Expanded non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) has provoked ethical concerns about its justifiable scope. In this paper, we evaluate the role of the child’s right to an open future in setting the scope of NIPT. This ‘open future principle’ has been cited in arguments both limiting and expanding parental freedoms. This moral right holds that adult autonomy rights which children cannot yet exercise should nonetheless be protected until they can. Its purpose is to protect the future autonomy of the child as (...) a future adult. Several authors have extended this rationale from child to fetus. However, the right was not anticipated to apply to the fetus, a non-legal entity in many jurisdictions. The aim of this paper is to reconsider whether this principle is useful to help deliberate the scope of NIPT. We find that extending the open future principle to delineate the scope of NIPT is theoretically flawed. We contend that in the prenatal context its value primarily lies with counselling for prenatal screening where it can be used to encourage parents’ reflection on the implications of knowing for the sake of knowing on their future children and their relationship with them. (shrink)

In the Australian state of Victoria, legislation allowing voluntary assisted dying (VAD) passed through parliament in November 2017. There was then an eighteen-month period before the start date for patient access to VAD, referred to as the “implementation period.” The implementation period was intended to allow time for the relevant government department and affected organizations to develop processes before the Act came into effect in June 2019. This qualitative interview study investigates the perspectives of a multidisciplinary sample of twelve clinicians (...) from a single metropolitan hospital during this implementation period. Maximum variation sampling was utilized to ensure breadth across discipline (medical, nursing, allied health), speciality, and stated level of support for the VAD legislation. Four key themes were identified from the interview data: preparing for the unknown, ethical diversity within the organization, building a respectful culture, and concerns about the inability of the legislated approach to capture clinical nuances. Overall, these clinicians’ workplace experiences during the implementation period were shaped by the ethical diversity within their organization and a sense of uncertainty about how the VAD legislation would integrate with the practical realities of their clinical setting. The concept of “ethical diversity” could be a useful one for supporting staff in an organization during a VAD implementation period. (shrink)

Several countries have implemented COVID-19 health passes or certificates to promote a safer return to in-person social activities. These passes have been proposed as a way to prove that someone has been vaccinated, has recovered from the disease, or has negative results on a diagnostic test. However, many people have questioned their ethical justification. This article presents some practical and ethical problems to consider in the event of wishing to implement these passes. Among the former, it is questioned how accurate (...) diagnostic tests are as a means of ensuring that a person is not contagious, whether vaccination guarantees immunity, the fact that health passes can be forged, whether they encourage vaccination, and the problem that there is no universally recognized health pass. Among the ethical issues, it is discussed whether health passes promote discrimination and inequality and whether they violate rights to privacy and freedom. It is concluded that health passes have enough ethical justification to be implemented. (shrink)

Kidney markets are prohibited in principle because they are assumed to undermine the seller’s dignity. Considering the trade-off between saving more lives by introducing regulated kidney markets and preserving the seller’s dignity, we argue that it is advisable to demand that citizens restrain their own moral judgements and not interfere with the judgements of those who are willing to sell a kidney. We also argue that it is advisable not only to limit the political implications of the moral argument of (...) dignity concerns toward a market-based solution but also to re-evaluate the dignity argument itself. First, if the dignity argument is to be given normative force, it must also consider the dignity violation of the potential transplant recipient. Second, there seems to be no compelling notion of dignity that demonstrates why it is morally permissible to donate but not to sell a kidney. (shrink)

The term “euthanasia” is used in conflicting ways in the bioethical literature, as is the term “assisted suicide,” resulting in definitional confusion, ambiguities, and biases which are counterproductive to ethical and legal discourse. I aim to rectify this problem in two parts. Firstly, I explore a range of conflicting definitions and identify six disputed definitional factors, based on distinctions between (1) killing versus letting die, (2) fully intended versus partially intended versus merely foreseen deaths, (3) voluntary versus nonvoluntary versus involuntary (...) decisions, (4) terminally ill versus non-terminally ill patients, (5) patients who are fully conscious versus those in permanent comas or persistent vegetative states, and (6) patients who are suffering versus those who are not. Secondly, I distil these factors into six “building blocks” and combine them to develop an unambiguous, value-neutral taxonomy of “end-of-life practices.” I hope that this taxonomy provides much-needed clarification and a solid foundation for future ethical and legal discourse. (shrink)

The spread of vaccine misinformation may contribute to vaccine refusal/hesitancy and consequent harms. Nonetheless, censorship is often rejected on the grounds of free expression. This article examines John Stuart Mill’s influential defence of free expression but finds that his arguments for freedom apply only to normal, reasonably favourable circumstances. In other cases, it may be permissible to restrict freedom, including freedom of speech. Thus, while Mill would ordinarily defend the right to express false views, such as that vaccines cause autism, (...) he might have accepted restrictions on anti-vaccine misinformation during the present pandemic. This illustrates that even the staunchest defenders of free speech can permit temporary restrictions in exceptional circumstances. (shrink)

In this paper I use normative analysis to explore the curious and seemingly singular phenomenon whereby some dog owners deny the physical and moral facts about a situation where it is claimed their dog harmed or irritated others. I define these as epistemic and ethical denial, respectively, and offer a tentative exploration of their implications in terms of relational autonomy and responsible behaviour in public spaces.