English title: Master Eckhart’s God Confronted with Nietzschean Critique of Christianity. Author tries to demonstrate that the way of thinking about Christian God developed in the late Middle Ages by Master Eckhart goes beyond the interpretation which underlies Nietzsche’s criticism of Christianity as a religion of the other world. In the paper, Author first presents the said criticism, followed by the vision of God outlined by Eckhart. He demonstrates that Christianity, criticized by Nietzsche, uses a commonsense vision of God’s transcendence (...) based on spatial images. The author also demonstrates that Eckhart defines this transcendence in such a way that it does not fall under Nietzsche’s criticism, in particular it cannot lead to the depreciation of worldliness in favour of an invented other world, which Nietzsche observes. Eckhart’s thought makes room for Christianity ‘after Nietzsche.’. (shrink)

English title: Change for praktike. Minor Comments to Evagrius Ponticus’ Philosophy of Life. The paper elucidates the evolution in understanding of a life phenomenon, which took place in the writing of the early Christian authors who referred to the heritage of the ancient philosophy trying to define their own position in relation to it. In this perspective the present author discusses the thought of Evagius Ponticus who undertakes some currents typical of Socrates’ concept of life, known from Plato’s dialogues. As (...) Bogaczyk argues, among the common points for both philosophical traditions, the ancient Greek and early Christian, there are, first of all, the understanding of life as change and as the exercise in accepting this change and mortality it inevitably implies. That is only the dialectics of life and death, or hope and pessimism, which makes the phenomenon of life accessible to us, and its concept possible to be grasped. Thus, this dialectics can be applied either in contemporary currents of philosophy of life or in psychological and medical approach towards the problem of depression. (shrink)

English title: The Issue of Evil in Philosophy of Józef Tischner. The paper presents several understandings of evil distinguished by Józef Tischner, like the axiological evil, agathological evil and structural evil. While exposing the phenomenological approach of Tischner, Gadacz discusses evil as ‘a phantom’ that accompanies the very source form of experience which, according to Tischner, stands for the episode of meeting another man. In this perspective evil as a ghost proves to be the source experience as well, alike the (...) episode of meeting being the source of happening of the good and freedom. Therefore, the original experience does not inform us whether something exists or it should be such and so, but rather tells us that there is something which ought not to be. (shrink)

English title: Ricoeur and Derrida — the Heritage of Death. In this article the author juxtaposes two different attempts of defending life against Heidegger’s horizon of death (Sein zum Tode) (the survie (survival) of Jacques Derrida and the “Living up to Death” of Paul Ricoeur). Their false proximity introduces a new insight into the discussion about the paradoxical positiveness of deconstruction. Ricoeur’s concept of life makes impossible the understanding of deconstruction as faithfulness to the other not in his identity, but (...) precisely in his otherness. (shrink)

The argument diagramming method developed by Monroe C. Beardsley in his (1950) book Practical Logic, which has since become the gold standard for diagramming arguments in informal logic, makes it possible to map the relation between premises and conclusions of a chain of reasoning in relatively complex ways. The method has since been adapted and developed in a number of directions by many contemporary informal logicians and argumentation theorists. It has proved useful in practical applications and especially pedagogically in teaching (...) basic logic and critical reasoning skills at all levels of scientific education. I propose in this essay to build on Beardsley diagramming techniques to refine and supplement their structural tools for visualizing logical relationships in a number of categories not originally accommodated by Beardsley diagramming, including circular reasoning, reductio ad absurdum arguments, and efforts to dispute and contradict arguments, with applications and analysis. (shrink)

The article analyses the history of the Einfühlung concept. Theories of ‘feeling into’ Nature, works of art or feelings and behaviours of other persons by German philosophers of the second half of the nineteenth century Robert and Friedrich Vischer and Theodor Lipps are evoked, as well as similar theory of understanding (Verstehen) by Wilhelm Dilthey and Friedrich Schleiermacher, to which Dilthey refers. The meaning of the term Einfühlung within Edith Stein’s thought is also analysed. Both Einfühlung and Verstehen were criticized (...) as non-objective and naive methods consisting only in the identification of the subject with the object or the projection of feelings onto the object. The article refers to criticism by Georg Gadamer and Bertolt Brecht and proposes ways to restitute the concept of Einfühlung after this criticism, recalling the theory of empathy by Dominick Lacapra, in terms of its advantages for the historical enquiry, or the myth of Narcissus analyzed in the spirit of psychoanalysis by Julia Kristeva. The article proposes a reformulation of the concept of mimesis, connected to the Einfühlung, understood as the identification, analogy, imitation of feelings (as it was described by Lipss and Vischer). Mimesis does not necessarily mean a passive repetition and reconstruction of the feelings of the object, but serves only as a starting point for the interest of the subject for the outside world or for experiences of historical protagonists. Then there is no identification or projection of feelings, but the creative, active and critical reformulation of knowledge. It is stated that empathy is not a passive, uncritical process, but that it deals with the critical choice of the object of empathy and with an active approach to the perceived feelings and appearances. In addition to this cognitive aspect, empathy may also contribute to the analytical and valuable introspection. Furthermore empathy allows us to connect the analysis of the facts with a personal narrative and understanding of individual identity in historical knowledge. (shrink)

