The article examines the transformations of the philosophical concept of world as it appears in the cosmopolitan tradition of political thought and its relation to the problem of the border. It focuses particularly on how world is understood as either lost or multiplied in the contexts of modernity, globalisation, and migration. The article discusses postcolonial conceptions of cosmopolitics and the political philosophy of Hannah Arendt to show how the universal ideal of the world is replaced by singular constructions of worlds (...) in terms of the experience of migrants and refugees or the phenomenological horizon of political action. I conclude by suggesting that Jacques Rancière’s understanding of politics as a conflict of worlds can take us beyond the traps of both cosmopolitan universalism and the phenomenological singularity of being-in-the-world. (shrink)

In the present article, we have demonstrated that it is important to understand the equating of mathematics with ontology in Badiou’s philosophy, taking into account the necessary connection between rational materialism and ontological realism. Only in this way can we truly understand Badiou’s fundamental thesis that thinking and being are the same. Philosophy is not ontology and it is not a true procedure, but a thought that arises by being conditioned with the generic thoughts of all four truth procedures (art, (...) politics, science, and love), which in turn does not mean that it cannot speak in the name of truth and ontology. (shrink)

In the article, the author addresses with two ways of dealing with life, biopolitics, and necropolitics, and connects them to the excess of power over life and death in the era of neoliberal global capitalism. Dealing with necropolitical processes requires a different analysis of spaces and temporalities, of necrospaces and necrotemporalities. It also requires consideration of the possibilities of resistance to necropolitical processes by those who are by no means silent witnesses, by no means mere victims, but subjects who have (...) undergone a process of (de)subjectivation in a way that, as Achille Mbembe would argue, leads to a process of destruction of their own subjectivity. (shrink)

Today, in the situation that we call the _instantiernity_ of the digital age, the visual aspect of the social (and power) relations is ever more important. A majority of human interaction on internet is happening in the field of vision. In this field, human desire follows the scopic drive, which is, according to Freud, expressed in the ambivalence of voyeurism and exhibitionism. This means that voyeurism and exhibitionism are the fundamental mechanisms operating in, and structuring, the digital virtual. This topic, (...) in a broader sense, tackles the inscription of the subject within the digital virtual spectacle, which deals with the relation between individual’s imaginary and symbolic identification, that is, between _ideal ego_ and _ego ideal. _To a certain extent, this also relates to what has been marked as »pathological narcissism«. Even if the changes brought about by the digital virtual, as far as the subject is concerned, are not ontological, i.e. they do not concern its relation to being, they do concern its entry into the field of the Other, and can, because they are systemic changes, fundamentally restructure the social fabric. The bet of this article is therefore not only to try to understand the mechanisms driving the formation of subectivity within the digital virtual, but also to trace their transformative potential. (shrink)

Although the desire to be free from God springs from humanity’s wish to enjoy pleasure without restraint, Lacan observes that humans remain neurotic and unhappy. That is because the prevailing “dead of God” form of atheism relies on the denial of a father/god, a negation that inadvertently replicates the logic of religion. Lacan, by contrast, grounds his atheism in a theory of pleasure that recognizes the role of “unpleasure” in breaking the tedium of easy, unlimited gratification. Turning to Greek tragedy, (...) Lacan shows how the ancient world used the gods as creators of “unpleasure” to generate human _jouissance_. The figure of Antigone, in particular, shows how the divine function can fulfill “the true formula of atheism,” which is not “God is dead,” but rather, Lacan affirms, that “_God is unconscious_.”. (shrink)

