Heidegger qualifies his work with the surprising assertion “I have no philosophy at all.” In this paper, I argue that, to make sense of this odd claim, we must carefully investigate his reflections on philosophical showing. While Heidegger never finished the segment of Being and Time intended to address this issue explicitly, the clues he offers in the published portion of the text indicate that, for him, successful philosophical showing takes place not primarily through a coherent collection of philosophical assertions (...) – that is, through “having a philosophy” – but rather through a certain well-placed interruption of these assertions: an interruption that, when employed in the right context and in the right manner, successfully points out certain particularly elusive phenomena. As I demonstrate, this mode of showing requires that we quite radically rethink what Heidegger is doing – and what we ourselves are doing – in philosophical inquiry. (shrink)

In this article, I focus on the way in which grief can alter temporal experience, to the extent that it is possible for the mourner to find themselves held out into the timeless time of the dead. My interpretation is informed by a close reading of poet Denise Riley’s remarkable work Time Lived, without Its Flow, which I bring into dialogue with the shifting conceptions of time put forward by Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In so doing, I situate Riley’s account of the (...) limits of temporal experience in grief at the juncture of Merleau-Ponty’s turn away from the horizontal time of Phenomenology of Perception, and towards the vertical time of The Visible and the Invisible. By conceptualising Riley’s own interpretation of time in terms of Merleau-Ponty’s turn to a thicker, ontological interpretation of time, I suggest we are able to think through the limits of temporal experience in grief and see what is lit up about time, meaning, subjectivity and inter-subjectivity, and life and death as a result. (shrink)

The final paragraph of the original 1971 edition of Stanley Cavell’s book The World Viewed has often been read too hastily; it is, as a result, frequently misunderstood. This article consists of a close reading of this one paragraph, correcting some of these misrepresentations and arguing that the juxtapositions of ideas that it presents express persistent themes in Cavell’s work in ways that are worthy of minute attention. The article attempts to show how examining the paragraph’s form and content can (...) illuminate and clarify our understanding of Cavell’s treatment of privacy, fantasy, modernism, mortality, and ontology – in film as well as much more generally. (shrink)

Welcome to Angelaki’s General Issue I 2024. Submissions for our general issues are accepted year-round.Angelaki is an internationally renowned journal and one of the most read of Routledge, Taylor...

In this paper I juxtapose Heidegger’s account of care with Fink’s account of play. The aim of this juxtaposition is to show how Fink’s account of human play sheds light on a modality of being that disrupts the futurism that characterizes the caring temporality of Dasein. In sections II and III, I argue that future projection plays a pivotal role in Heidegger’s analysis of human existence. In section IV, I discuss Fink’s critical reflections on the futurism of human existence. I (...) examine how our care for our own being can have a limiting effect on how we relate to the world. In section V, I discuss some key features of human play that allow us to think of it as an eventful activity that opens up a more flexible relation to the world. In the final section, I discuss how Fink’s account of play overcomes some of the issues raised in relation to Heidegger’s prioritization of the future. (shrink)

In this article, I shall outline a thought experiment aimed at reversing the relationship between bíos and zoē established by the anthropological machine. Giorgio Agamben resorts to the notion of “anthropological machine” to define the mechanism that produces the qualified life of human beings (bíos), through the inclusive exclusion of their biological life (zoē). My experiment does not render the exclusionary logic of the anthropological machine inoperative, but reverses the hierarchy it establishes between bíos and zoē. The result is what (...) I shall call the machine of biologism, or simply the biological machine. If the anthropological machine establishes its perimeters of exclusion/inclusion on the grounds of bíos, the biological machine resorts to zoē. Thus, the biological machine does not operate according to the anthropological difference, which deems the human being as essentially not an animal, but according to what I shall define as the biological difference. (shrink)

Contemporary work in Black Studies reflects the urgency of integrating lived experience into scholarly work. Scholars such as Saidiya Hartman and Christina Sharpe employ autobiographical frames and anecdotes in their writing in order to legitimate historically undervalued forms of knowledge production, and, as Hartman writes, to “counter the violence of abstraction.” Despite the efficacy of this methodology, however, the move itself remains under-theorized, even as scholars advocate for the necessity of taking seriously the intellectual labor and output of Black female (...) academics. “The Actual Scale of Breathing” examines the genealogy of Black feminist writers from slave narratives to the contemporary who find themselves in the impossible position of wanting to speak from experience but find the work of self-disclosure harmful. I argue that these writers innovate form to both refuse unearned access to interiority – specifically to white readers – while at the same time cultivating community through the incorporation of a polyphonic authority. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the Czech-born philosopher Vilém Flusser’s notion of telematic society, arguing that it implies a media-theoretical revision of Friedrich Schiller’s project for an aesthetic model of civic education, according to which aesthetic effectivity is reconsidered in light of a history of media based on a technological alternation of images and texts. After a brief overview of Schiller’s aesthetic letters, it examines the ways in which Flusser repositions and expands upon Schiller’s vision of an aesthetic education (most importantly, (...) the aesthetic condition or middle disposition), highlighting the role that Flusser assigns to the evolution of codes inherent in the most important cultural and media techniques, namely, images, texts, and technical images. It then shows how this modification results in a forecasting of a telematic model of aesthetic education, before concluding by addressing the prospects of such a model in a post-digital world of automated media bias. (shrink)

This article explores the influence of Bergsonian ideas on Simondon’s thought. In his main thesis Individuation in Light of Notions of Form and Information, Simondon parts ways with Bergson, in spite of parallel ideas, insofar as he favours a physical paradigm of individuation, applicable to all kinds of dynamic systems. Hence it is not just life that manifests a tendency toward individuation. The Bergsonian influence becomes manifest in Simondon’s complementary thesis On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, where he (...) applies a quasi-biological, evolutionary schema to technical development. The idea of technical evolution is Simondon’s attempt to bestow a certain autonomy and dignity to technical reality, too often depreciated in his view as a simple tool or extension of organic life. This article pursues the question of how this account of technical evolution fits within the broader schema of the theory of individuation. (shrink)

