80 found

Year:

  1.  49
    Relationalism and Unconscious Perception.Jacob Berger & Bence Nanay - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):426-433.
    Relationalism holds that perceptual experiences are relations between subjects and perceived objects. But much evidence suggests that perceptual states can be unconscious. We argue here that unconscious perception raises difficulties for relationalism. Relationalists would seem to have three options. First, they may deny that there is unconscious perception or question whether we have sufficient evidence to posit it. Second, they may allow for unconscious perception but deny that the relationalist analysis applies to it. Third, they may offer a relationalist explanation (...)
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  2.  7
    Rational Belief: Structure, Grounds and Intellectual Virtue.George Botterill - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):547-549.
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  3.  16
    “Ancona?” Aha! That’s Her Name! Tip-of-the-Tongue Experiences.Clotilde Calabi - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):409-418.
    Tip-of-the-tongue experiences have an intriguing and insidious character. Some philosophers have tried to reduce them to more common states, with some considering these experiences to be beliefs about one’s state of knowledge, and still others considering them feelings about one’s state of knowledge. These two latter views are not mutually exclusive; indeed, one might hold a mixed theory, according to which the TOT is a feeling that depends constitutively on a belief. In the paper I first argue against the idea (...)
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  4.  31
    Objects of Thought? On the Usual Way Out of Prior’s Objection to the Relational Theory of Propositional Attitude Sentences.Giulia Felappi - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):438-444.
    Traditionally, ‘that’-clauses occurring in attitude attributions are taken to denote the objects of the attitudes. Prior raised a famous problem: even if Frege fears that the Begriffsschrift leads to a paradox, it is unlikely that he fears a proposition, a sentence or what have you as the alleged object denoted by the ‘that’-clause. The usual way out is to say that ‘that’-clauses do not contribute the objects of the attitudes but their contents. I will show that, if we accept this (...)
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  5.  29
    Assessment–Sensitivity.Filippo Ferrari - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):516-527.
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  6.  33
    Misidentifying the Evolutionary Debunkers’ Error: Reply to Mogensen.William J. FitzPatrick - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):433-437.
    Andreas Mogensen has recently argued that the current debate over evolutionary debunking in ethics is mired in confusion due to a simple fallacy committed by debunkers and uncritically taken on board by their opponents. I argue that no party to this debate is involved in the type of confusion and fallacy Mogensen has in mind, which he himself notes would be an absurd and outlandish mistake for anyone to make in other domains. Debunkers do plausibly commit an error in their (...)
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  7.  5
    Worlds, Voyages and Experiences: Commentary on Pelczar’s Sensorama. [REVIEW]Geoffrey Lee - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):453-461.
  8.  53
    Save the Children!Artūrs Logins - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):418-422.
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  9.  3
    Introspection in Michael Pelczar’s Sensorama. [REVIEW]Eugene Mills - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):461-471.
  10.  12
    Issues in Phenomenalist Metaphysics. [REVIEW]Kevin Morris - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):471-479.
    This critical discussion of Michael Pelczar's Sensorama (OUP, 2015)raises several interrelated issues about Pelczar's phenomenalism that arise from its commitment to ungrounded experiential conditionals reflecting what experiences there would be, were there other experiences.
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  11.  26
    Corrigendum.Adam Morton - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):445-445.
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  12.  10
    The Varieties of Consciousness.Nagumanova Svetlana - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):553-556.
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  13.  10
    The Varieties of Consciousness By U. Kriegel. [REVIEW]Svetlana Nagumanova - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):553-556.
  14.  97
    Aboutness, Critical Notice. [REVIEW]Naomi Osorio-Kupferblum - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):528-546.
    This Critical Notice is about aboutness in logic and language. In a first part, I discuss the origin of the issue and the philosophical background to Yablo's book Aboutness (PUP 2014), which is itself the subject of the second and main part of my paper.
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  15.  3
    Summary.Michael Pelczar - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):449-453.
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  16.  1
    Replies.Michael Pelczar - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):479-501.
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  17.  11
    The Logical Structure of Kinds, By Eric Funkhouser.Katarina Perovic - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):549-553.
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  18.  7
    Debating Procreation: Is It Wrong to Reproduce?Allen Thompson - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):556-558.
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  19.  74
    Ethics and Evolutionary Theory.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):502-515.
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  20.  16
    How Propaganda Works.Jonathan Wolff - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):558-560.
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  21.  19
    Phenomenal Concepts and the Speckled Hen.Xiaoxing Zhang - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):422-426.
    Feldman proposed a solution to the speckled hen problem via ‘phenomenal concepts’, a solution which Fumerton accepted with reservation. Notwithstanding the existing criticisms of Feldman as being over-intellectualist, I argue that his approach fails for other reasons.
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  22.  26
    Paternalism.Jessica Begon - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):355-373.