Alain Badiou’s theory of discipline condenses many important theoretical tools that he developed throughout his long encounter with various philosophical and political milieus from the mid 1960s to the mid 1980s, when he wrote his magnum opus _Being and Event_. Through this vast terrain, Badiou expressed seemingly different commitments: from logic and the epistemology of science in the late 1960s and politics during the 1970s, to ontology and mathematics in the 1980s, which has continued to this time. However, a close (...) reading of his major works during this period reveals an internal thread of thought that runs between them, which I have named discipline. In other words, discipline is the framework within which we can reconstruct Badiou’s main ideas as part of a continuous work (during the stated period) that not only reveals the internal coherence of his overall thought over the course of time, within which he showed different and seemingly unrelated commitments, but also gives us a powerful tool to understand the key concepts of his philosophy, such as the procedures of truth, ontology, phenomenology, and his commitment to axiomatic thinking. In this essay we aim to examine the concept of the subject in relation to the theory of discipline. We will do so by examining Badiou’s encounter with two crucial aspects of the theory of the subject discussed by Lacan: the Cartesian _cogito_ and the relation of the subject to the mathematical infinite. (shrink)

Seen from the perspective of the inconsistency of the Other, the post-truth era can be considered to be an era emerging from a crisis in belief in the existence of the Other, which is to be taken in a twofold sense: as a belief in the Other of the Other, that is, the Other of Law, and a belief in the Other considered as the subject supposed to know. Insofar as the contemporary subject does not want to know anything about (...) this “condition of belief” without which no knowledge, and therefore no truth, are possible, the crisis of belief affect both, the Other and the subject. This can be seen in the fact that the failing belief in the Other and knowledge, considered as a distinctive feature of our profoundly unbelieving times, is accompanied by an unprecedented rise in anxiety at the social level, as contemporary subjects who do not believe in the (existence of the) Other are singularly defenceless before the irruption of the real. With truth losing its power to name the real, the subject itself as a singular response to the real is becoming ever more precarious. Which is why, when faced with the erratic irruption of the real, contemporary subjects are condemned to a desperate search for certainties. (shrink)

Analysing the role of Kant’s third and final Critique, the _Critique of Judgement_, in the system of Kant’s three Critiques (_Critique of Pure Reason_, _Critique of Practical Reason_, _Critique of Judgement_), the paper posits that with the conclusion of the system of critiques in the third _Critique_, Kant succeeds in presenting it as a point of a transfinitisation of knowledge within the critiques’ system.

It is the praxis of being a subject in the world which enables psychoanalysis to theorise subjectivity. Freud theorised subjectivity from the perspective of desires, those repressed unconscious forces which conflict with the subjects’ need to live in the world. The upshot of this conflict for the subject is trauma and for psychoanalysis such trauma provides a way into a remedy, a cure, the presumption of psychoanalysis being that through its method of transference, it does indeed possess the knowledge to (...) pursue a remedy. Lacan offers a new interpretation of Freud by considering the subject as an ongoing ontological enigma in so far as subjective unconscious desire is not only (potentially) traumatic but necessarily (always) linguistic. How is this an ontological enigma? For Lacan the subject is first and foremost a speaking being engaged in an ongoing struggle to articulate unconscious desire. This is because, claims Lacan, we are born into language which not only pre-exists us but continues after death. In this way subjectivity is inescapably oriented to language as simultaneously intrinsic external to it. The unconscious is therefore a mixture of inside and outside, an enigmatic (pre)ontological space which Lacan calls extimacy. This essay seeks to explore Lacan’s orientation of the subject towards extimacy as the site of subjective conflict where, in its quest for the subject’s desire to know and handle the symptom, transference engages a new ontological dimension in which we can say that the extimate is structured like a sensation. (shrink)

The kinds of specifically ethical questions we can meaningfully ask about the environment are rapidly becoming fewer as the climate emergency intensifies. The article argues that there is something fundamentally inadequate about the traditional conceptions of ethics regarding the climate crisis because they all tend to presuppose that we can somehow get it right. The problem is that we got it wrong and must start dealing with the consequences.