The Natural Contract (1990) marks the emergence of the environmental question in Serres’s work that became central in his later publications. Over the twenty years when the Anthropocene emerged as a distinct narrative entangling geological time with the history of human technology, Serres developed a rather similar “Grand Récit” embracing deep geological time, biological evolution, the process of hominization, and the future of humankind, although he did not enter into conversation with the leading figures of the interdisciplinary field of Anthropocene (...) studies. This paper seeks to characterize Serres’s position in the field of environmental philosophy as it has been reconfigured by the introduction of the concept of the Anthropocene. It first briefly surveys the personal pathway that led Serres to his diagnosis of a global climate crisis. It then compares the concepts that guided his analysis with the concepts debated in Anthropocene studies. Finally, I will suggest that the ethical measures proposed by Serres to face the crisis did not help to bring him into dialogue with the Anthropocene scholars. (shrink)

The passage of human civilization into the new geological era of the Anthropocene raises the question of species extinction. How can we confront the possibility of collective death in a way that does not descend into uncontained anxiety or melancholy? Michel Serres’s works in the Foundations and Humanism series offer critical insights into the way in which human violence and death operate as mechanisms for binding together human collectives. Serres draws attention to the role of “social technologies” based around sacrificial (...) practices, the scapegoating mechanism, and the use of corpses as markers of social relations (or “statues”). He argues that these mythic logics and practices persist in modern societies and technoscience. They may also be at work in a modified way in the proposed technical solutions to climate change around space travel and planetary colonization. Drawing on the tradition of Folk Horror film-making and literature, it is argued that reversing the direction of travel, back into the Earth, provides better instruction about how to live and die in the Anthropocene. Reflection on the puteal sites where this may be accomplished will serve as the mechanism. (shrink)

In this article, I want to ponder one particular aspect of Michel Serres as a writer: the peculiar impression that his texts are written as if “in many tongues.” Serres’s ambition with writing was to “travel light,” and indeed “lightning fast.” His style, I will argue, is characterized by a chiastic crossing of light and time whose proportioning is cosmic and architectonic, and figures canons of how embodied knowledges can cohabit in a domain of wisdom and ethical respect.

This essay considers the abiding preoccupation with glory in Michel Serres’s work and wonders how useful it is for understanding the economies of glory in the contemporary world. Glory is often linked for Serres with violence and the assertion of power, as these are bound up both with communication and publicity. Though he uses the story of the meeting of Diogenes and Alexander to focus the contrast between temporal power and the humbler claims of knowledge, Serres is also gloomily aware (...) of the ways in which knowledge too can be taken up in the pursuit of glory. His posthumous book, Relire le relié (Religion: Rereading What is Bound Together), proposes that the transcendence of divine glory can contain the human striving for power and fame. This essay uses the arguments of Giorgio Agamben regarding the political theology of glory to unfold an alternative, and much less idealistic account of the esteem economies of collective narcissism maintained by the global mediations of the contemporary world. Ultimately, Serres’s work hovers uncertainly, as perhaps the contemporary world does, between the condition of a glory-war of all against all and the function of glory as a kind of social glue. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to do a “diffractive reading” of texts by Karl Marx and Michel Serres. A diffractive reading, as this term is used by thinkers like Karen Barad, aims at the appearance of something new from the confrontation of two texts that at first sight seem to have very little to do with each other. I do a close reading of the start of “The Chapter on Capital (Continuation)” (from Notebook 5 in the Grundrisse), where Marx (...) speaks about nature, the land, and about how the common was lived by German tribes (he rejects the way the Romans speak of the Ager Publicus because of its already existing link to property). The German tribes on the contrary practice their community through a Vereinigung and not through a Verein which means that what binds them is temporary, caused by a need, and not institutionalized indefinitely. More important even, he speaks of the land as part of the commune, as part of us temporarily, and caused by a need. This “inorganic self,” which is how he defines the land that feeds us, and thus belongs to us, is what gives rise to our being and is thus an inextricable part of who we are. Then, I turn to Serres, who, in his book The Five Senses also analyzes what gives form to us. Starting from the etymological analysis of the Homo sapiens, in which Homo refers to humus, the rich topsoil of the earth and sapiens to sapient, to “having a taste for something,” Serres too speaks of the earth that feeds us. Their earthly analysis of what forces us to think then brings me to take another look at how we think about intelligence today, and how the alienation that both Marx and Serres are speaking of, seems to have installed itself in how we are imagining technology and food. I talk of how the American military designs meals for the American soldiers serving in Afghanistan and Iraq, knowing that “the sense of home” should be included in their ready-to-eat meals. I talk of the Museum for Forgotten Skills, an art project set up by Casco Art Institute, in Utrecht (the Netherlands), in which a new population was introduced to their land, to the idea of becoming part of the community again, taking part in its rituals, in understanding the land, the language and the history accompanying it. My conclusion, in line with Serres (and Marx) is not very uplifting though. Alienation, which in the end is all about how we have alienated ourselves from the land, from the earth, prevents us from living together, from becoming a community, and in the end, from living a life. (shrink)

This piece offers a response to Michel Serres’s Relire le relié (Citation2019) by way of a series of interruptions, which release unexpected meanings from the trinitarianism of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. It considers the problematics of translating the title into English as Religion: Rereading What is Bound Together (2021), and connects the discussion back to themes from two earlier texts, The Parasite (Citation1980) and the conversations with Bruno Latour, Éclaircissements (Citation1992), as well as to a modalization of interference in (...) Serres’s Hermès II (Citation1972). This series of interruptions and interferences consider the hybrid, pagan, and Christian nature of Serres’s religious inheritance and legacy. Understated, and awaiting discovery, is a connection between Hestia and Aphrodite, and between the woman caught in adultery, whom a crowd of learned men seek to stone, with whom the text opens, and Mary, the mother of God. (shrink)

This paper examines the concept of equilibrium in the work of Michel Serres. It starts with analysis of Serres’s philosophy of nature and, in particular, of the Lucretian cosmology he adumbrates in his 1977 text The Birth of Physics. By beginning here, we can see that his fundamental account of the material world is framed in terms of equilibrium or, rather, as a series of different equilibria that are dynamic, internally nested and reactive to each other in complex ways. In (...) this respect, Serres’s philosophy of nature resonates with work in contemporary Earth System Science that models the planet as a complex, adaptive system trending towards homeostatic regulation. But crucially, Serres goes further by extracting from this modelling important insights into human values. That is to say, he suggests that necessary and urgent questions about what sort of people we must be and what sort of social order we must pursue can be addressed through the prism of the concept of equilibrium. At the time of the Anthropocene, when planetary stability itself seems to be at stake, with potentially catastrophic implications for present and future life on earth, Serres’s work thus shows itself to be timely and apposite across a range of disciplinary applications. (shrink)

