutic philosophy, cannot limit itself solely to interpretative criticism. (...) Rather, it must follow the opening of truth primarily happening in transit from thinking to language. And the moment of this transit is the question of ourselves. (shrink)

This paper offers an analysis of central features of modern world history which suggest a confirmation, and extension, of something resembling Fukuyama's Kojeve-Hegel *end of history' thesis. As is well known, Kojeve interpreted Hegel as having argued that in a meaningful sense history, as struggle and endeavour to achieve workable stasis in the mutual relations of selves and state-society collectivities, literally came to an end with Napoleon's 1806 victory at the battle of Jena. That victory led to the establishment or (...) consolidation of a European system which significantly embodied the conceptually ideal roles and mutual relations of individual, state, law, and culture (including religious culture), in the aggregated states ruled or presided over by Napoleon. For Hegel the universal structures which constitute the progression of the Absolute are importantly independent of the actual concrete historical individuals and doings which embody and implement them. Once realized upon the earth, the idea of a civil society living, under law, with a sustainable religious and national normative ideology is inexpungible. Even if it has for a time dimmed, it will resurface and re-present itself, and, for Kojeve, has done so, in the gradual articulation of European union and the formations of the League of Nations and its successor the United Nations, in the world that is still our present world. It is much of this model that Fukuyama adopted, and conceived, more explicitly than perhaps either Hegel or Kojeve had done, as a realized triangulation of democracy, liberal individual rights ideology, and capitalism. The realization came to the fore, in Fukuyama's view, in the matrix of the events set in motion by the fall of communism in the European world in 1989. Contrary to Fukayama, of course, there has been rather a lot of 'history' very dramatically in the years in and since 1989, and of course especially explosively in 2001. This recent history notwithstanding, the end of history thesis seems plausible and defensible. Four large geopolitical struggles may be identified, as constituting sequential clusters of argument aimed at determining the human telos, or end-state. They constitute also a sequence of reductios of blueprints that are rivals to the liberalism-democracy-capitalism complex. The four are World War I and the geopolitical struggles between Liberal modernism and fascism, communism, and Islamism. Analyses of these four struggles are offered and defended. (shrink)

This paper offers an analysis of central features of modern world history which suggest a confirmation, and extension, of something resembling Fukuyama's Kojeve-Hegel *end of history' thesis. As is well known, Kojeve interpreted Hegel as having argued that in a meaningful sense history, as struggle and endeavour to achieve workable stasis in the mutual relations of selves and state-society collectivities, literally came to an end with Napoleon's 1806 victory at the battle of Jena. That victory led to the establishment or (...) consolidation of a European system which significantly embodied the conceptually ideal roles and mutual relations of individual, state, law, and culture, in the aggregated states ruled or presided over by Napoleon. For Hegel the universal structures which constitute the progression of the Absolute are importantly independent of the actual concrete historical individuals and doings which embody and implement them. Once realized upon the earth, the idea of a civil society living, under law, with a sustainable religious and national normative ideology is inexpungible. Even if it has for a time dimmed, it will resurface and re-present itself, and, for Kojeve, has done so, in the gradual articulation of European union and the formations of the League of Nations and its successor the United Nations, in the world that is still our present world. It is much of this model that Fukuyama adopted, and conceived, more explicitly than perhaps either Hegel or Kojeve had done, as a realized triangulation of democracy, liberal individual rights ideology, and capitalism. The realization came to the fore, in Fukuyama's view, in the matrix of the events set in motion by the fall of communism in the European world in 1989. Contrary to Fukayama, of course, there has been rather a lot of 'history' very dramatically in the years in and since 1989, and of course especially explosively in 2001. This recent history notwithstanding, the end of history thesis seems plausible and defensible. Four large geopolitical struggles may be identified, as constituting sequential clusters of argument aimed at determining the human telos, or end-state. They constitute also a sequence of reductios of blueprints that are rivals to the liberalism-democracy-capitalism complex. The four are World War I and the geopolitical struggles between Liberal modernism and fascism, communism, and Islamism. Analyses of these four struggles are offered and defended. (shrink)

In Book IV of the Metaphysics Aristotle argues that first philosophy investigates not only being qua being but also the axioms or principles of demonstration. In the same place he establishes which principles are first. The first among these is the principle of contradiction. The thesis I defend in my communication is that the principle of contradiction in Aristotle is not merely formal in the style of modern symbolic logic, but is the constituent law of all discourse. As such, the (...) most precise sense in which it is a 'first principle' is that of a condition of the possibility of significance: terms and judgments have significance if they comply with the condition; if they violate it they signify nothing and are vacuous. If my interpretation is correct, various consequences will be derivable from a first principle, of which the most important is its link with essence and substance. (shrink)

In Book IV of the Metaphysics Aristotle argues that first philosophy investigates not only being qua being but also the axioms or principles of demonstration. In the same place he establishes which principles are first. The first among these is the principle of contradiction. The thesis I defend in my communication is that the principle of contradiction in Aristotle is not merely formal in the style of modern symbolic logic, but is the constituent law of all discourse. As such, the (...) most precise sense in which it is a 'first principle' is that of a condition of the possibility of significance: terms and judgments have significance if they comply with the condition; if they violate it they signify nothing and are vacuous. If my interpretation is correct, various consequences will be derivable from a first principle, of which the most important is its link with essence and substance. (shrink)

Many scientific realists think that the best reasons for scientific theories are abductive, i.e., must appeal to what is also called inference to the best explanation (IBE), while some anti-realists have argued that the use of abduction in defending realism is question-begging, circular, or incoherent. This paper studies the idea that abductive inference can be reformulated by taking its conclusion to concern the truthlikeness of a hypothetical theory on the basis of its success in explanation and prediction. The strength of (...) such arguments is measured by the estimated verisimilitude of its conclusion given the premises. It is argued that this formulation helps to make precise and justifies the "ultimate argument for scientific realism": the empirical success of scientific theories would be a miracle unless they are truthlike. (shrink)

Many scientific realists think that the best reasons for scientific theories are abductive, i.e., must appeal to what is also called inference to the best explanation, while some anti-realists have argued that the use of abduction in defending realism is question-begging, circular, or incoherent. This paper studies the idea that abductive inference can be reformulated by taking its conclusion to concern the truthlikeness of a hypothetical theory on the basis of its success in explanation and prediction. The strength of such (...) arguments is measured by the estimated verisimilitude of its conclusion given the premises. It is argued that this formulation helps to make precise and justifies the "ultimate argument for scientific realism": the empirical success of scientific theories would be a miracle unless they are truthlike. (shrink)

This paper argues that human motility is essentially bound up in a pre-reflective being-in-the-world, and that contemporary science seems to bear out some of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological explorations in this area.

This paper argues that human motility is essentially bound up in a pre-reflective being-in-the-world, and that contemporary science seems to bear out some of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological explorations in this area.

In Soi-meme comme autre Ricoeur defines personal identity as singularity, this being the manner in which each individual structures a deposit of common experiences and ways of being-in-the-world in a space-time, and as such as a personalized manner of responding to the challenges of circumstances. For what is common and shared, the other is an alter ego. Identity is a holon that can't be divided into atoms, as the puzzle cases and Musil's L'Homme sans qualites seek to do. Ricoeur divides (...) identity into sameness and ipseity. Sameness designates a cumulative center of experiences; ipseity designates the other of oneself, i.e. the historical and changing quality of sameness. With the theories of Bremont and Greimas, Ricoeuer finds in literary narration the best examples of the dialectic between sameness and ipseity. In adddition he considers, with Mclntyre, that it is the best medium for formulating ethical judgments on the basis of discrete experiences. (shrink)

In Soi-meme comme autre Ricoeur defines personal identity as singularity, this being the manner in which each individual structures a deposit of common experiences and ways of being-in-the-world in a space-time, and as such as a personalized manner of responding to the challenges of circumstances. For what is common and shared, the other is an alter ego. Identity is a holon that can't be divided into atoms, as the puzzle cases and Musil's L'Homme sans qualites seek to do. Ricoeur divides (...) identity into sameness and ipseity. Sameness designates a cumulative center of experiences; ipseity designates the other of oneself, i.e. the historical and changing quality of sameness. With the theories of Bremont and Greimas, Ricoeuer finds in literary narration the best examples of the dialectic between sameness and ipseity. In adddition he considers, with Mclntyre, that it is the best medium for formulating ethical judgments on the basis of discrete experiences. (shrink)

Many philosophers (such as, for instance, Nancy Cartwright, Brian Ellis, and Hartry Field) regard scientific practice as the final arbiter in ontology. In this short paper, I argue that the very philosophers who profess to derive their ontological commitments from scientific practice impose certain views on the theories established by that practice that the practice itself does not support. This is not consistent with their view that science tells us what there is.

Many philosophers regard scientific practice as the final arbiter in ontology. In this short paper, I argue that the very philosophers who profess to derive their ontological commitments from scientific practice impose certain views on the theories established by that practice that the practice itself does not support. This is not consistent with their view that science tells us what there is.

The paper argues for the relevance of phenomenology for the contemporary debate about a naturalistic explanation of phenomenal c o n s c i o u s n e s s . Phenomenology's analysis of intentionality in terms of the conscious act, its representational content and the intentional object sustains an interpretation of qualia as intrinsic, nonrepresentational properties of the conscious mental acts themselves and not of their content. On the basis of this anti-representationalist clarification of the nature of qualia, (...) the paper substantiates the claim for a more comprehensive naturalistic explanation of embodiment. A phenomenological, i.e. noetico-noematical, analysis of bodily experience helps to integrate the role of the lived body in accepted psycho-physical explanations of conscious embodiment (for instance of proprioception). Furthermore and more importantly, noetical phenomenology identifies a proper bodily self-awareness, consisting of sensations localized on the lived body, as the quale of conscious embodiment. It is maintained that naturalizing embodiment demands a radical explanation of the conditions of possibility of this bodily self-awareness. (shrink)

The paper argues for the relevance of phenomenology for the contemporary debate about a naturalistic explanation of phenomenal c o n s c i o u s n e s s. Phenomenology's analysis of intentionality in terms of the conscious act, its representational content and the intentional object sustains an interpretation of qualia as intrinsic, nonrepresentational properties of the conscious mental acts themselves and not of their content. On the basis of this anti-representationalist clarification of the nature of qualia, the (...) paper substantiates the claim for a more comprehensive naturalistic explanation of embodiment. A phenomenological, i.e. noetico-noematical, analysis of bodily experience helps to integrate the role of the lived body in accepted psycho-physical explanations of conscious embodiment. Furthermore and more importantly, noetical phenomenology identifies a proper bodily self-awareness, consisting of sensations localized on the lived body, as the quale of conscious embodiment. It is maintained that naturalizing embodiment demands a radical explanation of the conditions of possibility of this bodily self-awareness. (shrink)

This essay deals with a particularly recalcitrant problem in the history of ideas, that of irrationalism. It emerged to full consciousness in mid-eighteenth century thought. Irrationalism was a logical consequence of individualism which in turn was a direct outcome of the Cartesian self-reflective subject. In time these tendencies produced the "critical" Zeitgeist and the "epoch of taste" during which Kant began thinking about such matters. Like Alfred Bäumler, I argue that irrationalism could not have arisen in ancient or medieval philosophical (...) discourse, as they both lacked a certain type of rationalism required as its conceptual antipode. Only after the Lisbon earthquake (1755), and the ensuing reason vs. passion debate acknowledging for the first time both human powers as equal contenders, did the specter of irrationalism arise and become a focus. Kant's revolution in thought produced "transcendental psychology" reconciling "pure" sensibility and "pure" reason and provided, I argue, the conceptual wherewithal to grant aesthetic feeling and irrationalism a philosophical niche. (shrink)