  23.  12
    Assertion: On the Philosophical Significance of Assertoric SpeechBy Sanford G. Goldberg.Daniel Brigham - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):389-391.
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  24. Perception and Its Objects.Berit Brogaard - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):374-380.
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  25.  57
    Externalist Psychiatry.Will Davies - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):290-296.
    Psychiatry widely assumes an internalist biomedical model of mental illness. I argue that many of psychiatry’s diagnostic categories involve an implicit commitment to constitutive externalism about mental illness. Some of these categories are socially externalist in nature.
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  26.  24
    You Me and the World.Naomi Eilan - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):311-324.
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  27.  42
    The Rules of ThoughtBy Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Benjamin W. Jarvis.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):393-397.
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  28.  47
    An Empirical Refutation of ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’.Paul Henne, Vladimir Chituc, Felipe De Brigard & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):283-290.
    Most philosophers assume that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, and most of them hold that this principle is true not only universally but also analytically or conceptually. Some skeptics deny this principle, although they often admit some related one. In this article, we show how new empirical evidence bolsters the skeptics’ arguments. We then defend the skeptical view against some objections to the empirical evidence and to its effect on the traditional principle. In light of the new evidence, we conclude that philosophers (...)
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  29. Alethic Undecidability Doesn’T Solve the Liar.Mark Jago - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):278-283.
    Stephen Barker presents a novel approach to solving semantic paradoxes, including the Liar and its variants and Curry’s paradox. His approach is based around the concept of alethic undecidability. His approach, if successful, renders futile all attempts to assign semantic properties to the paradoxical sentences, whilst leaving classical logic fully intact. And, according to Barker, even the T-scheme remains valid, for validity is not undermined by undecidable instances. Barker’s approach is innovative and worthy of further consideration, particularly by those of (...)
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  30.  6
    Manipulation: Theory and PracticeBy Christian Coons and Michael Weber.D. K. Levy - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):404-406.
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  31.  27
    Achievement by Gwen Bradford. [REVIEW]Eden Lin - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):402-404.
  32.  52
    Can One Decide to Do Something Without Forming an Intention to Do It?John McGuire - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):269-278.
    According to the received view of practical decisions, ‘deciding to X’ is synonymous with ‘forming an intention to X’. In this article, I argue against the received view on the basis of both experimental evidence and theoretical considerations. The evidence concerns a case involving a side-effect action in which people tend to agree that an agent decided to X yet disagree that the agent had a corresponding intention to X. Additionally, I explain why one should expect decisions and intentions to (...)
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  33.  16
    Can One Decide to Do Something Without Forming an Intention to Do It?: Table 1.John McGuire - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):269-278.
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  34.  13
    A Naturalistic Epistemology: Selected PapersBy Hilary Kornblith.Giacomo Melis - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):397-399.
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  35.  8
    The Self in Question: Memory, the Body and Self-ConsciousnessBy Andy Hamilton.Daniel Morgan - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):400-401.
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  36.  8
    Peacocke on Primitive Self-Representation.Karen Neander - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):324-334.
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  37.  5
    Summary.Christopher Peacocke - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):309-311.
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  38.  16
    The Nature and Role of First and Second Person Content.Christopher Peacocke - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):345-354.
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  39.  80
    De Se Content and De Hinc Content.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):334-345.
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  40.  16
    De SeContent andDe HincContent.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):334-345.
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  41.  20
    The Logical Must: Wittgenstein on LogicBy Penelope Maddy.David G. Stern - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):391-393.
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  42.  28
    Transformative Experience.William Talbott - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):380-388.
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  43. A New Argument Against Libertarian Free Will?David Widerker - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):296-306.
    In this paper, I present an argument that shows that the belief in libertarian freedom is inconsistent with two assumptions widely accepted by those who are physicalists with regard to the relation between the mental and the physical - that mental properties are distinct from physical properties, and that mental properties supervene on physical properties. After presenting the argument, I trace its implications for the question of the compatibility of libertarian free will and physicalism in general.
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  44.  16
    Transparency, Olfaction and Aesthetics.Thomas Baker - 2016 - Analysis 76 (2):121-130.
    Many have suggested that, unlike the so-called higher-senses, the lower-senses are not capable of providing aesthetic experience. Supporting this is, what I will call, the Transparency-Exteroceptivity Argument, which says that a necessary feature for aesthetic experience is lacking in the case of the lower-senses, namely transparency/exteroceptivity. I argue, contrary to the Transparency-Exteroceptivity Argument, that olfaction can provide transparent access to the properties of particular external objects. I argue that the Transparency-Exteroceptivity Argument relies on a misleading visuocentric and unimodal view of (...)
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  45.  38
    Self-Knowledge for Humans. [REVIEW]Annalisa Coliva - 2016 - Analysis 76 (2):246-252.
