What to do with Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory? An Interview with Jacques Rancière Conducted by Andrea Allerkamp, Katia Genel, and Mariem Hazoume Translated by Owen Glyn-Williams This interview was originally published in French as “Que faire de la théorie esthétique d’Adorno?” in Où en sommes-nous avec la Théorie esthétique d'Adorno?.

Overview of the special issue on Jacques Ranciere and Critical Theory, along with some additional thoughts.

Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Rancière treat speech as the medium for politics and, likewise, both diagnose the pathologies that follow from blockages on civic speech. That said, these broad commonalities give rise to significant divides regarding the social ontology of language, the forms of power that attend linguistic exchange, and how speech informs democratic agency. Ultimately, the essay will argue that Rancière highlights the political deficits within deliberative commitments to democratic values. In doing so, his challenge yields broader insights for (...) a democratic politics of speech and the linguistic resources that facilitate such a politics. (shrink)

While Jacques Rancière has never been affiliated in any way with the Institute for Social Research, this article examines the extent to which his work could be considered “Critical Theory” in the sense most closely associated with the Frankfurt School tradition. I argue that Rancière’s work is not critical theory in this narrow sense; I further lay out a kind of “Rancièrean” criticism of the very project of Frankfurt School Critical Theory. This in turn allows me to sketch out a (...) version of Critical Theory that might survive a Rancièrean critique. Even by this renewed conception, however, I argue that Rancière’s own work still cannot be considered a project of Critical Theory; but I finish the essay by laying out what a possible “Rancièrean” Critical Theory might look like, and why I think such a project would be valuable. (shrink)

Although Jacques Rancière and Jürgen Habermas share several important commitments, they interpret various core concepts differently, viewing politics, democracy, communication, and disagreement in conflicting ways. Rancière articulates his democratic vision in opposition to important elements of Habermas’s approach. Critics contend that Habermas cannot account for the dynamics of command, exclusion, resistance, and aesthetic transformation involved in Rancière’s understanding of politics. In particular, the prominent roles Habermas affords to communicative rationality and consensus have led people to think that he cannot grasp (...) the radical forms of political disagreement Rancière describes. While some have viewed Rancière as offering a trenchant challenge to Habermas, I will contend that Rancière’s critique is less compelling than some have thought. Habermasian understandings of third personal speech and aesthetic expression are nuanced and adaptable enough to evade Rancière’s criticisms. I conclude by suggesting that Habermasian theorists have also developed crucial forms of social and political critique that Rancière’s theory systematically excludes. (shrink)

This paper explores the relation between perception, invizibilization and recognizability in the work of Rancière, Honneth and Butler. Recognizability is the term employed here to indicate the perceptual process that necessarily occurs prior to a normative or ethical act of recognition and that provides the conditions that make recognition possible. The notion of recognizability points to the fact that perception is not merely a disinterested surveying of the perceptual field but indicates that it is already evaluative in the sense that (...) others are immediately distinguishable from other objects. When a failure of recognizability occurs, it is not due to the fact that the other has not been seen in a literal sense but instead that she has been intentionally ignored or invisibilized. The suggestion made here is that despite their different approaches, a comparison and dialogue between these three thinkers highlights the importance of this constellation of issues for critical theory. (shrink)

In Oneself as Another, Paul Ricoeur proposes a new ethical theory that integrates Aristotle’s eudaemonist virtue ethical outlook with Immanuel Kant’s deontological ethics. The goal is ambitious, and recent discussions in anglophone philosophy have made its undertaking look to be founded on a confusion. The new argument goes that the ethical justification at work in the Aristotelian and Kantian traditions is of opposed kinds. Attempts to integrate them, as a result, are either incoherent, or, in the best case, simply minor (...) variations on one or another predominant ethical outlook. The essay grants the opposed kinds thesis and argues that despite its apparent impossibility, Ricoeur nevertheless does succeed in integrating two ethical approaches, including their different sources of justification, to produce a novel and thus ethically interesting theory. The essay closes, finally, with a reflection on how this method might be developed one step further to include an insight by Emmanuel Levinas on the look of the Other, and so make for an ethics of recognition. (shrink)

The classical distinction between leisure and work is often used to define features of the emancipated life. In Aristotle leisure is defined as time devoted to purposeful activity, and distinguished from the labour time expended merely to produce life’s necessities. In critical theory, this classical distinction has been adapted to provide an image of emancipated life, as purposively driven, fulfilling and meaningful activity. Aspects of this adapted definition undermine the classical leisure/work distinction to the extent that the demand for meaningful (...) work, i.e., a leisure-work conjunction, is now used as a critical perspective on unfulfilling, oppressive labour. Rancière, however, is critical both of this idea of an extended franchise for leisure and of its dependence on craft and artisanal labour as the model of satisfying, skilled work. Instead of Aristotelian leisure, or ‘fulfilling’ work, Rancière identifies in the state of reverie an alternative marker for the emancipated life. The theme is consistent across the scattered archival, historiographical, philosophical, literary and aesthetic contexts his writing treats. But since reverie is defined as disengagement from action, the position raises a number of difficulties. This article examines how Rancière connects reverie to emancipation. It focuses on two questions: the nature of the relation between his definition of reverie and the classical, Aristotelian concept of action; and, whether, given the constitutive non-relation between reverie and action that he outlines, Rancière’s position can address the persistent problem in critical theory of the motivation for the emancipated life. It is argued that his highlighting of the potential communicative significance of modes and scenes of emancipated life is relevant to this problem. The key argument is that rather than developing a ‘theory’, his approach to emancipation focuses on and values communicable experiences of emancipation, and that states of reverie are one such type of valued experience. (shrink)