Serres thought that humans had become the world’s parasites and that we must seek a more reciprocal partnership with our host. He put forward a legal justification for writing a new social contract that encompassed the more-than-human. Serres associated the foundation of the “natural contract” with the story of evolution, the biological relation between symbiosis and the parasite. Closely aligned to his proposal, Serres also envisioned the gathering together of a universal history revealed by the knowledge of the diverse sciences (...) of matter and life and stories from the humanities and religion. He thought the “Grand Narrative” would bring people to an intimate understanding of our relation to the living world and the need for a contract of symbiosis. Serres referred to Molière’s Tartuffe, the fables of La Fontaine, the adventures of Tintin and Livy’s history of Rome to describe an underlying parasitical logic. Crossing social, medical, communicative and historical practices, the parasite is portrayed by Serres as an acquisitive guest, a contagious microbe, a confusing noise and part of ritualistic feasts. Crossing these specific examples, Serres depicts how the general operation of the parasite works in close partnership with the symbiotic. For instance, germs can both invade the body and strengthen immunity. As evolutionary biologists recognise, there is no simple division between parasitic and symbiotic processes. In this paper, I explore the biological–parasitic–symbiotic framework that Serres applies in the context of the ecological crisis and his proposal for a contract of symbiosis. I focus on pioneering research into the history of bacteria carried out by microbiologist Lynn Margulis and associated studies on the evolution of fungi and moss. I describe how this research contributes to Serres’s formulation of a universal story and at the same time helps both to supplement and critically engage with Serres’s thought on the natural contract. Specifically, I describe how Margulis’s contentions about the abilities of micro-organisms differ from Serres’s conception of the technology of “nature.” I also examine how his notion of the “Biosum,” a body that integrates all the perceptions and senses of the living world, informs his understanding of the divergent evolution of humankind. I conclude that Serres’s natural contract seeks to reinvent rather than imitate the rest of nature and briefly consider how his vision of inclusive global stories offers a glimpse of a new politics. (shrink)

Despite Michel Serres’s caution with figures of the limit, border, and boundary which philosophy and social theory put into play, his work can fruitfully be read as a proposal to rethink limits for a social and natural contract. By following up on the intimate connection between limits and law in his work, this paper shines a light on Serres’s argument for a parallelism of limits and laws; and particularly highlights the partially underacknowledged role of entropy for this matter. First, attention (...) will be drawn to the role of topological boundaries for Serres’s structural consideration of a natural contract in a number of his works (e.g., The Natural Contract, Atlas, Hominescence), in order to demonstrate the indispensable connection between topological boundaries, a topologically conceived ethics, and a topological approach to law. This grounds the argument for a second step, which will focus on the role of entropy and entropic difference for his understanding of processes of social organization as well as a proposal of a “new natural contract.” Similarly, this will emphasize the linkages between entropic figures of the limit and respective conceptions of a contract. This “new natural contract,” as Serres calls it, not only goes a long way in connecting themes around thermodynamic and informational entropy of the early Hermès series to his later employments of entropy in social theory, but also integrates different criticisms of his earlier natural contract and critiques of a Western-centric form of naturalism. The aim of this paper is to show that Serres’s approach to entropy engenders a reconsideration of a natural contract that not only thoroughly integrates his own non-essentialist and non-dualistic understanding of nature, but that opens up a horizon of resonances with feminist and postcolonial critiques of the Anthropocene. (shrink)

This is a lightly copy-edited version of the paper given by Bill Ross (1964–2022) at the “Michel Serres and the Social” Colloquium held at Queens’ College, Cambridge, in June 2022. The editor has maintained the language of “paper” rather than “article” throughout. The paper addresses the respective stances of Michel Serres and Jean-François Lyotard to the prospect of the end of the world. Considering this end in relation to technology, evolution, and information throws into relief how each thinker regards its (...) significance for humankind, its connection with the Earth, and what succeeds such an end. For Lyotard, the story is ultimately one of the inhuman, a possible version of the human continued elsewhere in the universe but where the characteristics we associate with humanity are threatened – or worse – by the necessity of adapting to a different environment. By contrast, Serres is shown to regard the prospect of the end as an impetus to renew our contract with the Earth. (shrink)

Michel Serres’s proposal to extend the social contract to a natural contract has been met with criticism and misunderstanding. In this article, I would like to respond to common criticisms by reconsidering two central related concepts. It is claimed that we cannot represent nature’s interests and therefore cannot come to an agreement, and thus a contract, with nature. However, I will suggest a way out by reinterpreting representation and agreement. I will start with the problem of representation: nature cannot be (...) represented. Specifically, I will present two counterarguments. The first argument is that political representation is always difficult, even in the case of human beings. Representing nature only seems more difficult because we have forgotten the difficulties associated with representing humans. The second argument aims to rethink representation. Representing nature only seems so hard because we tend to follow a cognitive understanding of representation, as if representation is about representing the ideas of the represented party. Instead, following Michael Saward, I propose an alternative understanding of representation as a game of representative claims and counterclaims: political representation is about claiming to speak on behalf of a referent and then allowing that referent to respond to that claim. Then I turn to the problem of agreement. A natural contract seems difficult because it is hard to imagine what it would mean for nature to agree to a particular proposal. To counter this, I turn to the notion of symbiosis, found in the work of Serres. A natural contract, I will argue, need not be a contract of consensus or synthesis. The alternative is a contract of symbiosis, which does not require all parties to have a common understanding of the situation. Instead, it allows for an agreement in which all parties have their own interests and definition of the situation. In this sense, a natural contract can make sense if it is understood as a contract in which symbiosis is achieved through political representation based on a game of claims and counterclaims. (shrink)

Volume 29, Issue 4, August 2024, Page 1-2.

Volume 29, Issue 4, August 2024, Page 3-13.

