The historical significance of Panaccio’s chosen topic is obvious: the debate between nominalism and realism is a topic of perennial and continuing interest, and William Ockham, though he never designated himself as such, is arguably the best-known and most systematic nominalist in the history of Western philosophy. But much of Ockham’s work is relatively inaccessible even to philosophically sophisticated readers. Not only has much of it not yet been translated, but it is articulated in the terminology and conceptual framework of (...) medieval scholasticism, which tends even now to be the precinct of specialists. Thus, philosophically sophisticated non-medievalists have long needed a short but accurate introduction to... Read More. (shrink)

abstract: The present article presents the views of two fifteenth-century Islamic scholars, ‘Alī al-Qūshjī (d. 1474) and Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī (d. 1502), on the following issue: When we make claims about extramental subjects and predicates, it seems plausible to suggest that such claims are true by virtue of corresponding to extramental reality. But what do we make of claims whose subjects and predicates are not extramental existents, such as philosophical claims like ‘An actual infinity is impossible’ or ‘Existence is a (...) second intention’? It seems problematic to suggest that such claims are made true by mental reality, for one can have false philosophical views. Such considerations led some earlier scholars to postulate that the truth of such propositions consists in correspondence with what is in the Active Intellect. Qūshjī raised objections to such proposals, and his glossator Dawānī developed another account that distinguished between de facto beliefs and the beliefs that are appropriate to our concepts. (shrink)

In his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (MAN) (1786), Kant aims to lay out an a priori foundation of physics, in his view the fundamental natural science, on the basis of his newly developed transcendental philosophy. Until recently, MAN has been one of Kant’s works that have received least attention. This might be due to its technical content, which reflects the physics and chemistry of his time, or its difficult style, or its quick way of moving from topic to topic: (...) even by Kantian standards, MAN is an enigmatic work. To Kant scholars not working in the field, it is also one of his most time-bound works. Others, however, see strong connections between the first Critique and MAN, and some even link... Read More. (shrink)

Hylomorphism is the view that particular objects are composites of form and matter. Something’s form is what causes it to be the specific kind of being it is and this form is realized in a suitable matter. When contemporary philosophers defend a broadly hylomorphic metaphysics and deign to discuss historical precursors at all, Aristotle is typically the only figure they engage. But hylomorphic theory after Aristotle is both complex and rich, and what we miss if we neglect this history is (...) significant. This collection offers an unusually thorough presentation of this history. It will be invaluable for those interested in hylomorphism and of interest to anyone who correctly views philosophy as a historically... Read More. (shrink)

In this important book, Christina Van Dyke asks what it would look like if scholars of medieval philosophy looked beyond the scholastic tradition in their accounts of key conceptual issues. As Van Dyke notes, the range of texts considered to be part of the medieval philosophical world has already expanded with scholarly recognition of the vital role played by Jewish and Islamic sources both in handing down and interpreting ancient Greek texts and in their substantive thinking about the questions raised (...) by them. Van Dyke wishes to expand the corpus of medieval philosophy in a different direction, rightly insisting that medieval Christian mystical or contemplative traditions are also places in which philosophy... Read More. (shrink)

Morganna Lambeth’s book reconstructs Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant, as articulated immediately after the publication of Being and Time (1927) in a 1927–28 lecture course and a 1929 book, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, often called Heidegger’s Kantbuch. Lambeth also outlines a Heideggerian method of historical-philosophical interpretation. So even historians of philosophy uninterested in the details of Heidegger’s reading of Kant will find stimulating historiographical proposals in Lambeth’s clearly written and illuminating book, particularly in its first chapter.As is well known, (...) Heidegger claimed to have found in Kant “crucial confirmation” of the philosophical path pursued in Being and Time (160). He... Read More. (shrink)

