The phenomenological ontologies of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty have often been discussed in comparison to one another. Often, a Merleau-Pontian critique of Sartre, based on subjectivity, has been given. In doing so, both Sartre’s and Merleau-Ponty’s views on freedom, facticity, the body, and the Other has been discussed in great detail. Despite all of this, however, not much emphasis has been given to their understanding of negativity in its relation to the construction of Self as the Being-in-the-world of human-reality. Accordingly, this (...) article will focus on the relationship between subjectivity and negativity in Sartre and Merleau-Ponty with a specific emphasis on Merleau-Ponty’s critique of Sartre’s philosophy of negation. First, the article will expand on Sartre’s philosophy of negation and explain how he conceives the experience of nothingness as the foundation of subjectivity. Later, it will develop a Merleau-Pontian critique of Sartrean philosophy of negation (a) by claiming that Sartrean negativity degenerates into pure and absolute positive of the Cartesian duality, and most importantly, (b) by showing how Merleau-Ponty constructs a new dialectical ontology of Self, based on the world-as-me; a being that is seen as flesh. (shrink)

Édouard Glissant’s Poetics of Relation is unlikely to strike most readers as a sacred text. True, the design of the 1997 English paperback edition hints at something mysterious within. The seventeenth century map on the cover, glowing green and only partially visible from the front, disrupts the geographic orientation a map might be expected to provide. The seeming clarity of the title, author, and translator, is likewise unsettled by their placement, suspended above the surrounding white expanse. Yet this trace of (...) eeriness is easily dispelled by the physical book’s assertion of scholarly credentials. “Michigan,” the name of the university press publisher, prominent on the spine and back, also announces itself on the front cover, and the text on the back declares the book an aesthetic and political—but not sacred—project, with three blurbs praising the translator’s achievement and the author’s brilliance. The Library of Congress cataloguing information on the copyright page tells us that Poetics of Relation, Glissant’s third monograph, is first and foremost about his birthplace (Martinique--civilization, language, culture, nationalism, and literature of). Secondarily, according to the cataloguers, it is a book about the French connection (“6. Martinique—Dependency on France. 7. West Indies, French—Relations—France. 8. France—Relations—West Indies.”). Scholarly interpretations of Poetics of Relation are of course more expansive and exploratory than cataloguing’s brevity allows. Still, most who write about this strange and beautiful text focus on poetics and politics, with very few lingering over Glissant’s own claims about the importance of the sacred. (shrink)

This is an ironic moment for Edouard Glissant’s growing community of readers. So many are discovering Glissant’s work for the first time, myself included, in part because a fervent commitment to a politics of recognition now dominates in many corners of the humanities. This is ironic largely because while the choice to engage with Glissant might be motivated by an all too generalized logic of recognition, to read Glissant is to learn about how the basic premises underpinning this logic are (...) deeply misguided. The politics of recognition, as a term of art, after all, is built on the conceptual planks made available by the standardizing impulses of the nation-state form and capitalism combined. Glissant, on the other hand, is nothing if not a theorist calling fervently for a path forward that does not depend on the complicities found in the conceptual imperialism inherent to the bureaucratic standardizing practices that bolster both the nation-state and contemporary capitalism. Glissant calls instead for an approach that offers the philosophical building blocks for a politics of coordination, which is described in Patchell Markell’s book, Bound by Recognition (2003) as a politics of acknowledgement. This politics entails forgingan alternative approach to the self and other, to identity and place, and to social orders in general than what the politics of recognition espouses. (shrink)

In Difference and Repetition1 Deleuze sets out to critique the regime of representation and common sense by developing a new conception of difference and repetition in which difference and repetition become liberated from the coherence and continuity of a self or I.2 Difference in itself means that difference has become independent not only from representation, but also from an enduring or coherent self. Difference in itself and repetition in itself are the becoming different and the repetition of a fractured or (...) dissolved self, which Deleuze relates to both a larval subject3 and to a simulacrum.4 In Difference and Repetition Deleuze defines both the concepts of larval subject and simulacrum through the multiplicities and differential relations of the realm of the virtual.5 However, they are not the same. A simulacrum defines a condition in which an entity has become transformed into pure appearance in which nothing appears. A simulacrum is no longer an entity, but only the illusion of an entity.6 This is distinct from the larval subject because the larval subject is an embryonic entity, an entity in the process of formation.7 Through an analysis of the conceptual relation and distinction between larval subject and simulacrum in the first part of the essay, I will reinterpret Deleuze as a philosopher of indifference and the impossibility of repetition, which is a critique on the common idea that Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition is a philosophy of pure difference and pure repetition. Also, I will argue that Deleuze did not just develop a transcendental empiricism (a metaphysics of process), but a philosophy of the universal in itself (which is the collapse of metaphysics). The universal in itself emerges when experience collapses and when the self-determination of entities has become impossible. (shrink)

