23 found

Year:

  1.  12
    In Our Best Interest: A Defense of Paternalism By Jason Hanna.Jessica Begon - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):199-202.
    In Our Best Interest: A Defense of Paternalism By HannaJasonOxford University Press, 2018. 271 pp. £47.99.
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  2. Strictly Speaking.Renée Jorgensen Bolinger & Alexander Sandgren - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):3-11.
    A type of argument occasionally made in metaethics, epistemology and philosophy of science notes that most ordinary uses of some expression fail to satisfy the strictest interpretation of the expression, and concludes that the ordinary assertions are false. This requires there to be a presumption in favour of a strict interpretation of expressions that admit of interpretations at different levels of strictness. We argue that this presumption is unmotivated, and thus the arguments fail.
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  3.  19
    Mathematical Application and the No Confirmation Thesis.Kenneth Boyce - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):11-20.
    Some proponents of the indispensability argument for mathematical realism maintain that the empirical evidence that confirms our best scientific theories and explanations also confirms their pure mathematical components. I show that the falsity of this view follows from three highly plausible theses, two of which concern the nature of mathematical application and the other the nature of empirical confirmation. The first is that the background mathematical theories suitable for use in science are conservative in the sense outlined by Hartry Field. (...)
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  4.  27
    Recent Work on Pain.Jennifer Corns - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):202-202.
    Analysis, 78: 737–53. doi:_ 10.1093/analys/any055 _.
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  5.  42
    Unfreezing the Spotlight: Tense Realism and Temporal Passage.Fabrice Correia & Sven Rosenkranz - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):21-30.
    Realism about tense is the view that the contrast between what was, what is and what will be the case is real, and not merely a projection of our ways of thinking. Does this view entail realism about temporal passage, namely the view that time really passes, in the same sense of ‘real’? We argue that the answer is affirmative for many versions of tense realism, and indeed for all sensible versions. We thereby address an important conceptual issue regarding these (...)
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  6.  19
    Ask Not What Bilateralist Intuitionists Can Do for Cut, but What Cut Can Do for Bilateralist Intuitionism.Bogdan Dicher - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):30-40.
    On a bilateralist reading, sequents are interpreted as statements to the effect that, given the assertion of the antecedent it is incoherent to deny the succedent. This interpretation goes against its own ecumenical ambitions, endowing Cut with a meaning very close to that of tertium non datur and thus rendering it intuitionistically unpalatable. This paper explores a top-down route for arguing that, even intuitionistically, a prohibition to deny is as strong as a licence to assert.
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  7.  5
    Finlay’s Methodology: Synthetic, Not Analytic.J. L. Dowell - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):102-110.
    Stephen Finlay’s proposed methodology for defending the central theses of his impressive Confusion of Tongues is an underexplored aspect of this work.1 1 His official methodology is analytic : A reduction of normative to non-normative vocabulary. Here, I argue that taking this official line at face-value forces the reader to conclude that the reductions at the heart of that book cannot be correct. In contrast, a philosophical methodology that does not proceed via analyses would better support those reductions, then understood (...)
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  8.  22
    Reply to Worsnip, Dowell, and Koehn.Stephen Finlay - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):131-147.
    This paper responds to comments on my 2014 book Confusion of Tongues by Alex Worsnip, Janice Dowell, and Glen Koehn. I first address Worsnip’s case for contextualism without relativism. Next I address Dowell’s and Worsnip’s scepticism about whether COT succeeds in providing an analytic reduction of the normative, and Dowell’s recommendation to pursue an alternative, synthetic method. I then consider Worsnip’s comments on COT’s implications for normative ethical theory, and end by responding to Koehn’s challenges to the details of my (...)
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  9.  46
    Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language By Stephen Finlay.Stephen Finlay - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):99-101.
    This is a short precis of my 2014 book Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language, accompanying my Reply to Worsnip, Dowell, and Koehn in the same volume.
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  10.  16
    Inner Speech: New Voices. [REVIEW]Daniel Gregory - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):164-173.
    In the last 10 years, inner speech – the little voice in the head – has started to become established as a topic in the philosophy of psychology. The two philosophers who have contributed most to this development are Agustín Vicente1 1 and Peter Langland-Hassan. Together, they have now edited the first largely philosophical anthology on the topic, Inner Speech: New Voices.2 2.
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  11. A Short Argument for Truthmaker Maximalism.Mark Jago - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):40-44.