Stephen Darwall’s Modern Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to Kant is the first volume of a two-part series on the history of Western moral philosophy from the seventeenth to the twenty-first century. This first part covers the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and, in some ways, reads as a response to Terence Irwin’s The Development of Ethics: A Historical and Critical Study, Vol. II: From Suarez to Rousseau (Oxford University Press, 2008). Irwin sees modern moral philosophy through the lens of “Aristotelian naturalism” (...) (11). On this view, the best life is one that most realizes human nature. This view is eudaimonist in that the reasons to pursue the best life are based in an agent’s good, and duty obligates when compliance aligns with their good. Irwin’s view that eudaimonism is the dominant position in modern ethics challenges an earlier reading, from Sidgwick and Anscombe, which held that moderns prioritized duty over the good and, by doing so, invented deontic moral thought. Darwall’s Modern Moral Philosophy is a defense of this deontic reading. (shrink)

abstract: This essay explores Salomon Maimon’s first published articles: an article on Moses Maimonides that he published in the Berlinische Monatsschrift in 1789 and a slightly revised version of the same article that he published in Ha-Meassef, the leading journal of the Jewish Enlightenment, several months later. These articles represent the first time that Maimon interprets Maimonides’s thought along the lines of Kantian philosophy, anticipating his interpretations of Maimonides in Giv’at ha-Moreh (1791), his Hebrew commentary on Maimonides’s Guide of the (...) Perplexed, and his Autobiography (1792/93). Employing Kantian terminology and concepts, Maimon offers a novel interpretation of Maimonides’s thought that accords with Kant’s critical insights. Furthermore, Maimon uses his explication of Maimonides’s thought as an opportunity to provide his own interpretation of Kant’s theory of cognition, setting the stage for his critical analysis of Kantian epistemology in his Essay on Transcendental Philosophy (1790). These articles also underscore the often-overlooked importance of Maimonides for Maimon more generally. (shrink)

abstract: In the Theaetetus, Plato seems to rule out the possibility of perceiving ordinary objects ( Tht. 184–87), only to rely on it shortly afterward ( Tht.191–96). Unlike existing interpretations, this paper develops a unified conception of perception that resolves not only this apparent inconsistency, but also a substantive puzzle about how to understand object perception and its relation to perception of special sensibles. This conception is part of a surprisingly rich account of perceptual experience in the Theaetetus that illuminates (...) the contribution of perception to cognition. (shrink)

Steve Nadler’s Descartes: The Renewal of Philosophy is an extended “Life and Works” essay framed by a question it sets out to answer: when does philosophy become modern? The book thus invites being read from the perspective of the reception of Descartes’s works. But this would fail to do justice to its contents, a well-informed and readable narrative, in eight chapters, of Descartes’s life from birth to death, interspersed with interesting details both biographical and otherwise.The focus is naturally on the (...) development of Descartes’s science and philosophy, with summary presentations and brief discussions of his works—the Rules (47–52), The World (76–87), the Discourse and its essays (99–112), the correspondence... Read More. (shrink)

This latest addition to the Cambridge Companion series covers the development of logic in ancient Greece, from its origins in the fourth century BCE through its rapid development by Aristotle and the Stoics and subsequent stagnation in later antiquity. It is an excellent collection. Four initial chapters summarize the history, followed by nine on “Key Themes”; three final chapters address the legacy of ancient logic. The contributors generally limit themselves to summarizing current scholarship (often with remarkable thoroughness). The extensive thirty-eight-page (...) bibliography serves well as a reference to the field.In chapter 1, “The Prehistory of Logic,” Nicholas Denyer sees logical theory as originating in... Read More. (shrink)

abstract: This paper reconstructs the origins of Gettier-style epistemology, highlighting the philosophical and methodological debates that led to its development in the 1960s. Though present-day epistemologists assume that the search for necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge began with Gettier’s 1963 argument against the JTB definition, I show that this research program can be traced back to British discussions about knowledge and analysis in the 1940s and 1950s. I discuss work of, among others, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, A. J. (...) Ayer, Norman Malcolm, and A. D. Woozley, showing how exchanges between different schools of analytic philosophy gave rise to new ideas about the nature of knowledge and analysis. Finally, I turn to Gettier’s intellectual development and argue that his paper was influenced by some of these debates, suggesting that even his interpretation of Plato’s definition of knowledge can be traced back to discussions in this period. (shrink)