The article draws attention to a certain multi-layered parallel between Nietzsche and Badiou’s theory of the event, which the author argues Badiou evaded by a kind of strategic relocation. The article does not focus so much on (and certainly not against) Badiou’s philosophy, but attempts to assess the possible implications of this relocation for Badiou’s interpretation of Nietzsche. In the first part of the article, the key concepts of Badiou’s account of Nietzsche are introduced, such as “archi-politics”, “antiphilosophy”, and the (...) “event Nietzsche”. Later, it is shown that, despite some fundamental differences, there is a strong resemblance between some key concepts of Badiou’s theory of the event, especially those related to the notion of “intervention”, and some concepts found in Nietzsche. Finally, the paper focuses on the problem of the “death of God”, which is somehow absent in Badiou’s interpretation, even though the term itself resonates strongly in various aspects of Badiou’s philosophy. (shrink)

The paper proceeds in three steps. First, it addresses what urgency and emergency are in their simplest terms; then, it places this in the context of the now very popular metaphor of imprisonment, which supposedly describes what is happening to us today; and in the final steps, it presents the task of critical theory today. Starting from the distinction between urgency and emergency (the main difference being that in the latter case there is an immediate threat or danger to life, (...) health, property, or the environment, while in the case of urgency there is no such immediate threat or danger), the paper proposes the concept of Super-emergency as a name for a (contemporary) situation that is out of control and feeds on our own antagonisms and contradictions. The accompanying atmosphere or mood is the “mood of nightmare”, which also explains why it seems so natural for us today to speak of arrest, imprisonment, or entrapment. By pointing out some consequences of prison metaphors, we suggest in the last part of the paper that it is not only urgent to think about and deal with urgency and emergency per se, but also with their particular deviation – the Super-emergency. Even if we do not have time to think and act differently, as our leaders, the media, and propaganda keep claiming (“now we do not have time to listen, to discuss, to exchange opinions, to talk”), it is precisely urgent situations that provide time for reflection and radical action to reclaim our common future. In other words, what is really urgent and necessary for us now, today, is to free ourselves from this yoke of emergency in which we are trapped and which we call here the Super-emergency. (shrink)

In light of the Iranian uprising of 1978–79, Foucault preferred to use the term revolt instead of revolution. In the first part of the article, we attempt to go beyond the limits of the nonspecific distinction he made between revolt and revolution by drawing on Furio Jesi’s phenomenology of revolt and showing in what sense the Iranian uprising can be considered a revolt. In the second part, the article highlights the connection between the Iranian uprising and Foucault’s later works by (...) arguing that his adventure in Iran effectively shaped his final intellectual trajectory. By examining the tension between the transcendental and the historical in Foucault’s works, we propose to read his Iranian experience against the backdrop of such tension to better understand his different approach to the question of the transcendental in his final years. (shrink)

The term “climate emergency” was employed in the 2008 book Climate Code Red as both a problem statement and a solutions strategy. The core propositions – that the biophysical circumstances were worse than generally understood, that the 2°C goal was dangerously high, and that the time for incremental change had expired – are re-examined in light of events over the last decade and the growing existential risk. The failure to recognise and respond to the climate emergency, and the incapacity of (...) markets to do so, means that widespread social, economic, and physical disruption is now inevitable. An emergency mode of response, characterised by decisive state leadership and market intervention which challenges the dominant economic paradigm, is now necessary to protect contemporary civilisation. (shrink)

The general question underlying this article is whether it is possible to turn a paradox into a productive principle. The article approaches this question through Adorno’s and Dainotto’s analyses of the jazz movement in fascist Italy. Jazz was marked by a specific paradox: on the one hand, it was banned due to its African American roots, and as such did not adhere to or glorify the Italian tradition; on the other hand, jazz served very well to protect the nationalist interests (...) in the light of the nascent mass movements. Against the backdrop of these analyses, the article proposes two distinct paradigms of exception: the logic of count till all and the logic of count till none. (shrink)

In the first part of the article, the author analyses the last phase of the Covid-19 pandemic, which he terms “ex-communication”. A characteristic of this phase is not only virus”, but also the irrevocable transition to “living with the virus” but also the retroactive erasure of potentially valuable lessons from the pandemic for dealing with other crises. After outlining a new legal understanding of climate emergency in the second part of the text, the author concludes by focusing on the global (...) warming debate in the 1970s. In doing so, he posits that we must search for the origin of all forms of “climate delay” (Lamb et al.) in the confluence of two contradictory tendencies during that period: the determination to stop global warming early and the techno-utopian desire to prevent the onset of an ice age by deliberately warming the atmosphere. The irony is that the caution offered as a way out of the contradiction not only failed to mitigate climate change but ultimately prevented the onset of an ice age for the foreseeable future. Such clear signals of the Anthropocene present us with a new choice, i.e. a choice between two versions of the self-evident, two versions of the impossible. (shrink)

The paper analyses the place of the End in Mary Shelley’s 1826 science fiction novel The Last Man, in which the image of a world devoid of humanity, as portrayed by the last man writing the last book, is drawn before the reader through a conceptual rethinking of notions such as the loss of the world, prophecy of the future, and oblivion of the past, as well as the return of the irretrievable through the siren song.

