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  1.  31
    The Difference Principle Would Not Be Chosen Behind the Veil of Ignorance.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (11):588-604.
    John Rawls argues that the Difference Principle would be chosen by parties trying to advance their individual interests behind the Veil of Ignorance. Behind this veil, the parties do not know who they are and they are unable to assign or estimate probabilities to their turning out to be any particular person in society. Much discussion of Rawls’s argument concerns whether he can plausibly rule out the parties’ having access to probabilities about who they are. Nevertheless, I argue that, even (...)
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  2.  30
    Two Sides of Modus Ponens.Stern Reuben & Hartmann Stephan - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (11):605-621.
    McGee argues that it is sometimes reasonable to accept both x and x-> without accepting y->z, and that modus ponens is therefore invalid for natural language indicative conditionals. Here, we examine McGee's counterexamples from a Bayesian perspective. We argue that the counterexamples are genuine insofar as the joint acceptance of x and x-> at time t does not generally imply constraints on the acceptability of y->z at t, but we use the distance-based approach to Bayesian learning to show that applications (...)
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  3.  13
    Addiction and Fallibility.Chandra Sripada - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (11):569-587.
    There is an ongoing debate about loss of control in addiction: Some theorists say at least some addicts’ drug-directed desires are irresistible, while others insist that pursuing drugs is a choice. The debate is long-standing and has essentially reached a stalemate. This essay suggests a way forward. I propose an alternative model of loss of control in addiction, one based not on irresistibility, but rather fallibility. According to the model, on every occasion of use, self-control processes exhibit a low, but (...)
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  4.  5
    Pure Quotation and Natural Naming.Michael Johnson - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (10):550-566.
    The name theory has largely been discarded in the literature on quotation. In this paper, I resurrect the theory under the heading of the natural name theory. According to the natural name theory, a pure quotation is a natural, rather than an arbitrary, name of a linguistic item. As with other natural names, like onomatopoeia, pure quotations resemble their referents. I argue that this observation allows us to deflate the arguments traditionally thought to undermine the name theory. Then I argue (...)
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  5.  18
    Alternatives and Truthmakers in Conditional Semantics.Paolo Santorio - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (10):513-549.
    Natural language conditionals seem to be subject to three logical requirements: they invalidate Antecedent Strengthening, they validate so-called Simplification of Disjunctive Antecedents, and they allow for the replacement of logically equivalent clauses in antecedent position. Unfortunately, these requirements are jointly inconsistent. Conservative solutions to the puzzle drop Simplification, treating it as a pragmatic inference. I show that pragmatic accounts of Simplification fail, and develop a truthmaker semantics for conditionals that captures all the relevant data. Differently from existing truthmaker semantics, my (...)
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  6.  23
    On the Question of Whether the Mind Can Be Mechanized, II: Penrose’s New Argument.Peter Koellner - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (9):453-484.
    Gödel argued that his incompleteness theorems imply that either “the mind cannot be mechanized” or “there are absolutely undecidable sentences.” In the precursor to this paper I examined the early arguments for the first disjunct. In the present paper I examine the most sophisticated argument for the first disjunct, namely, Penrose’s new argument. It turns out that Penrose’s argument requires a type-free notion of truth and a type-free notion of absolute provability. I show that there is a natural such system, (...)
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  7.  81
    The Perils of Parsimony.William Roche - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (9):485-505.
    It is widely thought in philosophy and elsewhere that parsimony is a theoretical virtue in that if T1 is more parsimonious than T2, then T1 is preferable to T2, other things being equal. This thesis admits of many distinct precisifications. I focus on a relatively weak precisification on which preferability is a matter of probability, and argue that it is false. This is problematic for various alternative precisifications, and even for Inference to the Best Explanation as standardly understood.
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  8.  36
    Global Supervenience Without Reducibility.Stephan Leuenberger - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (8):389-422.
    Does the global supervenience of one class on another entail reductionism, in the sense that any property in the former class is definable from properties in the latter class? This question appears to be at the same time formally tractable and philosophically significant. It seems formally tractable because the concepts involved are susceptible to rigorous definition. It is philosophically significant because in a number of debates about inter-level relationships, there are prima facie plausible positions that presuppose that there is no (...)
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  9.  48
    Groups: Toward a Theory of Plural Embodiment.Gabriel Uzquiano - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (8):423-452.