This is a magnificent biography, balanced, comprehensive, and meticulously researched. It reconstructs the life of a scholar whose analyses helped shape mid-twentieth-century British philosophy; and it traces the work of an intelligence officer whose analyses helped save tens of thousands of lives. Interestingly, it draws illuminating connections between Austin’s two careers. Rowe argues that the organization of Austin’s seminal Saturday Morning discussion group was informed by his experiences as leader of the Advanced Intelligence Section. Problems were broken down into smaller (...) components and assigned to caseworkers, often young tutors, who had to write ever more detailed reports on increasingly specific subjects... Read More. (shrink)

A telling footnote in Slavery and Race remarks that the existence of a strong antislavery movement prior to the American founding “is common knowledge among scholars who study early antislavery movements in America. However, historians of early modern philosophy are not always aware of it” (26n). This is true, and Jorati’s observation that we imitate the general American public in this respect should not assuage shame in our ignorance. For many Americans, this ignorance enables dubious justification. Contemporary philosophers, however, suffer (...) from recent prejudices about what counts as “real philosophy” or as “philosophically relevant.”Jorati’s effort to ameliorate this ignorance and challenge these prejudices is... Read More. (shrink)

abstract: It is generally agreed that what Kant means by quid juris in the first sentence of the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding is the question whether the claim at hand is legally valid, and that what he means by quid facti is a “neutral foil” to quid juris. I defend an alternative interpretation, according to which quid juris is the question whether certain facts are sufficient for the legal validity of the claim at hand, and quid (...) facti is the question: what are the facts? This interpretation is supported by the way that the terms quaestio juris and quaestio facti were used in the Roman-German legal tradition. It is also supported by Kant’s claim that “jurists... demand proof of both,” and by the structure of the legal deductions in Kant’s own writings. Finally, it sheds light on the aim and structure of the Deduction itself. (shrink)

abstract: In 1655, La Peyrère was the first to substantially argue for and popularize polygenism—the view that God created multiple original human mating pairs in separate acts of creation with numerous pairs created before Adam. Positing or rejecting polygenism has been central to modern theorizing about human types and origins. Prominent recent interpreters have maintained that La Peyrère’s polygenism does not imply a hierarchy of human types. This paper reconstructs La Peyrère’s account and, in opposition to the dominant view, argues (...) that his polygenism produces a human species hierarchy. The Adamite species is superior to the pre-Adamite species in virtue of its material composition, mode of creation, and form. The upshot is that La Peyrère’s theological system posits a protoracialist conception of human types. (shrink)

In the Prolegomena to De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Hugo Grotius expounds his theory of natural law by way of reply to a skeptical challenge from the Greek Academic Carneades. Though this dialectical context is undeniably important for understanding Grotian natural law, commentators disagree about the substance of Carneades’s challenge. This paper aims to give a definitive reading of Carneades’s skeptical argument, and, by reconstructing Grotius’s reply, to settle some longstanding debates about Grotius’s conception of natural law. I argue that (...) Grotius held a Stoic view of natural law, endorsing both the doctrine of eudaimonism and the claim that moral obligations are natural, not grounded in divine command. Consequently, Grotius’s view of natural law has more continuity with pre-modern, indeed ancient, morality than is usually supposed. However, I argue that we can still understand Grotius as a founder of modern moral philosophy. (shrink)

Few philosophers of note have been subject to the exigencies of intellectual fad and fashion quite like Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671–1713), once an influential and widely read author of a best-seller, who was largely forgotten until rediscovered by twentieth-century aestheticians claiming him as a founder of their discipline (11–14). The collection of his mature works, Characteristicks of Men, Manner, Times (1711), now boasts three modern editions and is routinely anthologized, and an expanding body of scholarship is (...) devoted to studying his thought. Shaftesbury remains a marginal figure, however, with his contribution to the canon, especially in the realm of moral philosophy, still... Read More. (shrink)

abstract: Leibniz holds that there are no two perfectly similar things, a doctrine he calls the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (the PII). What is his attitude toward its modal status? Most commentators hold that the principle is best understood as a necessary truth because it is allegedly entailed by doctrines such as the conceptual containment theory of truth, the Principle of Sufficient Reason (the PSR), and the denial of purely extrinsic denominations, which are arguably regarded by Leibniz as (...) necessary truths. In this paper, I argue against this consensus and show that (1) neither the conceptual containment theory of truth, nor the PSR, nor the denial of purely extrinsic denominations give Leibniz a good reason to hold that the PII is necessary; (2) Leibniz says that the PII is contingent in the correspondence with Clarke and not for dialectical reasons; and (3) the argument that Leibniz gives for the PII in §21 of his Fifth Letter to Clarke has been misunderstood; properly interpreted, it gives Leibniz a cogent argument rooted in some of his most important doctrines for the conclusion that the PII is a contingent truth. (shrink)

