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  1. Daydreaming as spontaneous immersive imagination: A phenomenological analysis.Emily Lawson & Evan Thompson - 2024 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5 (1):1-34.
    Research on the specific features of daydreaming compared with mind-wandering and night dreaming is a neglected topic in the philosophy of mind and the cognitive neuroscience of spontaneous thought. The extant research either conflates daydreaming with mind-wandering (whether understood as task-unrelated thought, unguided attention, or disunified thought), characterizes daydreaming as opposed to mind-wandering (Dorsch, 2015), or takes daydreaming to encompass any and all “imagined events” (Newby-Clark & Thavendran, 2018). These dueling definitions obstruct future research on spontaneous thought, and are insufficiently (...)
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  2.  3
    Two levels of confusion between imagination and memory.Margherita Arcangeli & Jérôme Dokic - 2024 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5.
    Is it possible to confuse one’s own memories with imaginings? And what about confusing one’s own imaginings with memories? The extensive literature in psychology on memory errors and confabulation suggests positive answers to these questions. However, things are more complicated, and the notion of confusion deserves a more detailed analysis. In this paper, we will do so and provide several scenarios showing that these two types of confusion can occur on two different levels: reflective (the level of self-ascription) and phenomenological (...)
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  3.  33
    Going ballistic: The dynamics of the imagination and the issue of intentionalism.Felipe Morales Carbonell - 2024 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5.
    Do we have control over the content of our imaginings? More precisely: do we have control over what our imaginings are about? Intentionalists say yes. Until recently, intentionalism could be taken as the received view. Recently, authors like Munro & Strohminger (2021) have developed some arguments against it. Here, I tentatively join their ranks and develop a new way to think about the way in which imaginings develop their contents that also goes against intentionalism. My proposal makes use of what (...)
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  4.  12
    Relearning and remembering: A gradualist account.Changsheng Lai - 2024 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5.
    Relearning and remembering are usually seen as two distinct cognitive processes in contemporary philosophy of memory. In particular, relearning is sometimes regarded as a kind of memory error. This paper aims to address two questions. First, is relearning a kind of memory error? Second, how to draw a distinction (if any) properly between relearning and remembering? My answer to the first question is a conditional ‘yes’—it depends on whether relearning can be falsidical and whether metacognitive monitoring counts as a part (...)
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  5. Imagining what you intend.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2024 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5.
    If we are free to imagine what we choose, this is likely because our intentions determine what we are imagining. However, in a recent article, Munro and Strohminger (2021) argue that, in some cases of imagistic imagining, our intentions do not determine what we are imagining. They offer examples where, intuitively, a person intends to imagine one thing but, due to the causal source of the image used, imagine another. This paper acknowledges the challenge posed by these cases while arguing (...)
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  6.  4
    Hedonic valence at the core of consciousness: A review of "A philosophy for the science of animal consciousness" by Walter Veit. [REVIEW]Nadine Meertens - 2024 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5.
    A book review of “A philosophy for the science of animal consciousness” by Walter Veit Routledge, 2023, 162 pages, ISBN 9781032343617.
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  7. Remembering religious experience: Reconstruction, reflection, and reliability.Daniel Munro - 2024 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5.
    This paper explores the relationship between religious belief and religious experience, bringing out a role for episodic memory that has been overlooked in the epistemology of religion. I do so by considering two questions. The first, the “Psychological Question,” asks what psychological role religious experiences play in causally bringing about religious beliefs. The second, the “Reliability Question,” asks: for a given answer to the Psychological Question about how religious beliefs are formed, are those beliefs formed using generally truth-conducive cognitive mechanisms (...)
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  8. Immersing oneself into one’s past: subjective presence can be part of the experience of episodic remembering.Denis Perrin & Michael Barkasi - 2024 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5.
    A common view about the phenomenology of episodic remembering has it that when we remember a perceptual experience, we can relive or re-experience many of its features, but not its characteristic presence. In this paper, we challenge this common view. We first say that presence in perception divides into temporal and locative presence, with locative having two sides, an objective and a subjective one. While we agree with the common view that temporal and objective locative presence cannot be relived in (...)
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  9.  16
    Successfully remembering a belief and the problem of forgotten evidence.Shin Sakuragi - 2024 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5.
    The problem of forgotten evidence consists of a pair of scenarios originally proposed by Alvin Goldman. In the “forgotten good evidence” and “forgotten bad evidence” scenarios, subjects hold the same memory belief while irreversibly forgetting its original, though different, pieces of evidence. The two scenarios pose a series of challenges to current time slice (CTS) theories, which posit that memory beliefs are justified solely by contemporaneous states. Goldman’s two scenarios pose an apparent dilemma to CTS theories given a naïve picture (...)