Derrida always stressed the importance of his engagement with Heidegger and often returned throughout his life to different aspects of Heidegger’s thought. With the recent publication of his 1964-65 course, Heidegger: The Question of Being and History greater insight is now possible into the exact terms of Derrida’s early engagement with Heidegger and the significance he would accord it in the major works of 1967 and beyond. With the reception of this text just beginning, many lines of interpretation are being (...) unfolded. However, one aspect not yet addressed in this early reception which will be crucial for approaching and orienting this work is the theme of auto-affection. The concept of auto-affection is important for assessing Derrida’s Heidegger course for two reasons. Firstly, Derrida understands auto-affection to be Heidegger’s most radical figuration of temporality in the period of Being and Time. Secondly, tracing Derrida’s early focus on auto-affection in Heidegger can provide an important context for understanding the initial development of what would become a prominent theme in Derrida’s own work. My argument in this paper is structured in three sections. In the first, I give a brief introduction to Derrida’s course. I then present the theme of auto-affection in this course and demonstrate its central importance. In conclusion, I show how Derrida’s treatment of this theme in the context of his early Heidegger engagement can be seen to look forward to his employment of auto-affection in Speech and Phenomena. (shrink)

Cet article propose une réflexion sur la protection des capacités au travail à partir de Martha Nussbaum. Sa visée est de penser les conditions institutionnelles de l’accès aux capacités, dans le cadre du travail, en mettant en évidence les points de tension entre l’approche des capacités et d’autres approches libérales, contractualiste ou utilitariste, qui structurent l’organisation du travail dans la société de marché. Libérale d’un point de vue politique dans la lignée d’Emmanuel Kant, tout en s’intéressant comme Aristote et à (...) Karl Marx à la question des seuils et des libertés substantielles, Nussbaum permet de souligner dans le même temps les tensions qui traversent le travail contemporain et les conditions d’un développement humain au travail à partir d’une liste de capacités centrales et d’un seuil d’accès aux ressources nécessaires pour les mettre en œuvre. L’article s’appuie sur cette approche des capacités et la théorie de la justice de Nussbaum pour analyser les limites du droit, souligner les logiques institutionnelles qui conditionnent l’accès aux capacités au travail, et de distinguer les responsabilités collectives vis-à-vis du développement humain au travail. (shrink)

A translation of a dialogue between Evelyne Grossman and Jacob Rogozinski on Artaud, Deleuze, and the status of the ego.

A review of Drew Dalton, The Ethics of Resistance: Tyranny of the Absolute, pp. 154.

Tristan Garcia’s Form and Object has been framed primarily as a contribution to object oriented metaphysics. In this article, I shall explicate and defend four claims that bring it closer to the modern critical tradition: 1) that Garcia’s Form and Object can be read, profitably, within the tradition of reflection upon the nature of possessions, self-possession and possessiveness; 2) that to read the book in this way is to see Garcia as the French heir to C. B. McPherson although it (...) will be argued that what this amounts to is that while McPherson was the anti-Locke, so to speak, Garcia is the anti-Rousseau; 3) that this framing has significant consequences for our reception of Form and Object in that it can be understood as a book that not only marks a moment in debates surrounding speculative realism and object oriented ontology but that it also, and primarily, marks an important moment in debates about the encroachment of things and the culture of possession that, in part, defines modernity; 4) that there is a novel ontological position within Form and Object, one that is neither relational nor individualist, that presents a challenging account of ‘the chance and the price’ of living after possession and how to overcome the deleterious effects of contemporary consumer societies. (shrink)

My short essay on Irigaray’s relation to Nietzsche could be divided into the beginnings of six arguments: First, Nietzsche continues to hold a special place in Irigaray’s thinking. Second, Amante Marine is an important part of Irigaray’s elemental philosophy. Third, Irigaray’s insistence on depth over surface in Amante Marine points to two different ways Nietzsche has been taken up in French Philosophy, which could be characterized as the difference between surface and depth. Fourth, Irigaray’s Amante Marine anticipates the most recent (...) direction in Nietzsche scholarship, which focuses on plants and the earth. Fifth, following Nietzsche, Irigaray suggests that we can learn lessons about sharing the earth from plants. And, finally, Irigaray’s elemental philosophy resonates with my own conception of earth ethics as responsiveness to other earthlings and our environment, which I develop in my recent book Earth and World. (shrink)

Because Europeans have shaped scholarly discourse about Southeast Asia and Buddhism, movement away from understanding “pure” Theravada Buddhism through religious and philosophical doctrine was a technique to decenter Western readings and shows how practitioners shaped their own beliefs. Stanley Tambiah called for academics to pay more attention to common beliefs of laypeople and everyday practices of monks. This, in turn, placed anthropologists at the center of collecting knowledge about Theravada Buddhism. Yet French philosophers continued, through their theories, to influence the (...) structure of anthropological analysis of Theravada cultures, particular through gift exchanges. In this paper, I will explore ways Derrida’s theories of gifts and ghosts can add to anthropological studies of Southeast Asian communities while also helping to recover philosophical and ethical components of Theravada practices. (shrink)