Michel Serres’s natural contract is not merely a proposal for an alternative legal or political paradigm. It offers something deeper: a new imaginary to unsettle and confront the deep assumptions of classical social contract theories and their retrojected justification: the state of nature. The argument of this article is that Serres systematically unpicks the conditions of possibility of the contractual paradigm in the modern social imaginary, replacing them with an original noise, a primacy of parasitic relationships and a telos of (...) symbiosis. This reframes the natural contract as the visible profile of a comprehensive social and natural imaginary that radically refigures society and ecology otherwise than on the basis of primacy of reciprocal exchange relationships between self-sufficient individuals. (shrink)

Michel Serres proposes that we reform our relation to the non-human world by striking a new contract to extend democratic rights and legal protections to nature. Following Serres’s lead, this has for the most part been understood in strictly legal terms. In this paper, I will show that the natural contract also has a narrative dimension, and moreover that taking this into account reveals an engagement with the Principle of Sufficient Reason that puts the relation of the natural contract with (...) law in a new light. The natural contract appears not as a standalone, law-based response to the climate emergency but as part of an ongoing rational practice that involves the law, the sciences, and a wider narrative exploration of the human and the non-human. After outlining Serres’s proposal for a natural contract, I will look briefly to his account of Lucretius in The Birth of Physics where both narrative and contract play an important part. Law is treated as a regularity arising from the connection between events, and further as a form of equilibrium modelled on the most advanced knowledge available. Serres’s discussion of Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason in The Natural Contract shows that the composition of such an equilibrium is both narrative and rational. (shrink)

Scrutinising Santner’s comments on his own method in his recent book Untying Things Together, the paper argues that at the heart of Santner’s theoretical endeavour lies something that might be called “the flesh of all words.” To elaborate this thesis, I begin, following a corresponding hint by Santner himself, with a description of Freud’s peculiar “way of working with concepts” in his The Interpretation of Dreams. From there I move on to the analysis of an author who has been one (...) of Santner’s main points of reference at least since his Psychotheology of Everyday Life: Franz Rosenzweig. The paper outlines Rosenzweig’s self-interpretation in his essay “‘The New Thinking’” and compares the specific methodology explained and developed in this text with the main work of Ferdinand Ebner, whose closeness to his own work Rosenzweig himself emphasised. Finally, against the background of these theoretical conceptions, I will borrow one of Santner’s own neologisms and use it to describe his work as the “encystance” on/of this flesh of all words. (shrink)

This essay focuses on Eric Santner’s psychoanalytic reinterpretation of the crucial symbol of Judaism – yetziat mitzrayim, the getting out of Egypt – as “the Exodus out of our own Egyptomania.” Formulated in his book on Rosenzweig and Freud, On the Psychotheology of Everyday Life, it appears in all Santner’s later works concerned with political theology, where “Egyptomania” stands for everything that overburdens human life with an excessive “signifying stress” or “ex-citation,” weighing it down with the impossible demands of the (...) ultimate metaphysical self-justification and the interpellating call to sublimity. Contrary to Hegel’s definition of Judaism as “the religion of the sublime,” Santner consequently champions the opposite view, according to which the Abrahamic revelation forms the first religion of radical desublimation that blocks the vertical transport into the extraordinary “beyond” and focuses instead on the immanent transcendence as the radical otherness of the neighbour/stranger in the world. The Exodus, therefore, is to be understood not as an exit out of the world, following the call of the otherworldly God, but precisely the other way round: as an exit of the Egyptomaniac metaphysical paralysis, where “Egypt” represents an impasse of the self-negating life which cannot tolerate its finite condition and invents a sublime alibi in a false promise of immortality. (shrink)

The article explores a number of closely related concepts in Eric Santner’s wide-ranging and yet concentrated oeuvre: the concept of the flesh, which is at the center of The Royal Remains, along with two more recent additions to Santner’s lexicon, the “void of knowledge” and “surplus scarcity,” both developed in Untying Things Together. Examining the logic and correlation of these concepts, the paper seeks to highlight certain tensions in Santner’s thought but also the possibilities his analyses of human stasis offer. (...) Alfred Döblin’s modernist classic Berlin Alexanderplatz then serves as a short test case (but also counterexample) of what we might call, taking our cues from Santner’s thinking, the “dreamwork of modernism.”. (shrink)

Starting from Santner’s essay “Freud’s ‘Moses’ and the Ethics of Nomotropic Desire,” the article explores a remarkably intriguing and simultaneously debatable statement made by Sigmund Freud regarding the accusation of the murder of God as a central Christian source of anti-Semitism. This investigation leads into the differentiation between two bodies of the King of the Jews: Jesus Christ and Jesus Barabbas, through which early Christians not only distanced themselves from political messianism (“Barabbas”), but also assumed a political culpability, acknowledging their (...) own responsibility for Jesus’ crucifixion. In doing so, they distanced themselves from those who neither acknowledged nor confessed a shared culpability, thereby designating them as the “Jews.” This demarcation from political guilt serves as the foundation for a “politics of guilt” in the form of a demarcation from “Judaism.” This gave rise to Christian anti-Judaism, which Freud ultimately traced back to the distinction between acknowledgment and non-acknowledgment of guilt in his book Moses and Monotheism. Drawing on the dimension of preserving communal unity through the confession of guilt, this article proposes that the Christian model of collective guilt confession should not be simply understood as a desire to liberate oneself from the superego pressures, as, according to Santner, a “spiriting away of spirits and specters.” Instead, it can be comprehended as a novel means of preserving a community through the exclusion of those who do not join in the declaration of guilt. (shrink)

This paper tries to provide some clues and red threads through the magisterial work of Eric Santner. The first part takes the point of departure in his book on Schreber (My Own Private Germany) and tries to lay down a basic narrative that subtends most of Santner’s work and can be encapsulated by “the secret history of modernity.” This narrative is briefly spelled out through the relationship of Schreber the father (the “surplus father” as the continuation of the enlightenment), Doctor (...) Flechsig (the seminal representative of the modern university discourse), and Schreber the son, the embodiment of the symptom of the progress of modernity. The second part of the paper scrutinizes three interrelated concepts proposed by Santner, too muchness, the surplus of immanence, and manatheism, which provide conceptual tools to address the break of modernity. The three concepts are brought into relation with the historical placement of psychoanalysis in modernity, the dialectic of “what remains” and the emergence of the new, and finally with the nature of the exception pertaining to the notion of the surplus. The last part, “the punning of reason,” examines Santner’s frequent use of puns (“puncepts”) as a conceptual strategy to deal with the paradoxes of universality. Punning is taken not as an addition or embellishment but as a poignant way to propose a new status of universality, related to what Lacan named lalangue. The three different perspectives try to show the different ways by which Santner’s work addresses the core conundrums of modernity. (shrink)

While classical authority is positivistic in form, authority in the age of Radical Democracy is negative in form. The latter produces shame as the pathological a priori of modern subjectivity. Shame springs from unworthiness in the face of the infinite demand emitted by the concept of the “coming community,” which, as the never-there-but-always-to-come, puts every present into the state of a normative subtraction. To be ashamed means to experience oneself as not yet worthy as to what the coming community demands.