This essay deals with a particularly recalcitrant problem in the history of ideas, that of irrationalism. It emerged to full consciousness in mid-eighteenth century thought. Irrationalism was a logical consequence of individualism which in turn was a direct outcome of the Cartesian self-reflective subject. In time these tendencies produced the "critical" Zeitgeist and the "epoch of taste" during which Kant began thinking about such matters. Like Alfred Bäumler, I argue that irrationalism could not have arisen in ancient or medieval philosophical (...) discourse, as they both lacked a certain type of rationalism required as its conceptual antipode. Only after the Lisbon earthquake (1755), and the ensuing reason vs. passion debate acknowledging for the first time both human powers as equal contenders, did the specter of irrationalism arise and become a focus. Kant's revolution in thought produced "transcendental psychology" reconciling "pure" sensibility and "pure" reason and provided, I argue, the conceptual wherewithal to grant aesthetic feeling and irrationalism a philosophical niche. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to point out the logical priority of the existential grounds of picturing reality by means of scientific representations, hypotheses as such. Also, to clarify the meaning of the inscribing and reading of the picture in terms of the existential conditions and facts of the human being who acts and reacts for survival, and who interprets its surroundings in connection with the train of consequences that connects up with this human action. The surrounding world thus (...) is recognized and interpreted in terms of playing and operating with signs, the significations of which make up the horizons of the world of the human being. This clarification is needed to throw light on how concepts mean in the application of words in language. And the clarity reached at this stage helps for us to clarify further the meaning of thinking and its relation to language-use in terms of playing and operating with signs in the conditions of the surrounding world, the action of the human body in its existential situation. Hence, the logical priority of the human condition in terms of the use and application of signs in the existential world of human being differs from the analytical representations of the world in science for scientific purposes. Which means that the representations of science are tools of the language, and that they are to be treated and interpreted as signs used to represent reality only in the scientific contexts, for the purposes of the language of science and scientific culture. Without such clarity, representations of science, scientific descriptions of reality are open to misinterpretation even by scientists and philosophers, let alone layman, to be so generalized to extend the bounds of its meaningful application in the scientific context of explaining or describing phenomena experimented, or observed under certain experimental conditions. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to point out the logical priority of the existential grounds of picturing reality by means of scientific representations, hypotheses as such. Also, to clarify the meaning of the inscribing and reading of the picture in terms of the existential conditions and facts of the human being who acts and reacts for survival, and who interprets its surroundings in connection with the train of consequences that connects up with this human action. The surrounding world thus (...) is recognized and interpreted in terms of playing and operating with signs, the significations of which make up the horizons of the world of the human being. This clarification is needed to throw light on how concepts mean in the application of words in language. And the clarity reached at this stage helps for us to clarify further the meaning of thinking and its relation to language-use in terms of playing and operating with signs in the conditions of the surrounding world, the action of the human body in its existential situation. Hence, the logical priority of the human condition in terms of the use and application of signs in the existential world of human being differs from the analytical representations of the world in science for scientific purposes. Which means that the representations of science are tools of the language, and that they are to be treated and interpreted as signs used to represent reality only in the scientific contexts, for the purposes of the language of science and scientific culture. Without such clarity, representations of science, scientific descriptions of reality are open to misinterpretation even by scientists and philosophers, let alone layman, to be so generalized to extend the bounds of its meaningful application in the scientific context of explaining or describing phenomena experimented, or observed under certain experimental conditions. (shrink)

Traces are generally considered to constitute an ontologically distinct class of objects that can be distinguished from other objects. However, it can be observed on close inspection that the principles to demarcate traces from other objects are quite general, imprecise and intuitively unclear, except perhaps the entropic account envisaging traces as low entropy states. This view was developed by Hans Reichenbach, Adolf Grünbaum, and J. J. C. Smart on the basis of Reichenbach's theory of branch systems that are subsystems of (...) wider systems. According to this theory, traces form within subsystems as low entropy states as a result of interaction with wider systems. It is also claimed that entropy is the measure of disorder, and that traces are ordered states. I argue that the concepts of entropy and disorder are used beyond their legitimate limits of application, for there are clear-cut counter-examples in the literature. I also analyze the concept of trace together with some examples from classical mechanics and geology in order to show that traces are determined relative to a particular context in which they are so defined. (shrink)

Traces are generally considered to constitute an ontologically distinct class of objects that can be distinguished from other objects. However, it can be observed on close inspection that the principles to demarcate traces from other objects are quite general, imprecise and intuitively unclear, except perhaps the entropic account envisaging traces as low entropy states. This view was developed by Hans Reichenbach, Adolf Grünbaum, and J. J. C. Smart on the basis of Reichenbach's theory of branch systems that are subsystems of (...) wider systems. According to this theory, traces form within subsystems as low entropy states as a result of interaction with wider systems. It is also claimed that entropy is the measure of disorder, and that traces are ordered states. I argue that the concepts of entropy and disorder are used beyond their legitimate limits of application, for there are clear-cut counter-examples in the literature. I also analyze the concept of trace together with some examples from classical mechanics and geology in order to show that traces are determined relative to a particular context in which they are so defined. (shrink)

Hegel's philosophy of literature, in the Aesthetics and other texts, gives no extended discussion of the novel. Hegel's predecessor Friedrich Schlegel had produced a philosophy of literature with a central position for the novel. Schlegel's discussion of the novel is based on a view of Irony which allows the novel to be the fusion of poetry and philosophy. Hegel retained a place for art, including poetry, below that of philosophy. The Ironic conception of the novel has themes, which also appear (...) in Hegel, of the unity of opposites. However, for Hegel Irony does not allow the unity of artistic form and does not allow art to be guided by law and science. Therefore Hegel's philosophy of literature owes much to Schlegel but needs to attack Irony and minimise the role of the novel. Irony is criticised as a purely negative position of a 'beautiful soul', which cannot act and in its absolutely subjective resistance to evil in the world becomes evil itself. Hegel gives great importance to Epic which foreshadows the emergence of philosophy in its unity, but it is a unity based on conflicting individuality and lawlessness. In the modern world Heroic lawlessness can only be approached as nostalgia, the novel cannot integrate individuality and law, only religion and philosophy above aesthetics, including the novel. (shrink)

Hegel's philosophy of literature, in the Aesthetics and other texts, gives no extended discussion of the novel. Hegel's predecessor Friedrich Schlegel had produced a philosophy of literature with a central position for the novel. Schlegel's discussion of the novel is based on a view of Irony which allows the novel to be the fusion of poetry and philosophy. Hegel retained a place for art, including poetry, below that of philosophy. The Ironic conception of the novel has themes, which also appear (...) in Hegel, of the unity of opposites. However, for Hegel Irony does not allow the unity of artistic form and does not allow art to be guided by law and science. Therefore Hegel's philosophy of literature owes much to Schlegel but needs to attack Irony and minimise the role of the novel. Irony is criticised as a purely negative position of a 'beautiful soul', which cannot act and in its absolutely subjective resistance to evil in the world becomes evil itself. Hegel gives great importance to Epic which foreshadows the emergence of philosophy in its unity, but it is a unity based on conflicting individuality and lawlessness. In the modern world Heroic lawlessness can only be approached as nostalgia, the novel cannot integrate individuality and law, only religion and philosophy above aesthetics, including the novel. (shrink)

In the Critique of Judgement Kant develops a theory of taste, according to which taste is the ability to make judgements concerning beauty, beauty in nature and in art. These judgements are based on a particular reflective activity, an activity in which the understanding is driven into a never-ending play with the imagination.In my paper I will try to show the actuality of Kant's aesthetic theory as a general theory of aesthetic experience, not only in connection with art, but as (...) a particular kind of experience possible in other areas as well. Aesthetic experience is, as I read Kant, a peculiar kind of setting free, of detaching the connection between our experience and objective reality, a connection presupposed in every non-aesthetic discourse. This disconnection from the empirical world, which is essential in aesthetic reflection, I will call an aesthetic emancipatedness.To experience something aesthetically means to set it free, to embody it in the aesthetic emancipatedness, to set it free from the boundaries of normality and make it something extraordinary; a deviation. But a deviation would only exist in contrast to that which it deviates from. Emancipatedness can only exist in contrast to a not yet emancipated condition. This explains why the aesthetic experience also affects the moral and the cognitive aspects of reality. (shrink)

In the Critique of Judgement Kant develops a theory of taste, according to which taste is the ability to make judgements concerning beauty, beauty in nature and in art. These judgements are based on a particular reflective activity, an activity in which the understanding is driven into a never-ending play with the imagination.In my paper I will try to show the actuality of Kant's aesthetic theory as a general theory of aesthetic experience, not only in connection with art, but as (...) a particular kind of experience possible in other areas as well. Aesthetic experience is, as I read Kant, a peculiar kind of setting free, of detaching the connection between our experience and objective reality, a connection presupposed in every non-aesthetic discourse. This disconnection from the empirical world, which is essential in aesthetic reflection, I will call an aesthetic emancipatedness.To experience something aesthetically means to set it free, to embody it in the aesthetic emancipatedness, to set it free from the boundaries of normality and make it something extraordinary; a deviation. But a deviation would only exist in contrast to that which it deviates from. Emancipatedness can only exist in contrast to a not yet emancipated condition. This explains why the aesthetic experience also affects the moral and the cognitive aspects of reality. (shrink)

How do metaphors and symbols embedded in sacred texts and narratives refigure meaning in the worlds of texts and readers? This is one of the problems that drives Paul Ricoeur's hermeneutic theory, where symbolic language moves beyond the constraints of denotation to enable us to interpret human experience in a plurivocal, rather than univocal ways. In my essay I examine Ricoeur's adherence to a disclosive theory of language, borrowed from Heidegger, and argue that it does not provide an adequate theory (...) of linguistic reference. Ricoeur does not give a structural explanation for how it is that the new meaning provided by metaphors actually impacts upon the cognitive dimensions of the interpretive process. I argue that Hegel's analysis of language is stronger in that it includes a discussion of the perceptual and cognitive stages of understanding, which include moments of hermeneutic "reversal"; here we see how it is that language simultaneously refers to and mediates experience. This might become the basis for developing a stronger explanatory model of the refiguring process which Ricoeur describes. (shrink)

How do metaphors and symbols embedded in sacred texts and narratives refigure meaning in the worlds of texts and readers? This is one of the problems that drives Paul Ricoeur's hermeneutic theory, where symbolic language moves beyond the constraints of denotation to enable us to interpret human experience in a plurivocal, rather than univocal ways. In my essay I examine Ricoeur's adherence to a disclosive theory of language, borrowed from Heidegger, and argue that it does not provide an adequate theory (...) of linguistic reference. Ricoeur does not give a structural explanation for how it is that the new meaning provided by metaphors actually impacts upon the cognitive dimensions of the interpretive process. I argue that Hegel's analysis of language is stronger in that it includes a discussion of the perceptual and cognitive stages of understanding, which include moments of hermeneutic "reversal"; here we see how it is that language simultaneously refers to and mediates experience. This might become the basis for developing a stronger explanatory model of the refiguring process which Ricoeur describes. (shrink)

A straightforward ontological account would be one which acknowledges relations as real beings, and that means, according to the scholastic tradition, as universals. The realist move in this sense which has been re-established within contemporary analytical ontology at least since Russell's early theory, is, however, not the only possible way to take relations seriously. In my paper I shall argue that there is much room for the ontological reconstruction of relations, even if one does not accept universals. The background for (...) this argument is a particularist and realist theory, based on tropes ("trope" being the short name for "property instance" or "individual quality"). One way of reconstruction is that relations themselves are particulars. They are supposed to be relational or polyadic tropes (J. Bacon, D. Mertz). The other way is to hold that relations are internal or formal, and therefore do not require a category sai generis (K. Mulligan, P. Simons). I shall discuss these alternatives and finally opt for the second, i.e., the reconstruction of relations as internal to their relata. Moreover, I offer an argument for why basic relations such as existential dependence should be granted a transcategorial status within trope ontology. Hence, the gist of my paper is to take relations seriously without falling prey either to stubborn nominalism or to strict realism. What I intend to explore is a middle avenue thereby choosing the best of both sides in order to explicate a moderate view on the realism of relations. (shrink)