Édouard Glissant undertakes a radical rethinking of ontology. The relations of creolization have key political and cultural consequences: they destabilize the Eurocentric foundations of knowledge; they affirm hybridity; they dislocate the colonial systems of power. Yet they also have another, perhaps even more consequential ambition. As Glissant says in Poetics of Relation, creolization contains an “attempt to get at Being.” Relation operates at the ontological level as a process of creation of a different constitution of being. Relation, which names the (...) “new and original dimension allowing each person to be there and elsewhere,” the diffracted “totalité-monde,” the event by which “[t]he elementary reconstitutes itself absolutely,” brings forth an ontological autopoeisis and reframing of the world. (shrink)

In this essay, I connect my work on Archipelago studies with Édouard Glissant’s notions of relationality and Caribbean confederations to formulate what I denominate as the erotics of archipelagic thinking. My main goal is to share my process of thinking with and through Glissant’s work to focus on a series of theoretical gestures that have allowed me to propose modes of reading literary depictions of Caribbean con/federations that go beyond the binary opposition between colonialism and nationalism. I am performing an (...) exercise that I assign to my students when I teach the “Introduction to Critical Theory” course at the University of Miami. Instead of writing an essay with a short theoretical introduction followed by a detailed close reading of literary and cultural texts that illustrate a keyword or a theoretical insight, I conduct a methodological meditation in which I theorize the archipelagic as a form of relationality that configures an erotic imaginary beyond the nuclear family and towards affective networks. To think about the Caribbean as an archipelagic formation, I use my comparative work on the Antillean Confederation in the Hispanic Caribbean (1860-1898) and the West Indies Federation in the English Caribbean (1958-1962) as a historical context in which the region congealed as a network of locations “act[ing] in concert.". (shrink)

The pervasive patterns of neocolonialism long at work in the Francophone Caribbean, whereby the islands have been overseas departments of France for over seventy-five years, operate through a strategic metropolitan praxis of prohibition and exclusion that has long undermined a functional framework that enables and valorizes local sociocultural self-affirmation. While France has effectively sought to efface Guadeloupean and Martinican discourses of nationalism by integrating them into an overarching metropolitan framework of domination of the Other and the disavowal of difference, carried (...) out as part and parcel of a universalizing French policy of ethnopolitical homogeneity, the articulation of nationalist counterdiscourses and cartographies of resistance aimed at asserting the vibrancy and independence of a Franco-Caribbean identity have strategically shifted over time from the purely political to the domains of cultural identity and its corollaries of philosophy and performance. (shrink)

“De l’information du poème” qui clôt la partie “Éléments” dans Poétique de la Relation, représente pour le lectorat habitué à l'écriture glissantienne un chapitre assez surprenant voire confondant tant au niveau de l’approche du sujet traité que de sa mise en forme rhétorique, car c’est autour de l’opposition entre poésie et informatique que démarre son propos. Tout d’abord, on a l’impression que Glissant s'écarte des riches lieux-communs qui rythment et structurent sa pensée puisque, après quelques pages consacrées au baroque, son (...) attention se tourne ici de manière apparemment aléatoire vers l'antagonisme entre les nouvelles technologies et le parangon de la création littéraire. L'intérêt de Glissant pour la science et les nouvelles technologies n’est certes pas une anomalie lorsque l’on considère l’ensemble de son œuvre puisque cette dernière est en effet bâtie sur un éclectisme quasi programmatique qui se manifeste à travers la pensée du rhizome et le droit à l'opacité. Cependant, la dichotomie entre “ces deux ordres de la connaissance, le poétique et le scientifique” sur laquelle repose l'hypothèse de ce court chapitre semble trancher avec la rhétorique relationnelle qui caractérise son approche. Le penseur semble même souscrire aux poncifs d’un discours d'époque réduisant la complexité des nouvelles technologies et la magnitude de leurs effets sur la société contemporaine à une simple série d’oppositions entre, d’une part, une culture humaniste qui rassemblerait une communauté en présence autour de la parole poétique menacée, et, d’autre part, le pouvoir aliénant de l’information transmise à travers des circuits non-relationnels, impersonnels, sans voix et sans visage. (shrink)

