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  1.  4
    Speaking, Inferring, Arguing. On the Argumentative Character of Speech.Cristina Corredor - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne 34 (2):43-64.
    Within the Gricean framework in pragmatics, communication is understood as an inferential activity. Other approaches to the study of linguistic communication have contended that language is argumentative in some essential sense. My aim is to study the question of whether and how the practices of inferring and arguing can be taken to contribute to meaning in linguistic communication. I shall suggest a two-fold hypothesis. First, what makes of communication an inferential activity is given with its calculability, i.e. with the possibility (...)
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  2.  1
    In Defence of a Fallacy.Richard Davies - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne 34 (2):25-42.
    In light of recent developments in argumentation theory, we begin by considering the account that Aristotle gives of what he calls sophistical refutations and of the usefulness of being able to recognise various species of them. His diagnosis of one of his examples of the grouping that he labels epomenon is then compared with a very recent account of the matter, which, like Aristotle, calls on us to attribute a mistake or confusion to anyone who uses this kind of argument. (...)
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  3.  2
    Slippery Slopes Revisited.Martin Hinton - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne 34 (2):9-24.
    The aims of this paper are to illustrate where previous attempts at the characterisation of slippery slope arguments have gone wrong, to provide an analysis which better captures their true nature, and to show the importance of achieving a clear definition which distinguishes this argument structure from other forms with which it may be confused. The first part describes the arguments of Douglas Walton and others, which are found wanting due to their failure to capture the essence of the slippery (...)
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  4.  2
    Speaker’s Referent and Semantic Referent in Interpretive Interaction.Palle Leth - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne 34 (2):65-80.
    In this paper I argue that the notions of speaker’s reference and semantic reference—used by Kripke in order to counter the contentious consequences of Donnellan’s distinction between the referential use and the attributive use of definite descriptions—do not have any application in the interpretive interaction between speaker and hearer. Hearers are always concerned with speaker’s reference. Either, in cases of cooperation, as presented as such by the speaker or, in cases of conflict, as perceived as such by the hearer. Any (...)
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  5. Preface.Piotr Stalmaszczyk Martin Hinton - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne 34 (2):5-8.
    The disciplines of general philosophy, philosophy of language, and linguistics have in common an interest in saying what it is that we can infer: what meaning, what truth; and how those inferences are to be justified. To do this, philosophers and linguists have endlessly discussed the concepts of truth and of meaning, and also the means of inference and its degrees of reasonableness and reliability. These debates do not narrow down to definitive answers, rather they broaden and spread their concerns (...)
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  6.  1
    Against the Quotational Theory of Meaning Ascriptions.Andrea Raimondi - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne 34 (2):81-103.
    According to the quotational theory of meaning ascriptions, sentences like “‘Bruder means brother” are abbreviated synonymy claims, such as “‘Bruder means the same as ‘brother’”. After discussing a problem with Harman’s version of the quotational theory, I present an amended version defended by Field. Then, I address Field’s responses to two arguments against the theory that revolve around translation and the understanding of foreign expressions. Afterwards, I formulate two original arguments against both Harman’s and Field’s versions of the theory. One (...)
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  7. Kantian Pragmatism and the Habermasian Anti-Deflationist Account of Truth.Tomoo Ueda - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne 34 (2):105-127.
    In this paper, I aim to characterize the pragmatist and anti-deflationist notions of truth. I take Habermas’s rather recent discussion and present the interpretation that his notion of truth relies on the reliabilist conception of knowledge rather than the internalist conception that defines knowledge as a justified true belief. Then, I show that my interpretation is consistent with Habermas’s project of weak naturalism. Finally, I draw some more general implications about the pragmatist notion of truth.
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  8.  3
    The Problematic Nature of Gödel’s Disjunctions and Lucas-Penrose’s Theses.Arnon Avron - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne 34 (1):83-108.
    We show that the name “Lucas-Penrose thesis” encompasses several different theses. All these theses refer to extremely vague concepts, and so are either practically meaningless, or obviously false. The arguments for the various theses, in turn, are based on confusions with regard to the meaning of these vague notions, and on unjustified hidden assumptions concerning them. All these observations are true also for all interesting versions of the much weaker thesis known as “Gö- del disjunction”. Our main conclusions are that (...)
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  9.  3
    Using Kreisel’s Way Out to Refute Lucas-Penrose-Putnam Anti-Functionalist Arguments.Jeff Buechner - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne 34 (1):109-158.
    Georg Kreisel suggested various ways out of the Gödel incompleteness theorems. His remarks on ways out were somewhat parenthetical, and suggestive. He did not develop them in subsequent papers. One aim of this paper is not to develop those remarks, but to show how the basic idea that they express can be used to reason about the Lucas-Penrose-Putnam arguments that human minds are not finitary computational machines. Another aim is to show how one of Putnam’s two anti-functionalist arguments avoids the (...)
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  10.  2
    Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem and the Anti-Mechanist Argument: Revisited.Yong Cheng - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne 34 (1):159-182.
    This is a paper for a special issue of Semiotic Studies devoted to Stanislaw Krajewski’s paper. This paper gives some supplementary notes to Krajewski’s on the Anti-Mechanist Arguments based on Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. In Section 3, we give some additional explanations to Section 4–6 in Krajewski’s and classify some misunderstandings of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem related to AntiMechanist Arguments. In Section 4 and 5, we give a more detailed discussion of Gödel’s Disjunctive Thesis, Gödel’s Undemonstrability of Consistency Thesis and the definability (...)