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    Personal identity and mental time travel.Marya Schechtman - 2024 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5.
    This paper examines the role of episodic memory, and the broader notion of “mental time travel” (MTT), in constituting personal identity. After arguing that the construal of memory’s role in personal identity found in traditional psychological continuity theories of personal identity is both unrealistic and unsatisfying, the paper endeavors to provide a better account. This begins with recent work in the science and philosophy of memory that sees episodic memory as part of a broader faculty for MTT (which also involves (...)
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  11.  4
    Seeing is believing: Implications of the dreamlike cognitive style for waking spontaneous thought and psychopathology.Nirit Soffer-Dudek - 2024 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5.
    The intuitive experience of dreaming is that we “see” something with our mind’s eye and react to it. Indeed, dream formation conceptualizations have often focused on the visual image-to-verbal thought direction of causality, inspired by bottom-up models of perception. However, despite being experienced as external to us, the dream environment is internally generated, meaning that dreams are more like imagination than perception. Dream thoughts (experienced with a sense of agency or selfhood) also affect subsequent dream images (experienced as non-agentive or (...)
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  12.  1
    Old and new versions of the Molyneux question: A review of experimental answers. [REVIEW]Charles Spence & Nicola Di Stefano - 2024 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5.
    The ‘Molyneux problem’ is typically framed in terms of the crossmodal matching of shape information from touch to vision. Indeed, shape along with intensity have commonly been considered amodal stimulus properties/dimensions (at least by developmental researchers). However, it is important to note that what is common, if anything, to the senses differs in the two cases: It is the physical stimulus (and possibly also the associated phenomenology) that is thought to be the same in the case of crossmodal (or intermodal) (...)
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  13. The Justificatory Power of Memory Experience.Lu Teng - 2024 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5.
    Psychological research has discovered that episodic memories are constructive in nature. This paper examines how, despite being constructive, episodic memories can provide us with justification for beliefs about the past. In current literature, two major approaches to memorial justification are internalist foundationalism and reliabilism. I first demonstrate that an influential version of internalist foundationalism, dogmatism, encounters problems when we compare certain types of memory construction with cognitive penetration in perception. On the other hand, various versions of reliabilism all face skeptical (...)
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  14.  29
    Memory identification and its failures.Fabrice Teroni - 2024 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5.
    When we remember, we often know that we do. How does this memory identification proceed? After having articulated some constraints on an attractive account of memory identification, this paper explores three types of accounts that respectively appeal to features of memory content, of memory as an activity, and of memory as an attitude. It offers reasons to favour an attitudinal account giving pride of place to the feeling of familiarity.
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  15.  7
    Prospects for epistemic generationism about memory.Uku Tooming & Kengo Miyazono - 2024 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5.
    A source of epistemic justification can be either preservative or generative, in that it can either just preserve justification that was provided by some other source or generate justification on its own. This paper asks what is required for generationism about memory to be true and argues that there are rather demanding conditions that a case of memory justification needs to satisfy in order to count as epistemically generative in a substantive sense. By considering a parallel argument for epistemically generative (...)
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  16. Accuracy in imagining.Amy Kind - 2024 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5.
    Recent treatments of imagination have increasingly treated imagining as a skill. Insofar as imaginative accuracy is one of the factors that underwrites this skill, it is important to understand what it means to say that an imagining is accurate. This paper takes up that task. The discussion proceeds in four parts. First, I address two worries that may naturally arise about the coherence ofthe notion of imaginative accuracy. Second, with those worries addressed, I turn to an exploration of what is (...)
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  17. Metacognition and the puzzle of alethic memory.André Sant'Anna - 2024 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5.
    Alethism is the view that successful remembering only requires an accurate representation of a past event. It opposes the truth-and-authenticity view, according to which successful remembering requires both an accurate representation of a past event and an accurate representation of a past experience of that event. Alethism is able to handle problematic cases faced by the truth-and-authenticity view, but it faces an important challenge of its own: If successful remembering only requires accurately representing past events, then how is it possible (...)
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  18. Remembering trauma in epistemology.Matthew Frise - 2024 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences.
    This paper explores some surprising effects of psychological trauma on memory and develops the puzzle of observer memory for trauma. Memory for trauma tends to have a third-person perspective, or observer perspective. But it appears observer memory, by having a novel visual point of view, tends to misrepresent the past. And many find it plausible that if a memory type tends to misrepresent, it cannot yield knowledge of, or justification for believing, details of past events. But it is also plausible (...)
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