Volume 29, Issue 3, June 2024, Page 1-2.

Volume 29, Issue 3, June 2024, Page 3-8.

In this paper, Eric Santner’s theory of political flesh is appreciated in its relation to philosophy of religion and Christian theology. In the first part of the paper, Santner’s speculative concept is brought into conversation with the debate on embodiment, incarnation, and a hermeneutics of the flesh. Santner’s conception of the flesh is shown to follow a logic of excarnation, or rather disincorporation, and thus to be at odds with contemporary harmonistic theories of embodiment that attempt to think body and (...) spirit together without rupture. In contrast, the relevance of Santner’s theory lies precisely in its antagonistic reading of the dynamics that constitute human embodied being – a dimension overlooked by most recent theories of embodiment. The second part of the article develops a reading of Protestantism as a “religion of the flesh” in line with Santner’s argument. In doing so, it is shown that the Protestant narrative of self-modernization and progress (Hegel’s “religion of freedom”) can be subverted by the conception of the flesh brought into play by Santner, revealing a much more ambivalent history of Protestantism. In a re-reading of the theologies of Karl Barth, Friedrich Schleiermacher, and John Calvin, it is shown that the Protestant understanding of the church can be made transparent to a figure of the undead that is virulent in it, namely the undead flesh of Jesus Christ. In the end, the question is raised whether this figure of an “undead” Christ might not be interpreted as a paradoxological intervention in the sense of Eric Santner. (shrink)

This article builds on Eric Santner’s reflections on The Weight of All Flesh and in particular his interpretation of the king’s two bodies (Royal Remains). Within the context of Protestant theology, the theopolitical consequences of the democratization of the political body described by Santner are of particular interest. In this respect, I argue for two theses: first, this process of democratization finds its parallel in the Protestant critique of the representational function of the church – and perhaps even a crucial (...) precondition. Second, in terms of a theological critique of ideology, this observation allows us insights into some accompanying symptoms of this process. From a theological perspective the weight of all flesh can then be precisely analyzed as the inertia of the flesh – and of all flesh at that. (shrink)

The essay examines how American superheroes wage their mythological battle against evil as one of metaphysical salvation and redemption. They incorporate fantasies of super-human and super-technological bodied that seek to inherit, realize, and surpass all previous mythic hero figures of human civilization. America is staged as a nation of nations that has reached the end of history and is waiting for Judgement Day. The waiting time is filled by the entertainment industry.

In his Mann ohne Eigenschaften, Robert Musil has the character Clarisse comment on a debate between her husband, Walter, and Ulrich, the “man without qualities,” about the “impossible” relation between art and life. “‘Ich find das doch sehr wichtig,’ sagte sie, ‘daß in uns allen etwas Unmögliches ist. Es erklärt so vieles. Ich habe, wie ich zuhörte, den Eindruck gehabt, wenn man uns aufschneiden könnte, so würde unser ganzes Leben vielleicht wie ein Ring aussehen, bloß so rund um etwas.’ Sie (...) hatte schon vorher ihren Ehering abgezogen und guckte nur durch seine Öffnung gegen die belichtete Wand. ‘Ich meine, in seiner Mitte ist doch nichts, und doch sieht er genau so aus, als ob es ihm nur darauf ankäme.’” The English translation is even stronger: “There is nothing inside, and yet it looks as though that were precisely what matters most.” This essay interrogates this “nothing” that matters most in relation to the crown of royal authority, the “hollow crown,” as Richard II calls it in Shakespeare’s play. I further flesh out the matter and materiality of this bit of nothing in relation to the struggle between Creon and Antigone in Sophocles’ play about the foundations of royal authority. The queen in the former play and Antigone in the latter are presented as being too much sad, as manifesting a grief that pertains to this nothing, to an indeterminate loss they both “encyst” (upon) in their subjective stances. (shrink)

The so-called Kulturkampf, the conflict between the German Reich and the Catholic Church in the 1870s and 1880s, is one of the most important ideological conflicts of the late nineteenth century and reveals a political theological dynamic characteristic of the modern (German) nation state. This paper analyzes the paradoxes of this conflict along the lines with Eric Santner’s analysis of political representations. During the Kulturkampf, Catholic citizens were publicly suspected of not being loyal Germans, and the Catholic Church is widely (...) figured as an (inner) enemy in the liberal press and in modern caricatures. In these polemics, numerous political theological figures emerge: images of a gendered relation of domination of the (female) church by the (male) state, phantasies of the body politic and its precarious unity as well as of its purification respectively of the extermination of its others that continue to determine other ideological conflicts in the twentieth century. (shrink)

This paper intends above all to highlight three fundamental interconnected questions: (1) without reifying it in a theoretical-systematic philosophy, to highlight Derrida’s Deconstruction as a “philosophical idiom” – that of différance or of the ab-solute otherness – endowed, therefore, with specific “theoretical” assumptions (khôra, messianic and trace); (2) to highlight and to clarify the meaning of the “Derridian exception” concerning the issue of the animal and animality within the context of the sacrificial philosophical-cultural Westernness; (3) to highlight the relevance of (...) the issue of the animal and animality in order to re-think, in new terms, the question of the human itself – still essentially structured in the light of a metaphysical subjectivity –, underlining the invaluable contribution of Deconstruction to rethink the exceptionality of the human among the living beings and to bring the war for compassion to a successful end, thus contributing to the emergence of new Lights for the promise of the “coming” [“à-venir”] of another humanity and, consequently, of another civilization. (shrink)

In this article, we consider Derrida’s grasp on counter-institution and outline a peculiar modality of ethics that it engenders. After evoking his counter-institutional public engagements in the introduction, we begin an analysis of the word counter-institution. In the first place, the polysemy of its prefix “counter” is exposed, followed by the claim that in Derrida’s philosophy this term denotes proximity and contact, rather than opposition – thus determining the architecture of the counter-institution. Furthermore, we discuss Derrida’s critique of traditional, sovereign (...) institutions that he saw as unjust and violent, relating it to his theory of decision, and making the claim that counter-institutions are inseparable from justice. In the second part, we conceptualize what is named the counter-ethics of promise and responsibility. By juxtaposing Derrida’s unorthodox views on the notions of promise and responsibility, we seek to formulate a counter-ethical thought that animates the relations in and of the counter-institution and challenges the limits of ethics. Finally, we propose that Derrida’s idea of unfaithful fidelity could be understood as the very condition counter-ethics, and by consequence, of deconstruction. (shrink)