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  11.  2
    Understanding, Expression and Unwelcome Logic.Štěpán Holub - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne 34 (1):183-202.
    In this paper I will attempt to explain why the controversy surrounding the alleged refutation of Mechanism by Gödel’s theorem is continuing even after its unanimous refutation by logicians. I will argue that the philosophical point its proponents want to establish is a necessary gap between the intended meaning and its formulation. Such a gap is the main tenet of philosophical hermeneutics. While Gödel’s theorem does not disprove Mechanism, it is nevertheless an important illustration of the hermeneutic principle. The ongoing (...)
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  12.  3
    Diagonal Anti-Mechanist Arguments.David Kashtan - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne 34 (1):203-232.
    Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem is sometimes said to refute mechanism about the mind. §1 contains a discussion of mechanism. We look into its origins, motivations and commitments, both in general and with regard to the human mind, and ask about the place of modern computers and modern cognitive science within the general mechanistic paradigm. In §2 we give a sharp formulation of a mechanistic thesis about the mind in terms of the mathematical notion of computability. We present the argument from (...)
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  13.  1
    Preface.Roman Kossak - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne 34 (1):5-8.
    The articles in this issue can be divided into three groups. Krajewski’s article, Yong Cheng’s contribution, and a short note by Rudy Rucker, provide detailed mathematical analysis of Lucas-Penrose type arguments. In the second group, with articles by Arnon Avron, Stepan Holub, Panu Raaikiainen, and Albert Visser, the authors discuss the status and various methodological and technical problems of the anti-mechanist arguments. In essence: what does the problem of “minds vs. machines” really mean, and how can it, and how should (...)
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  14.  3
    On the Anti-Mechanist Arguments Based on Gödel’s Theorem.Stanisław Krajewski - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne 34 (1):9-56.
    The alleged proof of the non-mechanical, or non-computational, character of the human mind based on Gödel’s incompleteness theorem is revisited. Its history is reviewed. The proof, also known as the Lucas argument and the Penrose argument, is refuted. It is claimed, following Gödel himself and other leading logicians, that antimechanism is not implied by Gödel’s theorems alone. The present paper sets out this refutation in its strongest form, demonstrating general theorems implying the inconsistency of Lucas’s arithmetic and the semantic inadequacy (...)
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  15.  2
    On Martin-Löf’s Constructive Optimism.V. Alexis Peluce - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne 34 (1):233-242.
    In his 1951 Gibbs Memorial Lecture, Kurt Gödel put forth his famous disjunction that either the power of the mind outstrips that of any machine or there are absolutely unsolvable problems. The view that there are no absolutely unsolvable problems is optimism, the view that there are such problems is pessimism. In his 1995—and, revised in 2013—Verificationism Then and Now, Per Martin-Löf presents an illustrative argument for a constructivist form of optimism. In response to that argument, Solomon Feferman points out (...)
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  16.  10
    The Anti-Mechanist Argument Based on Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems, Indescribability of the Concept of Natural Number and Deviant Encodings.Paula Quinon - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne 34 (1):243-266.
    This paper reassesses the criticism of the Lucas-Penrose anti-mechanist argument, based on Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, as formulated by Krajewski : this argument only works with the additional extra-formal assumption that “the human mind is consistent”. Krajewski argues that this assumption cannot be formalized, and therefore that the anti-mechanist argument – which requires the formalization of the whole reasoning process – fails to establish that the human mind is not mechanistic. A similar situation occurs with a corollary to the argument, that (...)
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  17. Remarks on the Gödelian Anti-Mechanist Arguments.Panu Raatikainen - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne 34 (1):267–278.
    Certain selected issues around the Gödelian anti-mechanist arguments which have received less attention are discussed.
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  18.  1
    A Note on the Lucas Argument.Rudy Rucker - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne 34 (1):81-82.
    We’re talking about J. Anthony Lucas’s classic argument that Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem rules out man-machine equivalence. This is an argument that Penrose revived and popularized in the 1990s. This fallacious argument is a thoroughly dead horse. But I’ll give it another beating here. Do note that the Lucas-Penrose argument is a completely distinct issue from PenroseHameroff speculation that the brain can act as a coherent quantum computer. It’s to Penrose’s credit that he’s associated with multiple controversial ideas!
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  19.  6
    Gödel’s Philosophical Challenge.Wilfried Sieg - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne 34 (1):57-80.
    The incompleteness theorems constitute the mathematical core of Gödel’s philosophical challenge. They are given in their “most satisfactory form”, as Gödel saw it, when the formality of theories to which they apply is characterized via Turing machines. These machines codify human mechanical procedures that can be carried out without appealing to higher cognitive capacities. The question naturally arises, whether the theorems justify the claim that the human mind has mathematical abilities that are not shared by any machine. Turing admits that (...)
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  20. Meeting on Neutral Ground. A Reflection on Man-Machine Contests.Albert Visser - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne 34 (1):279-294.
    We argue that thinking of the man-machine comparison in terms of a contest involves, in a reasonable scenario, a criterion of success that is neutral. This is because we want to avoid a petitio principii. We submit, however, that, by looking at things this way, one makes the most essential human things invisible. Thus, in a sense, the contest approach is self-defeating.
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