In Plato’s _Republic_ V, 449a-457b, Socrates argues that the guardian class of Kallipolis will comprise both men and women and that women with the appropriate nature ought to receive the same education and fulfill the same tasks as their male counterparts. In this article I argue, against competing interpretations of this claim as dependent either on the necessity of abolishing the oikos or on eugenic principles, that Socrates’ argument ought to be understood as a genuine argument about women’s natural capabilities (...) and ought to be interpreted in light of the Socratic debate about women’s virtues. Moreover, I show that the legal language mobilized, combined with polemical references to Aristophanes, serves the purpose of evoking Socrates’ trial, thus alerting the reader to the seriousness of the proposal in question. (shrink)

At the third episode of Sophocles’ Electra, the heroine, believing that her brother Orestes is dead, invites her sister Chrisothemis to a plan to kill Aegisthus, in a speech that recalls fifth century Athenian’s public honors to the tyrannicide couple, Harmodius and Aristogiton, and thus presents the two sisters as a kind of democratic champions (v. 947-989). This paper compares the treatment given by contemporary Commentaries to Sophocles’ Electrato this speech with recent gender-oriented studies of Athenian citizenship, in order to (...) argue that the idea of the ancient polisas a “man’s club” depends much more on a modern stereotype about Athenian politics than on the ancient evidence available to us –a stereotype that projects XIX century European conceptions of politics on the ancient context, and perpetuates backwards a supposedly universal masculine domination. In this light, Electra’s attitude, surely exceptional because of her equally exceptional situation, far from strikingly transgressing ancient gender-roles, points to the importance of female citizenship in democratic Athens. (shrink)

Presentation of Dossier Gender and Antiquity: problems and methods.

Diagoras and Theodorus are two of the atheists remembered in several catalogues of atheists in Antiquity, the first of which dates back to the 2nd century BC, and from then on invariably referredto by the ancients and to the present day as atheists. In fact, the atheism condemned in Athens had its roots in the pre-Socratic philosophical and scientific culture, whose fundamentally "materialistic" imprint is authoritatively testified to by Aristotle (MetaphysicsI 983b5-10). The philosophies of Anaximander, Anaximenes, Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Diogenes (...) of Apollonia, and of course the Atomists and Sophists offered, albeit in different ways, not only some important support for the critique of traditional divinities, but also for the philosophical foundations of atheism. Diagoras has nothing to do with this tradition; even some events in his life may at most merit the accusation of being impious, but not of being an atheist. heodore appears to be of a different cultural temperament, close not only to the culture of the Cyrenaic school, but also to that of the Cynics and the Sophists. We have not only references to his philosophical doctrines, but also clear evidence of his atheism, having dedicated himself to "radically eliminating common beliefs in the gods". In conclusion, while Diagora's name can safely be removed from the catalogues of atheists, Theodore's is rightly included. (shrink)

Os modos como cada sociedade ou grupo pondera sobre o consumo do álcool e seus efeitos nos múltiplos contextos culturais é bastante distinto, em especial quando os discursos se referem a este consumo com as atenções voltadas aos gêneros. Assim, as associações entre o consumo de bebidas alcoólicas e as alterações dos comportamentos sexuais de cada gênero, embora estejam presentes desde a antiguidade, devem ser entendidas nos contextos culturais em que foram produzidas, de modo a compreender como cada grupo social (...) lida com determinados aspectos fisiológicos e a partir dissoconstrói seus discursos e interdições. Desta forma, torna-se fundamental, um retorno cuidadoso às fontes antigas, evitando interpretações baseadas no senso comum ou na tradição, considerando as possíveis diferenças entre o discurso normativo e a prática cotidiana. (shrink)

Review of Flores-Júnior, O. La vie facile. Une lecture du cynisme ancien, Paris, Librairie philosophique J. Vrin. (2021).

Review & Reply. Review of Gonçalves, R.T. (tr.) Lucrécio. Sobre a Natureza das Coisas(2021).

The image of the Roman woman, which has survived to this day and imposed itself almost as the only possibility for the ancient scholarship, is the domiseda: the housewife, mother, and spinner. In addition to the investigations of this traditional depiction, which steered the research on Roman women, the issues of our time and the advances in scientific research constantly bring us new perspectives, approaches, and problems around this object of study. This inevitably motivates us to question the role of (...) women in the business and finance world in Ancient Rome. Is it possible to write an economic and financial history of Roman women? What are the limits of this endeavor? This article addresses the insertion of women in the business and finance world, as well as some of the multiple possibilities of writing the History of Women from the Economic and Social History viewpoint. The time frame is restricted to the end of the Republic and the imperial period. This article is therefore divided into three parts: first, an introduction to the discussion of the situation of women in the domus; secondly, methodological assumptions to the study of women and their placement in economic and financial life; and, finally, some examples ofwomen from three different social groups who appear involved in credit relations in the documentation. (shrink)

Resenha de Ancona, R.; Tsouvala, G. (eds.) New Directions in the Study of Women in the Greco-Roman World (2021).

