20 found

Year:

  1.  29
    Knowing Falsely: the Non-factive Project.Adam Michael Bricker - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (2):263-282.
    Quite likely the most sacrosanct principle in epistemology, it is near-universally accepted that knowledge is factive: knowing that p entails p. Recently, however, Bricker, Buckwalter, and Turri have all argued that we can and often do know approximations that are strictly speaking false. My goal with this paper is to advance this nascent non-factive project in two key ways. First, I provide a critical review of these recent arguments against the factivity of knowledge, allowing us to observe that elements of (...)
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  2.  6
    Anti-Luminous Mental States: Logical, Psychological and Epistemic Problems.Óscar L. González-Castán - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (2):283-300.
    In this paper I shall argue that Tim Williamson’s argument for the anti-luminosity of many mental states faces difficult logical, psychological and epistemological problems. From a logical point of view, his argument is correct. However, the contrary argument that says that the anti-luminosity thesis does not necessarily follow from it is also correct. This opens a sceptical scenario. Hence, if Williamson wants to convince us that we should rationally prefer his argument rather than the other, he needs to add considerations (...)
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  3.  4
    Manifestation and Unrestricted Dispositional Monism.Vassilis Livanios - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (2):179-196.
    Most metaphysicians agree that powers can exist without being manifested. The main goal of this paper is to show that adherents of an unrestricted version of Dispositional Monism cannot provide a plausible metaphysical account of the difference between a situation in which a power-instance is not manifested and a situation in which a manifestation of that power-instance actually occurs unless they undermine their own view. To this end, two kinds of manifestation-relation are introduced and it is argued that dispositional monists (...)
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  4.  36
    Frege’s Puzzle and Act-Based Propositions.Nikhil Mahant - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (2).
    I argue that the act-based accounts of propositions, like the one defended by Soames, cannot be used to address Frege’s Puzzle without also giving up the Millian view of names. I begin by identifying two puzzles—both of which have been called Frege’s puzzle—and discuss the act-based theorist’s solution to the first puzzle. I then raise an objection against the solution and argue that it cannot be overcome unless a concession is made. Making the concession, however, would make it impossible for (...)
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  5.  17
    Naïve Realism with Many Fundamental Kinds.Neil Mehta - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (2):197-218.
    Naïve realism is a theory of perception with great explanatory ambitions. It has been influentially argued that, in order to realize these explanatory ambitions, the naïve realist should say that any perception belongs to just one fundamental kind. I think, however, that adopting this commitment does not particularly help the naïve realist to realize her explanatory ambitions, and so is not warranted. This result is significant because once this commitment about fundamental kinds is relinquished, we see that it is possible (...)
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  6.  22
    Necessitism, Contingentism, and Lewisian Modal Realism.Cristina Nencha - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (2):227-247.
    Necessitism is the controversial thesis that necessarily everything is necessarily something, namely that everything, everywhere, necessarily exists. What is controversial about necessitism is that, at its core, it claims that things could not have failed to exist, while we have a pre-theoretical intuition that not everything necessarily exists. Contingentism, in accordance with common sense, denies necessitism: it claims that some things could have failed to exist. Timothy Williamson is a necessitist and claims that David Lewis is a necessitist too. The (...)
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  7.  10
    Lowe Vs Lewis Vs Lowe on Temporary Intrinsics.Dean Rickles - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (2):173-177.
    We find that E. J. Lowe’s resolution to David Lewis’s problem of temporary intrinsics is wrong, but not quite for the reasons adduced by Lewis himself. Our discussion hinges on a connection between state-independent properties and intrinsic properties.
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  8.  17
    Can We Have Physical Understanding of Mathematical Facts?Gabriel Tȃrziu - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (2):135-158.
    A lot of philosophical energy has been devoted recently in trying to determine if mathematics can contribute to our understanding of physical phenomena. Not many philosophers are interested, though, if the converse makes sense, i.e., if our cognitive interaction (scientific or otherwise) with the physical world can be helpful (in an explanatory or non-explanatory way) in our efforts to make sense of mathematical facts. My aim in this paper is to try to fill this important lacuna in the recent literature. (...)
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  9.  8
    Properties, Concepts and Empirical Identity.Nicholas Unwin - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (2):159-171.
