This paper argues that theEncomium of Helenmust be seen as a speech about the value and importance of wisdom in human life and not as much as one as aboutlogos. Gorgias sustains his vision based on a certain intellectualism which reduces moral faults to intellectual errors. This intellectualist program comprises a rationalization of emotions and a commitment with a certain tradition that discriminates between a minority with knowledge and a majority with only opinion. The consequence for Helen is that she (...) can be excused from her action at the expense of being reproached for her lack of wisdom and is thus relegated to the ignorant majority. Therefore, what is initially praise and an apology turns into severe blame. For this, I argue, the encomium can be qualified as an amusement (paignion). For theEncomium’s listeners the amusement becomes a challenge that demands they decipher the speech’s paradoxical character and appeal to their own wisdom to not be reproached like Helen. Thus theEncomiumcannot be seen as a treaty nor as mere joke but rather as an intellectualagônbetween the speech and the listener, which serves them “to arm the soul for contests of excellence”, as the epigram dedicated to Gorgias in Delfos says. (shrink)

Cicero’sTimaeuslegitimately stands as the first Latin exegesis of the Platonic dialogue. I shall deal with the interpretation of §§19–21, a passage that departs significantly from the Greek text in several respects. The aim of this paper is to explore the role Aristotelianism might have played in Cicero’sTimaeus. Among the points that support such an analysis is the mention of the Peripatetic Cratippus in the prologue. The interpretative scenario I suggest considers both Cratippus’ role and Antiochus’s philosophical system with its agreement (...) between Platonism and Aristotelianism. (shrink)

The Stoics identified the phantasia with the impression (typos) in the soul, or the impressing process (typōsis). Alexander of Aphrodisias engages directly with this account at De anima 68.10–21, and argues against the applicability of the impression in a theory of perception in Mantissa 10, especially 133.25–134.23. I analyse Alexander’s polemic account at De anima 68.10–21, I demonstrate that it differs from Chrysippus’ criticism of Cleanthes (contrary to some commentators), and I show how it fits in the context of his (...) argument. From this analysis it will emerge how Alexander uses Stoic ideas to form his Aristotelian account. Then, I show that Alexander, by taking ‘typos’ metaphorically, not only prefers the term ‘enkataleimma’ over ‘typos’ in his theory of phantasia, but he keeps the ‘typos’ terminology only to remain faithful to Aristotle’s use (contrary to some commentators). (shrink)

In Proclus’ Platonic Theology (V 17, 62. 22–63. 2) one can detect a clear recollection of the well-known and much discussed passage 1048b18–35 from Metaphysics IX 6. This passage is transmitted in only one branch of the manuscript tradition and some scholars maintain that it is not by Aristotle or that it does not belong to his Metaphysics. On the other hand, Proclus’ testimony, supported by other passages by Neo-Platonic authors, provides an argument for the original location of the discussed (...) section in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. (shrink)

This article proposes a reconstruction of the Sextan critique against the Pythagorean conception of number as principle of all existing things. Taking into consideration all the parallel passages concerning the presentation and the polemic about the Pythagorean doctrine, the present article proposes a division of the sceptical critique into two sections, the first one presenting the Pythagorean reasons to consider the numbers as principle existing apart from numbered things, and the second one presenting the arguments that Sextus himself built against (...) them. This paper will show that this structure is consistent with the sceptical method, which consists in pointing out the ἰσοσθένεια among different positions which leads to suspension of judgment. Regarding the Pythagorean doctrine that emerges from these passages, the present article discusses the way in which Sextus testified a juxtaposition between Pythagorean and Platonic doctrines, probably due to a Middle-Platonic or Neopythagorean elaboration, against which Sextus used Platonic concepts, adopting in original way arguments taken from the Parmenides and the Phaedo. Despite the ἐποχή about the nature of the number, this article will argue that Sextus did not avoid to use the number in practical daily life, in a way that is consistent with the sceptical practical criterion. (shrink)

This paper aims to investigate the equivalent of Epicurus’ πρόληψις, the second criterion of the Epicurean Canonic (DL X 31 = fr. 35 Usener), in Lucretius’ De rerum natura (DRN). Taking stock of the several occurrences of the Latin terms notitia and notities in the six books of the poem, I show that Lucretius’ view about preconception remains faithful to Epicurus’ πρόληψις, and that the poet does not endorse a less empiricist position than his Master because of some influence of (...) the Stoic ἔννοια. To this end, I will also briefly address an important case in which πρόληψις, albeit not clearly mentioned, plays an essential role, namely the prolepsis of the deity (DRN V 1169–1182). Finally, I explain how Lucretius can be of some help in grasping the controversial relationship between the criterion of πρόληψις and that of ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας (animi inectus/iactus), showing in which way the poet seems to consider the latter as a criterion of truth in its own right. (shrink)

