View year:

  1.  4
    “Respectful Denunciation, Peaceful Incitement, and Productive Frustration”: the Wonderfully Subversive Project of Hasok Chang’s Realism for Realistic People.Daniel S. Brooks - 2025 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 56 (1):143-147.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2.  2
    Angela Potochnik: Science and the Public. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Elements in the Philosophy of Science), 2024, 84pp., €15.45 (Paperback), ISBN: 9781009048828. [REVIEW]Ann-Christin Fischer - 2025 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 56 (1):149-152.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  6
    Assessing Vickers’ Plea for Identifying Future-Proof Science.María del Rosario Martínez-Ordaz & Dubian Cañas - 2025 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 56 (1):117-130.
    We critically examine Vickers’ project of future-proof science, which aims to identify scientific facts based upon a solid international scientific consensus. Vickers claims that second-order evidence—specifically a 95% consensus among a diverse, international scientific community—provides a principled criterion for identifying future-proof science. We challenge both the motivation behind this project and Vickers’ account of scientific consensus. Our analysis raises concerns about the methodological validity of the 30 alleged examples of future-proof science, questioning the selection, isolation, and interpretation of such scientific (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4.  17
    Infinite Practices, One Mathematics: Challenging Mathematical Pluralism.Melisa Vivanco - 2025 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 56 (1):1-11.
    Theories about the foundations of mathematics often encounter a problem similar to the traditional demarcation problem in science. In this context, it is pertinent to examine the first candidate for the identifying property of mathematical pluralism: reduction within a structure. As I argue here, this notion is insufficient for a coherent definition of structure within the plurality. In the end, demarcating a plurality of mathematics can be as problematic as demarcating a unitary mathematics. -/- .
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
 Previous issues
  
Next issues