Familism, patriotism, and cosmopolitanism form three concentric circles in a person's life. Each of these respective human communities constitutes an independent good for the good life. The value of family life does not depend on the value of country, and the world. Nor does the value of patriotic life or cosmopolitan life depend on that of family life. Shifting allegiances between these circles entails reallocating loyalty and dedication, and thus both enriches one's life and incurs a cost to it. In (...) the view that I construct here, a philosophy of the good life articulates its own vision of the ideal allocation of loyalty and dedication among these three or more spheres. While cosmopolitanism has its own value and good, it also comes with a cost; proponents of cosmopolitanism-including Confucian cosmopolitansoften overlook such a cost. I argue for a "dynamic harmony" approach to cosmopolitanism that takes into account the cost it incurs on people's local commitments. (shrink)

This paper is about the following questions: how, exactly, do the historical Confucian philosophers account for the ethical value of cosmopolitan care? More specifically, how do Mengzi (Mencius) and later Mengzi-inspired Confucian philosophers conceive of the ethical basis for caring about non-citizen strangers? These questions are both important in their own right and also offer a way of testing the limits of the widespread characterization of Confucian ethics as relational or role-based. I explore two possibilities in detail. The first is (...) that moderate care for non-citizen strangers is good insofar as it is consistent with “graded love” or “care with distinctions,” which itself is a necessary feature of humane virtue (ren 仁). The second is that care for non-citizen strangers is based on roles or relationships between the agent and the non-citizen, perhaps as members of a larger (trans-national or interstate) community. I argue that the first possibility is far more consistent with the texts than the latter, and that the latter stretches the notion of a (social) relationship too far. I also draw some conclusions about the ways in which Mengzi-style Confucian ethics is and is not properly characterized as “relational,” and note some advantages of Mengzian cosmopolitanism rightly understood. (shrink)