In Spring 2022, the Theory Center Reading Group at Indiana University- Bloomington was devoted to the work of Martinican writer and thinker Édouard Glissant. We focused on his Poetics of Relation (Poétique de la Relation 1990, English tr. 1997), while also engaging with the recently translatedTreatise on the Whole-World (Traité du Tout-Monde, 1996, English tr. 2020). An award-winning fiction and poetry writer, Glissant (1928-2011) is arguably the most influential Caribbean thinker of the 20th century, who over the course of his (...) career developed a unique aesthetic and philosophical lexicon that has shaped the language and perspectives of successive generations of theorists in poststructuralism, postcolonialism, and globalization. His works cover virtually all genres and forms, from lyrical poetry to scholarly studies, from historical and experimental fiction to philosophical essays and political manifestos on topics as enduring and as urgent as slavery, racism, (neo)colonialism, creolization, and the “chaos-world.” Concepts such as opacity, Relation, “archipelagic” and “trembling” thinking, rhizomatic identity, and the “Whole-World” generated conversations with thinkers like Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Derek Walcott, Abdelkebir Khatibi, Achille Mbembe and others. Moreover, Glissant and his late idea of the “entour” have also influenced a younger generation of scholars in environmental humanities, intermediality and visual arts, and alter-globalization. In 2020, the Glissant Translation Project started publishing Glissant’s works in English in a comprehensive manner, attesting to the growing interest in his work far beyond the confines of his native Antilles and a Francophone audience to readers across the globe. (shrink)

This work argues that Simone Weil and Michel Henry appropriate two key insights from Marx—the critique of abstraction and the possibility of living labor—in order to philosophize subjectivity more actively. I place the two philosophers together because there is an uncanny similarity in their interpretations of Marx and specifically, in their use of his notion of praxis. The work begins with Weil’s and Henry’s criticism of philosophy for ignoring what is most human—praxis, or subjectivity. Following Marx’s _First Thesis on Feuerbach_, (...) both argue that philosophy problematically abstracts subjectivity by objectifying it. In other words, philosophy too often identifies the subject as a _thing_ that can be described, analyzed, and examined. Both assert that just as Capital deadens workers and their living laboring capacity, western philosophy is limited by various objectifications that function to deaden the individual, most notably _a knowledge of consciousness. _The two reject these objectifications and argue that Marx’s praxis offers another, more active, modality for considering subjectivity. The second half of this work focuses on what is unique to Weil and Henry: the suggestion that Marx’s living has not been adequately understood. Both suggest that Marx attends to praxis philosophically by creating a new method: one that emphasizes what Weil calls _experiencing_ and Henry designates _knowledge of life._ Attending to this method provides the operative distinction in my work: the difference between a philosophy that objectifies by relying on a _knowledge of consciousness_ and a philosophy that attends to _experiencing_ and depends upon a _knowledge of life_. The key for Weil and Henry is that Marx attends to the active dimension of subjectivity: _real_, lived, existence. For both, praxis and living labor point to a singular dimension of subjectivity that is irreducible to objectification, generalization or even to theorizing. In the concluding section I discuss how both thinkers’ interpretations of Marx provide a different modality for philosophy: the possibility of considering subjectivity subjectively by focusing on cultures that foster _knowledge of life_ and promote the singular dimension that is living labor. (shrink)

Contributor biographies for special issue Thinking with Glissant.

Recent literature regarding how Ricoeur’s work relates to the philosophy of technology appears prima facie to be contradictory. In one established interpretation, Ricoeur’s contributions are merely indirect as he did not engage with the empirical turn of the discipline in the 1980s and maintained a suspicious view of technology based on a profound concern with the distinction between persons and things. In this view, Ricoeur’s work does not add anything new to the discipline but is still valuable to the philosophy (...) of technology through other features of his corpus, such as his critical hermeneutics and narrative theory. In another interpretative approach, some argue Ricoeur adds to the field by directly thematizing technology when studying ethics and human capability–he cannot be thought of as merely ignoring the complex relationship between the social sphere and technology. The present paper offers a dialectical analysis of these interpretative approaches and argues that these positions are not mutually exclusive, but rather capture complementary aspects about the nature of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic and political projects. At one level, Ricoeur engages with core themes of philosophy of technology by exploring the ambiguity of specific technologies and techniques and their implications to social, cultural, and political spheres; in doing so, Ricoeur contributes directly to the field by avoiding the reduction of meaning into merely technical questions. On the other hand, it is also true that Ricoeur, particularly in the main thematic areas of his great works since the 1970s, has not been directly involved with specific questions of how different recent technologies are intertwined with social, political, and ethical aspects, and his emphasis against a reductionist type of technical mentality distanced him from a closer engagement with specific technological issues. In this sense, most of his contributions to the philosophy of technology are indirect. Nevertheless, this paper wants to emphasize that this dialectic analysis invites us to recognize the richness and potential of Ricoeur’s thought to understand how technologies are shaping our experiences in the world. The recently published volume Interpreting Technology, edited by Wessel Reijers, Alberto Romele, and Mark Coeckelbergh, is a powerful example of such potential. (shrink)