A straightforward ontological account would be one which acknowledges relations as real beings, and that means, according to the scholastic tradition, as universals. The realist move in this sense which has been re-established within contemporary analytical ontology at least since Russell's early theory, is, however, not the only possible way to take relations seriously. In my paper I shall argue that there is much room for the ontological reconstruction of relations, even if one does not accept universals. The background for (...) this argument is a particularist and realist theory, based on tropes. One way of reconstruction is that relations themselves are particulars. They are supposed to be relational or polyadic tropes. The other way is to hold that relations are internal or formal, and therefore do not require a category sai generis. I shall discuss these alternatives and finally opt for the second, i.e., the reconstruction of relations as internal to their relata. Moreover, I offer an argument for why basic relations such as existential dependence should be granted a transcategorial status within trope ontology. Hence, the gist of my paper is to take relations seriously without falling prey either to stubborn nominalism or to strict realism. What I intend to explore is a middle avenue thereby choosing the best of both sides in order to explicate a moderate view on the realism of relations. (shrink)

Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics belongs to the phenomenological tradition. What is striking then is that one of the central themes in phenomenology, the nature of time consciousness, receives no sustained treatment in Gadamer's writings. It's fair to say that Gadamer is the only major figure in phenomenology not to address the issue of time at length. In this paper I argue that Gadamer does have an account of time consciousness and it can be found most fully articulated in his account of (...) the aesthetic experience connected to festivals. Festivals, as models of epochal experiences, are the primordial experiences of time upon which other forms of time consciousness are constituted. Significantly, then, the reproduction of the meaning of tradition plays a role in the heart of Gadamer's theory of time and therefore his theory of experience. (shrink)

In his Allgemeine Psychologie of 1912, Natorp formulates a by now classical criticism of phenomenology. 1. Phenomenology claims to describe and analyze lived subjectivity itself. In order to do so it employs a reflective methodology. But reflection is a kind of internal perception; it is a theoretical attitude; it involves an objectification. And as Natorp then asks, how is this objectifying procedure ever going to provide us with access to lived subjectivity itself? 2. Phenomenology aims at describing the experiential structures (...) in their pretheoretical immediacy. But every description involves the use of language, involves the use of generalizing and subsuming concepts. For the very same reason, every description and expression involves a mediation and objectification that necessarily estranges us from subjectivity itself.In his early lecture course Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem of 1919 Heidegger responds to Natorp's challenge and attempts to show that the criticism is based on some questionable assumptions. More specifically, Heidegger argues that Natorp's criticism might be pertinent when it comes to a phenomenology based on a reflective methodology, i.e. when it comes to a Husserlian phenomenology, but it is wide of the mark when it comes to Heidegger's own hermeneutical phenomenology.In this paper I wish to present both Natorp's criticism and Heidegger's response in detail. One of the aims will be to articulate the criticism that Heidegger himself—via his discussion with Natorp—directs against a reflective phenomenology. In the final part of the paper I will then evaluate the pertinence of this criticism. Is it at all justified? (shrink)

In his Allgemeine Psychologie of 1912, Natorp formulates a by now classical criticism of phenomenology. 1. Phenomenology claims to describe and analyze lived subjectivity itself. In order to do so it employs a reflective methodology. But reflection is a kind of internal perception; it is a theoretical attitude; it involves an objectification. And as Natorp then asks, how is this objectifying procedure ever going to provide us with access to lived subjectivity itself? 2. Phenomenology aims at describing the experiential structures (...) in their pretheoretical immediacy. But every description involves the use of language, involves the use of generalizing and subsuming concepts. For the very same reason, every description and expression involves a mediation and objectification that necessarily estranges us from subjectivity itself.In his early lecture course Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem of 1919 Heidegger responds to Natorp's challenge and attempts to show that the criticism is based on some questionable assumptions. More specifically, Heidegger argues that Natorp's criticism might be pertinent when it comes to a phenomenology based on a reflective methodology, i.e. when it comes to a Husserlian phenomenology, but it is wide of the mark when it comes to Heidegger's own hermeneutical phenomenology.In this paper I wish to present both Natorp's criticism and Heidegger's response in detail. One of the aims will be to articulate the criticism that Heidegger himself—via his discussion with Natorp—directs against a reflective phenomenology. In the final part of the paper I will then evaluate the pertinence of this criticism. Is it at all justified? (shrink)

This paper concerns Jacques Derrida's reading of S0ren Kierkegaard's interpretation of the biblical story of Abraham's sacrifice. Abraham's decision to listen to God's command and sacrifice to Him his beloved son is based on his personal faith which conflicts with general morality. On the basis of this story, Derrida argues that we often witness similar conflicts between religion and morality, demonstrating that responsibility is ultimately based on something irresponsible, i.e. something secret. The paper finally discusses Derrida's logic of ultimates.

In this paper I present Pluralistic Kantianism as a viable alternative to other prominent accounts of the determination of the truth conditions of our ordinary empirical statements. I further claim that this sort of Kantianism is capable of handling certain theoretical difficulties faced by any scheme-based semantics. Moreover, Pluralistic Kantianism can shed some light on such crucial issues as cross-cultural communication and understanding. As a result, if the account offered here is on the right track, we may get a palatable (...) alternative to both restrictive monism and apathetic relativism, both of which ultimately fail to explicate or enlighten the successful and unsuccessful instances of cross-cultural understanding. (shrink)

In this paper I present Pluralistic Kantianism as a viable alternative to other prominent accounts of the determination of the truth conditions of our ordinary empirical statements. I further claim that this sort of Kantianism is capable of handling certain theoretical difficulties faced by any scheme-based semantics. Moreover, Pluralistic Kantianism can shed some light on such crucial issues as cross-cultural communication and understanding. As a result, if the account offered here is on the right track, we may get a palatable (...) alternative to both restrictive monism and apathetic relativism, both of which ultimately fail to explicate or enlighten the successful and unsuccessful instances of cross-cultural understanding. (shrink)

In this paper I present Pluralistic Kantianism as a viable alternative to other prominent accounts of the determination of the truth conditions of our ordinary empirical statements. I further claim that this sort of Kantianism is capable of handling certain theoretical difficulties faced by any scheme-based semantics. Moreover, Pluralistic Kantianism can shed some light on such crucial issues as cross-cultural communication and understanding. As a result, if the account offered here is on the right track, we may get a palatable (...) alternative to both restrictive monism and apathetic relativism, both of which ultimately fail to explicate or enlighten the successful and unsuccessful instances of cross-cultural understanding. (shrink)

Depuis le milieu des annees 1960, les etudes spinozistes ont pris un nouvel essor sous l'impulsion du courant marxiste qui a vu dans le programme de liberation des collectivites pense par Spinoza le projet politique le plus apte ä assurer une reponse ä la crise de legitimite du marxisme. Dans la foulee de certaines intuitions de Althusser, et ä la lumiere de la conceptualite spinoziste, plusieurs penseurs (notamment Deleuze, Negri, Macherey, Matheron et Virno) ont ainsi propose un nouveau modele d'organisation (...) de la vie en commun. Ces acteurs de la renaissance spinoziste redigent, en quelque sorte, le chapitre conclusif de la derniere ceuvre de Spinoza (i.e. le Tratte politique reste inacheve) en definissant les nouvelles conditions de la democratic ä l'heure de la deterritorialisation generalisee marquee par l'abolition des frontieres nationales (economie mondiale, reseaux informatiques, etc.). Ce contexte offre l'occasion de repenser la politique en radicalisant les propos de Spinoza et en faisant jouer les notions de "puissance" et de "multitude" non seulement contre les concepts de "pouvoir" et de "peuple" qui en sont venus ä dominer le champ de la reflexion en philosophic politique, mais egalement contre les philosophies de l'histoire fondees sur la dialectique et la teleologie. Apres avoir decrit brievement quelques-uns des principaux enjeux de la politique spinoziste et avoir presente les nouveaux ennemis du spinozisme (neo-liberalisme et marxisme ideologique), nous ferons une genealogie de la refondation neo-spinozienne de Marx (Althusser, Deleuze, Negri) avant de repondre ä la question "Que faire?". II s'agira alors de determiner le role de l'Etat et de situer cette pensee politique par rapport ä l'utopie revolutionnaire. Ce parcours contribuera ä mieux definir les fondements et les implications de la democratic non-representative qui est au cceur des revendications de la renaissance spinoziste. (shrink)

Depuis le milieu des annees 1960, les etudes spinozistes ont pris un nouvel essor sous l'impulsion du courant marxiste qui a vu dans le programme de liberation des collectivites pense par Spinoza le projet politique le plus apte ä assurer une reponse ä la crise de legitimite du marxisme. Dans la foulee de certaines intuitions de Althusser, et ä la lumiere de la conceptualite spinoziste, plusieurs penseurs (notamment Deleuze, Negri, Macherey, Matheron et Virno) ont ainsi propose un nouveau modele d'organisation (...) de la vie en commun. Ces acteurs de la renaissance spinoziste redigent, en quelque sorte, le chapitre conclusif de la derniere ceuvre de Spinoza (i.e. le Tratte politique reste inacheve) en definissant les nouvelles conditions de la democratic ä l'heure de la deterritorialisation generalisee marquee par l'abolition des frontieres nationales (economie mondiale, reseaux informatiques, etc.). Ce contexte offre l'occasion de repenser la politique en radicalisant les propos de Spinoza et en faisant jouer les notions de "puissance" et de "multitude" non seulement contre les concepts de "pouvoir" et de "peuple" qui en sont venus ä dominer le champ de la reflexion en philosophic politique, mais egalement contre les philosophies de l'histoire fondees sur la dialectique et la teleologie. Apres avoir decrit brievement quelques-uns des principaux enjeux de la politique spinoziste et avoir presente les nouveaux ennemis du spinozisme (neo-liberalisme et marxisme ideologique), nous ferons une genealogie de la refondation neo-spinozienne de Marx (Althusser, Deleuze, Negri) avant de repondre ä la question "Que faire?". II s'agira alors de determiner le role de l'Etat et de situer cette pensee politique par rapport ä l'utopie revolutionnaire. Ce parcours contribuera ä mieux definir les fondements et les implications de la democratic non-representative qui est au cceur des revendications de la renaissance spinoziste. (shrink)

Levinas pretende liberarse de la esclavitud del subjetivismo moderno. En realidad, de lo que se trata es de salir del ser por una nueva via. Estamos ante una Filosofia de la Liberaciön.

Levinas pretende liberarse de la esclavitud del subjetivismo moderno. En realidad, de lo que se trata es de salir del ser por una nueva via. Estamos ante una Filosofia de la Liberaciön.