Recently, some scholars have authoritatively claimed the idea that _Men. _97e2-98b5 is a strong criticism of any epistemological perspective based on an additive model of knowledge, in which knowledge is conceived as a form of opinion with the addition of something else. In this article I try to show that Plato's aim is not to criticize this model of knowledge but to pose, in the form of a hypothesis which has to be verified in other texts, the main problem of (...) his epistemology: is the _logos_, or rather the _aitias_ _logismos_, able to bind opinions so firmly together that they are transformed into that kind of infallible knowledge that is the _episteme_? In order to justify this interpretation of _Men._ 97e2-98b5, I try to provide a new reading of the meaning of the relationship between this passage of the dialogue and some topics exposed in the previous sections of the text (such as the maieutic experiment to which Socrates subjects Meno's slave, the Recollection doctrine and the method by hypothesis). (shrink)

This paper addresses the contemporary thesis of psychophysical supervenience and its application to the interpretation of Aristotle’s psychological hylomorphism. It will be shown that the supervenience thesis, in its different versions, fails to explain the essential unity of the soul and of the psychophysical compound. Arguments will be provided on the basis of Aristotle’s discussion of the harmony theory of the soul (_de An_. I 4) and more generally on his methodological claims on the definition of the soul and of (...) its affections (_de An_. I 1). (shrink)

El decir que todos y todas hemos nacido de mujer parece una perogrullada. Esta es, como lo expresa Rich, la única experiencia unificadora, innegable, compartida por mujeres y hombres: aquellos meses que pasamos dentro del cuerpo de una mujer, desarrollándonos. Sin embargo, es usual encontrar en el discurso cívico de las ciudades griegas, la idea de que la mujer no tiene relación alguna con el origen de la especie. Las mujeres son con frecuencia representadas como un grupo separado y cerrado (...) sobre sí mismo, el genos gynaikon, que viene a agregarse al anthropos genos una vez que este ya existe. La hipótesis del presente escrito sostiene que hay dos aspectos conceptuales que acompañan la narrativa del genos gynaikon: (i) la ambigüedad en la clasificación del grupo de las mujeres y (ii) el lugar secundario que se les asigna respecto del origen de la humanidad. Como objetivo general propongo mostrar que el tópico del genos gynaikon está presente, a través de estos aspectos conceptuales, en la concepción platónica y aristotélica de la reproducción y la diferencia sexual. (shrink)

This article examines the role that humbling plays in Socratic practice. Specifically, we consider how Socrates humbles his interlocutors in order to turn them towards the pursuit of philosophical friendship. We argue against a standard interpretation of humbling in the Lysis, which holds that Socrates humbles Lysis by exposing his own ignorance to him at 210d. Instead, we argue that the humbling occurs not when Lysis is (allegedly) made aware of his own ignorance, but at 222d near the end of (...) the dialogue, when Lysis is made to think that he is not as good a friend as he thought he was. On this reading, Socrates humbles Lysis not by exposing to him his ignorance about theoretical matters but by suggesting to him that he may be not the sort of person he thought he was. (shrink)

Many scholars consider that Socrates in the Lysis holds that friendship and love are egoistic and utility-based. In this paper, I will argue against those readings of Plato’s Lysis. I will analyze how Socrates treats utility and egoism in the many different kinds of friendship he discusses in the dialogue, from parental love, like-to-like, and unlike-to-unlike relationships, to the accounts of friendship rooted in the human relation to the good and the ways in which we can belong with some other (...) human beings. The upshot of my paper is twofold. I endeavor to prove that some of these relationships, as Plato’s Socrates discusses them, are not egoistic and that Plato represents and valorizes a particular type of friendship having to do with philosophy and philosophical way of life, which is for the sake of another. (shrink)