The author deals with the lost works of Empedocles, an often neglected subject, in the frame of the discussion concerning the number of the poems and their main features. He reviews the traces of the Passage of Xerxes, of the Medical Discourse, and of the Proem to Apollo among the fragments and witnesses, taking his cue from textual aspects and dealing with the contents, the significance of each of these writings in Empedocles’ culture and thought and their multifarious relationships with (...) his times. As to the Passage, he tries to reconcile the contrasting interpretations so far proposed (historical or religious poem). Concerning B111, the only relic from the Medical Discourse, he explains why its contents are incompatible with the Physical Poem and the Purifications. He analyzes the Proem to Apollo in several perspectives (text, witnesses, contents also from the epistemological point of view, literary genre). He assigns fragments 131–134 and 142 to the Proem, drawing one of his arguments from the comparison with the third Homeric Hymn to Apollo, and also suggesting a relationship with an intellectual cult of the sun. Formal features help to ascribe each fragment to the relevant poem. Close similarities between fragments do not necessarily mean that they come from the same writing: Empedocles is wont to allude to one poem of his while composing another. The author concludes that the striving for a reductio ad unum of the Acragantine’s output, also evident in the attempt by a number of scholars to make only one poem out of the Περὶ φύσεως and the Καθαρμοί, has often led researchers to take for granted that none of the fragments preserved might belong to the lost works. (shrink)

Following the traces of some references to pre-existing matter in the Septuagint, the article analyses the interpretation of Gen 1, 2a in Philo of Alexandria’s De opificio mundi with a focus on his omission of the ἀκατασκεύαστος character of the earth. Philo’s interpretation is closely linked to his conception of emptiness and to his pioneering defence of a creation ex nihilo. In his cosmology, which is articulated as a dual interpretation of the Genesis and Plato’s Timaeus, the matter plays an (...) essential role. Philo justifies its existence on Aristotelian-Stoic grounds, highlighting the process of gradual refinement whereby matter passes from being a rough ὕλη to being an elaborate type of οὐσία. (shrink)

In Eth. Nic. V 8, Aristotle provides a classification of damages an agent may do, establishing degrees of culpability. In doing so, Aristotle recalls what he said about voluntary and involuntary actions in the preceding books about voluntary and involuntary actions. In this paper, I defend the thesis according to which the Eudemian account on voluntariness is consistent with the classification of damages Aristotle provides in Eth. Nic. V 8, arguing that one of Aristotle’s concerns in dealing with voluntariness is (...) the legal practices of his time, which we can regard as strongly linked to his discussion on moral responsibility. Thereby, I challenge David Charles’ view that the account of voluntariness featured in the book on justice differs both from the Nicomachean account and the Eudemian one. (shrink)

The present paper deals with a syntactic ambiguity in Numenius’ Fr. 30, 9 and proposes a new reading. According to most scholars, in this fragment Numenius tries to identify Egyptian gods and human souls descending into generation. Instead, I argue that, since theology and psychology are different topics in Fr. 3, Numenius is rather talking about the interrelation of gods and souls in the process of metempsychosis.

The studies of É. Évrard, recently published by M.-A. Gavray, are high quality works which allow to immerse oneself in the context of the Platonic-Aristotelian school of Alexandria in Egypt throughout the sixth century AD. They mostly focus on the figure and work of Joannes Philoponus, with specific attention to the compositional technique of his Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics and of On the Eternity of the World against Aristotle. Despite being strongly critical of the Stagirite on some points, also due (...) to his Christian faith, Philoponus deeply assimilated Aristotelian methods, lexicon and concepts. He therefore uses this legacy in his commentary on the first chapter of the biblical text of the book of Genesis on the creation of the universe, of living species and of the human being. This work by Philoponus provides a first example of Christian Aristotelianism before the well-known one of the medieval Scholasticism. (shrink)

This paper aims at re-evaluating the significance of Peripatetic features in Severus’ exegesis of the Timaeus through a comparison between Severus’ doxography in the PM and the fragment of his treatise on the soul quoted by Eusebius. Indeed, until now, the scholarly literature has been inclined to consider Severus as a plain anti-Aristotelian and pro-Stoic Platonist. However the recent edition of the Porphyrian lost treatise On Principles and Matter allows us to grasp more clearly to what extant Severus’ view on (...) the nature of the soul and on the bodily motion is grounded on an in-depth knowledge of the Peripatetic debates of his time. (shrink)

This article focuses on the Platonic version of the doctrine of oikeiosis set forth by Piso in Cicero’s De finibus, Book V. The article aims to show that: 1) Cicero’s account, while clearly having Stoic features, is also consistent with the eudaemonistic character of Socrates’ and Plato’s ethics; 2) the replacement of oikeiosis with “assimilation to god”, attested in a passage of the Anonymous Commentary on Plato’s Theaetetus, derives from the intent to remove Epicurean egoistic connotations from Plato’s ethics; according (...) to the Anonymous, the Stoic oikeiosis alone would not suffice to attain this purpose. (shrink)

In Metaphysics A 6, Aristotle claims that Plato only recognises formal and material causes. Yet, in various dialogues, Plato seems to use and distinguish efficient and final causes too. Consequently, Harold Cherniss accuses Aristotle of being an unfair, forgetful, or careless reader of Plato. Since then, scholars have tried to defend Aristotle’s exegetical skills. I offer textual evidence and arguments to show that their efforts still fall short of the desired goal. I argue, instead, that we can reject Cherniss’ assertation (...) by re-examining Aristotle’s exegetical and methodological assumptions. (shrink)