In his inaugural lecture, Heidegger declares that “the idea of ‘logic’ itself disintegrates into the turbulence of a more original questioning” (Wegmarken [Pathmarks], ed. William McNeil [Cambridge University Press, 1998], 117/92). The question pursued in this questioning is that of the meaning of Being (Sein), the Seinsfrage. As an indication of what we are seeking, Heidegger writes in Being and Time: “In the question which we are to work out, what is asked about is Being—that which determines entities as entities, (...) that on the basis of which entities are already understood, however we may discuss them in detail” (Sein und Zeit [Being and Time], trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson [Harper & Row, 1962], 6... Read More. (shrink)

abstract: Henry of Ghent contends that a causal power is a relation that a substance bears to an act. Scholars have taken this relational account to commit Henry to the Megaric view that a power exists only if it is actualized. We argue that this reading is mistaken because, for Henry, a power is not a “real relation” between a substance and an act. Rather, it is a “relation of reason.” We then consider the worry that if a power is (...) a relation of reason, it is a partially mind-dependent entity. We argue that this worry is unfounded because Henry’s claim that a power is a relation of reason is not so much a claim about what a power is, metaphysically speaking, but rather a claim about how we must conceptualize it. (shrink)

This learned, elegant book builds an interpretation of beatitude in Spinoza’s Ethics through interaction with a range of primary texts, including prominently the Zhuangzi, as well as secondary literature on Spinoza. Douglas’s focus is the promise that Spinoza’s doctrine of beatitude offers for eluding what is worst about death.The book starts with an account of beatitude that will serve as a foil. Chapter 1 sets out André Comte-Sponville’s account of beatitude in Spinoza, advertised as a Stoic account, on which one (...) attains beatitude by developing a sort of desire that is immune to hope: without hope and with the right sort of desire, we lack unfulfilled desires and so are happy (12). Douglas argues that, on this... Read More. (shrink)

While the American electorate is being roiled by a series of high-profile court cases that examine accountability among politicians, and legal minds are grappling with the question of whether the president of the United States even counts as an “officer” of the same, Melissa Lane has delivered a masterful study on the historical origins of these notions. Of Rule and Office: Plato’s Ideas of the Political explores the concepts of rule and office as they were conceived by the pioneers of (...) democracy in Athens and their greatest political theorist, Plato.The book casts Plato as a political theorist whose central preoccupation is the famous political conundrum articulated by Juvenal: “Who will watch the watchmen?” His... Read More. (shrink)

C. D. Broad developed three different accounts of time over the course of his career. Emily Thomas has recently argued that the shift from the first to the second of these was motivated by his engagement with the philosophy of Samuel Alexander. In this paper, I argue that the shift from the second to the third was instigated by Broad’s engagement with precognitive dreams and with the thought of John William Dunne. Furthermore, I argue that fully appreciating Broad’s interest in (...) psychic research in general, and precognitions in particular, is required for understanding the theory of time he defended in the second volume of Examination of McTaggart’s Philosophy. I also argue that interpreting the Examination in light of Broad’s engagement with Dunne can help remove the inconsistencies in Broad’s third account. (shrink)

Basile and Lyssy’s volume is a collection of eleven essays published in honor of Günter Zöller and dedicated to the conceptions of system and freedom in Kant and Fichte, which have been central to Zöller’s research. The editors rightly emphasize that systematicity in Kant is related to metaphysics as a disposition of reason. For Kant, reason is teleological, namely, directed toward its final end, the realization of the highest good in the world. This is why Kant’s theoretical philosophy—his transcendental idealism (...) as a metaphysical doctrine— makes room for the possibility of freedom, while his practical philosophy shows freedom’s reality and the need of theoretical reason to cohere with the demands of practical... Read More. (shrink)

abstract: In the Categories, Aristotle relies on the truth of claims like ‘Socrates is an individual’ and ‘human is a species,’ but it is not clear how terms like ‘species’ and ‘individual’ fit into the framework of the Categories. Do these terms introduce substances or accidents? When we truly apply them to a subject, is the predication we express essential or accidental? These questions puzzled ancient commentators on the Categories but have largely been neglected in modern scholarship. My central contention (...) is that these terms correspond to entities outside of the categories. An upshot of my account is that sentences like ‘human is a species’ and ‘Socrates is an individual’ express neither essential nor accidental predications. (shrink)

