This article develops a discursive explanation of mixed constitution: mixed constitutional ideas and discourse generate mixed constitutional design and practice. On that base, it explores the nature, factors, and functions of the mixed constitution in Vietnam. The emergence of competing constitutional ideas (Confucian, socialist, liberal, universal) animates a constitutional discourse in which different actors adhere to different ideas. Consequently, the 2013 Constitution of Vietnam embodies a mixture of the ideas in its provisions on political institutions, economy, and especially human rights. (...) The enforcement of the constitution induces competing claims to constitutional meanings. The mixed constitution is shaped by path dependency and global diffusion of constitutional ideas. It functions as the base to constrain ideational monopoly and widen the public discourse on constitutional development. (shrink)

The study of illiberal constitutions has recently generated enormous scholarly interests. Few, however, have focused on whether democracies may still embrace constitutionalism mixed with illiberal elements. This article explores mixed constitutions of South Korea and Taiwan, the two democracies with vibrant civil societies in East Asia. Three distinctive features in both constitutions have demonstrated illiberal elements, including duty clauses imposed upon citizens, directives requiring the State to enact laws to fulfill the goals of governance, and constitutional cultures that exhibit high (...) deference to political elites based on the Confucian tradition. This article further examines the impacts of such mixed constitutions on three challenging issues: managing pandemic crisis, applying artificial intelligence, and combating fake news. This article finds mixed features of illiberal and democratic constitutions in the two countries by giving their governments more space in managing urgent crises, showing higher deference to experts who are generally trusted by the public, and making compromises to individual rights for greater public good. However, this does not imply that the government is not made democratically accountable, or rights and freedoms are not asserted or valued by individuals. To the contrary, nongovernmental organizations and courts in the two countries continue to act as a counterbalancing force, challenging the government’s policies and decisions if not reasonably balanced, weakening the tendency of power concentration that has been seen in other countries where democratic backsliding or authoritarian governance is gradually revived. (shrink)

This article explores the development of ideas in constitutional design. The point of departure is a perspective of constitutions-as-products, and thus, an examination of the invention, innovation, and an uptake of these products. The article conceptualizes constitutional innovation and distinguishes its manifestations with respect to constitutional products, the process of constitution-making, and in supporting institutions. The last two elements, in line with Schumpeter’s approach to innovation, would seem especially important to constitutional development. The article provides several examples from the area (...) of human rights and argues that innovations tend to be found in situations in which there is strong aversion to a prior order. It also shows that innovations tend to come from the periphery rather than the global core of the field. One of the sources of “mixed” constitutions is precisely such innovations, which then form raw material for further mixing. (shrink)

The article explores the long-term consequences of permissive constitutional arrangements, drawing on a comparative study of Israel, India and Sri Lanka. In all three countries, constitutional drafters at the foundational stage adopted permissive arrangements that avoided controversial decisions on conflicted identity-related issues. In all three cases, three to six decades after independence, the permissive constitutional approach was replaced by more decisive formal constitutional principles. Such unpermissive constitution making was meant to limit the range of options available for future legislation or (...) constitutional interpretation by courts, and preferred nationalist, religious and ethnocentric identity. This article seeks to investigate why such developments occurred in the three countries, and what can be learned from them about the durability and normative advantages of permissive constitutional arrangements. Empirical analysis of the long-term consequences of permissive arrangements illustrates the limited durability that appeared to characterize some of these arrangements. The present assessment also reveals how in some cases, the main ideational conflict at the heart of the constitutional debates has shifted over the years. Nevertheless, the central argument put forth by this article is that, despite ongoing challenges, permissive constitutional arrangements should still be regarded as a valuable constitutional tool for advancing political compromise and facilitating stable democratic institutions. The analysis demonstrates the crucial role permissive constitutions may have as a political tool designed to circumvent violent conflicts and as an analytical tool, thereby offering insight into current constitutional conflicts over ideational issues. (shrink)