The classic formula of disavowal given by Octave Mannoni, “I know well, but all the same,” undergoes interesting and far-reaching permutations in today’s social context. When it comes to dealing with and (not) responding to various crises, we usually point the finger at deniers and their “irrational” attitudes. However, far more common and socially problematic is the attitude that combines full recognition and denial in the same movement. Moreover, knowledge of a problem not only goes seamlessly with ignoring it but (...) seems to make ignoring it possible in the first place. Saying that “we know well” often enables us to ignore the real of that knowledge. Disavowal thus takes a doubly perverse turn, which is the focus of the analysis in this article. (shrink)

The paper is primarily devoted to Nietzsche’s account of cruelty, which represents an indispensable key to understanding Nietzsche’s genealogical project in many of its essential aspects. This study is complemented by parallels with two other outstanding intellectual figures of the late nineteenth century: Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky and Leopold von Sacher-Masoch. Dostoevsky wrote that “civilisation has made mankind if not more bloodthirsty, at least more vilely, more loathsomely bloodthirsty.” Nietzsche went a step further in this assessment: not only does civilisation not (...) make us immune to cruelty, but it must itself be seen to emerge directly from cruelty at every significant step it has taken. What brings Nietzsche close to Masoch, on the other hand, is the fact that these historical or even prehistorical developments that have shaped humankind and civilisation are not only related to cruelty, but must be observed as various forms of the internalisation (“spiritualisation”, “deification”) of cruelty. The core of the study is devoted to analyses of different forms and aspects of Nietzsche’s concept of the internalisation of cruelty (in relation to power-relations, subject-object relations, mutations of pleasure, and perversions). (shrink)

The article defines the problem of the nature of ideas in Descartes’s philosophy according to the ontology of substances. First, it illuminates Descartes’s relation to antecedent theories of ideas (as platonic forms or as corporal images) and demonstrates that, in opposition to them, Descartes conceives ideas as modes of thinking substance. Then, it develops two possible explanations of his theory. The first one understands an idea as a complex consisting of perception and its necessary internal object, which enables the representation (...) of external objects. The second one understands it as an act with intrinsic representative structure. By using Arnauld’s analysis of Descartes’s texts, it demonstrates that in accordance with the second model, an idea is a singular mode of thinking substance, which should at the same time be understood as an act of mind and as a representation of objects. (shrink)

The text treats the theme of cruelty starting from how it appears in the everyday dominant ideology. If we want to feel the pulse of our modern ideological landscape, we cannot ignore the fact that it has recently been severely shaken by the Russian aggression against Ukraine. The war in Ukraine has repeatedly been called cruel, and cruelty in general is today unanimously seen as something reprehensible and repulsive. But the same is true of torture, which, although in principle prosecuted, (...) is carried out in secret. And if every war is cruel, what does the statement “the war in Ukraine is cruel” mean? In what contexts does it fit? The text explores this question on several levels, beginning with modern understandings of war and cruelty, moving to the broader historical context in which the statement is made, and finally asking whether it means that we still have one foot in the 20th century in some sense. Following Badiou’s work _The Century_, which emphasises the role of the passion of the real, war (which is intended to end all wars), and cruelty in the twentieth century, this statement also means that the twentieth century is not (yet) over in a sense, and that this century may be settling accounts with itself (again) with the war in Ukraine. (shrink)