Abstract:This paper sheds light on the relation of mutual exclusion and implication that binds Derridean ethics with the figure of God. In rupture with existing scholarship that categorizes Derridean ethics as either radically atheistic or dialectically pertaining to the Judeo-Christian moral order, I put forward the argument that Derrida’s ethical thinking is best considered outside of the dialectics of a/theism. I demonstrate that, far from plainly disproving or falling within the bounds of existing religious discourses, Derrida inaugurates a new way (...) of relating to the absolute – whether it be named God, the infinitely other, or justice – beyond nihilism and idealism, atheism and theism, or more precisely between the two, in a space Derrida refers to as the space of spectrality. I thereby hope to finally do justice to the subtlety of Derridean ethics and foster the recognition that, twenty years after Derrida’s death, his ghosts can be of use in tackling some of the greatest ethical and political challenges of the twenty-first century, including the pursuit of peaceful pluralism in the context of rampant violence carried out in the name of God. (shrink)

Recent scholarship on Jacques Derrida’s work has turned toward his political and institutional engagements. I further this body of research by outlining a twofold problematic regarding the issue of “parliament.” Its first dimension concerns what I call a poli-technic of lying, which denotes that politically impactful techniques of lying demand we follow the lacunae of the polis, the phenomenality of an international public sphere and technologies of public circulation, and the relationship between the construction of categories of “peoples,” “nations,” “borders,” (...) and their “authorities” with practices of force or violence. In the following, I consider Derrida’s relation to the International Parliament of Writers (IPW) as a supplementary institution from which examination of this problematic might be situated in light of alternative traditions predicated on hospitality, and on sheltering the other as a practice inextricable from a “frank concept of truth.” I also consider the emergent possibilities this approach opens for responding to immediate conditions – attacks on the lives of writers around the world, accelerating global displacement, intensifying border closures, and unchecked police enforcement. I look toward the political unit Derrida identifies as crucial for these actions: the city as a space for frank and open speech – the ville franche. (shrink)

This paper investigates the ethics of deconstruction by considering it as a form of “resultless” thinking in the sense Hannah Arendt gave to that term: as the destabilization rather than the production of rules, norms, and criteria. In section II, I distinguish deconstruction’s specific resultlessness from Arendtian “self-destruction,” skeptical suspension, and Socratic irony, for whom resultlessness issues from the symmetrical cancelling out of equal counter-arguments. To the foremost objection to the resultlessness of thinking (the Arendtian “danger” that thinking is unable (...) to respond to the urgent demand for results), deconstruction opposes a reconceptualization of the very notions of “urgency” and “danger.” But such reconceptualization still does not amount to a justification for a deconstructive ethics: I argue in section III that deconstruction always performatively relates to a threefold danger that constitutes its “anxiety.” At the core of this anxiety is the resistance to reassurance and “good conscience.” I conclude, in section IV, by asking whether the ethics of deconstruction can perhaps be qualified – if not through its results or principles – as a “fundamental attunement” [Grundstimmung], by comparing deconstruction’s anxiety to Kierkegaard’s resistance to righteousness and good conscience, in the latter’s revaluation of wonder as the fundamental attunement of philosophy. (shrink)

Based on a reading of the opening of The Animal That Therefore I Am, this essay exposes the genealogy and structure of the articulation of two motifs of Jacques Derrida’s thought: the promise and animality. Following a confrontation between Heidegger’s and Nietzsche’s conceptions of the human, we will show that, for deconstruction, the possibility to promise, or the possibility of having an “avenir,” is characteristic of an “animal” structure of experience. The anthropological specificity is not pertinent in this context: if (...) animality names the structure of experience in general, and if humanity is reinscribed into it, then this reconfiguration is not a matter of classes, but of structure. Therefore, the promise of deconstruction is an implication of the structure of experience of finite living beings: experience is open, historic, insofar as it is animal. Finally, we will show why the affirmation of this articulation coincides with that of deconstruction’s “categorical imperative.”. (shrink)

This essay starts with the possibility of situating Derrida’s aporetic ethics in the domain of normative ethics and argues that Derrida’s reflection on ethics is enrooted in the specific way he conceives the phenomenological notion of auto-affection. In the second section, I analyze, in the early work, auto-affection with signs and show its centrality in Derrida’s first encounter with Levinas’s philosophy. Derrida refuses to substitute the hetero-affective relation to the Other for auto-affection as the source of universal law and normativity. (...) He does not sacrifice universality and tackles the problem of autonomous ethical decision-making even though he welcomes through affectivity the signification of the singular other, which is irreducible to conceptual, emotive, and normative self-relation. This background helps us understand the rootedness of ethical aporias in a reflection on auto-affection. (shrink)

This article considers sociocultural identity and identification in the work of Jacques Derrida. Though Derrida’s philosophy is often presented as a source of inspiration for identity politics, Derrida’s precise position on identity is far from evident. This discussion will unpack his account of identity through a dialogue with the work of Amartya Sen, a Nobel laureate in economics and moral philosopher, known for his capabilities approach. In spite of their philosophical differences, I propose that Sen and Derrida share strikingly similar (...) views about identity. Descriptively, they both understand sociocultural identity as inherently hybrid, anti-essentialist and plural. Sen’s argument for this is based on empirical and historical examples, while Derrida’s focuses on the relationship between cultural identity and the other. Their shared understanding of identity is reflected in a similar normative argument: we should consciously select our identities, so as to protect the plural nature of identities. In the case of Sen, this is accomplished through reason. Derrida takes a broader understanding of this, based on his concept of inheritance. I propose that inheritance needs to be interpreted as involving active and critical deliberation on identity and that this is an ethical dimension of Derrida’s work. I conclude by pointing to the potential for future dialogue between Sen and Derrida, the need to reflect further on the normative aspects of inheritance and the potential for their work to inform identity politics. (shrink)