The latest scholarly contribution by Joël Biard is a monograph about the late fourteenth-/ early fifteenth-century philosopher Blasius of Parma, known above all for his heterodox materialist views. This explains his nickname, doctor dyabolicus, the evil or diabolical doctor. Blasius is no stranger to Biard, who has edited both Blasius’s works and (recently) one volume on this thinker (J. Biard and A. Robert, editors, La Philosophie de Blaise de Parme: Physique, psychologie, éthique [Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2019]). Despite a growing number (...) of publications on Blasius by scholars focusing on different aspects of his oeuvre, we still lack a competent overview of his thought, especially one dedicated to his philosophy of... Read More. (shrink)

abstract: Moral autonomy might seem to harbor inconsistency. Whereas nomos suggests that moral laws are grounded in our essence or nature (and thus are not up to us), autos suggests that they are grounded in some free act of self-legislation or prescription (and thus are up to us). Latter-day Kantians often respond by compromising on autonomy, deflating either nomos or autos. This investigation reconstructs how Christian Wolff, Kant’s great rationalist predecessor, already forged a path for embracing autonomy without compromise. His (...) reconciliation, I argue, rests on distinguishing different respects in which moral laws stand in need of grounding. I further unravel why no parallel reconciliation is found in Kant. This, I conclude, still leaves open that Kant may similarly seek to embrace autonomy without compromise. (shrink)

The secondary literature on St. Anselm of Canterbury’s ontological argument is voluminous. Some of it attributes to Anselm the view that existence is a great-making property. In this book, Brian Leftow focuses on Anselm’s “Reply to Gaunilo” and Anselm’s claim that “if any perfect being existed, its existence would be absolutely necessary” (1). Leftow contextualizes his book-length project as an attempt to formulate a successful argument for this claim, but he distinguishes his interpretation of Anselm’s claim from other interpretations by (...) asserting that Anselm’s “Perfect Being Necessity” does not imply that necessity is a great-making property. Leftow defends this claim by arguing that “a perfect being could be... Read More. (shrink)

This book focuses on the relationship between religion and secularism in Kant, Hegel, and subsequent modern thought. Rosen argues that Kant and Hegel’s philosophies should be seen as secularizing but not themselves secular. Specifically, Rosen argues for the continued importance of religion in Kant’s and Hegel’s philosophies, while also maintaining that their philosophies nevertheless contributed significantly to the transformation of traditional religious notions into secularized variants. Immortality serves as the book’s flagship illustration of these claims: “This book is particularly focused (...) on one feature of traditional religion: the belief in personal immortality and the way in which new conceptions of human... Read More. (shrink)

