Year:

  1.  7
    Illusionism's Discontent.Balog Katalin - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12):40-51.
    Frankish positions his view, illusionism about qualia (a.k.a. eliminativist physicalism), in opposition to what he calls radical realism (dualism and neutral monism) and conservative realism (a.k.a. non-eliminativist physicalism). Against radical realism, he upholds physicalism. But he goes along with key premises of the Gap Arguments for radical realism, namely, 1) that epistemic/explanatory gaps exist between the physical and the phenomenal, and 2) that every truth should be perspicuously explicable from the fundamental truth about the world; and he concludes that because (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  12
    ‘What It is Like’ Talk is Not Technical Talk.Jonathan Farrell - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (9-10):50-65.
    ‘What it is like’ talk (‘WIL-talk’) — the use of phrases such as ‘what it is like’ — is ubiquitous in discussions of phenomenal consciousness. It is used to define, make claims about, and to offer arguments concerning consciousness. But what this talk means is unclear, as is how it means what it does: how, by putting these words in this order, we communicate something about consciousness. Without a good account of WIL-talk, we cannot be sure this talk sheds light, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  4
    Science and Consciousness Just Wed: Should This Union Be Annulled?Bricklin Jonathan - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (9-10):250-253.
    If science relates only to the objectifiable, how can it relate to consciousness? I.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  51
    Russellian Physicalism, Bare Structure, and Swapped Inscrutables.Kevin Morris - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (9-10):180-198.
    This paper discusses and evaluates a recent argument for the conclusion that an attractive variety of Russellian monism ought to be regarded as a form of physicalism. According to this line of thought, if the Russellian’s “inscrutable” properties are held to ground not only experience, but also the physical structure of the world—and in this sense are not “experience-specific”—they thereby have an unproblematic place in physicalist metaphysics. I argue, in contrast, that there can be a sense in which the Russellian’s (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  5. Luminescent Physicalism, A Book Review of Evan Thompson's *Waking, Dreaming, Being*. [REVIEW]Gregory M. Nixon - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (9-10):262-267.
    This is a fine book by an extraordinary author whose literary followers have awaited a definitive statement of his views on consciousness since his participation in the important book on biological autopoiesis, The Embodied Mind (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991) and his recent neurophenomenology of biological systems, Mind in Life (2007). In the latter book, Thompson demonstrated the continuity of life and mind, whereas in this book he uses neurophenomenology as well as erudite renditions of Buddhist philosophy and a good (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  7
    Consciousness and Neural Force Fields.B. I. B. Lindahl & Peter Århem - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (7-8):228-253.
    This article compares Wolfgang Köhler's pioneering field theory of the consciousness–brain relation with Benjamin Libet's conscious mental field theory and Karl Popper's mental force field hypothesis. In the discussion of Köhler's theory we devote special attention to his analysis of problems of sense perception and to his explanation of figural after-effects. Both Libet and Popper take consciousness to causally interact with the brain, and we argue that even Köhler presupposes an interactionist interpretation of the consciousness–brain relation. We argue that nothing (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  21
    Hurley's Transcendental Enactivism.Dave Ward - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (5-6):12-38.
    Susan Hurley (1998a, 2003a, 2008) argues that our capacities for perception, agency and thought are essentially interdependent and co-emerge from a tangle of sensorimotor processes that are both cause and effect of the web of interactive and communicative practices they weave us into. In this paper, I reconstruct this view and its main motivations, with a particular focus on three important aspects. First, Hurley argues that an essential aspect of conscious perception – its perspectival unity – constitutively depends on agency. (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  1
    The Phenomenology of Psychopathological Embodiment: A Critique of Thomas Fuchs' Concept of Corporealization.Anthony Vincent Fernandez - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (3-4):50-75.
    In this article I offer a critical analysis and evaluation of Thomas Fuchs' concept of corporealization, as well as the Leib/Körper distinction (i.e. the distinction between the lived and corporeal body) that it is founded upon. First, I show that the foundational concepts -- Leib and Körper -- are problematically heterogeneous, each including a diverse set of phenomena requiring further delineation and clarification. Second, I consider the historical origins of this heterogeneity and ambiguity within Fuchs' work. I show that Fuchs' (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9.  16
    Iconicity and the Format of Perception.Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (3-4):255-263.
    According to one important proposal, the difference between perception and cognition consists in the representational formats used in the two systems (Carey, 2009; Burge, 2010; Block, 2014). In particular, it is claimed that perceptual representations are iconic, or image-like, while cognitive representations are discursive, or language-like. Taking object perception as a test case, this paper argues on empirical grounds that it requires discursive label-like representations. These representations segment the perceptual field, continuously pick out objects despite changes in their features, and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  16
    Dimensions of Reliability in Phenomenal Judgment.Brentyn J. Ramm - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (3-4):101-127.
    Eric Schwitzgebel (2011) argues that phenomenal judgments are in general less reliable than perceptual judgments. This paper distinguishes two versions of this unreliability thesis. The process unreliability thesis says that unreliability in phenomenal judgments is due to faulty domain-specific mechanisms involved in producing these judgments, whereas the statistical unreliability thesis says that it is simply a matter of higher numbers of errors. Against the process unreliability thesis, I argue that the main errors and limitations in making phenomenal judgments can be (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  46
    The First-Person Perspective and Beyond: Commentary on Almaas.Simon Hoffding & Joel Krueger - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (1-2):158-178.
    In this commentary, we engage with Almaas’s contribution from the perspective of phenomenology and its idea of a ‘minimal self’. We attempt to clarify Almaas’s claims about ‘phenomenological givens’ and ‘non-dual’, ‘pure consciousness’, and then show how they might be reconciled with phenomenological approaches to consciousness and self. We conclude by briefly indicating some of the ways a comparative analysis of this sort is mutually beneficial.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
 Previous issues
  
Next issues