This article focuses on Latin American constitutionalism with two goals in mind. The first goal is to identify narratives of constitutional mixity or hybridity that have been influential in Latin America, something that habilitates a comparative analysis with references to mixed or hybrid constitutionalism in other scenarios. One narrative underlines the combination of U.S.-inspired constitutionalism with background civil law systems. Another narrative highlights the way classic regional constitutional designs feature a liberal-conservative hybridation that, some claim, continue to influence constitutional dynamics (...) up to this day. And the third narrative is associated with the establishment in regional countries of hybrid or mixed systems of judicial review. The second goal of the article, more methodological in kind, is to explore what do Latin American narratives on mixity teach in the way to clarifying the nature and implications of exercises constitutional taxonomy. As it emerges, constitutional taxonomy is a way of organizing and generating knowledge which is useful to describe, but most meaningful when addressed to provide an explanation, which is often just an antechamber to normative evaluation. Whether a particular exercise of constitutional taxonomy makes sense in a particular scenario, however, is a different matter, and the article suggests that describing, explaining and evaluating Latin American constitutions as hybrid is illuminating but also problematic in a number of ways. (shrink)

This article argues that constitutional mixture should be regarded as an inherent, inevitable feature of constitutions, and to some degree all constitutions are mixed. Thus, “mixed constitutions” should not be regarded as a distinct category of constitutions. Instead of asking whether a constitution is mixed, it might therefore be more useful to ask in which characteristics and to what extent a constitution is mixed. To demonstrate this, the article provides a preliminary typology of constitutional mixture considering the form or system (...) of government; the nature or character of government; the religious or secular identity; the flexibility or rigidity of the constitution; and its model of judicial enforcement—judicial or parliamentary supremacy. Examining these constitutional features, allows to shed light on the three different dimensions of “constitutional mixture”: First, the various features of the constitutional order do not function in a binary yes-or-no manner but appear and move along a spectrum. Second, the various features of the constitution change with time. Third, the various features of the constitutional text may be in tension with the features of the society. (shrink)

This article provides the first-ever comprehensive analysis of how the relationship between the Chinese and Hong Kong legal orders has morphed in nature since China’s resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997. It argues that the relationship has evolved from a form of legal pluralism found in the European Union to a monist but bifurcated system—to a “dual state,” to borrow from Ernst Fraenkel’s theory. Recent events, including Beijing’s imposition of a national security law on Hong Kong and its (...) overhaul of Hong Kong’s election methods, have consolidated that evolution. The analysis herein not only enables us to make sense of the developments in the China-Hong Kong relationship, but has five wider theoretical implications. First, it suggests a way of distinguishing a dual state from a fully liberal legal system. Second, it discerns the similarities and differences between legal pluralism and dual state. Third, it connects the literature on theories of legal order and that on the dual state. Fourth, it clarifies the relationship between theories of legal order and regime types. Finally, Hong Kong’s experience reveals the challenges of and potential mechanisms for maintaining liberal values in an authoritarian regime. (shrink)

This article uses Ernst Fraenkel’s dual-state framework as an analytical tool to study those conflicting imperatives and constitutional tensions with a focus on the power to detain. This article makes the argument that China has emerged as a dual state with a normal state that functions increasingly with a rule-based government in inter-personal matters and a prerogative state that solidifies control in areas that are regarded as political sensitive. Overall, while the equilibrium between the normative and prerogative states has been (...) evolving in China, it has remained stable. The Party has been able to build a relatively self-defined and self-referencing legal system to provide the certainty and order that the Chinese political economy demands while maintaining a zone of exception, expansive and continuing to evolve, for the prerogative state to safeguard authoritarian rule. (shrink)

In this article, I consider a curious blind spot in constitutional scholarship concerning the resurging rural/urban divide—a readily evident phenomenon closely associated with political resentment and anti-establishment sentiments—and how we may begin to address that challenge through creative constitutional designs. Specifically, I draw upon insights from comparative constitutionalism to discuss four main areas of constitutional law and theory that appear to hold some intellectual promise in this context: formal constitutional commitment at the national level to recognizing the urban/rural divide and (...) commitment to addressing it; creative electoral system designs that take into account the spatial dimension of politics; spatial pluralization based on concepts such as “mixed constitutions,” “community standards,” and “margin of appreciation”; and rethinking elements of equalization and fiscal federalism more generally. Taken together, the four directions I discuss here offer a repertoire of constitutional design possibilities that hold promise in mitigating the resurging rural/urban gulf. More generally, they serve as an invitation to constitutional thinkers to shake up the rather stagnant constitutional thought of spatial governance, and to think creatively about the ever-expanding urban/rural divide and its consequences for the theory and practice of 21st century constitutional democracy. (shrink)