    Properties and concepts are similar kinds of thing in so far as they are both typically understood to be whatever it is that predicates stand for. However, they are generally supposed to have different identity criteria: for example, heat is the same property as molecular kinetic energy, whereas the concept of heat is different from the concept of molecular kinetic energy. This paper examines whether this discrepancy is really defensible, and concludes that matters are more complex than is generally thought. (...)
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  10.  9
    Collective Epistemic Luck.Moisés Barba & Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):99-119.
    A platitude in epistemology is that an individual’s belief does not qualify as knowledge if it is true by luck. Individuals, however, are not the only bearers of knowledge. Many epistemologists agree that groups can also possess knowledge in a way that is genuinely collective. If groups can know, it is natural to think that, just as true individual beliefs fall short of knowledge due to individual epistemic luck, true collective beliefs may fall short of knowledge because of collective epistemic (...)
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  11.  12
    A Kierkegaardian Anti-Luck Epistemology.Tim Black - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):85-97.
    We can address the issue of epistemic luck, the possibility that the world interferes with the activity of believing so as to keep that activity from achieving its aim, by rethinking the aim of that activity. So, if we give up truth, for example, as the aim of belief, and if we embrace a different aim—the aim of believing as my ideal self would have me believe—we can eliminate the possibility of luck and leave the world no room to interfere (...)
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  12.  10
    Is Fallible Knowledge Attributable?E. J. Coffman - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):73-83.
    Here are two prima facie plausible theses about propositional knowledge: a belief could still constitute knowledge even if the belief is justified in a way that’s compatible with its being either false or accidentally true; each instance of knowledge is related to its subject in a way similar to that in which each intentional action is related to its agent. Baron Reed develops and defends a novel argument for the incompatibility of and. In this paper, I clarify and critically assess (...)
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  13.  12
    Evidence, Epistemic Luck, Reliability, and Knowledge.Mylan Engel - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):33-56.
    In this article, I develop and defend a version of reliabilism – internal reasons reliabilism – that resolves the paradox of epistemic luck, solves the Gettier problem by ruling out veritic luck, is immune to the generality problem, resolves the internalism/externalism controversy, and preserves epistemic closure.
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  14.  9
    Skill, Luck, and Epistemic Probability.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):25-31.
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  15.  25
    Rationality, Success, and Luck.Ram Neta - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):57-71.
    Rationality, whatever exactly it demands of us, promotes success, whatever exactly that is. Some philosophers interpret that slogan as something that can provide them with a way of reductively explaining the demands of rationality by appeal to some independently intelligible notion of success: being rational, they might say, is just having whatever property it is that promotes success. Other philosophers may interpret the same slogan as something that can provide them with a way of reductively explaining the notion of success (...)
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  16.  30
    Varieties of Epistemic Risk.Duncan Pritchard - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):9-23.
    My interest is in how shifting from an anti-luck epistemology to an anti-risk epistemology can enable us to make sense of some important epistemic phenomena. After rehearsing the more general arguments for preferring anti-risk epistemology over its anti-luck cousin, I argue that a further advantage of this transition lies in how it puts us in a better position to understand certain trade-offs with regard to epistemic risk. In particular, there can be ways of forming beliefs that are epistemically low risk (...)
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  17.  5
    Correction to: Epistemic Luck and Knowledge.Michael J. Shaffer - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):7-8.
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  18.  68
    Epistemic Luck and Knowledge.Michael J. Shaffer - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):1-6.
    This is an editorial introduction to a special issue of Acta Analytica on epistemic luck.
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  19.  52
    Safety, Evidence, and Epistemic Luck.Michael J. Shaffer - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):121-134.
    This paper critically explores Timothy Williamson’s view of evidence, and it does so in light of the problem of epistemic luck. Williamson’s view of evidence is, of course, a crucially important aspect of his novel and influential “knowledge-first” epistemological project. Notoriously, one crucial thesis of this project is that one’s evidence is equivalent to what one knows. This has come to be known as the E = K thesis. This paper specifically addresses Williamson’s knowledge-first epistemology and the E = K (...)
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  20.  16
    Relationism and the Problem of Order.Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2022 - Acta Analytica:1-29.
    Relationism holds that objects entirely depend on relations or that they must be eliminated in favour of the latter. In this article, I raise a problem for relationism. I argue that relationism cannot account for the order in which non-symmetrical relations apply to their relata. In Section 1, I introduce some concepts in the ontology of relations and define relationism. In Section 2, I present the Problem of Order for non-symmetrical relations, after distinguishing it from the Problem of Differential Application. (...)
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