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  46.  8
    How We Fight By Helen Frowe and Gerald LangTorture and Moral Integrity By Matthew H. Kramer.Jovana Davidovic - 2016 - Analysis 76 (2):259-263.
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  47.  25
    Modal Logic and Contingentism: A Comment on Timothy Williamsons Modal Logic as Metaphysics.Louis deRosset - 2016 - Analysis 76 (2):155-172.
    Necessitists hold that, necessarily, everything is such that, necessarily, something is identical to it. Timothy Williamson has posed a number of challenges to contingentism, the negation of necessitism. One such challenge is an argument that necessitists can more wholeheartedly embrace possible worlds semantics than can contingentists. If this charge is correct, then necessitists, but not contingentists, can unproblematically exploit the technical successes of possible worlds semantics. I will argue, however, that the charge is incorrect: contingentists can embrace possible worlds semantics (...)
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  48. Ontology, Composition, Quantification and Action.Bryan Frances - 2016 - Analysis 76 (2):137-142.
    The literature on material composition has largely ignored the composition of actions and events. I argue that this is a mistake. I present a set of individually plausible yet jointly inconsistent claims regarding the connection between quantification and existence, the composition of physical entities and the logical forms of action sentences.
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  49.  24
    Timothy Williamson on the Contingently Concrete and Non-Concrete.Jeffrey C. King - 2016 - Analysis 76 (2):190-201.
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  50.  33
    Model Theory and Contingent Existence.Boris Kment - 2016 - Analysis 76 (2):172-190.
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  51.  25
    Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief.Justin McBrayer & Theresa O’Hare - 2016 - Analysis 76 (2):223-231.
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  52.  76
    Knowledge-to-Fact Arguments (Bootstrapping, Closure, Paradox and KK).Murali Ramachandran - 2016 - Analysis 76 (2):142-149.
    The leading idea of this article is that one cannot acquire knowledge of any non-epistemic fact by virtue of knowing that one that knows something. The lines of reasoning involved in the surprise exam paradox and in Williamson’s _reductio_ of the KK-principle, which demand that one can, are thereby undermined, and new type of counter-example to epistemic closure emerges.
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  53.  10
    Ignorance and Moral Obligation By MICHAEL J. ZIMMERMAN.Ben Sherman - 2016 - Analysis 76 (2):263-265.
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  54.  16
    Naming, Necessity and More: Explorations in the Philosophical Work of Saul Kripke By Jonathan Berg.Joshua Spencer - 2016 - Analysis 76 (2):253-256.
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  55.  12
    Debates in the Metaphysics of Time Edited by L. Nathan Oaklander.Stephan Torre - 2016 - Analysis 76 (2):256-259.
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  56.  38
    The Point of Assertion is to Transmit Knowledge.John Turri - 2016 - Analysis 76 (2):130-136.
    Recent work in philosophy and cognitive science shows that knowledge is the norm of our social practice of assertion, in the sense that an assertion should express knowledge. But why should an assertion express knowledge? I hypothesize that an assertion should express knowledge because the point of assertion is to transmit knowledge. I present evidence supporting this hypothesis.
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  57.  33
    Summary.Timothy Williamson - 2016 - Analysis 76 (2):153-155.
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  58.  50
    Replies to King, deRosset and Kment.Timothy Williamson - 2016 - Analysis 76 (2):201-222.
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  59.  39
    The Inessential Indexical: On the Philosophical Insignificance of Perspective and the First Person By Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever. [REVIEW]Philip Atkins - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):99-102.
    Due largely to the influence of Perry (1979) and Lewis (1979), many philosophers now believe that certain attitudes are ‘essentially indexical’, and that this fact is philosophically significant. Going against the conventional wisdom, Cappelen and Dever (2013) (henceforth ‘C&D’) have two goals. The modest goal is to show that Perry, Lewis and their followers have failed to establish any clear ‘essential indexicality’ thesis. The ambitious goal is to show that indexicality is ‘shallow’, in that it does not play any interesting (...)
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  60.  36
    A Solution to the Paradox of Analysis.Mark Balaguer & Terry Horgan - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):3-7.
    The paradox of analysis asks how a putative conceptual analysis can be both true and informative. If it is true then isn’t it analytic? And if it is analytic then how can it be informative? Our proposed solution rests on a distinction between explicit knowledge of meaning and implicit knowledge of meaning and on a correlative distinction between two kinds of conceptual competence. If one initially possesses only implicit knowledge of the meaning of a given concept and the associated linguistic (...)
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  61.  63
    Reasoning and Reflection: A Reply to Kornblith.Paul Boghossian - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):41-54.