The article retraces three important steps along the path of Derrida’s Heidegger interpretation in The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume II. Readings of The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Introduction to Metaphysics, and “The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics” complement and further develop Derrida’s deconstruction of Heidegger, which revolves around the term “Walten” and its role in the world-formation that makes community possible. The analysis of what Derrida calls the hyper-sovereignty of Walten reveals an ethico-political ambiguity in Heidegger’s texts. On the one (...) hand, this hyper-sovereignty registers as a super-sovereign violence that founds theological-political world-constructs through the exclusion of those deemed other. On the other hand, like différance it serves as the condition of impossibility of a common world. Following Derrida’s provocation, I develop this second sense to argue that the dissolution of the common world entails an ethical imperative to carry the other with whom one has nothing in common. (shrink)

While fidelity is a crucial aspect of Jacques Derrida’s thinking as it pertains to issues of faith, ethics, and responsibility, this key position in deconstructionist discourse has hardly yet been brought to light. Less still have the biopolitical resonances of Derrida’s work, with its careful attention to the terms and stakes of life particularly in his later writing, been considered as a deconstructionist practice of fidelity and infidelity in its own right. In pursuing these threads, this essay argues that thinking (...) a deconstructionist ethics through fidelity and biopolitics makes possible the crafting of a new philosophical weave for catching our responsibilities to others – to the very otherness of life itself – that Derridean hospitality opens up. Taken together in this way, a deconstructionist fidelity to life otherwise, to a biopolitics to come, makes possible an infidelity to political order as we know it that explodes the limitations of biopolitical theory. In squinting, blinking, tearing up, and listening, the borders of life are blurred in an ambivalent ethics of a transness within which life itself is made to waver and arrive anew. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the relationships that Derrida establishes between three analytic discussions and three autoimmunities. The analytic discussions are (1) the antinomy of hospitality, related to what happens when the subject faces demands from strangers; (2) the antinomy of the death penalty, related to the meeting between the right to life and the right to end the life of another; (3) the antinomy of animality related to laws and what lies beyond them. The autoimmunities are (1) the autoimmunity of (...) inclusion: democracy is open only to its sovereign citizens while it claims to welcome all who are excluded; (2) the autoimmunity of rights and liberties: in liberal democracy, rights and liberties are meant to challenge sovereignty’s absolutism, but any attack on sovereignty is an attack on rights and liberties; (3) the autoimmunity of globalization: for democracy to work it requires protection provided by a supersovereignty, which limits the sovereignty of states, and hence, democracy. The paper follows Derrida’s connections between the questions of hospitality, the death penalty, and animality on the one hand, and the autoimmune aspects of democratic politics on the other, to argue that his deconstruction of democracy is an ethicization of democracy activated by the concept of sovereignty, and a deconstruction of sovereignty via ethics. (shrink)

This paper delves into the deconstruction of the notion of responsibility, drawing a correlation with the process of decomposition of the concept of sovereignty as discussed by Derrida in his last research works. We explore Derrida’s consideration of absolute responsibility as no longer passing through the figure of the sovereign. Derrida’s thought takes its distance from the philosophical and hegemonic determination of the notion of responsibility, for the conceptual system of its axiomatic defines responsibility based on the sovereign individual’s freedom (...) and makes responsibility the effect of his power. Yet, this definition condemns ethics to failure, since it does not account for the other supposed in the idea of response. Derrida incorporates absolute singularity, and consequently secrecy, into the structure of responsibility, enabling thought to encounter the absolute other. The text outlines the influence of Nietzsche and Celan in Derrida’s thought and develops an approach that sees in his work the effort to create a poetic revolution in the history of philosophy and knowledge by opening thought to radical alterity. (shrink)

Derrida’s description of the aporia of decision-making is herein used to demonstrate how ethico-political concerns can already be found within the articulation of time and space as they are experienced by mortal beings, broadly understood.

This essay advances the thesis that Derrida’s ethics consists in the practice of philosophical responsibility. I contend that philosophical responsibility is the historical and ethical task of establishing a critical relation to one’s tradition which deliberately avoids passively and naively taking it for granted by questioning its origin and revealing its historicity. Further, I show that Derrida learns the task of philosophical responsibility from Husserl’s own version of philosophical responsibility, which he later transforms with the help of Husserl’s own methodological (...) tools. I maintain that the difference between Husserl’s and Derrida’s respective tasks is the injunction they are responding to and, concomitantly, the sense each gives to historicity. Whereas Husserl is responding to the principle of reason so as to reawaken the historicity of universal truth and its foundation, that is, the telos of Reason, Derrida is responding for the principle of reason with the purpose of disclosing the historicity of signification – différance – whose operation reduces the telos of Reason. (shrink)

This paper endeavors to argue that Derrida’s deconstructionist ethics can be construed as an embodiment of immanent ethics. To achieve this goal, it commences with Friedrich Nietzsche’s articulation of immanent ethics, drawing a contrast with formalist and conformist accounts of morality, exemplified in Kant. Following that, the paper explores the ethical thoughts of Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze to establish a connection between immanent ethics and the problem of life. In this context, we observe how immanent ethics redirects ethical concerns (...) from human consciousness to the domain of life, modes of existence, the unconscious desire and its exteriority. Within this framework, the paper characterizes Derrida’s ethics of deconstruction as a convergence of the immanence of deconstruction and deconstruction as a creative mode of life. As a result, Derrida’s formulation of ethical challenges within the context of aporias, impossibility, and responsibility can be understood as a call for resistance against conformity to established forms of life. This imbues deconstruction with an intrinsic ethical-political character. (shrink)

This essay seeks to establish the sense in which Derrida’s stated indifference to questions of legitimate descent can function as an ethical or political principle, as he argues in “Marx and Sons.” We track Derrida’s response to accusations of a lack of fealty in texts such as “Marx and Sons,” “Biodegradables: Seven Diary Fragments,” and “Limited Inc a b c … ” alongside his problematization of a certain sense of inheritance or heritage. We argue that Derrida reveals the necessity of (...) troubling established legitimate inheritances as an ethical and political first principle. As such, we argue that Derrida’s reading of Marx is not just one faithful reading among others, but an indifference to the paradigm of fealty in inheritance. (shrink)

Most countries provide some form of nationality or citizenship either by birthright or inheritance. This paper accepts Jacques Derrida’s invitation to imagine nationality or citizenship otherwise, this time by death and burial: you are from where you die or are buried. I read Derrida’s invitation alongside his four studies of Martin Heidegger’s use of “Geschlecht” to argue that we ought to reconsider the relationship between the nation and (its) philosophy. I show that Derrida’s proposed “law of the eclipse” provides us (...) new resources to rethink nationalism today. (shrink)