In this paper, I examine how and why Heidegger's early conception of freedom as the ground of the self-appropriation of Dasein had been gradually transformed after 1930. The approach of Heidegger to the issue of human freedom displays how his thinking proceeds from Kant's formulation of the problem in "The Third Antinomy" of the first Critique to Sophocles' tragedy of Antigone. I argue that the reason behind this transformation resides in the attempt of thinking the relation between freedom and natural (...) necessity over and beyond the constraints of critical philosophy. What seems pivotal in this transformation is Heidegger's growing concern with the "tragic" in which he envisages the possibility of a genuine exposure to the "truth" of the conflict between freedom and necessity and, more primordially, to the "abode" wherein the encounter between man and Being {Sein) occurs. Here, the "tragic" is pointing to the limits of representation and what is presented. In other words, it exhibits the limits of human freedom in its relation to the truth of Being. In the passion for disclosure of Being {aletheia), man is driven into the freedom of instituting its truth. In Heidegger's late thinking, human freedom is determined not any more by the obligation of choosing oneself but by the necessity of clearing the truth of Being. Human freedom is tragic in the face of this necessity that it has to answer. Therefore, man is envisaged as having no right or mastery over his freedom for there is no total clearing of its origin. Finally, I argue that it seems impossible to understand the transformation in Heidegger's concept of freedom without an appeal to his emphasis on the "tragic" as being an attempt to deepen and to transfigure the problem as treated in Kantian critical philosophy. In its tragic sense, Heidegger's concept of human freedom displays what lies beneath the Kantian antinomy: the incomprehensible origin of human freedom conceived as the event of the historical appropriation of Being {Er-eignis). (shrink)

In this paper, I examine how and why Heidegger's early conception of freedom as the ground of the self-appropriation of Dasein had been gradually transformed after 1930. The approach of Heidegger to the issue of human freedom displays how his thinking proceeds from Kant's formulation of the problem in "The Third Antinomy" of the first Critique to Sophocles' tragedy of Antigone. I argue that the reason behind this transformation resides in the attempt of thinking the relation between freedom and natural (...) necessity over and beyond the constraints of critical philosophy. What seems pivotal in this transformation is Heidegger's growing concern with the "tragic" in which he envisages the possibility of a genuine exposure to the "truth" of the conflict between freedom and necessity and, more primordially, to the "abode" wherein the encounter between man and Being {Sein) occurs. Here, the "tragic" is pointing to the limits of representation and what is presented. In other words, it exhibits the limits of human freedom in its relation to the truth of Being. In the passion for disclosure of Being {aletheia), man is driven into the freedom of instituting its truth. In Heidegger's late thinking, human freedom is determined not any more by the obligation of choosing oneself but by the necessity of clearing the truth of Being. Human freedom is tragic in the face of this necessity that it has to answer. Therefore, man is envisaged as having no right or mastery over his freedom for there is no total clearing of its origin. Finally, I argue that it seems impossible to understand the transformation in Heidegger's concept of freedom without an appeal to his emphasis on the "tragic" as being an attempt to deepen and to transfigure the problem as treated in Kantian critical philosophy. In its tragic sense, Heidegger's concept of human freedom displays what lies beneath the Kantian antinomy: the incomprehensible origin of human freedom conceived as the event of the historical appropriation of Being {Er-eignis). (shrink)

The present text shows the hidden root of the question of being in Heidegger's Early Writings. His first logic and epistemological investigations in a neokantian atmosphere moves to ontological interests: he gives up the notion of transcendental subject, and asks for the historical and temporal background of live. In this sense, the young Heidegger gives his work a new direction by searching for the hermeneutical pressupositions that allows philosophy to formulate again the question of being from a radical point of (...) view. (shrink)

The present text shows the hidden root of the question of being in Heidegger's Early Writings. His first logic and epistemological investigations in a neokantian atmosphere moves to ontological interests: he gives up the notion of transcendental subject, and asks for the historical and temporal background of live. In this sense, the young Heidegger gives his work a new direction by searching for the hermeneutical pressupositions that allows philosophy to formulate again the question of being from a radical point of (...) view. (shrink)

The issues of difference, diversity, otherness, and the possibility of community have emerged as leading philosophical and socio-political questions in recent times. An increasing theoretical emphasis on issues of difference and alterity, with a corresponding convergence of topics like globalization, have brought into renewed focus not only the question of otherness, but more fundamentally, the question of how the encounter with the Other is to take place. My paper examines the treatment of issues of difference and otherness within a perspective (...) of philosophical hermeneutics. In recent writings, Gadamer has suggested that the principles of his philosophical hermeneutics can prove beneficial in reflections on contemporary social problems of diversity and cultural difference. In examining these claims, I question whether Gadamer acknowledges sufficiently the challenges and resistance of otherness. At the same time, I also question the claims of some theorists who maintain that it is never possible to bridge difference and otherness. In the end I suggest that while the resistance of difference might be underestimated, there are nevertheless promising approaches for thinking difference and diversity to be found in a hermeneutical perspective. (shrink)

The issues of difference, diversity, otherness, and the possibility of community have emerged as leading philosophical and socio-political questions in recent times. An increasing theoretical emphasis on issues of difference and alterity, with a corresponding convergence of topics like globalization, have brought into renewed focus not only the question of otherness, but more fundamentally, the question of how the encounter with the Other is to take place. My paper examines the treatment of issues of difference and otherness within a perspective (...) of philosophical hermeneutics. In recent writings, Gadamer has suggested that the principles of his philosophical hermeneutics can prove beneficial in reflections on contemporary social problems of diversity and cultural difference. In examining these claims, I question whether Gadamer acknowledges sufficiently the challenges and resistance of otherness. At the same time, I also question the claims of some theorists who maintain that it is never possible to bridge difference and otherness. In the end I suggest that while the resistance of difference might be underestimated, there are nevertheless promising approaches for thinking difference and diversity to be found in a hermeneutical perspective. (shrink)

Im Folgenden werden die unterschiedlichen Nietzsche-Bilder der deutschen Philosophie skizziert und insbesondere wird nach ihrer Bedeutung im nationalsozialistischen Kontext gefragt. Dabei geht es nicht darum, festzustellen, ob Nietzsche ein "Wegbereiter" des Nationalsozialismus war oder nicht. In der Hauptsache sollen die wichtigsten Nietzsche- Interpretationen - aus den Jahren zwischen 1930 und 1945 - in konkreten politischen und gesellschaftlichen Lagen und Verhältnissen sichtbar gemacht werden. Daher werden die konkreten historischen Bedingungen, unter denen Nietzsches Denken gedeutet wurde, zum Ausgangspunkt gemacht. In diesem Vortrag (...) wird auf die wichtigsten Schnittstellen für die Faschisierung von Nietzsches Philosophie hingewiesen. Unter Faschisierung ist eine bestimmte Reorganisation der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft zu verstehen, bei der die Parteien und Organisationen der Arbeiterbewegung ausgeschaltet und die Instanzen der Zivilgesellschaft als Apparate des Führer-Staates refunktionalisiert werden. Als ideelle Vergesellschaftungsmacht leistete die Philosophie hier ihren Beitrag zur Stabilisierung der nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft, indem sie eine zustimmende Wahrnehmung der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse organisierte. Gerade in dieser Richtung leistete die Nietzsche- Interpretation zwischen 1933 und 1945 einen wesentlichen Beitrag nicht nur zur Konstitution eines nationalsozialistischen Subjekts, sondern zugleich zur Reproduktion der Herrschaft. (shrink)

Im Folgenden werden die unterschiedlichen Nietzsche-Bilder der deutschen Philosophie skizziert und insbesondere wird nach ihrer Bedeutung im nationalsozialistischen Kontext gefragt. Dabei geht es nicht darum, festzustellen, ob Nietzsche ein "Wegbereiter" des Nationalsozialismus war oder nicht. In der Hauptsache sollen die wichtigsten Nietzsche- Interpretationen - aus den Jahren zwischen 1930 und 1945 - in konkreten politischen und gesellschaftlichen Lagen und Verhältnissen sichtbar gemacht werden. Daher werden die konkreten historischen Bedingungen, unter denen Nietzsches Denken gedeutet wurde, zum Ausgangspunkt gemacht. In diesem Vortrag (...) wird auf die wichtigsten Schnittstellen für die Faschisierung von Nietzsches Philosophie hingewiesen. Unter Faschisierung ist eine bestimmte Reorganisation der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft zu verstehen, bei der die Parteien und Organisationen der Arbeiterbewegung ausgeschaltet und die Instanzen der Zivilgesellschaft als Apparate des Führer-Staates refunktionalisiert werden. Als ideelle Vergesellschaftungsmacht leistete die Philosophie hier ihren Beitrag zur Stabilisierung der nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft, indem sie eine zustimmende Wahrnehmung der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse organisierte. Gerade in dieser Richtung leistete die Nietzsche- Interpretation zwischen 1933 und 1945 einen wesentlichen Beitrag nicht nur zur Konstitution eines nationalsozialistischen Subjekts, sondern zugleich zur Reproduktion der Herrschaft. (shrink)

In his Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (GA 65), Heidegger claims: "Making itself intelligible is the suicide of philosophy" (435). He defines intelligibility in terms of the modern metaphysical forms of thinking and speaking about beings as objects of representation. Moreover, intelligibility involves a uniform accessibility for the inauthentic. anybody of an age marked by thoughtlessness. Thus, Heidegger upholds and tries to adhere to a principle of unintelligibility for the thinkers in the crossing from the first beginning to the other (...) beginning of philosophy. Thinkers in the crossing are essentially ambiguous and indefinite in their attempt to move through and away metaphysical thinking toward a be-ing-historical thinking. Their only option is to say the metaphysical language of beings as language of be-ing, and this involves a transformation of language and thinking through a "turning around" of the meaning of metaphysical words. Unintelligibility is an essential feature of this transformed and transformative effort to carry out the ultimate task of "the bringing back of beings from the truth of be-ing" (11). If philosophy makes itself intelligible, then it fails to accomplish its mission in the age of the abandonment of be-ing by beings. Unintelligibility in Heidegger, as he defines it and as it occurs in his own writing, suggests the concomitant demand on us, the philosophers of today, to make the effort to interpret the language of beings as language of be-ing. (shrink)

In his Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (GA 65), Heidegger claims: "Making itself intelligible is the suicide of philosophy" (435). He defines intelligibility in terms of the modern metaphysical forms of thinking and speaking about beings as objects of representation. Moreover, intelligibility involves a uniform accessibility for the inauthentic. anybody of an age marked by thoughtlessness. Thus, Heidegger upholds and tries to adhere to a principle of unintelligibility for the thinkers in the crossing from the first beginning to the other (...) beginning of philosophy. Thinkers in the crossing are essentially ambiguous and indefinite in their attempt to move through and away metaphysical thinking toward a be-ing-historical thinking. Their only option is to say the metaphysical language of beings as language of be-ing, and this involves a transformation of language and thinking through a "turning around" of the meaning of metaphysical words. Unintelligibility is an essential feature of this transformed and transformative effort to carry out the ultimate task of "the bringing back of beings from the truth of be-ing" (11). If philosophy makes itself intelligible, then it fails to accomplish its mission in the age of the abandonment of be-ing by beings. Unintelligibility in Heidegger, as he defines it and as it occurs in his own writing, suggests the concomitant demand on us, the philosophers of today, to make the effort to interpret the language of beings as language of be-ing. (shrink)

In what manner can philosophy best face world problems? I argue that philosophy's most important contribution to problem solving is not analysis and clarification but synoptic in nature. Relying upon the power of reflection and the scope of imagination as linked to a patient attempt to understand many disciplines, the philosopher ideally seeks to comprehend problems in their many-dimensioned complexity. The disciplines of ecology, evolution, and ethics are especially fruitful in guiding the philosopher seeking to assess the relative worth of (...) things in their emergent inter-relationships. - In the body of the paper I attempt an outline of the outstanding human caused harms, injustices, and instabilities resulting in pain and suffering today. World philosophy today seems sufficiently pluralistic, comprehensive and free of unduly constraining orthodoxies that it can again play a significant role not only in conceptualizing problems but in articulating solutions. Broad visions comparable to Plato's as set forth in the Republic can again be ventured. We need to seek out ways to place into power a council of international philosopher kings and queens offering effective solutions beyond the dictates of partisanship and ideology. I conclude by suggesting five principles that international philosopher kings and queens might be expected to rely upon to bring about a more just global society. (shrink)