Slovenian epistemology is characterised by an idiosyncratic canon, based on three fundamental authors: Gaston Bachelard, Alexandre Koyré, and Thomas Kuhn. What binds this canon together is the attitude that the history of science should be viewed as a history of radical breaks or revolutions in scientific thought. The drawback of such an anthology of authors is not only that it is outdated, but that, from the position of this canon, it is difficult to discern the problems stemming from the approach (...) to history of science it endorses. In order to highlight the blind spots of Slovenian epistemology, I examine a different interpretative trajectory of the notion of scientific revolution in the United Kingdom and the United States. The methodological program, which focuses on revolutionary breakthroughs in scientific ideas, is thus re-evaluated by considering its strategic role in the institutionalisation of the history of science as a discipline. The event that marked the translation of French epistemology into English history of science were the lectures of the delegates from the Soviet Union at the Second International Congress of the History of Science and Technology in 1931. In post-war Anglo-American history of science, the concept of scientific revolution was adopted as a means of excluding Marxist studies of science – which had spread under the influence of the Soviet delegation – from the realm of acceptable discourse. I demonstrate how the Cold War historiography of science introduced a divide between the “internal” and “external” factors of scientific development, and their supposed synthesis in the work of Thomas Kuhn. Finally, I review the critiques that the sociology of scientific knowledge levelled at the story of the Scientific Revolution and point out the importance of these controversies for current epistemological research. (shrink)

The article describes a rarely mentioned and discussed method of explication first found in Chapter six of Descartes’s posthumously published _The World_ (_Le Monde_), where he uses a fictitious cosmological narrative to develop an account of our material universe and its laws. The assumption of such an approach is that the thing’s structure (nature) can be revealed by its genesis (its producibility), even if the latter is fictitious, or rather, precisely _because_ it is fictitious. This method of “genetic epistemology” turns (...) out to be surprisingly influential: it is found, for example, in Rousseau’s reflections on the state of nature, but also in commentaries on Descartes’s philosophy – e.g. in Martial Gueroult’s principle of “the order of reasons”. (shrink)

This article draws on Jacques Derrida’s and Roberto Esposito’s conceptualisations of the immunitarian paradigm to analyse the Slovenian crime novel _The Virus_. In the first part, we examine the links between neoliberalism and the rise of the Slovenian authoritarian state during the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic. In the second part, we show that the neoliberal ethos is expressed in the figure of the self-serving and self-disciplined detective, in the nature of desocialised and privatised crime, and in the figure (...) of the self-righteous criminal. Although the actions of the detective and the criminal are autoimmunitarian, both function – paradoxically – as guardians of the common good by pursuing private interests. In the final section, we deconstruct the binary oppositions underlying the dual status of murdered victims, who are simultaneously criminally responsible and possess an unusual (non-heteronormative) or pathological sexual identity. (shrink)

If we had to identify the most controversial concept today, “happiness” would certainly figure among the main candidates for this role. On the one hand, “happiness” has represented one of the main ethical axes in the history of philosophy – from Greek _eudaimonia_ to Bentham’s “greatest happiness for the greatest number of people.” Ethics was almost inextricably connected with the search for happiness, which was already in Greek synonymous for the “good life”. On the other hand, capitalism today, notwithstanding the (...) general apathy and despair due to the permanent crises of the capitalist system (climate change, pandemics, financial crises, etc.), still legitimises itself with, if not guarantees, at least a promise of happiness. Despite different historical contexts which again and again gave meaning to the concept of happiness, a common denominator can still be identified, which today, in the era of late capitalism, has even gained the status of a cornerstone of our hegemonic image of happiness. Happiness is a question of being. The evocation of happiness usually raises the question of whether one is happy or not, what it means to be happy, and how we become so. Happiness is thus inextricably connected to the question of identity: it is the sensual expression of our being, of what we supposedly are. In contrast to this “ontologisation of happiness”, the article tries to show not only that there is a _materialist concept of happiness_, but also that the latter bases itself on the primacy of the verb “having” instead of “being”. From a materialist perspective, happiness is something that we have or encounter, and not something that we are. Two references are crucial in this articulation: first, Benjamin’s formulation of happiness from his last essay “On the concept of history”, and second, the Freudian-Lacanian theory of repetition. (shrink)