    Hilary Kornblith’s book is motivated by the conviction that philosophers have tended to overvalue and overemphasize reflection in their accounts of central philosophical phenomena. He seeks to pinpoint this tendency and to correct it. -/- Kornblith’s claim is not without precedent. It is an oft-repeated theme of 20th-century philosophy that philosophers have tended to give ‘overly intellectualized’ accounts of important phenomena. One thinks here of Wittgenstein, Ryle and many others. -/- One version of this charge is that philosophers have tended (...)
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  62.  25
    Knot and Tonk: Nasty Connectives on Many-Valued Truth-Tables for Classical Sentential Logic.Tim Button - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):7-19.
    Prior’s Tonk is a famously horrible connective. It is defined by its inference rules. My aim in this article is to compare Tonk with some hitherto unnoticed nasty connectives, which are defined in semantic terms. I first use many-valued truth-tables for classical sentential logic to define a nasty connective, Knot. I then argue that we should refuse to add Knot to our language. And I show that this reverses the standard dialectic surrounding Tonk, and yields a novel solution to the (...)
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  63. A Counterexample to Variabilism.Mihnea D. I. Capraru - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):26-29.
    Recent literature contains influential arguments for variabilism, the view that we should understand proper names as analogues not of constants but of variables. In particular, proper names are said to sometimes take semantic values that are not referential but purely general. I present a counter-example to this view.
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  64.  47
    Replacing Truth.Jennifer Duke-Yonge - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):88-96.
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  65.  24
    The Artful Species: Aesthetics, Art and Evolution By Stephen Davies.Andy Hamilton - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):115-117.
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  66. Action Without Attention.Carolyn Dicey Jennings & Bence Nanay - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):29-36.
    Wayne Wu argues that attention is necessary for action: since action requires a solution to the ‘Many–Many Problem’, and since only attention can solve the Many–Many Problem, attention is necessary for action. We question the first of these two steps and argue that it is based on an oversimplified distinction between actions and reflexes. We argue for a more complex typology of behaviours where one important category is action that does not require a solution to the Many–Many Problem, and so (...)
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  67.  12
    The Heart of Human Rights By Allen Buchanan.Ari Kohen - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):113-115.
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  68.  36
    Replies to Boghossian and Smithies.Hilary Kornblith - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):69-80.
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  69.  30
    Summary.Hilary Kornblith - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):39-40.
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  70.  30
    Intuition By Elijah Chudnoff.Janet Levin - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):97-99.
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  71.  86
    Empty Ideas: A Critique of Analytic Philosophy By Peter Unger. [REVIEW]Fraser MacBride - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):102-104.
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  72.  55
    The Norm of Belief.Richard N. Manning - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):81-87.
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  73.  17
    Born Free and Equal? A Philosophical Inquiry Into the Nature of Discrimination By K. Lippert-Rasmussen. [REVIEW]Serena Olsaretti - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):111-113.
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  74.  39
    MacBride on Truth in Truthmaking.Matthew Simpson - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):19-26.
    Fraser MacBride has argued that deflationism about truth makes the truthmaker principle, that every truth has a truthmaker, implausible. This is because on a deflationary view, the truthmaker principle is a mere abbreviation of a conjunction of claims which have no independent motivation. In this article, I argue that this claim is false: deflationism does not entail that the truthmaker principle is a mere abbreviation of such a conjunction, because the claims MacBride focuses on are in fact irrelevant to the (...)
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  75. Reflection On: On Reflection.Declan Smithies - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):55-69.
    In his book, On Reflection, Hilary Kornblith criticizes what he regards as a chronic tendency in philosophy towards inflating the significance of reflection in ways that manifest a combination of philosophical naiveté and scientific ignorance about how reflection actually works. In these comments, I respond to Kornblith's challenge by sketching an account of the philosophical significance of reflection in the theory of epistemic justification.
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  76.  15
    Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness By David J. Bennett and Christopher S. Hill, Eds.J. Henry Taylor - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):108-111.
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  77.  21
    Essays in Collective Epistemology Edited by Jennifer Lackey, Ed. [REVIEW]Leo Townsend - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):105-108.
  78.  27
    Assessment Sensitivity.Filippo Ferrari - 2016 - Analysis (4):anw021.
    In this paper I offer some critical comments to MacFarlane's recent book "Assessment Sensitivity". I focus primarily on MacFarlane's understanding of the normative aspects of enquiry—in particular I take issue with the phenomena of retraction and disagreement as preclusion of joint accuracy. I argue that both notions are problematic and that—at least in the case of basic taste—they are not needed in order to account for our intuitions.
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  79.  93
    Modal Realism, Still At Your Convenience.Mark Jago & Harold Noonan - 2016 - Analysis.
    Divers (2014) presents a set of de re modal truths which, he claims, are inconvenient for Lewisean modal realism. We argue that there is no inconvenience for Lewis.
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  80.  66
    Punishment.Zachary Hoskins - 2016 - Analysis:anw022.
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