Hermeneutics, in its phenomenological mode, has become one of the dominating issues in contemporary philosophical discours. Hans-Georg Gadamer, the leading exponent of phenomenological hermeneutics, develops his theory in his monumental work Truth and Method1, by regarding hermeneutics as an exploration of both the archaeology of human understanding and constitutive role of language in experience. In this paper, we have presented a brief exposition of Gadamer's views, giving an emphasis on how human understanding of objects inevitably mingles with its traditions or (...) prejudices. Following Gadamer, we also have offered a systematic account of the role of language upon our overall understanding and building of an impersonal criterion of the truth and meaning of experiences. And finally we have critically examined Habermas* critique of Gadamer's failure to see language as a camouflage of domination of stronger experiences and the fact that the history of understanding is systematically distorted by this domination. (shrink)

Hermeneutics, in its phenomenological mode, has become one of the dominating issues in contemporary philosophical discours. Hans-Georg Gadamer, the leading exponent of phenomenological hermeneutics, develops his theory in his monumental work Truth and Method1, by regarding hermeneutics as an exploration of both the archaeology of human understanding and constitutive role of language in experience. In this paper, we have presented a brief exposition of Gadamer's views, giving an emphasis on how human understanding of objects inevitably mingles with its traditions or (...) prejudices. Following Gadamer, we also have offered a systematic account of the role of language upon our overall understanding and building of an impersonal criterion of the truth and meaning of experiences. And finally we have critically examined Habermas* critique of Gadamer's failure to see language as a camouflage of domination of stronger experiences and the fact that the history of understanding is systematically distorted by this domination. (shrink)

Ce que nous voulons faire dans ce travail, est de presenter des concepts differents de terme de l'existence chez Martin Heidegger et Jean-Paul Sartre. Parce que cette analyse nous donnera la possibility de bien comprendre les principales idees de ces penseurs dans la Philosophie contemporaine.D'abord, nous devons remarquer que le terme d'existence retient une place centrale chez eux. Comme nous l'avons expose dans notre travail, la filiation entre ces penseurs est construite particulierement sur cette idee. Dans ce travail, nous avons (...) pose differentes questions, et nous livrons leurs reponses. D'ailleurs, on voit que chez Heidegger, l'essence du dasein reside dans son existence, et chez Sartre l'existence precede l'essence. En plus, quand Sartre parle d'existence, c'est de maniere abstraite, autrement dit l'existence est un concept analytique. L'existence sartrienne etant la facticite, elle exprime la condition humaine d'un etre pour lequel dans son etre il y va de son etre. D'un autre cote, l'existence pour Heidegger n'est pas un cadre abstrait, un autre mot pour dire la condition humaine mais un lieu etrange et inquietant.Brievement, l'une des plus grandes caracteristiques de l'existence chez Heidegger est qu'elle n'est pas connaissable objectivement, et n'est pas definissable tout court. Mais chez Sartre, l'existence, c'est avant tout d'etre dans ses actes et par ses actes. (shrink)

Ce que nous voulons faire dans ce travail, est de presenter des concepts differents de terme de l'existence chez Martin Heidegger et Jean-Paul Sartre. Parce que cette analyse nous donnera la possibility de bien comprendre les principales idees de ces penseurs dans la Philosophie contemporaine.D'abord, nous devons remarquer que le terme d'existence retient une place centrale chez eux. Comme nous l'avons expose dans notre travail, la filiation entre ces penseurs est construite particulierement sur cette idee. Dans ce travail, nous avons (...) pose differentes questions, et nous livrons leurs reponses. D'ailleurs, on voit que chez Heidegger, l'essence du dasein reside dans son existence, et chez Sartre l'existence precede l'essence. En plus, quand Sartre parle d'existence, c'est de maniere abstraite, autrement dit l'existence est un concept analytique. L'existence sartrienne etant la facticite, elle exprime la condition humaine d'un etre pour lequel dans son etre il y va de son etre. D'un autre cote, l'existence pour Heidegger n'est pas un cadre abstrait, un autre mot pour dire la condition humaine mais un lieu etrange et inquietant.Brievement, l'une des plus grandes caracteristiques de l'existence chez Heidegger est qu'elle n'est pas connaissable objectivement, et n'est pas definissable tout court. Mais chez Sartre, l'existence, c'est avant tout d'etre dans ses actes et par ses actes. (shrink)

The studying of Marx, said Gyorgy Lukäcs at the beginning of the 1920s, does not mean the uncriticised recognition of the results of his researches, nor the set in well-defined theses, the interpretation of a book. One has to become absorbed in the ceuvre of Marx, so that then, as a second step, one can commence the systematic elaboration of the problems of our age. It is unjust that in western philosophies, especially in the Anglo-Saxon concerning literature the name of (...) the old-age Lukäcs does not appear, or is present as that of some Stalinist inquisitor, the indisputable pillar of Marxism and the Bolshevik movement. Yet his late piece of labour, his vast ontology experiment convincingly shows how one can penetrate the original texts of Marx and at the same time preserve one's conceptual souvereignity, sense of reality, and one's capacity, at least in a latent way, to judge or surpass the thoughts of one's master. This study aims to interpret the problem of Lukäcs's relation to Marx through the analysis of the labour concept of Lukäcs, and would like to prove that the rereading of Lukäcs (and Marx) can serve with surprises, new meanings and morals even today. (shrink)

The studying of Marx, said Gyorgy Lukäcs at the beginning of the 1920s, does not mean the uncriticised recognition of the results of his researches, nor the set in well-defined theses, the interpretation of a book. One has to become absorbed in the ceuvre of Marx, so that then, as a second step, one can commence the systematic elaboration of the problems of our age. It is unjust that in western philosophies, especially in the Anglo-Saxon concerning literature the name of (...) the old-age Lukäcs does not appear, or is present as that of some Stalinist inquisitor, the indisputable pillar of Marxism and the Bolshevik movement. Yet his late piece of labour, his vast ontology experiment convincingly shows how one can penetrate the original texts of Marx and at the same time preserve one's conceptual souvereignity, sense of reality, and one's capacity, at least in a latent way, to judge or surpass the thoughts of one's master. This study aims to interpret the problem of Lukäcs's relation to Marx through the analysis of the labour concept of Lukäcs, and would like to prove that the rereading of Lukäcs (and Marx) can serve with surprises, new meanings and morals even today. (shrink)

Foucault argued in his retrospective writings that it is possible to give an overall interpretation of his work around the question of subjectivity and that his individual books are historical analyses of the constitution of certain subjective experiences that he finds characteristic of modernity. Furthermore, he called this history of the emergence, development and transformation of subjective experiences a 'history of thought.' Hence understanding the sense in which Foucault uses the notion of thought seems to be crucial for an interpretation (...) of his writings within the framework he provided in his retrospective accounts. In this paper I will argue that the Foucaultian notion of thought is Kantian in fundamental ways, and that this Kantian framework is present throughout his entire work. This argument will provide the background for a rejection of the claim that Foucault's individual writings are specific and marginal. Finally, I will claim that the standard periodizations of Foucault's work under the headings of archaeology, genealogy and ethics have to be reconsidered and revised. (shrink)

Foucault argued in his retrospective writings that it is possible to give an overall interpretation of his work around the question of subjectivity and that his individual books are historical analyses of the constitution of certain subjective experiences that he finds characteristic of modernity. Furthermore, he called this history of the emergence, development and transformation of subjective experiences a 'history of thought.' Hence understanding the sense in which Foucault uses the notion of thought seems to be crucial for an interpretation (...) of his writings within the framework he provided in his retrospective accounts. In this paper I will argue that the Foucaultian notion of thought is Kantian in fundamental ways, and that this Kantian framework is present throughout his entire work. This argument will provide the background for a rejection of the claim that Foucault's individual writings are specific and marginal. Finally, I will claim that the standard periodizations of Foucault's work under the headings of archaeology, genealogy and ethics have to be reconsidered and revised. (shrink)

My lecture is concerned with a presentation of the method of Deleuzian thought, which - I would like to contend - well represent the change that has taken place in postmodernist thought. Deleuze is unique in calling himself a "classical metaphysicist," i.e. a restorer of classical thought, albeit via the screen - thought which has managed to survive and overcome the obstacle of modernity. The Deleuzian unification of pre-modern thought and modernist critique with Nietzsche's theory of eternal repetition gives rise (...) to a method, whose utter meaning is an attempt to provide thinkers with sharp tools for successfully opposing later capitalism and globalization, something that stands at the very heart of Deleuzian metaphysics. This opposition, which in effect is also a new doctrine of moral aesthetics, lies at the core of this present lecture. I would like to present the special combative nature of Deleuzian thought, and through him to present a different radical angle of the post-modern paradigm. (shrink)

My lecture is concerned with a presentation of the method of Deleuzian thought, which - I would like to contend - well represent the change that has taken place in postmodernist thought. Deleuze is unique in calling himself a "classical metaphysicist," i.e. a restorer of classical thought, albeit via the screen - thought which has managed to survive and overcome the obstacle of modernity. The Deleuzian unification of pre-modern thought and modernist critique with Nietzsche's theory of eternal repetition gives rise (...) to a method, whose utter meaning is an attempt to provide thinkers with sharp tools for successfully opposing later capitalism and globalization, something that stands at the very heart of Deleuzian metaphysics. This opposition, which in effect is also a new doctrine of moral aesthetics, lies at the core of this present lecture. I would like to present the special combative nature of Deleuzian thought, and through him to present a different radical angle of the post-modern paradigm. (shrink)

Ce travail a pour objectif d'analyser les reflexions ä propos du droit et de la justice faites par Jacques Derrida et Gianni Vattimo. L'objectif principal est de mettre l'accent sur les traits dominants qui distinguent ces reflexions quand elles touchent aux exigences de la praxis (juridique, ethique, politique), ä laquelle les deux philosophes s'adressent de fagon differente. D'un cöte, il y a la deconstruction deridienne, qui denonce le manque de fondement du droit, sa violence originelle, et au moyen d'une double (...) seance et un double mouvement se deplace en un exercice intellectuel lucide, radical et incessant; de l'autre, l'ontologie faible [debole) et nihiliste du philosophe italien dont la proposition est une hermeneutique qui n'en reste pas ä la phase de la denonciation mais veut "faire justice", de fagon pratique et concrete, en essayant d'affaiblir et de reduire peu ä peu la violence originelle du droit. (shrink)

Ce travail a pour objectif d'analyser les reflexions ä propos du droit et de la justice faites par Jacques Derrida et Gianni Vattimo. L'objectif principal est de mettre l'accent sur les traits dominants qui distinguent ces reflexions quand elles touchent aux exigences de la praxis (juridique, ethique, politique), ä laquelle les deux philosophes s'adressent de fagon differente. D'un cöte, il y a la deconstruction deridienne, qui denonce le manque de fondement du droit, sa violence originelle, et au moyen d'une double (...) seance et un double mouvement se deplace en un exercice intellectuel lucide, radical et incessant; de l'autre, l'ontologie faible [debole) et nihiliste du philosophe italien dont la proposition est une hermeneutique qui n'en reste pas ä la phase de la denonciation mais veut "faire justice", de fagon pratique et concrete, en essayant d'affaiblir et de reduire peu ä peu la violence originelle du droit. (shrink)

