Amerykański filozof Richard Rorty wytrwale pracował na etykietkę intelektualnego enfant terrible. Jednym z przejawów jego oryginalności w akademickim milieu była zdecydowana obrona amerykańskiego patriotyzmu przedstawiona w Spełnianiu obietnicy naszego kraju i innych pismach. W niniejszym artykule staram się uwypuklić pewne cechy Rortiańskiego patriotyzmu oraz powiązać je z jego krytyką lewicy kulturowej. Jego zdaniem utraciła ona polityczne wpływy i uczyniła swoim fetyszem radykalne teoretyzowanie właśnie na skutek swojego antyamerykanizmu. Na koniec stawiam pytanie o to, czy wzrost znaczenia lewicy kulturowej w USA (...) w ostatnich latach nie poddaje w wątpliwość diagnozy Rorty’ego. (shrink)

In his 2018 book, Identity, the Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment, Stanford University politi­cal scientist Francis Fukuyama addresses themes which might more properly be considered matters of political philosophy and the philosophy of law: How are we to navigate between traditional, ethnic, unitary conceptions of the nation on the one hand, and the threat of identitarian fragmentation on the other? Though Fukuyama affirms the importance of the concepts of human dignity and identity, more or less as these (...) are commonly understood, he also criticizes the contemporary phenomenon of identity politics—which he views as a danger to liberal democ­racy. “The rise of identity politics in modern liberal democracies,” writes Fukuyama, “is one of the chief threats that they face;” and moreover, “unless we can work our way back to more universal understand­ings of human dignity, we will doom ourselves to continuing conflict.” This paper raises the question of whether the well reasoned case against identity politics as a threat to national unity and purpose leaves room for skepticism of fast-paced and more ambitious (“Wilsonian”) pursuit of internationalist goals of globalization. Greater emphasis on political consensus at home may helpfully strengthen the hand of American foreign policy in support of liberal democracy. But we now look back with well founded skepticism on neo-conservative interventionism, and there are just and needed limits on globalizing internationalism imposed by and implicit in the retreat from identity politics. Having lost the unity of purpose of Cold War liberalism, we are yet to find a “golden mean” avoiding ethnic nationalism and short of political fragmentation. (shrink)

In Anarchy, State and Utopia, Nozick presented his doctrine of right libertarianism, largely a contemporary restatement of Locke’s moral imperative that an individual’s rights to his life, liberty, and property are absolute and place limits on state action. Parallelly, Nozick espoused the free-market system as a framework that not only respects individual rights but ensures material benefits. While the free market results in radical inequalities in holdings and widespread dispossession, Nozick treats the process as morally just and any state redistribution (...) through taxation as wrong. However, neither Nozick nor his many critics fully considered the role of money in capitalist free markets, an omission I begin to address. Nozick asserts that money emerges pre-politically through the uncoerced actions of individuals, and that it derives its value from the commodity that underpins it. This conception of money underpins Nozick’s claims that a minimal state can be just and that the free-market system is a moral, efficient, and neutral allocator of resources. However, Nozick’s approach omits addressing how money’s general acceptability and stability are achieved. Answers can be found in heterodox economic paradigms, which put the state at the center of money creation, rendering money (and the state) incompatible with natural rights. Furthermore, by insisting on money’s commodity nature, Nozick ignores the seventeenth century revolution in money, necessitated by the emergence of free-market capitalism and commodity money’s inability to underpin it. In other words, it is not commodity money but credit money that should be the proper object of Nozick’s analysis. I go on to analyze what credit money is, how it arose, and why some form of it is necessary in a free-market context. Ultimately, I argue that it is not compatible with natural rights and is itself redistributive. Key words: money, distributive justice, Nozick, Locke, free market capitalism, natural rights. (shrink)

