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  1.  43
    The Meno Paradox of Reflection.Eli Alshanetsky - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (4):219-235.
    The paper introduces a new puzzle about reflection—albeit one that is reminiscent of the famous paradox about inquiry in Plato’s Meno. We often make our thoughts clear to ourselves in the process of putting them into words. Our puzzle is that, on the one hand, coming to know what we are thinking seems to require finding words that would express our thought; yet, on the other hand, finding the words seems to require already knowing what we are thinking. I argue (...)
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  2.  10
    Defeasible Tolerance and the Sorites.Ivan Hu - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (4):181-218.
    I propose a novel solution to the Sorites Paradox. The account vindicates the tolerance of vague predicates in a way that properly addresses the normativity of vagueness while avoiding sorites contradiction, by treating sorites reasoning as a type of defeasible reasoning. I show how this can be done within the setting of a nonmonotonic deontic logic. Central to the proposal is its deontic interpretation of tolerance. I draw a key distinction between two types of tolerance, based on different deontic notions, (...)
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  3.  98
    The Causal Decision Theorist's Guide to Managing the News.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (3):117-149.
    According to orthodox causal decision theory, performing an action can give you information about factors outside of your control, but you should not take this information into account when deciding what to do. Causal decision theorists caution against an irrational policy of 'managing the news'. But, by providing information about factors outside of your control, performing an act can give you two, importantly different, kinds of good news. It can tell you that the world in which you find yourself is (...)
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  4.  91
    Constitution and Dependence.David Mark Kovacs - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (3):150-177.
    Constitution is the relation that holds between an object and what it is made of: statues are constituted by the lumps of matter they coincide with; flags, one may think, are constituted by colored pieces of cloth; and perhaps human persons are constituted by biological organisms. Constitution is often thought to be a.
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  5.  41
    Statistical Normalization Methods in Interpersonal and Intertheoretic Comparisons.William MacAskill, Owen Cotton-Barratt & Toby Ord - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (2):61-95.
    A major problem for interpersonal aggregation is how to compare utility across individuals; a major problem for decision-making under normative uncertainty is the formally analogous problem of how to compare choice-worthiness across theories. We introduce and study a class of methods, which we call statistical normalization methods, for making interpersonal comparisons of utility and intertheoretic comparisons of choice-worthiness. We argue against the statistical normalization methods that have been proposed in the literature. We argue, instead, in favor of normalization of variance: (...)
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  6. "Ought" and Error.Christine Tiefensee - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (2):96-114.
    The moral error theory generally does not receive good press in metaethics. This paper adds to the bad news. In contrast to other critics, though, I do not attack error theorists’ characteristic thesis that no moral assertion is ever true. Instead, I develop a new counter-argument which questions error theorists’ ability to defend their claim that moral utterances are meaningful assertions. More precisely: Moral error theorists lack a convincing account of the meaning of deontic moral assertions, or so I will (...)
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  7.  9
    Maximal Non-Trivial Sets of Instances of Your Least Favorite Logical Principle.Lucas Rosenblatt - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (1):30-54.
    The paper generalizes Van McGee's well-known result that there are many maximal consistent sets of instances of Tarski's schema to a number of non-classical theories of truth. It is shown that if a non-classical theory rejects some classically valid principle in order to avoid the truth-theoretic paradoxes, then there will be many maximal non-trivial sets of instances of that principle that the non-classical theorist could in principle endorse. On the basis of this it is argued that the idea of classical (...)
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  8. Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles.Weng Kin San - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (1):5-29.
    Fitch’s Paradox shows that if every truth is knowable, then every truth is known. Standard diagnoses identify the factivity/negative infallibility of the knowledge operator and Moorean contradictions as the root source of the result. This paper generalises Fitch’s result to show that such diagnoses are mistaken. In place of factivity/negative infallibility, the weaker assumption of any ‘level-bridging principle’ suffices. A consequence is that the result holds for some logics in which the “Moorean contradiction” commonly thought to underlie the result is (...)
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  9.  32
    Margaret Gilbert: Rights and Demands: A Foundational Inquiry.R. Jay Wallace - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (1):55-59.
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