Las criticas a la filosofia moderna, vertidas desde el pensamiento actual, son sobradamente conocidas. Algunas de ellas han querido hacer realidad un proyecto de destrucciön radical. Ahora bien, tal destrucciön solo resultarä verdaderamente eficaz si, como de hecho estä sucediendo, va seguida de propuestas alternativas que se atengan de manera mäs adecuada a la realidad humana y a la estricta tarea de la filosofia. En esta Hnea de contribucion positiva se encuentra, a mi juicio, la particular aportaciön de la hermeneutica (...) filosöfica contemporänea, encaminada a la rehabilitaciön de la razön practica. En esta ponencia se harä menciön especial a la comprensiön de Hans-Georg Gadamer, el pensador alemän fallecido en 2002, que tan decididamente ha marcado el curso de la filosofia actual.Tal rehabilitaciön parece un paso necesario en el camino conducente a una comprensiön mäs acertada de la tarea filosöfica y de su objeto. El reconocimiento de algunos aspectos de la razön, tales como la flnitud o su caräcter situacional, puede contribuir a una vision mäs ajustada de su esencia y posibilidades. Elimina, ademäs, el peligroso riesgo que supone la pretension de lo absolute* e incondicionado. Admitir lo que podriamos denominar los Umites de la razön no significa ineurrir en posiciones relativistas ni eseepticas; constituye, tan solo, un necesario ejercicio de atenimiento a lo real. (shrink)

Las criticas a la filosofia moderna, vertidas desde el pensamiento actual, son sobradamente conocidas. Algunas de ellas han querido hacer realidad un proyecto de destrucciön radical. Ahora bien, tal destrucciön solo resultarä verdaderamente eficaz si, como de hecho estä sucediendo, va seguida de propuestas alternativas que se atengan de manera mäs adecuada a la realidad humana y a la estricta tarea de la filosofia. En esta Hnea de contribucion positiva se encuentra, a mi juicio, la particular aportaciön de la hermeneutica (...) filosöfica contemporänea, encaminada a la rehabilitaciön de la razön practica. En esta ponencia se harä menciön especial a la comprensiön de Hans-Georg Gadamer, el pensador alemän fallecido en 2002, que tan decididamente ha marcado el curso de la filosofia actual.Tal rehabilitaciön parece un paso necesario en el camino conducente a una comprensiön mäs acertada de la tarea filosöfica y de su objeto. El reconocimiento de algunos aspectos de la razön, tales como la flnitud o su caräcter situacional, puede contribuir a una vision mäs ajustada de su esencia y posibilidades. Elimina, ademäs, el peligroso riesgo que supone la pretension de lo absolute* e incondicionado. Admitir lo que podriamos denominar los Umites de la razön no significa ineurrir en posiciones relativistas ni eseepticas; constituye, tan solo, un necesario ejercicio de atenimiento a lo real. (shrink)

This paper concerns Jacques Derrida's reading of S0ren Kierkegaard's interpretation of the biblical story of Abraham's sacrifice. Abraham's decision to listen to God's command and sacrifice to Him his beloved son is based on his personal faith which conflicts with general morality. On the basis of this story, Derrida argues that we often witness similar conflicts between religion and morality, demonstrating that responsibility is ultimately based on something irresponsible, i.e. something secret. The paper finally discusses Derrida's logic of ultimates.

Mes recherches actuelles tendent ä croiser l'analyse epistemologique avec l'esthetique pour degager le röle du sujet historique dans Velaboration des savoirs universels. II s'agit, pour moi, de deplacer le point de vue transcendantal, formel, afin de renouveler la perspective epistemologique par le concept de diathese. Deux questions se posent. Quel est l'apport du sujet 1) dans le processus de structuration formelle des savoirs? (construction, deconstruction, reconstruction de la connaissance), 2) dans la transmission - transformation des savoirs? (decontextualisation et actualisation historique (...) des paradigmes successifs).En diathese, la conscience de soi - chacun, chacune d'entre nous - ne s'envisage que traversee par la conscience d'autrui. II suffit de rompre avec le solipsisme identitaire des formalismes classiques, et leur determinisme problematique, pour constater avec stupefaction que l'autre tient, en soi, la part constitutive de notre biographic- de la langue de la mere ä la langue des autres. Langue etrangere, qui est pourtant le vehicule de la connaissance de soi. D'oü mon interet pour une reconsideration ä la fois epistemologique et esthetique du cogito cartesien, place ä la fois au coup d'envoi des theories de la conscience et du renouvellement de la pensee scientifique moderne et contemporaine.Dans cette perspective, l'indice de verite des analyses et des syntheses produites par le chercheur, ne saurait prendre forme et force que dans la diathese d'une communaute de recherche, ä la fois specifique et historique. De lä, irresistiblement, le logos devient dialogos. Ce qui signifie que, d'une part, chaque conscience se voit de facto qualifiee pour participer ä l'elaboration ou ä la transmission des connaissances et que, d'autre part, pour qu'un acte de conscience individuel devienne epistemologiquement significatif, i l s'avere necessaire qu'il soit formule ä l'interieur d'une communaute de recherche. Laquelle, seule, peut ä la fois l'actualiser (et done le limiter) comme savoir historique, tout en l'universalisant comme savoir formel. Evitant ainsi le piege de l'hypostasier comme savoir absolu. Le concept de diathese ouvre done ä une epistemologie genetique, preoccupee autant de structure et de construction que d'histoire des sciences. Car ce n'est pas tant (mais aussi) la formalisation des enonces scientifiques que le degre de conscience de leur contenu conceptuel, qui determine avec le plus de rigueur le degre de verite des savoirs d'un individu au sein d'une communaute de recherche, ou d'une communaute de recherche dans l'histoire de la connaissance. (shrink)

Mes recherches actuelles tendent ä croiser l'analyse epistemologique avec l'esthetique pour degager le röle du sujet historique dans Velaboration des savoirs universels. II s'agit, pour moi, de deplacer le point de vue transcendantal, formel, afin de renouveler la perspective epistemologique par le concept de diathese. Deux questions se posent. Quel est l'apport du sujet 1) dans le processus de structuration formelle des savoirs? (construction, deconstruction, reconstruction de la connaissance), 2) dans la transmission - transformation des savoirs? (decontextualisation et actualisation historique (...) des paradigmes successifs).En diathese, la conscience de soi - chacun, chacune d'entre nous - ne s'envisage que traversee par la conscience d'autrui. II suffit de rompre avec le solipsisme identitaire des formalismes classiques, et leur determinisme problematique, pour constater avec stupefaction que l'autre tient, en soi, la part constitutive de notre biographic- de la langue de la mere ä la langue des autres. Langue etrangere, qui est pourtant le vehicule de la connaissance de soi. D'oü mon interet pour une reconsideration ä la fois epistemologique et esthetique du cogito cartesien, place ä la fois au coup d'envoi des theories de la conscience et du renouvellement de la pensee scientifique moderne et contemporaine.Dans cette perspective, l'indice de verite des analyses et des syntheses produites par le chercheur, ne saurait prendre forme et force que dans la diathese d'une communaute de recherche, ä la fois specifique et historique. De lä, irresistiblement, le logos devient dialogos. Ce qui signifie que, d'une part, chaque conscience se voit de facto qualifiee pour participer ä l'elaboration ou ä la transmission des connaissances et que, d'autre part, pour qu'un acte de conscience individuel devienne epistemologiquement significatif, i l s'avere necessaire qu'il soit formule ä l'interieur d'une communaute de recherche. Laquelle, seule, peut ä la fois l'actualiser (et done le limiter) comme savoir historique, tout en l'universalisant comme savoir formel. Evitant ainsi le piege de l'hypostasier comme savoir absolu. Le concept de diathese ouvre done ä une epistemologie genetique, preoccupee autant de structure et de construction que d'histoire des sciences. Car ce n'est pas tant (mais aussi) la formalisation des enonces scientifiques que le degre de conscience de leur contenu conceptuel, qui determine avec le plus de rigueur le degre de verite des savoirs d'un individu au sein d'une communaute de recherche, ou d'une communaute de recherche dans l'histoire de la connaissance. (shrink)

According to our opinion, Lukäcs's way does not lead to Marx but to himself and his independent philosophy and in spite of its inconsistency and mistakes it is still one of the most significant achievements of the XXt h century.

According to our opinion, Lukäcs's way does not lead to Marx but to himself and his independent philosophy and in spite of its inconsistency and mistakes it is still one of the most significant achievements of the XXt h century.

Comment l'humanite peut-elle resoudre les problemes d'une cite close ou d'un monde clos? Un des problemes essentiels pose est celui de l'agrandissement, qui rend les societes difficilement gouvernables et dangereuses, et qui renvoie done ä la question de la guerre. En 1932, Bergson est un des premiers philosophes ä pressentir la possibility de l'extermination, du genocide. Quelle est la place de la democratic d'une part et d'une societe des nations d'autre part dans la resolution des problemes mondiaux? Pour Bergson, la (...) democratic est la conception politique la plus eloignee de la nature, la seule qui transcende, dans ses intentions au moins, les conditions de la societe close. Est-ce que les organisations de cooperation efficaces sont mondiales? Les problemes mondiaux se resolvent, mais seulement si, explique Bergson, une portion süffisante de l'humanite est decidee ä les surmonter. L'humanite, qui n'a cesse de contredire la nature, est capable, pourtant, explique Bergson, de fournir l'efTort necessaire pour depasser ce qui reste clos en 1'homme, de l'ordre de l'immobilite de l'espece. Or cet effort vise la mobilite meme, une conscience synonyme d'invention et de liberte. Penser l'humanite et ses problemes n'a pas pour ambition de decouper des essences, mais d'intervenir dans un processus humain en mouvement. Les problemes mondiaux ne sont ni speciflquement anthropologiques ni speciflquement politiques, mais ä l'articulation des deux, dans une jointure entre theorie et pratique, la ou l'humanite est consciente et, partant, agissante. La conscience des problemes de l'humanite, reels et possibles, est chez Bergson plus metaphysique qu'anthropologique, dans le sens ou il ne s'agit pas d'envisager l'humanite dans l'ensemble de ses determinations, mais d'appliquer ä certains de ses evenements la double perspective du voir et du vouloir propre ä l'intuition metaphysique. (shrink)

Comment l'humanite peut-elle resoudre les problemes d'une cite close ou d'un monde clos? Un des problemes essentiels pose est celui de l'agrandissement, qui rend les societes difficilement gouvernables et dangereuses, et qui renvoie done ä la question de la guerre. En 1932, Bergson est un des premiers philosophes ä pressentir la possibility de l'extermination, du genocide. Quelle est la place de la democratic d'une part et d'une societe des nations d'autre part dans la resolution des problemes mondiaux? Pour Bergson, la (...) democratic est la conception politique la plus eloignee de la nature, la seule qui transcende, dans ses intentions au moins, les conditions de la societe close. Est-ce que les organisations de cooperation efficaces sont mondiales? Les problemes mondiaux se resolvent, mais seulement si, explique Bergson, une portion süffisante de l'humanite est decidee ä les surmonter. L'humanite, qui n'a cesse de contredire la nature, est capable, pourtant, explique Bergson, de fournir l'efTort necessaire pour depasser ce qui reste clos en 1'homme, de l'ordre de l'immobilite de l'espece. Or cet effort vise la mobilite meme, une conscience synonyme d'invention et de liberte. Penser l'humanite et ses problemes n'a pas pour ambition de decouper des essences, mais d'intervenir dans un processus humain en mouvement. Les problemes mondiaux ne sont ni speciflquement anthropologiques ni speciflquement politiques, mais ä l'articulation des deux, dans une jointure entre theorie et pratique, la ou l'humanite est consciente et, partant, agissante. La conscience des problemes de l'humanite, reels et possibles, est chez Bergson plus metaphysique qu'anthropologique, dans le sens ou il ne s'agit pas d'envisager l'humanite dans l'ensemble de ses determinations, mais d'appliquer ä certains de ses evenements la double perspective du voir et du vouloir propre ä l'intuition metaphysique. (shrink)