The paper presents the profiles of three American thinkers associated with the tradition of individualist anarchism. These will be: Lysander Spooner (1808–1887), Albert Jay Nock (1870–1945) and Murray Newton Rothbard (1926–1995). These thinkers were involved not only in writing, but were also active participants in the political life of the time. In their opinion, the state, whose genesis is based on violence and conquest, and the individual are the greatest enemies. The state was perceived as the greatest threat to the (...) freedom of the individual, as it violated the principles of natural law, which in turn was to constitute the moral foundation of society. The state was, therefore, in the opinion of these thinkers, something inherently unjust, because by force and against the will of its citizens it forced them to obey. They did not perceive history in terms of class struggle, but as a struggle between individuals and society against the state. Spooner compared the state to a gang of robbers and murderers (valuing them higher than the state, however) and argued that the constitution did not bind citizens in any way, as it had not been signed by them personally, and the government had no power over the one handed over to it by free units. Nock pointed to the gradual appropriation by the state (“professional criminals”) of competences belonging to society, and the opposing goals of both. He distinguished between a government that aims to protect individuals and justice, and a state that aims to plunder, based on a law it has created. Rothbard advocated the abolition of the state as a tax consumer and its replacement with an anarcho-capitalist order in which private property would be its foundation. Theories of Spooner, Nock and Rothbard, although directed against the state, were not only negative. At their roots was the good of individuals. For Spooner, they were primarily workers, for Nock, citizens, and for Rothbard, entrepreneurs and owners. This fact is worth emphasizing, as the criticism of anarchism often boils down to allegations of radicalism and utopianism, without taking into account its protectionist nature. Criticism of the state is always a consequence of the human vision and should be considered from this perspective. The concepts of Spooner, Nock and Rothbard, although directed against the state, were not only negative. At their root was the good of individuals. For Spooner, they were primarily workers, for Nock, citizens, and for Rothbard, entrepreneurs and owners. This fact is worth emphasizing, as the criticism of anarchism often boils down to allegations of radicalism and utopianism, without taking into account its protectionist nature. In the article, in addition to presenting the positions of American individualist anarchists, we will pay attention to the positive aspects of the criticism of the state and show that already in the nineteenth and twentieth century anarchists recognized certain mechanisms of power, which also occur with particular intensity today. (shrink)

Philosophy as a discipline is facing new challenges that will determine its future. The challenges include the historic ones relating to economic conditions and administrative leadership that focuses on preparation for employment in a way that lessens the intellectual development of students. But the new challenges occur in a worldwide democratic recession and in political leadership that seems to be moving toward greater censorship and less academic freedom. In America, this is also occurring with a decline in student enrollment that (...) negatively impacts the liberal arts and particularly philosophy. This article examines the way two forms of American naturalism may respond. John Dewey’s cultural naturalism and George Santayana’s thorough, non-reductive naturalism provide an array of alternatives. I explore alternatives open to philosophers that include abandoning philosophy by leaving the university or becoming an administrator as well as alternatives available if one remains in the university. Finally, I offer four criteria for judging the viability of choosing any of the alternatives. (shrink)

The present paper outlines John Lachs’s idea of stoic pragmatism and develops its important part that is the relation between the individual and the community. In his project, Lachs reduces the whole tradition of Stoic philosophy to its later, Roman version and tries to link it with the philosophical tradition of American pragmatism (especially William James, John Dewey, and George Santayana, who is close to pragmatism at some points) hoping that it is possible for these two to "enrich and complete (...) each other" so that to provide "a better attitude to life than either of the two views alone." Stoic pragmatism pursues factual improvement in the quality of life for individuals living in given social circumstances, rather than a new theory about such improvement. Interestingly, stoic pragmatism overlaps at many points with the so-called modern stoicism, a movement that uses Stoic ethics in contemporary contexts. (shrink)

This article explores what John Dewey’s political philosophy can offer in regard to the current crisis in digital democracy. It focuses on two digital mechanisms, the “filter bubble” and the “echo chamber”. While there is a prominent, Dewey-inspired debate on “digital publics” in the literature, a reconstruction of the Deweyan concepts of the public and of shared experience shows that it does not adequately reflect the aspect of situated and embodied experience. Based on this, it is shown that digital media (...) offerings must also be rooted in local contexts of experience in order to answer the challenge of those two problematic mechanisms. (shrink)