The Philosophical Contribution of Kostas Axelos: The Issue of the Open System and Technological Civilization -/- Kostas Axelos (1924–2010) remains one of the most intriguing and underexplored figures in contemporary philosophy. His work, situated at the crossroads of Marxism, Heideggerian phenomenology, and the philosophy of technology, raises critical questions about the nature of modern civilization and the fate of thought in an increasingly technological world. One of the central academic issues in Axelos’ thought is his concept of the "open system," (...) which presents a radical alternative to both dialectical materialism and structuralism. This issue is especially relevant in our age of digital globalization and algorithmic governance, as it poses fundamental questions about the limits of human autonomy and the possibilities of thought in a technologically determined world. -/- The Open System: A Critique of Closed Philosophical Paradigms -/- Axelos’ notion of the "open system" challenges traditional metaphysical and epistemological assumptions that rely on closure, determinacy, and finality. Unlike Hegelian dialectics, which seeks resolution through synthesis, Axelos proposes a dynamic, ever-unfolding process that resists totalization. His critique extends to Marxist orthodoxy, which he argues falsely assumes a teleological closure in history. By advocating an open-ended view of reality, Axelos aligns himself with thinkers like Nietzsche and Heidegger, emphasizing a world in flux rather than one governed by fixed structures or ultimate goals. -/- This issue raises critical academic debates: How can philosophical thought remain relevant in an era dominated by technological systems that impose rigid structures on human existence? Is the "open system" a viable framework for understanding contemporary globalized societies, or does it risk devolving into an abstract and impractical relativism? -/- For Axelos, closed systems—whether philosophical, political, or scientific—seek to impose rigid frameworks that ultimately stifle thought and creativity. He sees Western metaphysical traditions as largely obsessed with categorization and finality, which leads to an artificial separation between subject and object, mind and world, theory and practice. In contrast, his "open system" embraces indeterminacy and fluidity, recognizing that reality is in perpetual motion and that any attempt to fix meaning within rigid boundaries leads to intellectual stagnation. -/- Axelos’ concept also engages with existentialist and phenomenological traditions, particularly in how it resists essentialist definitions of being. He challenges not only the dogmas of classical metaphysics but also structuralist tendencies that seek to analyze reality in terms of fixed codes and relationships. Instead, Axelos suggests that the world should be understood as a game (le jeu du monde), a process of continuous becoming where human existence is not predefined but rather shaped by the interactions of open-ended forces. This issue raises critical academic debates: How can philosophical thought remain relevant in an era dominated by technological systems that impose rigid structures on human existence? Is the "open system" a viable framework for understanding contemporary globalized societies, or does it risk devolving into an abstract and impractical relativism? Furthermore, how does Axelos' open system relate to contemporary discussions of complexity theory, cybernetics, and ecological thinking, all of which emphasize the interconnectedness and dynamism of systems? -/- A related issue in Axelos' work is his analysis of technological civilization. In Le Jeu du Monde (The Play of the World), he argues that technological advancement has not only transformed human existence but has also reshaped the very way we think and conceptualize reality. Technology, in Axelos’ view, is not merely a tool but a fundamental mode of being that structures our world and thought processes. -/- This raises significant academic concerns about autonomy, alienation, and the role of philosophy. If technology governs human thought as Axelos suggests, can there be genuine freedom in intellectual and political life? How does one resist technological determinism without retreating into romanticized notions of pre-technological existence? Axelos does not advocate for a rejection of technology but rather calls for a new form of thinking that embraces its presence while resisting its totalizing tendencies. -/- Axelos highlights the paradox of technological civilization: while it offers immense possibilities for connectivity, knowledge production, and efficiency, it also risks subordinating human creativity and autonomy to systemic logic. He critiques the way in which technology, rather than serving human purposes, increasingly dictates them—turning individuals into passive participants in a mechanized world. The dominance of algorithmic governance, artificial intelligence, and automation exemplifies the culmination of this technological destiny, raising profound concerns about the future of human agency. -/- Furthermore, Axelos’ thought resonates with contemporary debates about digital culture, surveillance capitalism, and the commodification of knowledge. As digital technologies reshape the nature of labor, communication, and governance, the question arises: To what extent can individuals maintain authentic engagement with the world when technological mediation defines nearly every aspect of existence? In this sense, Axelos anticipates concerns found in posthumanist and critical media theories, particularly regarding the erosion of subjectivity in the face of ever-expanding cybernetic systems. -/- Another crucial aspect of Axelos’ critique is the way in which technological civilization imposes a fragmented, instrumentalized view of knowledge. He challenges the reduction of thought to mere data-processing and the dominance of specialized, compartmentalized disciplines that fail to grasp the holistic nature of existence. By contrast, his open system philosophy encourages a mode of thinking that resists fragmentation and embraces a planetary perspective, one that acknowledges the interrelation of philosophy, science, politics, and art in an ever-evolving world. (shrink)