    Groups are ubiquitous in our lives. But while some of them are highly structured and appear to support a shared intentionality and even a shared agency, others are much less cohesive and do not seem to demand much of their individual members. Queues, for example, seem to be, at a given time, nothing over and above some individuals as they exemplify a certain spatial arrangement. Indeed, the main aim of this paper is to develop the more general thought that at (...)
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  10.  12
    Pure Quotation Is Demonstrative Reference.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (7):361-381.
    In a paper published recently in the Journal of Philosophy, Mario Gómez-Torrente provides a methodological argument for the “disquotational,” Tarski-inspired theory of pure quotation. Gómez-Torrente’s previous work has greatly contributed to making this theory perhaps the most widely supported view of pure quotation in recent years, against all other theories including the Davidsonian, demonstrative view for which I myself have argued. Gómez-Torrente argues that rival views make quotation “an eccentric or anomalous phenomenon.” I aim to turn the methodological tables. I (...)
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  11.  48
    On the Question of Whether the Mind Can Be Mechanized, I: From Gödel to Penrose.Peter Koellner - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (7):337-360.
    In this paper I address the question of whether the incompleteness theorems imply that “the mind cannot be mechanized,” where this is understood in the specific sense that “the mathematical outputs of the idealized human mind do not coincide with the mathematical outputs of any idealized finite machine.” Gödel argued that his incompleteness theorems implied a weaker, disjunctive conclusion to the effect that either “the mind cannot be mechanized” or “mathematical truth outstrips the idealized human mind.” Others, most notably, Lucas (...)
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  12.  22
    A BULLET for Invariance: Another Argument Against the Invariance Criterion for Logical Terms.Alexandra Zinke - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (7):382-388.
    According to the classical invariance criterion, a term is logical if and only if its extension is isomorphism-invariant. However, a number of authors have devised examples that challenge the sufficiency of this condition: accepting these examples as logical constants would introduce objectionable contingent elements into logic. Recently, Gil Sagi has responded that these objections are based on a fallacious inference from the modal status of a sentence to the modal status of the proposition expressed by that sentence. The present paper (...)
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  13.  48
    Transformative Decisions.Kevin Reuter & Michael Messerli - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (6):313-335.
    Some decisions we make—such as becoming a parent or moving to a different part of the world—are transformative. According to L. A. Paul, transformative decisions pose a major problem to us because they fall outside the realm of rationality. Her argument for that conclusion rests on the premise that subjective value is central in transformative decisions. This paper challenges that premise and hence the overall conclusion that transformative decisions usually are not rational. In the theoretical part of the paper, we (...)
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  14.  28
    Scope or Focus? Normative Focus and the Metaphysics of Normative Relations.Nicholas Shackel - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (6):281-312.
    A prolonged debate about the nature of norms has been conducted in terms of the scope of a modal operator. Here I argue that the features of what I call Normative Focus are more fundamental than scope. We shall see limitations of scope contrasted with better analysis in terms of Normative Focus. Some authors address such limitations by extending what they mean by scope. I show that scope is still not doing the work: what does it is their elicitation of (...)
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  15.  30
    From Degrees of Belief to Binary Beliefs: Lessons From Judgment-Aggregation Theory.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (5):225-270.
    What is the relationship between degrees of belief and binary beliefs? Can the latter be expressed as a function of the former—a so-called “belief-binarization rule”—without running into difficulties such as the lottery paradox? We show that this problem can be usefully analyzed from the perspective of judgment-aggregation theory. Although some formal similarities between belief binarization and judgment aggregation have been noted before, the connection between the two problems has not yet been studied in full generality. In this paper, we seek (...)
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  16.  16
    Hannes Leitgeb: The Stability of Belief: How Rational Belief Coheres with Probability.Sven Ove Hansson - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (5):276-280.
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  17.  20
    Lisa Tessman: When Doing the Right Thing Is Impossible.David Heyd - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (5):271-275.
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  18.  19
    Note on the Individuation of Biological Traits.Mihnea D. I. Capraru - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (4):215-221.
    Bence Nanay has argued that we must abandon the etiological theory of teleological function because this theory explains functions and functional categories in a circular manner. Paul Griffiths argued earlier that we should retain the etiological theory and instead prevent the circularity by making etiologies independent of functional categories. Karen Neander and Alex Rosenberg reply to Nanay similarly, and argue that we should analyze functions in terms of natural selection acting not on functional categories, but merely on lineages. Nanay replies (...)
