Year:

  1.  2
    The Tripartite Role of Belief.Kenny Easwaran - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):189-206.
    Belief and credence are often characterized in three different ways—they ought to govern our actions, they ought to be governed by our evidence, and they ought to aim at the truth. If one of these roles is to be central, we need to explain why the others should be features of the same mental state rather than separate ones. If multiple roles are equally central, then this may cause problems for some traditional arguments about what belief and credence must be (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  15
    A Tale of Two Epistemologies?Alan Hájek & Hanti Lin - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):207-232.
    So-called “traditional epistemology” and “Bayesian epistemology” share a word, but it may often seem that the enterprises hardly share a subject matter. They differ in their central concepts. They differ in their main concerns. They differ in their main theoretical moves. And they often differ in their methodology.However, in the last decade or so, there have been a number of attempts to build bridges between the two epistemologies. Indeed, many would say that there is just one branch of philosophy here—epistemology. (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  11
    Troubles for Bayesian Formal Epistemology.Terry Horgan - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):233-255.
    I raise skeptical doubts about the prospects of Bayesian formal epistemology for providing an adequate general normative model of epistemic rationality. The notion of credence, I argue, embodies a very dubious psychological myth, viz., that for virtually any proposition p that one can entertain and understand, one has some quantitatively precise, 0-to-1 ratio-scale, doxastic attitude toward p. The concept of credence faces further serious problems as well—different ones depending on whether credence 1 is construed as full belief or instead is (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Imprecise Probability and Higher Order Vagueness.Susanna Rinard - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):257-273.
    There is a trade-off between specificity and accuracy in existing models of belief. Descriptions of agents in the tripartite model, which recognizes only three doxastic attitudes—belief, disbelief, and suspension of judgment—are typically accurate, but not sufficiently specific. The orthodox Bayesian model, which requires real-valued credences, is perfectly specific, but often inaccurate: we often lack precise credences. I argue, first, that a popular attempt to fix the Bayesian model by using sets of functions is also inaccurate, since it requires us to (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Closure Failure and Scientific Inquiry.Roush Sherri - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):275-299.
    Deduction is important to scientific inquiry because it can extend knowledge efficiently, bypassing the need to investigate everything directly. The existence of closure failure—where one knows the premises and that the premises imply the conclusion but nevertheless does not know the conclusion—is a problem because it threatens this usage. It means that we cannot trust deduction for gaining new knowledge unless we can identify such cases ahead of time so as to avoid them. For philosophically engineered examples we have “inner (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  15
    Should I Pretend I'm Perfect?Julia Staffel - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):301-324.
    Ideal agents are role models whose perfection in some normative domain we try to approximate. But which form should this striving take? It is well known that following ideal rules of practical reasoning can have disastrous results for non-ideal agents. Yet, this issue has not been explored with respect to rules of theoretical reasoning. I show how we can extend Bayesian models of ideally rational agents in order to pose and answer the question of whether non-ideal agents should form new (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  4
    A Limited Defense of the Kalām Cosmological Argument.Case Spencer - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (1):165-175.
    The kalām cosmological argument proceeds from the claims that everything with a beginning has a cause of its existence, and that the universe has a beginning. It follows that the universe has a cause of its existence. Presumably, this cause is God. Some defenders of the argument contend that, since we don’t see things randomly coming into existence, we know from experience that everything with a beginning has a cause of its existence. Against this, some critics argue that we may (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  3
    Sellars's Synoptic Vision.Dionysis Christias - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (1):135-163.
    The purpose of this article is to examine Sellars’s envisaged stereoscopic fusion between the manifest and the scientific image in regard to the central issue of the being of the normative. I shall propose that the best way to make sense of the notion of the Sellarsian ‘stereoscopic fusion’ is to hold both that the core function of normative discourse is to point toward something that does not exist, but ought to exist, namely a regulative ideal and that the raison (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9.  3
    The Silence of God and the Theological Virtue of Hope.Aaron Cobb - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (1):23-41.