The paper centers on philosophy's major trends and trials at the turn of the XXt h and XXIs t century, its leading idea is based on several basic assumptions which can be summarized as follows: 1) the title is a query after XXt h-century philosophy's main achievements and their usefulness in the XXIs t ; 2) speaking about philosophy's achievements, the author particularly means its critical role in condemning and de-mystifying evil, dispelling illusion and myth, and disclosing untruth; 3) the (...) answer to the titular question is based on the entire paper's main assumption that there are three main problems of XXt h-century thought which - as a heritage - will be carrying over into the XXIs t. These problems are the problem of being (Sein), the problem of reason, and the problem of humanity (man). In connection with these problems the author formulates his main thesis that the twentieth century philosophy is characterized by three features which are the following: (a) anti-metaphysical disposition, (b) anti-rationalism, and (c) anti-humanism. (shrink)

The paper centers on philosophy's major trends and trials at the turn of the XXt h and XXIs t century, its leading idea is based on several basic assumptions which can be summarized as follows: 1) the title is a query after XXt h-century philosophy's main achievements and their usefulness in the XXIs t ; 2) speaking about philosophy's achievements, the author particularly means its critical role in condemning and de-mystifying evil, dispelling illusion and myth, and disclosing untruth; 3) the (...) answer to the titular question is based on the entire paper's main assumption that there are three main problems of XXt h-century thought which - as a heritage - will be carrying over into the XXIs t. These problems are the problem of being (Sein), the problem of reason, and the problem of humanity (man). In connection with these problems the author formulates his main thesis that the twentieth century philosophy is characterized by three features which are the following: (a) anti-metaphysical disposition, (b) anti-rationalism, and (c) anti-humanism. (shrink)

In the modern Continental tradition the word "subjectivity" is used to denote all that refers to a subject, its psychological-physical integrity represented by its mind, all that determines the unique mentality, mental state, and reactions of this subject. Subjectivity in this perspective has become on the Continent the central principle of philosophy.Modern Continental philosophy not only maintains the value of the subject and awakens an interest in genuine subjectivity. It evolves from the subject and subjective self-consciousness as Jundamento inconcusso. Thus (...) modern Continental philosophy should be understood and discussed as a philosophy of subjectivity. This paper deals, on the one hand, with the philosophical-historical reconstruction of modern philosophy of subjectivity from Descartes to Hegel, and, on the other hand, with an analysis and evaluation of Hegel's systematic approach to subjectivity in terms of philosophical tradition, especially from the viewpoint of the realization of the idealistic program of selfconsciousness represented by German idealists.Focusing on the major lines of development of the theory of subjectivity in Continental philosophy from Descartes to Hegel, 1(1) discuss the quandaries of early modern philosophers concerning subject and subjectivity and their attempts to resolve these quandaries by developing the fundamentally new (in contrast to previous tradition) understanding of subjectivity; (2) show that the issue of subjectivity was the basic topic of transcendental idealism; and (3) introduce Hegel's approach to subjectivity and briefly define its novel character. (shrink)

This paper argues that an important feature of Locke's doctrine concerning primary and secondary qualities is also central to Hume's thinking. Section one considers Locke's distinction, presenting it in terms of an "error theory." Locke argues that we attribute secondary qualities to objects and that in so doing give those qualities an ontological status they do not otherwise possess. Locke completes his theory by drawing on the concept of "resemblance" to explain why such mistakes occur in the first place. Section (...) two turns to Hume's philosophy, arguing that, despite his ambiguous comments on Locke and "the modern philosophy," he employs an error theory of the sort developed by Locke. This contention is supported by way of Hume's treatment of beauty as a secondary quality or sentiment which arises in an individual who judges an object beautiful. The paper concludes by emphasizing that, for Hume, this philosophical explanation of beauty stands in contrast to the error committed in common life where, as in Locke's account, people make the mistake of taking beauty to be in the object itself. (shrink)

Plato put housing second only to a secure food supply in the order of business of an emerging polis [Republic 2.369d); we argue, without quibbling over rank, that adequate housing ought to have fundamental priority, with health and education, in civil societies' planning, budgets, and legislative agendas. Something made explicit in the Platonic Laws, and often reiterated by today's poor — but as often forgotten by bureaucrats— is that human wellbeing, eudaimonia, is impossible for the homeless. That is, adequate housing (...) is valuable to human societies independently of its instrumental role in supporting the safety, health, and education of the populace. Currently, governments all too frequently end up undermining their own health and education programs as a direct result of neglecting the housing needs of the poor. Finally, we argue that governments ought now to be using the low-cost ways that already exist to provide, or to promote the provision of, better housing for their increasingly urbanized populations; further, even in those circumstances where it is necessary to subsidize housing, governments' most important role is to develop just regulatory and enforcement systems within which public- and private-sector investment can operate. (shrink)

The paper focuses on the trajectory of involvement of the ancient Greek philosophers, up to Callisthenes and Clearchus, in the competition of the two greatest oracles, the Delphic and the Didymian (Branchidae), on the one hand, and in the ideology of colonization of the East, on the other. While the pre-Socratic Milesian philosophers were close to the Branchidae, Plato and Aristotle supported Delphi and the Delphic Apollo-Dionysian syncretism. I examine how theoriginal interpretation of the famous Delphic maxim 'Know Yourself related (...) to political issues, e.g. implementation of the Platonic and Aristotelian political Utopias, and how after Alexander this interpretation lost its value. I conclude that from the very dawn, philosophy has been neither the first nor the last comer to the stage of world affairs, but already is inside them, acting as a creative intermediary within such problem-producing domains as politics and religion. (shrink)

The paper focuses on the trajectory of involvement of the ancient Greek philosophers, up to Callisthenes and Clearchus, in the competition of the two greatest oracles, the Delphic and the Didymian (Branchidae), on the one hand, and in the ideology of colonization of the East, on the other. While the pre-Socratic Milesian philosophers were close to the Branchidae, Plato and Aristotle supported Delphi and the Delphic Apollo-Dionysian syncretism. I examine how theoriginal interpretation of the famous Delphic maxim 'Know Yourself related (...) to political issues, e.g. implementation of the Platonic and Aristotelian political Utopias, and how after Alexander this interpretation lost its value. I conclude that from the very dawn, philosophy has been neither the first nor the last comer to the stage of world affairs, but already is inside them, acting as a creative intermediary within such problem-producing domains as politics and religion. (shrink)

The architectonic principle, as stated in Aristotle's Politics, is related to the arrangement of the arts, the technai, whereby it is argued that the leading art is the politike techne. Plato, in the Gorgias, has argued for an architectonic of crafts. Four technai provide the best, aei pros to beltiston therapeuousai, and they differ from the pseudo-crafts that offer pleasure while indifferent to the beltiston. The principle for arranging the architectonic is the pursuit of the best, whereby each practitioner of (...) a craft is expected to give logos concerning the "how" as well as the end of the craft. Extending the Platonic principle, Aristotle brings together under a unified theory the intelligibility of nature and human nature in line with the ends of episteme and techne, especially the politike techne. (shrink)

The architectonic principle, as stated in Aristotle's Politics, is related to the arrangement of the arts, the technai, whereby it is argued that the leading art is the politike techne. Plato, in the Gorgias, has argued for an architectonic of crafts. Four technai provide the best, aei pros to beltiston therapeuousai, and they differ from the pseudo-crafts that offer pleasure while indifferent to the beltiston. The principle for arranging the architectonic is the pursuit of the best, whereby each practitioner of (...) a craft is expected to give logos concerning the "how" as well as the end of the craft. Extending the Platonic principle, Aristotle brings together under a unified theory the intelligibility of nature and human nature in line with the ends of episteme and techne, especially the politike techne. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall discuss the relation between practical reason and emotions in Kant. First, I begin by explaining why knowledge of emotions is important for the transcendental project in the moral domain, understood as the claim that reason can determine our actions, in spite of our inclinations. Second, I explain the definition of affects and passions in Kant's philosophy and relate the two to feelings and the faculty of desire. I then question the possibility of controlling emotions, showing (...) that it is, if not an altogether impossible task, at least a difficult one. I show that while affects present a momentary loss of control, they can still coexist with practical reason. Passions, however, may ground principles for actions, and represent a serious danger for rational mastery over inclinations. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall discuss the relation between practical reason and emotions in Kant. First, I begin by explaining why knowledge of emotions is important for the transcendental project in the moral domain, understood as the claim that reason can determine our actions, in spite of our inclinations. Second, I explain the definition of affects and passions in Kant's philosophy and relate the two to feelings and the faculty of desire. I then question the possibility of controlling emotions, showing (...) that it is, if not an altogether impossible task, at least a difficult one. I show that while affects present a momentary loss of control, they can still coexist with practical reason. Passions, however, may ground principles for actions, and represent a serious danger for rational mastery over inclinations. (shrink)

The paper considers the multiplication of speech organs in Diderot's first novel Les Bijoux indiscrets. The main plot device of the novel—the talking "jewels" or female sex organs— enables Diderot to confront two different conceptions of the soul, the spiritual and material, in one and the same body. The voice coming from the head, traditionally held to be the seat of the soul, is contradicted by a voice that comes from that part of the body which is traditionally considered as (...) to be the least submissive to the head or mind. When the body rebels against the women who believe themselves to be spiritual substances in command of the body to which they are united, it is in fact the soul which is identical with the body or with its organization that really rebels against them, and objects to the false portrayal of its seat—and function— in the body. Strictly speaking, by unmasking the testimony of the women as a lie, the jewels expose the very spiritualist position itself as a lie. The paper then argues that, unlike the spiritualism propounded by the head, the spontaneous philosophy of the "indiscreet jewels" is one of forthright materialism. (shrink)

The paper considers the multiplication of speech organs in Diderot's first novel Les Bijoux indiscrets. The main plot device of the novel—the talking "jewels" or female sex organs— enables Diderot to confront two different conceptions of the soul, the spiritual and material, in one and the same body. The voice coming from the head, traditionally held to be the seat of the soul, is contradicted by a voice that comes from that part of the body which is traditionally considered as (...) to be the least submissive to the head or mind. When the body rebels against the women who believe themselves to be spiritual substances in command of the body to which they are united, it is in fact the soul which is identical with the body or with its organization that really rebels against them, and objects to the false portrayal of its seat—and function— in the body. Strictly speaking, by unmasking the testimony of the women as a lie, the jewels expose the very spiritualist position itself as a lie. The paper then argues that, unlike the spiritualism propounded by the head, the spontaneous philosophy of the "indiscreet jewels" is one of forthright materialism. (shrink)

In the modern Continental tradition the word "subjectivity" is used to denote all that refers to a subject, its psychological-physical integrity represented by its mind, all that determines the unique mentality, mental state, and reactions of this subject. Subjectivity in this perspective has become on the Continent the central principle of philosophy.Modern Continental philosophy not only maintains the value of the subject and awakens an interest in genuine subjectivity. It evolves from the subject and subjective self-consciousness as Jundamento inconcusso. Thus (...) modern Continental philosophy should be understood and discussed as a philosophy of subjectivity. This paper deals, on the one hand, with the philosophical-historical reconstruction of modern philosophy of subjectivity from Descartes to Hegel, and, on the other hand, with an analysis and evaluation of Hegel's systematic approach to subjectivity in terms of philosophical tradition, especially from the viewpoint of the realization of the idealistic program of selfconsciousness represented by German idealists.Focusing on the major lines of development of the theory of subjectivity in Continental philosophy from Descartes to Hegel, 1(1) discuss the quandaries of early modern philosophers concerning subject and subjectivity and their attempts to resolve these quandaries by developing the fundamentally new (in contrast to previous tradition) understanding of subjectivity; (2) show that the issue of subjectivity was the basic topic of transcendental idealism; and (3) introduce Hegel's approach to subjectivity and briefly define its novel character. (shrink)

Ancient Greek culture and its crown jewel philosophy grew out of a distinct realization that life is precarious. In order not to perish, humankind needs art {poiesis). With art human beings can live well and rise above the forces of destruction. Art in all of its forms proceeds by receiving guidance from logos, the principle of metron. Mythos is logos enacted. Through logos as art human beings can create value and be a value unto themselves.