The two most compelling accounts of the friend in Plato’s Lysis are that the neither good nor bad is friend of the good and that the akin is friend of the akin. In this paper I challenge a common interpretation that these accounts are the same, similar to, or compatible with one another. I argue instead that the two accounts are incompatible because they rely on opposing assumptions about the nature of desire and its relationship to need and about friendship (...) and its orientation towards what benefits the one who loves. Although I do not offer a comprehensive interpretation of the dialogue, I argue that, given his main assumptions about the friendship, desire, and philosophy in the Lysis, Socrates could only endorse first of these accounts, that the neither good nor bad is a friend of the good, if indeed endorses any of them. (shrink)

Socrates in the Lysis discusses philia and the conditions under which two or more people can be said to engage in this relationship. Many commentators take Socrates to be attempting to discover how human beings enter into the relationship of friendship, a relationship characterized by reciprocal affection, altruistic concern and personal intimacy. Other readers of the Lysis see in the dialogue’s investigation of philia a discussion of desire and attraction at the most general level. On this view, philia is one (...) species of the general human desire for good. The present paper develops a third reading of philia. Philia is a type of partnership or fellowship where affection and intimacy are not central features of the relationship. The fellowship involves at least one party who possesses wisdom while other members of the fellowship seek to benefit from wisdom. Thus philia is a characteristically human response to the need for wisdom. The members of such a fellowship share a common desire for a good which gives purpose to their association, and because of their common desire to benefit from this good the members can be described as fellows or partners in the pursuit of this good. (shrink)

This paper argues that the account of friendship (philia) present in Plato's dialogue the Lysis is rife with the disruptive and maddening force of eros. By its end it is no longer clear whether the familiar sorts of personal relationships that we typically count as friendships, and which Aristotle discusses with great sensitivity and appreciation in the Nicomachean Ethics, can be meaningfully sustained. To support this thesis, the paper analyzes each of the seven, relatively self-contained arguments Socrates offers. In addition, (...) it shows how the dramatic context in which these arguments are embedded foreshadows the dialogue's principal objective: to blur the distinction between philia and eros by allowing the latter to infect the former. (shrink)

In the Lysis, Socrates claims to be looking for an account of what kind of quality in another person or object stimulates friendship or love (philia). He goes through a series of proposals, refuting each in turn. In the end, he throws us back to the point from where the arguments started, declaring an aporetic outcome. What is the purpose of this apparently futile and circular inquiry? Most interpreters try to reconstruct a theory of friendship or love from the arguments (...) of this dialogue. Against such a doctrinal reading, this essay defends an “aporetic reading” of the dialogue and connects it to its protreptic function. Starting with a preliminary discussion of what defines an aporetic dialogue and what distinguishes indirect protreptic from explicit protreptic discourse, the essay then analyzes the aporetic method of the Lysis, distinguishing it from aporetic discourse in some of his earlier dialogues. Finally, it analyzes how, and for what kind of audience, the Lysisfunctions as an indirect protreptic. This includes a comparison with the protreptic use of aporetic argumentation in the Euthydemus. (shrink)

Plato’s Lysis shows Socrates in conversation with two boys he has met at a wrestling school, Lysis and Menexenus. Their debate revolves around the notion of philia, seeking to pin down the nature of this relation, who or what takes part in it, and what causes it. The word philiahas usually been translated as “friendship” but has a wider application in this dialogue, as it encompasses a variety of friendly and loving attitudes toward both people and things. The kinds of (...) interpersonal philia evoked include erotic attachments, kinship relations, utility-based relations, and playful companionship. Roughly two-thirds into the dialogue, the focus turns to a more general theory of desiderative attachments and the question of their ultimate telos and cause. The conversation ends, at least on the face of it, in an impasse, an aporia, when the interlocutors find themselves thrown back to the point from where they started, and no attempt to answer the question of what philia is or what motivates it has stuck. The Lysis nevertheless offers many incentives for further discussion and has elicited radically different responses from its interpreters as to what its real message is. For instance, does it promote a form of utilitarian egoism according to which human attachment can never, or should never, be altruistically motivated? Or does it hint at a very different concept of interpersonal love based on the idea that friendship, as it were, completes us since it connects us with those that share the same values? Does this dialogue stay within the familiar ambit of Socratic ethics, centered around the question of what it takes to achieve happiness (eudaimonia) in a human life, without a concern for metaphysical questions? Or, quite the contrary, does its discussion of the highest object of love (to proton philon) point forward to the metaphysical program of Plato’s so-called middle-period dialogues and especially to the notions of the form of the good or the form of the beautiful, notions which are at the center of the Republic and the Symposium? These questions and others will continue to be debated about this puzzling dialogue. The essays assembled in the present volume address many of these topics. (shrink)