Deconstruction occupies an “eccentric” place in the varied field of biopolitics, as it radicalizes the indissoluble knot that binds life to power. On the basis of Foucauldian analysis, Derrida reflects on the “deviation” of biopolitics, which turns into bio-thanato-politics, that is to say, politics over life (bios) and death (thanatos). Life and death are not opposite, rather, they are inseparable, as one has inscribed the other within itself. Derrida’s bio-thanato-politics, as a deconstruction of the concept of life and its relationship (...) with the power, which is always the power of life and death, is not a different declination of biopolitics, but its radicalization. Beyond the biopolitical alternative between a power over life and a power of life, Derrida thinks a bio-thanato-politics, namely, a politics of the survival. Surviving well together, indeed, is the essential character of his democracy to-come. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose that Derrida’s writing on the impossibility of justice has the potential for fruitful dialogue with Ruth Chang’s contemporary account of practical rationality. For Derrida, making a just decision must always come with a moment of undecidability, a “leap” into the unknown with an experience of doubt and anxiety that continues to “haunt” the decision-maker. By contrast, in her work on rationality, Chang proposes that hard decisions are difficult to make because the alternatives are “on a (...) par,” such that there are no rational differences between the alternatives that would contribute to choosing one over the other. Hard decisions are made by expressing one’s own rational agency, generating will-based reasons to commit to or “drift” into one of the alternatives. Derrida writes of anxiety, doubt, and impossibility, yet Chang writes of commitment, agency, and rationality. Despite these differences, there are important comparisons and connections between the two accounts that are worth exploring. I suggest that the moment of the decision which Derrida describes as heterogeneous to knowledge can be understood as a moment of parity in which there is a lack of given reasons, as explained by Chang. Chang’s account of rational agency provides an interpretation of how decision-making is possible despite the undecidability as described by Derrida. This notion of commitment and agency as explained by Chang is not incompatible with Derrida’s insistence that the responsible decision is haunted by anxiety and doubt. Instead, I suggest that Derrida’s writing highlights uncertainty as central to understanding the nature of hard choices and how to navigate the demands of justice. (shrink)

Jacques Derrida’s and Gilles Deleuze’s philosophies of justice share many similar features. For both, justice involves an overturning of law by extralegal means, made possible by an “undecidability” in the judgment-making process. To distinguish their conceptions of justice, we examine their implicit modes of non-classical reasoning with regard to “otherness,” building from Routley and Routley and Daniel Smith, to conclude that Derrida’s thinking on justice is at least paracomplete (or analetheic) while Deleuze’s is just paraconsistent (or dialetheic).

This special issue of Angelaki on “Derrida: Ethics in Deconstruction” appears twenty years after the sad occasion of the death of Jacques Derrida in Paris on 12 October 2004, after an extraordinary...

This thematic issue of Angelaki covers the ethics in deconstruction in Jacques Derrida in the broadest way, so as to be an engagement with Derrida’s philosophy as a whole rather than the isolation...

This paper gives an account of the most significant elements of Derrida’s ethical thought, drawing on the desert of the Hebrew Bible, which Derrida associates with a moral law that is ethically troubling. Partly with reference to Kierkegaard’s account of the story of Abraham and Isaac, Derrida examines how ethical law can become subordinate to the sovereignty of the power apparently at the source of ethics which may then destroy moral law. The political equivalent of this is the decision proposed (...) by Carl Schmitt, drawing on Kierkegaard. Derrida’s famous statement that “deconstruction is justice” is the recognition that justice, and ethics in general, is caught between the formality of law and the violence of the sovereign power. One outcome of this is sacrifice as substitution, where ethics becomes recompense for violation through sacrifice. Sacrifice is the offering of a substitute. The substitution becomes repeated and itself is then the source of violence contravening some sense of ethics. Derrida’s attempts to escape from these deserts include a poetics which recognises the subjective and the aesthetic in the interpretation of law. It also includes the development of a form of sacrifice which is the individual responding to violation in an individualised way which cannot be substituted. (shrink)

This paper aims to present Derrida’s reflections on Europe, which criticizes Europe’s actuality while recognizing its promise to-come. Europe in modernity has been conceptualized as sovereign heading, the only one capable of governing the world. Derrida hopes for a Europe other than a super-state, closed within its borders, and an economic alliance. He works on today’s Enlightenment, that is, on a new shape of Europe as a shoreline fit to welcome the other, following in the footsteps of Kant, who redefined (...) the right of hospitality and drafted a cosmopolitan order, but going beyond his sketch. In the global age Europe must exemplarily assume The law of hospitality as its key principle, constantly seeking to translate it into political and legal acts. (shrink)

Abstract:The central inquiry of this article concerns the ethical orientation within post-structuralism, specifically questioning its potential affinity with deontology. While the “philosophers of difference” offer divergent perspectives on the doctrine of judgment, Jacques Derrida folds it within Deconstruction as a nomo-aporetic transcendental horizon. To understand this operation and its potential ethical significance, I suggest Jean-François Lyotard offers the best counter-model with which to compare against Derrida’s. Amongst their direct and indirect exchanges with each other is a dialogue concerning the law (...) and its fundamental ground. Through their respective readings of Kafka – Derrida’s reading of “Before the Law” and Lyotard’s reading of “In the Penal Colony” – both attempt to delineate how the specific nature of the ground of the law determines the way in which an individual becomes subject to the law. Despite the enigmatic nature of their discourses, their comparison reveals converging and diverging trajectories in their ethical reflections as they push toward thinking the limits of lawfulness. Through such a comparative study of their texts, this exploration aims to unveil the shared fugitive vector of their ethical contemplations within the post-structuralist framework. (shrink)

In “Toward an Ethic of Discussion,” Jacques Derrida returns to the controversy with Jonathan Searle to clarify his position but above all because he “would have wished to make legible the (philosophical, ethical, political) axiomatics hidden beneath the code of academic discussion.” I intend, in turn, to return to this text in order to find in it not only the conditions of an ethics of academic discussion but also of interpretation in a deconstructive perspective. In “Toward an Ethic of Discussion,” (...) in fact, it is possible to point out the necessity of a certain ethical treatment of the texts. In particular, how can we determine the conditions of an ethical use of quotation against the always possible manipulation of the text that quotation makes possible? I attempt to answer this question claiming that the reading protocol of deconstruction meets these conditions showing us at the same time the ethical conditions of scientific discourse in general, beyond any scientific claim of objectivity. (shrink)