Ο Θουκυδίδειος ρεαλισμός είναι Ανθρωποκεντρικός, βασισμένος στην έννοια της αμετάβλητης ανθρώπινης φύσης, Ιστορικά εμπειρικός, εστιάζει στην εμπειρική παρατήρηση και την αναλυτική ερμηνεία των γεγονότων, Απομυθοποιητικός, απορρίπτει τη θεϊκή ή μυθολογική αιτιολόγηση της ιστορίας και Ηθικά διαλεκτικός, αποκαλύπτει την ένταση μεταξύ πολιτικής ανάγκης και ηθικού ιδανικού. Ο Θουκυδίδειος ρεαλισμός αποτελεί μια από τις σημαντικότερες συνεισφορές του Θουκυδίδη όχι μόνο στην ιστοριογραφία αλλά και στην πολιτική φιλοσοφία και θεωρία των διεθνών σχέσεων. Ο Θουκυδίδης δεν είναι μόνο ιστορικός, αλλά και τραγικός στοχαστής. Η (...) αντίληψή του ότι η ανθρώπινη φύση αποβλέπει με αναγκαιότητα σε συγκρούσεις θυμίζει τον ποιητικό στοχασμό του Σοφοκλή και του Ευριπίδη. Δεν προτείνει λύση στο ανθρωπολογικό ζήτημα ούτε καν διόρθωση ή μεταρρύθμιση, προτείνει ψυχρή διερεύνηση και κατανόηση των παθών και των κινήτρων της Πολιτικής Πράξης. Είναι σκεπτικιστής αλλά όχι μηδενιστής. Αναγνωρίζει τη σκοτεινή όψη της ανθρώπινης φύσης αλλά δεν την εξιδανικεύει ούτε την καταδικάζει με ηθικά διδακτικό τρόπο. -/- Ο Θουκυδίδης εγκαινιάζει μια νέα εποχή στην ιστορική σκέψη, συνδυάζοντας μεθοδολογική αυστηρότητα με φιλοσοφική διεισδυτικότητα. Η αποστασιοποίησή του από το αντικείμενο, ηαυστηρή επιλογή πηγών, και η αναλυτική προσέγγιση των γεγονότων διαμορφώνουν ένα είδος ιστορίας που δεν εξαντλείται στην αφήγηση αλλά διεκδικεί την κατανόηση. Παράλληλα, η γνωσιοθεωρία του θέτει τις βάσεις για τη συζήτηση περί ιστορικής αλήθειας και αντικειμενικότητας, προσφέροντας ένα διαχρονικό πρότυπο για την ιστορική επιστήμη. Η αποστασιοποιημένη αφήγηση του Θουκυδίδη προτείνει ένα είδος ιστορικής αντικειμενικότητας, ξένης προς τον Ηρόδοτο ή αργότερα τον Ξενοφώντα. Δεν αποδίδει τα αίτια των γεγονότων σε θεούς ή Μοίρα, αλλά σε εμπειρικά αίτια και ψυχολογικά κίνητρα. Έτσι, η ιστορία γίνεται επιστήμη της πολιτικής και της ψυχολογίας. Ο Θουκυδίδης γράφει (Ι.22.1):"Το σαφές ἐκ τῆς τε ἐμπειρίας τοῖς σαφῶς εἰδόσι διδαχθῆναι."Η ιστορική αλήθεια δεν είναι απλώς αναφορά γεγονότων, αλλά προσπάθεια ερμηνείας, όπωςφαίνεται και στην ανακατασκευή των δημηγοριών. Ο ίδιος δηλώνει ότι συνέθεσε τους λόγους ώστε να αποδώσουν "κατά το πιθανόν" τα όσα ειπώθηκαν. Εδώ βλέπουμε έναν πρώιμο σκεπτικισμό απέναντι στην απόλυτη αλήθεια – έναν σχετικισμό που παραπέμπει στους σοφιστές και στον Πλάτωνα, ο οποίος πιθανόν αντιδρά στο έργο του Θουκυδίδη γράφοντας τους ιδεώδεις διαλόγους του. Ο Θουκυδίδης, αντί να προκρίνει μια ενιαία και αμετάβλητη αλήθεια, προκρίνει την αναπαράσταση των λόγων των δρώντων προσώπων, δίνοντας χώρο στη συγκρουσιακή πολυφωνία. Σε αυτό το πλαίσιο, η ‘’Μελόσια Διατριβή’’ δεν αποτελεί