English title: Józef Tischner’s Phenomenology of Boundary Experience. Author of the paper distinguishes four paradigms of phenomenological analysis one can indicate in Tischner’s philosophical writing. Each of these paradigms captures the issue of the genuine source of phenomenological experience. This genuine source can be provided with: transcendental ‘I’, axiological ‘I’, Dasein, or the relationship to another man. By developing the latter, i.e. the paradigm based on the experience of meeting (dialogue), Tischner makes the foundations for his Philosophy of Drama (in (...) Polish: Filozofia dramatu) which should be interpreted, as Piecuch argues, in terms of the possible ways to conduct phenomenological analysis. The peculiarity of this way is that it aims at grasping various aspects of the border experience in which a man experiences the limits of one’s own thinking, activity and sensing. (shrink)

English title: The Reception of Søren Kierkegaard’s Thought in Józef Tischner’s Philosophy. The aim of this article is to indicate sources of Józef Tischner’s philosophical inspiration in Søren Kierkegaard’s texts. For Tischner Kierkegaard apperared as a great expert of human matters and as a exquisite, subtle romantic writer. In his refined use of metaphors Tischner searches material to describe a network of almost imperceptible connections of values, norms and customs, by which a human being is wrapped in his/her everyday life. (...) This network Tischener calls a „little axiology of everyday life”. He does not penetrate in all the structure of the very complicated existential philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard, but using his quasi-fenomenological descriptions our philosopher performs his own analises in the sphere of philosophy of drama and philosophy of meeting. Tischner devotes a lot of attention to a phenomenon of existential dispair, and to a certain degree he has a dispute with Kierkegaard. In the last part of this article were indicated philosophical divergences of both philosophers, which have the source in different Christian profession and in historical differences of national cultures. (shrink)

English title: The Fundations of Normativity by Kant and Spener. In one of the chapters in Conflict of Faculties, Kant presents so-called “Spener’s problem”. Kant refers to the conception of the 17th century theologian Philipp Jakob Spener, concerning the problem of radical moral transformation of individuals. Spener became famous as one of the founders and main exponents of pietistic theology, which in the 18th century became one of the most significant intellectual trends at the University of Königsberg and about which (...) one may assume, that it could influence the evolution of Kantian philosophy. The goal of the article is to compare the main assumptions of Spener’s theology with Kantian theory of moral motivation. The analysis focuses on the possibility of describing the phenomenon of normativity in both conceptions. (shrink)

In contemporary Western analytic philosophy, the classic analogical argument explaining our knowledge of other minds has been rejected. But at least three alternative positive theories of our knowledge of the second person have been formulated: the theory-theory, the simulation theory and the theory of direct empathy. After sketching out the problems faced by these accounts of the ego’s access to the contents of the mind of a “second ego”, this paper tries to recreate one argument given by Abhinavagupta (Shaiva philosopher (...) of recognition) to the effect that even in another’s body, one must feel and recognize one’s own self, if one is able to address that embodied person as a “you”. The otherness of You does not take away from its subjectivity. In that sense, just as every second person to whom one could speak is, first, a person, she is also a first person. Even as I regret that I do not know exactly how some other person is feeling right now, I must have some general access to the subjective experience of that other person, for otherwise what is it that I feel so painfully ignorant about? My subjective world is mine only to the extent that I recognize its continuity with a sharable subjective world where other I-s can make a You out of me. (shrink)

In his Tractatus and Notebooks 1914-1916, Wittgenstein develops some themes concerning the nature of the subject, transcendentalism, solipsism and mysticism. Though Wittgenstein rejects a naive, psychological understanding of the subject, he preserves the idea of the metaphysical subject, so-called “philosophical I”. The present investigations exhibit two ways of grasping the subject: (1) subject as a boundary (of the world); (2) subject (I) as the world. The author of the paper aims to analyze different methods of conceiving the subject, both logical (...) and transcendental. Then he discusses the naturalistic or reductionist consequences of solipsism which were derived by Wittgenstein. Moreover, he refers to the concept of ‘subject of will’ introduced in the Tractatus. Finally, the author puts a question whether the metaphysical subject is a boundary of the world identified with the subject of will. While trying to answer this question one can point to the essential difficulties of Wittgenstein’s standpoint. These difficulties become especially evident if we examine Wittgenstein’s statements concerning mysticism. The category of subject seems to gain a new dimension when reconsidered in this context. In the conclusion, the author offers an interpretation inspired by Schopenhauer’s conception of the double aspect of the subject that is to overstep these difficulties. (shrink)