    Each truth has a truthmaker: an entity in virtue of whose existence that truth is true. So say truthmaker maximalists. Arguments for maximalism are hard to find, whereas those against are legion. Most accept that maximalism comes at a significant cost, which many judge to be too high. The scales would seem to be balanced against maximalism. Yet, as I show here, maximalism can be derived from an acceptable premise which many will pre-theoretically accept.
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  12.  8
    Fit for an End.Glen Koehn - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):110-122.
    To my mind, a central insight of Stephen Finlay’s remarkable book Confusion of Tongues lies in his rejection of two opposing extremes in the theory of value. The first mistake he avoids is thinking that goodness is some property, entirely independent of interests and belonging to particular goods, which is asserted to obtain when something is favourably evaluated. According to a theory like Finlay’s, value is not in fact a simple, irreducible property shared by all and only good things. We (...)
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  13.  17
    Robbers, Pickpockets and Average Mutual Firmness.Jakob Koscholke - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):45-51.
    Mark Siebel has presented a compelling argument against Branden Fitelson’s probabilistic measure of coherence. The present paper shows how Siebel’s argument can be strengthened and thereby extended to an argument against a huge class of coherence measures from the literature including William Roche’s average mutual firmness account, which has not been challenged up to now.
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  14.  29
    How Many Normative Notions of Rationality? A Critical Study of Wedgwood’s The Value of Rationality.Giacomo Melis - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):174-185.
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  15.  4
    Well-Being as Value Fulfillment: How We Can Help Each Other to Live Well By Valerie Tiberius.Polly Mitchell - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):196-198.
    Well-Being as Value Fulfillment: How We Can Help Each Other to Live Well By TiberiusValerieOxford University Press, 2018. xii + 214 pp.
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  16.  44
    First-Person Thought.Daniel Morgan & Léa Salje - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):148-163.
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  17. Rescue and Personal Involvement: A Response to Woollard.Theron Pummer & Roger Crisp - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):59-66.
    Fiona Woollard argues that when one is personally involved in an emergency, one has a moral requirement to make substantial sacrifices to aid others that one would not otherwise have. She holds that there are three ways in which one could be personally involved in an emergency: by being physically proximate to the victims of the emergency; by being the only person who can help the victims; or by having a personal encounter with the victims. Each of these factors is (...)
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  18. Plenty of Room Left for the Dogmatist.Thomas Raleigh - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):66-76.
    Barnett provides an interesting new challenge for Dogmatist accounts of perceptual justification. The challenge is that such accounts, by accepting that a perceptual experience can provide a distinctive kind of boost to one’s credences, would lead to a form of diachronic irrationality in cases where one has already learnt in advance that one will have such an experience. I show that this challenge rests on a misleading feature of using the 0–1 interval to express probabilities and show that if we (...)
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  19.  28
    Classless.Sam Roberts - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):76-83.
    Classes are a kind of collection. Typically, they are too large to be sets. For example, there are classes containing absolutely all sets even though there is no set of all sets. But what are classes, if not sets? When our theory of classes is relatively weak, this question can be avoided. In particular, it is well known that von Neuman–Bernays–Godel class theory is conservative over the standard axioms of set theory ): anything NGB can prove about the sets is (...)
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  20.  19
    Climate Change, Individual Emissions and Agent-Regret.Toby Svoboda - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):84-89.
    Some philosophers are skeptical that individuals are morally blameworthy for their own greenhouse gas emissions. Although an individual’s emissions may contribute to climate change that is on the whole very harmful, perhaps that contribution is too trivial to render it morally impermissible. Against this view, there have been attempts to show that an individual’s lifetime emissions cause non-trivial harm, but in this paper I will consider what follows if it is true that an individual is not blameworthy for her emissions. (...)
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  21.  24
    Non-Sceptical Infallibilism.Nuno Venturinha - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):186-195.
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  22.  52
    Plural Grounding and the Principle of Sufficient Reason.Jonas Werner - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):90-95.
    In a recent article published in this journal, Kris McDaniel proposes a variant of Peter van Inwagen’s argument against the principle of sufficient reason that makes crucial use of plural grounding. In this response paper I object to McDaniel’s argument. I argue that there is no notion of plural grounding available that is both irreflexive in the sense required for the argument to go through and general enough to formulate the principle of sufficient reason as proposed by McDaniel.
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  23.  23
    Resisting Relativistic Contextualism: On Finlay's Confusion of Tongues.Alex Worsnip - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):122-131.
    Stephen Finlay’s book Confusion of Tongues is extraordinarily sophisticated, ambitious and thought-provoking. I highly commend it to those who haven’t read it yet. I will begin this commentary with a summary of which big-picture issues Finlay and I agree on and which we disagree on.
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