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  1.  40
    The Rule-Following Paradox and the Impossibility of Private Rule-Following.Jody Azzouni - unknown - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5.
    Kripke’s version of Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox has been influential. My concern is with how it—and Wittgenstein’s views more generally—have been perceived as undercutting the individualistic picture of mathematical practice: the view that individuals—Robinson Crusoes—can, entirely independently of a community, engage in cogent mathematics, and indeed have “private languages.” What has been denied is that phrases like “correctly counting” can be applied to such individuals because these normative notions can only be applied cogently in a context involving community standards. I attempt (...)
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  2.  23
    Reference and Knowledge of Reference.Gregory Bochner - unknown - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5:3.
    This paper addresses two issues: (a) Does linguistic competence with respect to a given sentence S (or an utterance of S) whose meaning is that p strictly require knowledge that S means that p ? (b) Of what kind is the entity which is the subject matter of the propositions embedded in the knowledge-that attributions constituting attributions of linguistic competence? These two issues are addressed in connection to some classical problems raised by names and direct reference theory. It will be (...)
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  3.  49
    Language Understanding and Knowledge of Meaning.Mitchell Green - unknown - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5:4.
    In recent years the view that understanding a language requires knowing what its words and expressions mean has come under attack. One line of attack attempts to show that while knowledge can be undermined by Gettier-style counterexamples, language understanding cannot be. I consider this line of attack, particularly in the work of Pettit and Longworth , and show it to be unpersuasive. I stress, however, that maintaining a link between language understanding and knowledge does not itself vindicate a cognitivist view (...)
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  4.  56
    Inferential Role and the Ideal of Deductive Logic.Thomas Hofweber - unknown - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5.
    There is a substantial question in the philosophy of language whether understanding a language involves knowledge of some metalinguistic facts about words. Does understanding a language in part consist in knowing what the words in that language mean? Most of the debate about this topic is carried out in the philosophy of language proper, where it seems to belong.1 But recently a subculture of philosophers has emerged who have argued that one of the lessons we must draw from issues in (...)
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  5.  29
    Having Linguistic Rules and Knowing Linguistic Facts.Peter Ludlow - unknown - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5:8.
    'Knowledge' doesn't correctly describe our relation to linguistic rules. It is too thick a notion . On the other hand, 'cognize', without further elaboration, is too thin a notion, which is to say that it is too thin to play a role in a competence theory. One advantage of the term 'knowledge'-and presumably Chomsky's original motivation for using it-is that knowledge would play the right kind of role in a competence theory: Our competence would consist in a body of knowledge (...)
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  6.  9
    Editor's Introduction.Douglas Patterson - unknown - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5.
    It can seem a truism that to understand a language is to know what its expressions mean.
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  7.  28
    On the Epistemology and Psychology of Speech Comprehension.Dean Pettit - unknown - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5:9.
    How do we know what other speakers say? Perhaps the most natural view is that we hear a speaker's utterance and infer what was said, drawing on our competence in the syntax and semantics of the language. An alternative view that has emerged in the literature is that native speakers have a non-inferential capacity to perceive the content of speech. Call this the perceptual view. The disagreement here is best understood as an epistemological one about whether our knowledge of what (...)
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