It is my pleasure to present you the first issue of the Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal, published by the Department of Philosophy and Sociology, Pedagogical University of Cracow. This is a peer-reviewed journal founded to facilitate dialogue between Polish and international scholars and, on the other hand, to build bridges between professional philosophers and a wider educated public. We are open to the publishing of scholarly studies in history of philosophy as well as papers reporting the on-going debates in contemporary (...) philosophy, representing various currents in philosophical inquiry, including continental, analytic, non-Western traditions and comparative perspectives. We also publish polemical papers, responses and interviews, book reviews and notices from professional philosophers. Besides, we are open to critical and innovative suggestions concerning teaching methods and the purposes of up-to-date philosophical education. As the name itself suggests, the Argument is intended to provoke rational argument, encourage clear and precise reasoning, and enhance the essential philosophical need for justification and well-founded argument that support the presented views and clarify the accepted positions. the Argument is also intended to serve as a forum for dedicated philosophical debate, polemics and dispute implied by the plurality of the methods and possible interpretations developed within contemporary philosophy. Being aware of the variety of socio-epistemic dimensions of scholarship we also encourage critical, inter-disciplinary and creative articles on topics of traditional and emerging interest. Therefore, we welcome papers on such varied specialisations as: metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, axiology, logic, philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind, political philosophy, philosophy of science, as well as philosophical education, gender and feminist thought, bioethics, environmental philosophy, etc. Favouring methodological and thematic plurality we also want to present philosophy as a rich field of great cultural and social value. (shrink)

The author of this paper discusses some major points vital for two classical Indian schools of philosophy: (1) a significant feature of linguistic analysis in the Yoga tradition; (2) the role of the religious practice (iśvara-pranidhana) in the search for true self-identity in Samkhya and Yoga darśanas with special reference to their gnoseological purposes; and (3) some possible readings of ‘ahamkara’ and ‘asmita’ displayed in the context of Samkhya-Yoga phenomenology and metaphysics. The collision of language and metaphysics refers to the (...) risk of paralogism caused by the common linguistic procedures making the subject define its identity within the semantic order (i.e. verbal conventions and grammatical rules) which does not reflect the actual metaphysical situation of the self, though it determines one’s self-understanding in the empirical sense. Whereas, Samkhya-Yoga aims at recognizing, reorganizing and, finally, going beyond these procedures regarded as the obstacles on the path towards self-knowledge and liberation form metaphysical ignorance. (shrink)

The leading theme of the first volume of the Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal is Subjectivity and Self-knowledge. Five contributors focused on this theme consider various aspects of the self, referring either to western authors (Włodzimierz Heflik, Roger Melin) or eastern thinkers (Marzenna Jakubczak), or undertaking a comparative perspective and discussing arguments given both by western and Indian philosophers (Arindam Chakrabarti, Sven Sellmer).

In this paper Animalism is analysed. It will be argued that Animalism is correct in claiming (i) that being of a certain sort of animal S is a fundamental individuative substance sortal concept (animal of the species Homo Sapiens), (ii) that this implies that Animalism is correct in claiming that persons such as us are, by necessity, human beings, (iii) that remaining the same animal is a necessary condition for our identity over time. Contrary to Animalism it will be argued (...) that this does not imply that person should be understood as a phased sortal concept. It will be argued that Animalism rests upon a prior conception of person, and that this implies that person must be understood as a basic substance sortal concept through which we have to individuate ourselves and others. It is further argued that this, together with the insights of Animalism, implies that persons, by necessity, are beings of a biological nature. (shrink)

The system R, or more precisely the pure implicational fragment R›, is considered by the relevance logicians as the most important. The another central system of relevance logic has been the logic E of entailment that was supposed to capture strict relevant implication. The next system of relevance logic is RM or R-mingle. The question is whether adding mingle axiom to R› yields the pure implicational fragment RM› of the system? As concerns the weak systems there are at least two (...) approaches to the problem. First of all, it is possible to restrict a validity of some theorems. In another approach we can investigate even weaker logics which have no theorems and are characterized only by rules of deducibility. (shrink)

The conception of subjectivity developed by the German philosopher Hermann Schmitz (1927-) is especially suitable for cross-cultural investigations because its foundations lie in human experiences that are basic and universal. The paper has two aims. Firstly, to give an outline of Schmitz’s theory. Secondly, to show its usefulness (and its limits) by interpreting some Greek and Indian philosophers which, at the same time, represent certain main approaches to the problem of subjectivity.