_ Source: _Volume 38, Issue 1, pp 46 - 69 Most readers believe Grotius failed to refute Socinus in _De satisfactione_. This article argues that Grotius’s failure was one of reception rather than argument. It is possible to read _De satisfactione_ as Grotius adverted: a genuine concept of satisfaction, and a defence of the catholic faith. Grotius does reject a necessitarian identical satisfaction, in which a repayment is equal to a debt, but like Aquinas, he embraces a teleological equivalent satisfaction, (...) in which a punishment fits a crime. Yet Grotius’s catholic theory was predestined not to persuade a wartime Continental audience whose centre had not held and which sought definitive distinctions from the Roman church. His attempt to forge a broad middle way would succeed only later in Britain. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 38, Issue 1, pp 229 - 233 This note announces a recent find in a private Swiss archive: Christian Wolff’s complete lecture course on Grotius’s _De iure belli ac pacis_ that he gave at the University of Marburg between June 1739 and May 1740.

_ Source: _Volume 38, Issue 1, pp 71 - 105 Grotius’s theory of punishment provides a unique lens through which to view his evolving thought on sovereignty between _De Indis_ and _De iure belli ac pacis_ and the implications of that evolution for Grotius’s theory of the ius in bello. Throughout both works, Grotius attempted to leave open the possibility of private punishment and private warfare, a position not easily squared with prevailing views of sovereign authority. Initially, Grotius was content (...) with a theory marrying the private right of punishment with more traditional Scholastic views of sovereignty through a transfer of the private right from individuals into the hands of the sovereign. This theory also adopted traditional views of subject responsibility for sovereign acts—and, by extension, the exposure of subjects to punishment for the acts of their sovereign. By the time of his mature work, however, Grotius turned away from natural law justifications for collective responsibility and collective punishment, denying that subjects had to answer for the acts of their sovereign as a necessary incident of the compact creating civil society. This led Grotius to refer virtually all forms of collective responsibility, such as reprisal or punishment exacted through war, to the law of nations. This sharp reduction of the natural consequences of the creation of sovereign power also enabled Grotius’s argument that the private right of war, and in particular the private right of punishment, remained available after the creation of civil society. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 38, Issue 1, pp 148 - 175 In his _Historia Gotthorum_, Hugo Grotius set up a Swedish ‘Gothic myth’, a powerful historiographical construct aimed at increasing Swedish prestige by identifying the ancient Swedish as the forebears of the late antique Goths, Vandals and Lombards. Entering into dialogue with fellow historiographers was vital to this venture. The ‘Prolegomena’ to _Historia Gotthorum_ are accordingly marked by an extensive polemical dimension. A critical discourse analysis of both explicit and hidden polemics (...) in this text reveals a clever combination of scholarly argumentation on the basis of historical evidence and strategic image-building to convince the reader. Furthermore, Grotius regularly drew on the works of contemporary colleagues for his historical evidence. The present article sheds light on the various argumentation strategies deployed in the ‘Prolegomena’ to _Historia Gotthorum_ and the role of early modern historiographical texts as treasure troves of historical knowledge. This not only offers further insight into Grotius’s historiographical practice, but also provides an excellent example of how early modern historical writers interacted with the texts of their immediate colleagues. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 38, Issue 1, pp 106 - 128 This paper is interested in the critical potential of the idea of original common possession of the Earth. On the basis of a comparative analysis of Hugo Grotius and Immanuel Kant, it shows how different the meaning of this idea can be within a theory of property or territory. The first part is devoted to Grotius’s account of why and how the institution of property was progressively introduced. It highlights the (...) importance this account attaches to the intention of the first distributors for a good understanding of property laws, and in particular, for an understanding of their non-application in situations of extreme necessity. The second part takes the opposite path and shows that although Kant rejects the very existence of a right of necessity, the idea that one might be liberated from a law is not completely absent from, and even plays a crucial role in, his account of property. Clarification of this role ultimately leads us back to the idea of original possession in common of the Earth. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 38, Issue 1, pp 1 - 27 In 1617, Hugo Grotius had his treatise _On satisfaction_ published. Explicitly directed against Faustus Socinus’s 1594 book _On Jesus Christ as our Saviour_, it purports to contribute to the confutation of the Italian scholar’s teachings, which in the Netherlands were widely regarded as utterly heretical. The way in which he perceived Socinus, however, was mainly determined by the image of Socinianism as disseminated by its detractors, foremost Sibrandus Lubbertus of Franeker. (...) Grotius did read Socinus’s work, but not with much care, and at least unaccommodatingly. The reason for Grotius to intervene in this theological debate is often assumed to have been to vindicate his and his ecclesiastical party’s views on religion as orthodox, or at least far removed from Socinianism and other heresies. In contrast, it is proposed here to take the explicit motivation in the preface at face value, and assume that Grotius wrote it to refute Socinus on the basis of his juridical, philological, and historical errors, simply because he could, and genuinely abhorred Socinianism as he had learned to understand it. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 38, Issue 1, pp 28 - 45 In his _Defensio fidei catholicae de satisfactione Christi adversus Faustum Socinum Senensem_ Grotius makes use of sources taken from Roman law. We discuss three examples and ask the question whether something may be said about the weight of the arguments Grotius has taken from Roman law, mainly the _Digest_. The first one relates to his belief that it is a matter of public interest that crimes do not remain unpunished and (...) he calls this argument even a trivial commonplace: _Hoc enim iudicare videtur trita sententia delicta puniri publice interest._ The second example is Grotius’s thesis that _si alio animo alius idem solvat, liberatio non contingit._ The third example is his thesis that _ex Romanorum legibus … poenae variantur pro conditione personarum_ which he also justifies with an impressive number of references. The conclusion is that Grotius uses these arguments, as if they were propositions suitable to function as part of the theological construction apt to rebut the views of Socinus, but for that purpose Grotius´s quotations are generally taken out of their original context and landed on a sort of Procrustean bed of his theological presuppositions. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 38, Issue 1, pp 176 - 210 Two pirated editions form a vital but neglected part of the printing and reception history of the first edition of Grotius’s _Mare liberum_.

_ Source: _Volume 38, Issue 1, pp 211 - 228 In this Reply, I argue that _pace_ Knud Haakonssen it is dubious that Adam Smith managed to ‘blow up’ Hugo Grotius’s universalist system of natural jurisprudence. Rather, Smith emerges as a closet rationalist who put forward crypto-normative universalist claims himself and found that he could not in the end improve upon Grotius’s system. Grotius was not seen by Smith as a ‘casuist’ _tout court_. I try to give an explanation for (...) the tensions introduced into Smith’s work by his incorporation of key aspects of Grotius’s theory of justice. Furthermore, I try to clarify in what regard Grotius should be seen as a novel and original thinker. Lastly, I argue in favor of according ideas and arguments their own weight, against a facile contextualism that is always in danger of falling prey to the genealogical fallacy. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 38, Issue 1, pp 129 - 147 The essay investigates elements of sixteenth-century scholastic thought that have played a role in Grotius’s doctrine of necessity: the nature of the rights of the person in extreme need; the relation of the right of necessity to self-preservation; the compact that lies at the origin of property rights; and finally the obligation of restitution once the emergency is over. Grotius did not develop the doctrine of necessity as an abstract principle (...) about the relationship between private property and subsistence rights. Instead, he used it primarily as a normative principle on permissible behavior in times of war. The comparison with sixteenth-century thought and the practical purposes for which he developed the principle help to understand better the Grotian conception about the subjective nature of the right of necessity and its normative foundation. (shrink)