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  19. The Perspectival Character of Perception.Kevin J. Lande - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (4):187-214.
    You can perceive things, in many respects, as they really are. For example, you can correctly see a coin as circular from most angles. Nonetheless, your perception of the world is perspectival. The coin looks different when slanted than when head-on, and there is some respect in which the slanted coin looks similar to a head-on ellipse. Many hold that perception is perspectival because you perceive certain properties that correspond to the “looks” of things. I argue that this view is (...)
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  20.  65
    What Would Normative Necessity Be?Marc Lange - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (4):169-186.
    Fine and Rosen have argued that normative necessity is distinct from and weaker than metaphysical necessity. The first aim of this paper is to specify what it would take for this view to be true—that is, what normative necessity would have to be like. The author argues that in order for normative necessity to be weaker than metaphysical necessity, the metaphysical necessities must all be preserved under every counterfactual antecedent with which they are all collectively logically consistent—even when their preservation (...)
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  21. Aesthetic Rationality.Keren Gorodeisky & Eric Marcus - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (3):113-140.
    We argue that the aesthetic domain falls inside the scope of rationality, but does so in its own way. Aesthetic judgment is a stance neither on whether a proposition is to be believed nor on whether an action is to be done, but on whether an object is to be appreciated. Aesthetic judgment is simply appreciation. Correlatively, reasons supporting theoretical, practical and aesthetic judgments operate in fundamentally different ways. The irreducibility of the aesthetic domain is due to the fact that (...)
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  22.  31
    Paolo Mancosu: Abstraction and Infinity.Bob Hale - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (3):158-166.
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  23. Normal Knowledge: Toward an Explanation-Based Theory of Knowledge.Andrew Peet & Eli Pitcovski - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (3):141-157.
    In this paper we argue that knowledge is characteristically safe true belief. We argue that an adequate approach to epistemic luck must not be indexed to methods of belief formation, but rather to explanations for belief. This shift is problematic for several prominent approaches to the theory of knowledge, including virtue reliabilism and proper functionalism (as normally conceived). The view that knowledge is characteristically safe true belief is better able to accommodate the shift in question.
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  24.  91
    Susanna Siegel: The Rationality of Perception.Bill Brewer - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (2):106-110.
  25.  71
    Quinean Updates: In Defense of "Two Dogmas".Bryan Pickel & Moritz Schulz - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (2):57-91.
    Quine challenged traditional views of the a priori by appealing to two key premises: that any statement may be held true “come what may” and that no statement is immune to revision in light of new experience. Chalmers has recently developed a seemingly compelling response to each of these claims. The critique is particularly threatening because it seems to rest on the Bayesian premise that upon acquiring evidence E, a rational agent will update her credence in any statement S to (...)
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  26. Must Consequentialists Kill?Kieran Setiya - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (2):92-105.
    Argues that the ethics of killing and saving lives is best described by agent-neutral consequentialism, not by appeal to agent-centred restrictions. It does not follow that killings are worse than accidental deaths or that you should kill one to prevent more killings. The upshot is a puzzle about killing and letting die.
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  27.  21
    Tommie Shelby: Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent, and Reform.Bernard R. Boxill - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (1):52-56.
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  28.  32
    Epistemic Closure, Home Truths, and Easy Philosophy.Walter Horn - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (1):34-51.
    In spite of the intuitiveness of epistemic closure, there has been a stubborn stalemate regarding whether it is true, largely because some of the “Moorean” things we seem to know easily seem clearly to entail “heavyweight” philosophical things that we apparently cannot know easily—or perhaps even at all. In this paper, I will show that two widely accepted facts about what we do and don’t know—facts with which any minimally acceptable understanding of knowledge must comport—are jointly inconsistent with the truth (...)
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  29.  19
    The Credit Economy and the Economic Rationality of Science.Kevin J. S. Zollman - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (1):5-33.
    Theories of scientific rationality typically pertain to belief. In this paper, the author argues that we should expand our focus to include motivations as well as belief. An economic model is used to evaluate whether science is best served by scientists motivated only by truth, only by credit, or by both truth and credit. In many, but not all, situations, scientists motivated by both truth and credit should be judged as the most rational scientists.
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