    Hope is crucial human agency, but its fragility grounds a substantive challenge to Christian belief. It is not clear how a perfectly loving God could permit despairinducing experiences of divine silence. Drawing upon a distinctively Christian psychology of hope, this paper seeks to address this challenge. I contend that divine silence can act as a corrective to misplaced natural hopes. But there are risks in God’s choice to allow a person to lose all natural hope. Thus, if God is perfectly (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  3
    Aquinas and the Epistemic Condition for Moral Responsibility.Peter Furlong - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (1):43-65.
    Agents are morally responsible for their actions only if they understand what they are doing. This much seems clear, but it is unclear exactly what agents must understand in order to be morally responsible; in other words, the epistemic condition for moral responsibility is difficult to discover. In this paper, I will investigate Aquinas’s discussion of knowledge, voluntariness, and moral responsibility in order to discover his views on this condition. Although he never provides a formal expression of such a condition, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  1
    On Inadvertently Created Abstracta, Fictional Storytelling, and Scientific Hypothesizing.Goodman Jeffrey - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (1):177-188.
    In my “Creatures of Fiction, Objects of Myth”, I present and defend an argument for thinking that mythical creationism—the view that mythical objects like phlogiston and Vulcan are abstract artifacts—is false. One intriguing sort of objection to my argument has been recently put forth by Zvolenszky ; she claims that a crucial premise is seen to be unjustified once one considers the phenomena of inadvertently created abstracta—specifically, inadvertently created fictional characters. I argue here that even if we admit inadvertently created (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  19
    Racism, Ideology, and Social Movements.Sally Haslanger - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (1):1-22.
    Racism, sexism, and other forms of injustice are more than just bad attitudes; after all, such injustice involves unfair distributions of goods and resources. But attitudes play a role. How central is that role? Tommie Shelby, among others, argues that racism is an ideology and takes a cognitivist approach suggesting that ideologies consist in false beliefs that arise out of and serve pernicious social conditions. In this paper I argue that racism is better understood as a set of practices, attitudes, (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  2
    The Social Transmission of Direct Cognitive Relations.Wulfemeyer Julie - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (1):119-134.
    Both Russell and Donnellan proposed direct, non-descriptive cognitive relations between thinkers and objects. They agreed that such relations couldn’t be initiated in evidence cases, but Donnellan, unlike Russell, thought direct cognitive relations could be transmitted from person to person. Kaplan suggests the issues of initiation and transmission are separable—allowing one to deny that evidence yields direct cognition while believing direct cognition is transmittable. Here, cases involving transmission, evidence, ordinary perception, and perception aided by technology are considered. It is concluded that (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  4
    Agent-Regret and the Social Practice of Moral Luck.Jordan MacKenzie - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (1):95-117.
    Agent-regret seems to give rise to a philosophical puzzle. If we grant that we are not morally responsible for consequences outside our control, then agent-regret—which involves self-reproach and a desire to make amends for consequences outside one’s control—appears rationally indefensible. But despite its apparent indefensibility, agent-regret still seems like a reasonable response to bad moral luck. I argue here that the puzzle can be resolved if we appreciate the role that agent-regret plays in a larger social practice that helps us (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  2
    Transformative Understanding Acquisition.A. Wilkenfeld Daniel - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (1):67-93.
    Some experiences change who we are in ways we cannot understand until we have that very experience. In this paper I argue that so-called “transformative experiences” can not only bring about new understanding, but can actually be brought out by the gain of understanding itself. Coming to understand something new can change you. I argue that not only is understanding acquisition potentially a kind of transformative experience; given some of the recent philosophy of the phenomenology of understanding, it is a (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  7
    The Social Transmission of Direct Cognitive Relations.Julie Wulfemeyer - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (1):119-134.
    Both Russell and Donnellan proposed direct, non-descriptive cognitive relations between thinkers and objects. They agreed that such relations couldn’t be initiated in evidence cases, but Donnellan, unlike Russell, thought direct cognitive relations could be transmitted from person to person. Kaplan (2012) suggests the issues of initiation and transmission are separable—allowing one to deny that evidence yields direct cognition while believing direct cognition is transmittable. Here, cases involving transmission, evidence, ordinary perception, and perception aided by technology are considered. It is concluded (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
 Previous issues
  
Next issues