In this article, we study Latin American populist constitutions and their uses, seeking to analytically understand whether populist constitutionalism is, indeed, a thing. We posit that Latin American populist constitutionalism is a particular form of mixed constitutionalism in three senses: first, as a specific combination of substantive traits that includes both empowering and constraining devices; second, as a peculiar politics of constitutional change that incorporates popular mobilization against pre-existing institutions as a key trait; and third, as a particular practice of (...) constitutional enforcement that involves weak and selective implementation, often through institutional capture. By considering not only the texts of constitutions but also the ways in which they are changed and implemented, we hope to complement legal perspectives of mixed constitutions with a sociopolitical analysis of practices and contexts. By capturing the distinctive contribution of Latin American populism to the discussion of mixed constitutions, we seek to challenge both legal conceptions of constitutionalism that reduce it to negative or constraining features, and political conceptions of populism that simply equate it to authoritarian rule. (shrink)

A central task of comparative constitutional law scholarship is categorization and classification of constitutions. Recent scholarship, no doubt informed by the populist tide, has sought to develop the concept of a mixed constitution. Broadly speaking, a mixed constitution is a constitution that integrates liberal and illiberal elements, elements that are usually separate and not found under the same constitution. The study of “mixed constitutions” encompasses both descriptive and normative aspects. First, an attempt to ascertain what, exactly, makes a constitution “mixed.” (...) Second, an attempt to analyze either the desirability of such a system or an attempt to figure out how to harness mixed constitutions in the service of particular normative goals, for example the protection of human rights. This article has two goals. First, an inquiry into the descriptive aspect of mixed constitutions. My aim is to show that given the seeming consensus of what constitutes a mixed constitution, the category itself might encompass many more constitutions than is often acknowledged, to the point that many constitutions are likely to be mixed to a certain extent. My second goal is to demonstrate that given this definitional consensus, what makes a constitution mixed is not necessarily because the constitution itself is mixed, but because sub-constitutional norms shape our constitutional understanding. Put differently, the meaning of a constitution is not determined exclusively through an analysis of the constitution, but also by shifts in sub-constitutional understandings. If this is correct, then it turns out that the universe of mixed constitutions is much larger than thought, which casts doubt on the utility of the category of mixed constitutions. (shrink)

This article uses Ernst Fraenkel’s concept of the “dual state” as the vehicle for examining the role of “lynch law” as a mode of governance of African Americans in the United States from 1865 to 1940. It begins with a largely jurisprudential inquiry placing my interpretation of Ernst Fraenkel’s distinction between the normative state and the prerogative state in dialogue with a version of American Legal Realism, in which law consists entirely of “moves” such as permissible distinctions and analogies that (...) are treated as acceptable by relevant professional communities. Seen through that lens the distinction between the normative state and the prerogative state thins out. The arbitrariness Fraenkel associates with the prerogative state infects the normative state and the prerogative state is pervaded by norms that aren’t mere simulacra of legal norms. The two kinds of state are different in degree rather than in kind—but differences in degree can matter. Part II uses the revised distinction in a preliminary examination of lynch law in the U.S. South. Lynch law was not an example of Fraenkel’s prerogative state; the norms enforced through lynch law might have been popular versions of norms drawn from the prerogative state. And yet “lynch law” was different not only in content from the rules of law formally applicable to all people in the United States but also in the lived experience of those subject to lynch law. Lynch law might not have been arbitrary in the sense that it had no knowable normative content, but, perhaps because the norms were popular rather than legislated or formal, it was substantially vaguer than the formal law and significantly less able to guide the choices made by those subject to it. (shrink)