While Henry and Levinas are often juxtaposed, little attention has been given to their shared views on pain and pleasure. Both phenomenologists converge on the argument that an adequate account of pain and pleasure requires a critical confrontation with the theory of intentionality. This raises further questions. What roles do interiority and exteriority play in pain and pleasure? Should they be conceived as different tonalities of one essence or as heterogenous phenomena? Despite their shared critique of intentionality, Henry and Levinas (...) respond differently to these questions. We argue that Henry’s account suffers from an imprisonment in immanence, leading to a homogenous account of pain and pleasure as derivatives of one essence. In our view, Levinas points toward a more fruitful phenomenological account, both in so far as he does not divorce pain and pleasure from exteriority, and also in the way his phenomenology preserves the heterogeneity of pleasure and pain. (shrink)

In an effort to complicate the human subject, this article considers the critical insights of psychoanalytic thinker Jacques Lacan, focusing in particular on his essay, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I As Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience” (1949). ‘The Mirror Stage’ explains how we break from nature, differentiate ourselves from the animal and graduate from primordial subsistence as psychically folded into the first lightning strike of recognition that arrives with/as self-reflection. Curiously however, in sustaining his argument (...) about the human specificity of the mirror stage phenomenon, Lacan relies upon ethological research on nonhuman self-recognition. This reliance of his argument on the figure of the animal has largely been interpreted in two ways: as an inconsequential detail, undeserving of theoretical exploration, or, as confirmation of Lacan’s self-evident anthropocentrism. For instance, Buse (2017) and Ziser (2007) have noted the significant discrepancies within ‘The Mirror Stage’ between Lacan’s understanding of primate self-recognition, and that of his main source, Wolfgang Köhler. Although, both thinkers hold the position that Lacan’s treatment of the animal in ‘The Mirror Stage’ provides sufficient textual evidence for a reading that endorses human exceptionalism. Departing from this prior research, I focus on these same textual irregularities within ‘The Mirror Stage,’ yet see something quite different taking place in these moments. In order to preserve the complexity of Lacanian material, in a detailed examination utilising close reading, I pick apart long passages of both Lacan and his sources and conclude that Lacan’s position on the animal is both ambivalent and ambiguous in character. This culminates in a lack of clarity regarding how to understand Lacan’s position on both the animal, and correlatively the human. In turn, acknowledging this uncertainty provides a novel way to approach this seminal text, and a justification to revise accusations of anthropocentrism, alongside dominant interpretations more broadly. (shrink)

This article seeks to explore the relevance of compromise in Raymond Aron’s essays. The concept of compromise has never been subjected to critical scrutiny in his works. The paper offers a new interpretation of R. Aron’s democratic theory by arguing that “the sense of compromise”, mainly set out in Democracy and Totalitarianism, is a foundational and pivotal concept to highlight the specifics of his liberal thought and his understanding of democratic pluralism. It aims to provide a critical analysis, presenting a (...) focused exploration of three types of compromise, broken down into three areas (the political-pluralist compromise; the economic compromise; the foreign policy compromise). In each of these cases, key qualities and limitations of compromise solutions for deadlocked controversies are outlined. The article argues that, for R. Aron, economic compromise is the easiest to achieve. The paper further discusses possible criteria that can help to discriminate moral from immoral compromises. It concludes that “the sense of compromise” is inseparable from any serious attempt to think afresh R. Aron’s democratic theory. (shrink)