απλώς αποτύπωση Page 3 ρεαλιστικής πολιτικής σκέψης, αλλά και φιλοσοφικό σχόλιο για την ερμηνευσιμότητα της έννοιας του δικαίου και της αλήθειας. Ο Πλάτων, ειδικά στην Πολιτεία και στον Γοργία, φαίνεται ναεπιχειρεί μια μεταφυσική θεμελίωση της αλήθειας, σε αντίθεση με τη σχετική και εμπειρικά θεμελιωμένη παρουσίασή της από τον Θουκυδίδη. Η μεθοδολογική αποστασιοποίηση του Θουκυδίδη εκδηλώνεται με πολλούς τρόπους και αποτελεί το θεμέλιο της ιστορικής του μεθόδου. Σε αντίθεση με την παραδοσιακή αφηγηματική ιστοριογραφία, ο Θουκυδίδης επιδιώκει την αντικειμενικότητα και τη λογική ερμηνεία των γεγονότων, αποφεύγοντας την ηθική αξιολόγηση και την προσφυγή στο θαυμαστό ή στο μυθικό στοιχείο. Στην περίφημη δήλωση της μεθόδου του(1.22), ο ίδιος τονίζει ότι δεν κατέγραψε το έργο του ως ῥητορικὸν ἀγώνισμα (ρητορική επίδειξη)αλλά ως «κτῆμα ἐς αἰεί», δηλαδή ως μόνιμο κτήμα για όσους επιθυμούν να κατανοήσουν όχι μόνοτο παρελθόν αλλά και το μέλλον, «κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον». Μέσα από αυτή τη φράση αναδύεται η βασική αρχή της αποστασιοποίησής του: η αποφυγή προσωπικής εμπλοκής και η στροφή προς μια αναλυτική, αιτιακή διερεύνηση των φαινομένων, βασισμένη στη φύση του ανθρώπου και όχι σε υπερβατικούς παράγοντες.Η γνωσιοθεωρητική διάσταση του Θουκυδίδη αναδεικνύεται στην επίμονη αναζήτηση της αλήθειας και στη στάση του απέναντι στη γνώση. Αναγνωρίζει τις δυσκολίες της πιστής απόδοσης των γεγονότων, εξαιτίας της μεροληψίας των μαρτύρων και της φθοράς της μνήμης. Ωστόσο, μέσω της κριτικής εξέτασης των πηγών και της αντιπαραβολής διαφορετικών αφηγήσεων, επιχειρεί να προσεγγίσει το πιο αξιόπιστο δυνατό συμπέρασμα. Επιπλέον, η καταγραφή των δημηγοριών αποτελεί ένα σημαντικό γνωσιοθεωρητικό ζήτημα. Ο ίδιος ομολογεί ότι οι λόγοι δεν αποδίδονται κατά λέξη, αλλά κατά το νόημα των όσων ειπώθηκαν, ανάλογα με τα όσα "έκρινα ότι ταίριαζε ναλεχθούν" (1.22). Η παραδοχή αυτή εγείρει ερωτήματα για τα όρια της ιστορικής αναπαράστασης, τα οποία ο Θουκυδίδης διαχειρίζεται όχι με αποδοχή της μυθοπλασίας, αλλά με εστίαση στην ουσία του λόγου και των προθέσεων των ιστορικών προσώπων. Αυτή η επιλογή φανερώνει ότι γιατον Θουκυδίδη, η αλήθεια της ιστορίας δεν είναι απαραίτητα ταυτισμένη με την κυριολεκτική ακρίβεια, αλλά με τη βαθύτερη κατανόηση των κινήτρων και των μηχανισμών της πολιτικής δράσης. Τέλος, η περίφημη φράση ότι το έργο του θα είναι χρήσιμο σε εκείνους που θα θελήσουν να κατανοήσουν «τὰ γενόμενα καὶ τὰ ἐσόμενα πάλιν ἐς τὸ παραπλήσιον» (1.22) δείχνει την πίστη του στην κυκλική φύση της ανθρώπινης ιστορίας και στην ύπαρξη καθολικών νόμων της ανθρώπινης συμπεριφοράς, οι οποίοι καθιστούν δυνατή την ιστορική γνώση -/- (. (shrink)