The present paper deals with the diachronic evolution of the Cartesian concept of intuitus, focusing particularly on the reasons for its (at least lexical) dismissal in Descartes's mature elaborations of his metaphysics. In section 1, I address the notion of intuitus presented in the Rules, showing that this concept is pivotal in Descartes' early epistemology of evidence. In section 2, I argue that such a concept can be traced back to certain distinctive elements of the Late Scholastic debate on angels (...) and human knowledge, from which Descartes could have drawn some of his early ideas. In section 3, I analyze the reasons behind Descartes' dismissal of the notion of intuitus, arguing for a deliberate choice, due both to epistemologico-metaphysical and theological reasons, on which I dwell focusing especially on Descartes' letters. -/- . (shrink)

Schopenhauer’s concept of intuition (Anschauung) plays a fundamental roll in his philosophy: As pure intuition it addresses the forms of sensuality time and space. As empirical intuition it refers to the objects of the understanding (Verstand) and therefor to causal relations. But intuition is not only limited to Schopenhauer’s epistemology but is present in nearly every important aspect of his philosophical system. In his aesthetics Schopenhauer claims that every aesthetic cognition is necessarily intuitive, rendering every insight in the platonic ideas (...) through aesthetic contemplation as intuitive as well. Given that the understanding functions as the faculty of (empirical) intuition rather than reason, which is only the faculty of concepts, it seems at the first glance that Schopenhauer tries to exclude reason from any involvement in the aesthetic cognition of platonic ideas. But on closer examination Schopenhauer seems to argue for a rather fundamental involvement of reason in the fields of aesthetics as he insists on the importance of Besonnenheit (discernment, awareness, deliberateness). Aside from that only the participation of reason in the aesthetics could explain why animals, that share the same faculty of intuition as humans, are not capable of aesthetic judgement or producing art. In this article I argue that reason is a necessary condition for the possibility of aesthetic cognition but not as a theoretical faculty but in its practical function through Besonnenheit. While the platonic idea as well as every object of aesthetic contemplation must be given to our intuition, reason enables us to be besonnen and therefor gives us the possibility to suspend our actual willing for the sake of aesthetic contemplation. In this sense aesthetic cognition could be called besonnene Intuition. (shrink)

In this paper, with reference to Vito Acconci’s Following Piece (1969) and Sophie Calle’s Take care of yourself (2007), I show that some works of conceptual art rely on exemplification to convey ideas, and I defend the following claims about those works. In the first place, I argue that the kinds of events and of objects they present us with are relevant for appreciating the views the works convey. In the second place, siding with Elisabeth Schellekens (2007) and Peter Goldie (...) (2007), I argue, contra James Young (2001), that those artworks can yield experiential knowledge. In the third place, I argue that those artworks also possess probatory value. Finally, I maintain that those artworks can be valuable instruments for the education of the emotions. (shrink)