In the wake of Black Atlantic terror, enslavement, colonialism and violence, is there a place for literature? Where is there a place for the author? In other words, to rethink poet Muriel Rukeyser’s question, where is there a place for Black Atlantic literature and authorship? Proposing Paul Gilroy’s The Black Atlantic as the window through which to answer these questions, this essay focuses on the place for/of literature and authorship as Gilroy thinks them through an engagement with Richard Wright’s life (...) and work, and also through the work of other Black Atlantic authors, primarily C.L.R. James, Toni Morrison, Aimé Césaire and Édouard Glissant. These figures show that the Black Atlantic author must persist in tenaciously writing through and within the violence that defines their experiences, revealing the necessity of such literature and the importance of producing such a literary practice. This essay poses that there is no place for Black Atlantic authorship if the author is not grappling, writing, and “living with,” as Toni Morrison would suggest, the unspeakable violence and absolute terrors of experience—scenes of horror must be (re)made through cultural production or there can be no poesis. This process of transformation amid (dis)location is grounded in the Black Atlantic experience of terror and diaspora, about which Gilroy writes, concluding his final chapter with an analysis of the Jewish diasporic experience. Because this essay engages a Jewish poet’s provocation in order to think the Black Atlantic, it is crucial to interrogate both the significance of this invocation and Gilroy’s assessment of the intimate interconnection and solidarity between the Black and Jewish experiences. (shrink)

Le texte propose une analyse de l'acte de manger chez Emmanuel Levinas. Plus spécifiquement, nous nous concentrons sur le manger et le travail. Le manger et le travail sont deux types d’appropriation possibles du monde par l’ipséité. Notre but est de décrire les deux types d’appropriation du monde chez Emmanuel Levinas et de les comparer. On en tirera des possibles conséquences pour une pensée écologique dans la conclusion parce que le manger éfface les frontières entre l'humain et le non-humain. Il (...) s'agit d'un essai écologique de déconstruire le rapport entre l’humain et le monde, qui se montre dans l’acte de manger. (shrink)

A number of claims made by Derrida concerning Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of Husserl will be carefully considered and evaluated here. First, Derrida’s claim that Merleau-Ponty’s mis-interprets Husserl’s letter to Lévy-Bruhl will be challenged. Secondly, Derrida’s claim that his criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology can be applied just as well to Merleau-Ponty’s will be challenged. Thirdly, it is a careful consideration of textual evidence that will be used to support these challenges. Finally, Merleau-Ponty’s late lectures will take us back to the Lévy-Bruhl letter (...) and finally to Merleau-Ponty’s own phenomenology of language, one that integrates perception and language and yet that still privileges not eidetic essences or linguistic expression but perception as its primary term. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s metaphor of seduction suggests that language catches philosophers in the trap of metaphysics. Nietzsche uses the poetic powers of language to fight against this metaphysical language. However, his use of the metaphor of truth as a woman seems to seduce him back in metaphysics. Metaphors become seductive because of their rhetorical and performative power. One must therefore be wary of the seduction of metaphors when attempting at revaluating the metaphysics of language. Hélène Cixous undertakes such a task, using a (...) poetic language in order to escape the metaphysical dualisms embedded in language without falling back into its traps. (shrink)

Conventionally distinguished as a problem for medical professionals, experiences of embodied pain have prompted a significant set of themes and perspectives in the Continental tradition of philosophy. The discipline of phenomenology, in particular, offers thought-provoking approaches for understanding the fullness and diversity of living one’s pain in everyday life. In contrast to scientific practices that tend to take for granted the subjective structures of human consciousness in action, the phenomenological framework of lived experience offers profoundly subtle accounts for explaining how (...) a person’s pain alters their ways of relating to themselves, to others, and to the wider world around them. In recent years, scholars of phenomenology have undertaken extensive research on the complex relationality between health and human consciousness, including the behavioral grids and existential textures that come with that relationship. Greatly influenced by twentieth century phenomenology, this new development in the scholarship has undergone three distinct waves. The first wave focused on the work of Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer to develop a hermeneutic of healthcare practice; the second wave incorporated Maurice Merleau-Ponty to understand illness from an increasingly carnal point of view; and the third and most recent wave has relied primarily on Edmund Husserl to construct the intentionality involved with the consciousness of pain. (shrink)

While Ricœur's œuvre is commonly known as hermeneutic philosophy, it is evident that he also deals with major problems dialectically - a discipline often put in opposition to hermeneutics. In this paper, I offer an interpretation of the relationship between dialectic and hermeneutic regarding Ricœur's early theory of the self, which he developed in the 1960s, beginning with the second volume of his Philosophie de la volonté, Finitude et Culpabilité. I argue that hermeneutic and dialectic refer to each other by (...) combining a structural model of reflexive self-consciousness and a mediation of consciousness with a transcendent other. Only their interrelation allows for a sufficient theory of concrete reflexion. (shrink)