Ancient Greek culture and its crown jewel philosophy grew out of a distinct realization that life is precarious. In order not to perish, humankind needs art {poiesis). With art human beings can live well and rise above the forces of destruction. Art in all of its forms proceeds by receiving guidance from logos, the principle of metron. Mythos is logos enacted. Through logos as art human beings can create value and be a value unto themselves.

This paper argues that an important feature of Locke's doctrine concerning primary and secondary qualities is also central to Hume's thinking. Section one considers Locke's distinction, presenting it in terms of an "error theory." Locke argues that we attribute secondary qualities to objects and that in so doing give those qualities an ontological status they do not otherwise possess. Locke completes his theory by drawing on the concept of "resemblance" to explain why such mistakes occur in the first place. Section (...) two turns to Hume's philosophy, arguing that, despite his ambiguous comments on Locke and "the modern philosophy," he employs an error theory of the sort developed by Locke. This contention is supported by way of Hume's treatment of beauty as a secondary quality or sentiment which arises in an individual who judges an object beautiful. The paper concludes by emphasizing that, for Hume, this philosophical explanation of beauty stands in contrast to the error committed in common life where, as in Locke's account, people make the mistake of taking beauty to be in the object itself. (shrink)

In this article I analyze a traditional interpretation of Platonic philosophy, which assumes a "theory of two worlds." I try to prove that it is difficult to accept such an interpretation. If one can say that the on tic status of ideas differs from the ontic status of undefined matter (the phenomenon is always for Plato a relation, a compositum, of idea and undefined matter), one nevertheless cannot say that accepting this necessarily results in accepting two independently existing worlds. For (...) then what would phenomena be, if they lacked the ideas that are the source of their determination; and what would ideas themselves be, if they referred to something other than the subject of their determination? Plato always opted for the existence of one world, although this world was for him ontically complex. (shrink)

In this article I analyze a traditional interpretation of Platonic philosophy, which assumes a "theory of two worlds." I try to prove that it is difficult to accept such an interpretation. If one can say that the on tic status of ideas differs from the ontic status of undefined matter, one nevertheless cannot say that accepting this necessarily results in accepting two independently existing worlds. For then what would phenomena be, if they lacked the ideas that are the source of (...) their determination; and what would ideas themselves be, if they referred to something other than the subject of their determination? Plato always opted for the existence of one world, although this world was for him ontically complex. (shrink)

In this article I analyze a traditional interpretation of Platonic philosophy, which assumes a "theory of two worlds." I try to prove that it is difficult to accept such an interpretation. If one can say that the on tic status of ideas differs from the ontic status of undefined matter (the phenomenon is always for Plato a relation, a compositum, of idea and undefined matter), one nevertheless cannot say that accepting this necessarily results in accepting two independently existing worlds. For (...) then what would phenomena be, if they lacked the ideas that are the source of their determination; and what would ideas themselves be, if they referred to something other than the subject of their determination? Plato always opted for the existence of one world, although this world was for him ontically complex. (shrink)

Nous proposons dans cette communication d'etudier le rapport entre «le reel empirique» et «la raison theorique» dans le Systeme hegelien. L'objectif est de detacher Tun de l'autre ces deux concepts afin de voir la structure interne de l'esprit qui ne depend pas de la necessite objective du processus empirique dudeveloppement de l'histoire. Dans ce detachement possible, il convient d'interroger la conception hegelienne de la liberte de l'homme dans le monde.

Nous proposons dans cette communication d'etudier le rapport entre «le reel empirique» et «la raison theorique» dans le Systeme hegelien. L'objectif est de detacher Tun de l'autre ces deux concepts afin de voir la structure interne de l'esprit qui ne depend pas de la necessite objective du processus empirique dudeveloppement de l'histoire. Dans ce detachement possible, il convient d'interroger la conception hegelienne de la liberte de l'homme dans le monde.

Aristotle assigns positive value to artistry and its skills, placing them below science but nearby. Fuller content for this view of art can be garnered from his technical treatises, especially the accounts of rhetoric and dialectic, where the subjectivity imported by the role of audiences is explored with subtlety. These ideas have influence on later philosophy of aesthetics and of technology, and they need to be pondered by those engaged in current debate in these areas.

Aristotle assigns positive value to artistry and its skills, placing them below science but nearby. Fuller content for this view of art can be garnered from his technical treatises, especially the accounts of rhetoric and dialectic, where the subjectivity imported by the role of audiences is explored with subtlety. These ideas have influence on later philosophy of aesthetics and of technology, and they need to be pondered by those engaged in current debate in these areas.

Plato wrote dialogues, and he praised dialectic, or conversation, as a suitable style for fruitful philosophical investigation. His works are great literature; and nodoubt this quality derives much from their form as dialogues. They also have definite philosophical content; and an important part of this content is their dialecticalepistemology. Dialectic is part of the content of Plato's philosophy. Can we reconcile this content with his literary style? I shall examine and sharpen the sense of this problem by referring to four (...) passages from different works of Plato: Parmenides 132b-c, Protagoras 351-2, Sophist 248-9, Republic 592. In these passages we can distinguish a main position, which represents what it is natural to label Platonism, from a line of thought which diverges from that position and yet also seems authentically Platonic. I argue that the solution to this tension lies in the notion of dialectic as a tentative and exploratory method of philosophy. This view of dialectic is in some conflict with Plato's official account of the method as guaranteed to deliver fundamental truth; but that conflict presents one more version of the phenomenon which I am exploring. The theory of dialectic provides philosophical support for the method of dialogue. That is how philosophy and literature are linked in Plato's pursuit of truth. (shrink)

Plato wrote dialogues, and he praised dialectic, or conversation, as a suitable style for fruitful philosophical investigation. His works are great literature; and nodoubt this quality derives much from their form as dialogues. They also have definite philosophical content; and an important part of this content is their dialecticalepistemology. Dialectic is part of the content of Plato's philosophy. Can we reconcile this content with his literary style? I shall examine and sharpen the sense of this problem by referring to four (...) passages from different works of Plato: Parmenides 132b-c, Protagoras 351-2, Sophist 248-9, Republic 592. In these passages we can distinguish a main position, which represents what it is natural to label Platonism, from a line of thought which diverges from that position and yet also seems authentically Platonic. I argue that the solution to this tension lies in the notion of dialectic as a tentative and exploratory method of philosophy. This view of dialectic is in some conflict with Plato's official account of the method as guaranteed to deliver fundamental truth; but that conflict presents one more version of the phenomenon which I am exploring. The theory of dialectic provides philosophical support for the method of dialogue. That is how philosophy and literature are linked in Plato's pursuit of truth. (shrink)

According to Kant, all finite rational beings are unconditionally bound to obey the moral law, expressed in the formula of the categorical imperative. The assent (the taking to be true) to this law is a practical knowledge, since its ground is objectively and subjectively sufficient. However, the immortality of the soul and the existence of God are not objects of practical knowledge but just objects of practical faith, of moral faith more precisely, for the assent to them has a barely (...) subjectively sufficient ground and is not a necessary consequence of this knowledge of the moral law. According to our interpretation of the Kantian philosophy, the ground of moral faith in God's existence and in the immortality of the soul will be found only in the finite rational being with a disposition (Gesinnung) for the actual fulfilment of the moral law. We will defend this interpretation and maintain that the radical evil of human nature, diagnosed by Kant, prevents all men from having a moral faith, which does not mean that this obstacle is unsurmountable, since the conversion of men into Good is possible. In our view, what makes this conversion feasible is the possibility (implicit in Kant's thought) of an irregular act of the free-will, that of adopting a good fundamental maxim. (shrink)

According to Kant, all finite rational beings are unconditionally bound to obey the moral law, expressed in the formula of the categorical imperative. The assent to this law is a practical knowledge, since its ground is objectively and subjectively sufficient. However, the immortality of the soul and the existence of God are not objects of practical knowledge but just objects of practical faith, of moral faith more precisely, for the assent to them has a barely subjectively sufficient ground and is (...) not a necessary consequence of this knowledge of the moral law. According to our interpretation of the Kantian philosophy, the ground of moral faith in God's existence and in the immortality of the soul will be found only in the finite rational being with a disposition for the actual fulfilment of the moral law. We will defend this interpretation and maintain that the radical evil of human nature, diagnosed by Kant, prevents all men from having a moral faith, which does not mean that this obstacle is unsurmountable, since the conversion of men into Good is possible. In our view, what makes this conversion feasible is the possibility of an irregular act of the free-will, that of adopting a good fundamental maxim. (shrink)

This paper draws upon my research into the posthumously published fragmentary remains of Hölderlin and Novalis's philosophical reflections to describe how their explanations of the possibility of self-consciousness are far more convincing than those provided by their philosophical contemporaries, and still have much to contribute to contemporary debates concerning the nature of 'consciousness' and 'selfhood.' The paper begins by sketching the background to their accounts of self-consciousness, that is, Fichte's critique of Kant's 'reflection model' of self-consciousness and the subsequent critique (...) of Fichte's 'solution' to this problem by more orthodox Kantians (such as F. I . Niethammer). I shall then present an account of how Hölderlin and Novalis may be said to enact a 'synthesis' of the opposed Kantian and Fichtean positions, to formulate an account of self-consciousness that on one hand acknowledges the power of—in Henrich's words—Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht into the inadequacy of the Kantian 'reflection model,' whilst, on the other hand, re-appropriating such a 'reflection model.' They thus argue that I am only aware of myself as T by means of a reflective act (in which I in some sense become my own intentional object), whilst at the same time arguing that such awareness nevertheless involves a non-reflective 'dimension.' For Hölderlin and Novalis, therefore, consciousness is always intentionally directed, and yet in being intentionally directed, it is also non-reflectively related to itself or "self-luminous" sea conception of consciousness which has similarities with Sartre's conception of the 'pre-reflective cogito.'. (shrink)

This paper draws upon my research into the posthumously published fragmentary remains of Hölderlin and Novalis's philosophical reflections to describe how their explanations of the possibility of self-consciousness are far more convincing than those provided by their philosophical contemporaries, and still have much to contribute to contemporary debates concerning the nature of 'consciousness' and 'selfhood.' The paper begins by sketching the background to their accounts of self-consciousness, that is, Fichte's critique of Kant's 'reflection model' of self-consciousness and the subsequent critique (...) of Fichte's 'solution' to this problem by more orthodox Kantians. I shall then present an account of how Hölderlin and Novalis may be said to enact a 'synthesis' of the opposed Kantian and Fichtean positions, to formulate an account of self-consciousness that on one hand acknowledges the power of—in Henrich's words—Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht into the inadequacy of the Kantian 'reflection model,' whilst, on the other hand, re-appropriating such a 'reflection model.' They thus argue that I am only aware of myself as T by means of a reflective act, whilst at the same time arguing that such awareness nevertheless involves a non-reflective 'dimension.' For Hölderlin and Novalis, therefore, consciousness is always intentionally directed, and yet in being intentionally directed, it is also non-reflectively related to itself or "self-luminous" sea conception of consciousness which has similarities with Sartre's conception of the 'pre-reflective cogito.'. (shrink)

In the sixth century BCE Ionian philosophers explained the sun as a mass of fire, sometimes as floating like a leaf or a cloud above the earth. It was thought to be fueled by moist vapors from the earth. In the f i f t h century philosophers typically envisaged the sun as a red-hot stone or a molten mass carried around by the force of a cosmic vortex. The decisive shift in explanations seems to result from the cosmology of (...) Parmenides, who recognized that the moon received its light from the sun, and hence inferred that the heavenly bodies were spherical solid bodies. The new theory required a new account of how the sun came to be hot. The sun was said to be heated either by being in a fiery region or by friction. The discovery of a large meteorite seemed to confirm the fifth-century theory. (shrink)