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  1.  36
    Integrity and the Value of an Integrated Self.Alfred Archer - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (3):435-454.
    What is integrity and why is it valuable? One account of the nature of integrity, proposed by John Cottingham amongst others, is The Integrated Self View. On this account integrity is a formal relation of coherence between various aspects of a person. One problem that has been raised against this account is that it isn’t obvious that it can account for the value of integrity. In this paper I will respond to this problem by providing an account of the value (...)
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  2.  7
    Two Ways to Frustrate a Desire.David Birks & Thomas Douglas - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (3):417-434.
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  3.  12
    Duty and Distance.Constanze Binder & Conrad Heilmann - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (3):547-561.
    Ever since the publication of Singer’s (1972) article on ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’ have debates about duties to the distant needy been marked by a high degree of controversy. Most contributors discuss how duties are established or influenced by the fact that those in need of help can be geographically close or distant. In other words, they debate the problem of duty and distance from the perspective of duties. Here, we change tack and put the concept of distance at the (...)
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  4.  4
    Focusing Respect on Creatures.Elizabeth Foreman - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (3):593-609.
    Obligations of respect tend to be grounded in the moral relevance of features of creatures rather than in the creatures themselves. This is troubling for two reasons: (1) There is a difference between what we take the attitude of respect to be, and the way in which our theories structure our obligations, and (2) If the presence of a feature is what generates our obligations, then the creatures to whom we are obligated lose their claim on us if they lose (...)
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  5.  2
    The Resuscitation of Normative Privacy.Jennifer K. Greene - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (3):383-395.
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  6.  28
    Moral Realism, Fundamental Moral Disagreement, and Moral Reliability.Justin Horn - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (3):363-381.
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  7.  5
    Intentions and Permissibility: A Confusion of Moral Categories?Anton Markoč - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (3):577-591.
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  8.  1
    The Ethics of Patenting the BRCA Genes for Breast Cancer Research.Park John Jung - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (3):531-545.
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  9.  2
    Authenticity, Self-Fulfillment, and Self-Acknowledgment.Michael Rings - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (3):475-489.
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  10.  7
    Moral Knowledge and the Genealogy of Error.Nicholas Smyth - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (3):455-474.
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  11.  57
    The Separateness of Persons: A Moral Basis for a Public Justification Requirement.Jason Tyndal - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (3):491-505.
    In morally grounding a public justification requirement, public reason liberals frequently invoke the idea that persons should be construed as “free and equal.” But this tells us little with regard to what it is about us that makes us free or how a claim about our status as persons can ultimately ground a requirement of public justification. In light of this worry, I argue that a public justification requirement can be grounded in a Nozick-inspired argument from the separateness of persons (...)
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  12.  1
    Human Rights, Global Justice, or Historical Responsibility? Three Potential Appeals.Steve Vanderheiden - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (3):397-415.
  13. Understanding “Meaning of Life” in Terms of Reasons for Action.Višak Tatjana - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (3):507-530.
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  14.  4
    What Does the Shape of a Life Tell Us About Its Value?Christine Vitrano - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (3):563-575.
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  15.  25
    Imaginative Moral Development.Nicolas Bommarito - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (2):251-262.
    The picture of moral development defended by followers of Aristotle takes moral cultivation to be like playing a harp; one gets to be good by actually spending time playing a real instrument. On this view, we cultivate a virtue by doing the actions associated with that virtue. I argue that this picture is inadequate and must be supplemented by imaginative techniques. One can, and sometimes must, cultivate virtue without actually performing the associated actions. Drawing on strands in Buddhist philosophy, I (...)
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  16.  16
    Retraction Note To: Strategic Bombing, Causal Beliefs, and Double Effect.Ezio Di Nucci - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (2):361-361.
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  17.  20
    Appreciating Bad Art.John Dyck & Matt Johnson - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (2):279-292.
    There are some artworks which we appreciate for their bad artistic qualities; these artworks are said to be “good because bad”. This is puzzling. How can art be good just because it is bad? In this essay, we attempt to demystify this phenomenon. We offer a two-part analysis: the artistic flaws in these works make them bizarre, and this bizarreness is aesthetically valuable. Our analysis has the consequence that some artistic flaws make for aesthetic virtues. Such works therefore present a (...)
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  18. Nietzsche on Human Greatness.Hassan Patrick - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (2):293-310.
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  19.  4
    Collective Directionality: A New Possibility for Collectives as Objects of Normative Consideration.Marcus Hedahl - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (2):233-250.
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  20.  4
    Sainthood and the Good Life.Joseph Kupfer - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (2):263-278.
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  21. Philip Pettit, The Robust Demands of the Good: Ethics with Attachment, Virtue and Respect. Oxford University Press 2015. 256pp. £25.00 GBP. [REVIEW]Liam Moore - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (2):357-360.
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  22.  14
    Real Imaginal Relationships with the Dead.Kathryn J. Norlock - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (2):341-356.
    Open Access: Appreciating the relationship of the living to our dead is an aspect of human life that seems to be neglected in philosophy. I argue that living individuals can have ongoing, non-imaginary, valuable relationships with deceased loved ones. This is important to establish because arguments for such relationships better generate claims in applied ethics about our conduct with respect to our dead. In the first half of the paper I advance the narrower claim that psychological literature affirmative of “imaginal (...)
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  23.  9
    Minor Goods and Objective Theories of Well-Being.Christopher M. Rice - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (2):221-231.
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  24.  68
    Right-Makers and the Targets of Virtue.Nicholas Ryan Smith - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (2):311-326.
    The still dominant virtue-ethical account of right action claims that an action is right just in case a virtuous agent would perform it. Because this account arguably fails to capture what makes actions right, virtue ethicists are well-advised to consider alternatives. I argue that a target-centered account, if suitably developed, succeeds in capturing what makes actions right. First, I explain why a target-centered account shows initial promise in capturing what makes actions right and present an interpretation of the account as (...)
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  25.  11
    Temporal Asymmetry and the Self/Person Split.Patrick Stokes - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (2):203-219.
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  26.  9
    Is Patience a Virtue?Denise Vigani - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (2):327-340.
    There are significant challenges to developing a neo-Aristotelian account of a virtue of patience. First, on an Aristotelian understanding, virtue is both instrumentally good and good in itself. Yet exclusively instrumental views of patience are pervasive in the philosophical literature. Furthermore, these instrumental views present patience as more like a psychological skill than a virtue of character. Skills, however, can be misused. If patience is to be a virtue, its account must entail goodness in its possessor. Finally, there is the (...)
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  27.  10
    The Right Balance.Martijn Boot - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (1):13-32.
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  28.  5
    The Essential Connection Between Human Value and Saintly Behavior.Simon Coghlan - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (1):123-140.
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  29.  5
    An Expanded Conception of Sentimental Value.Rochelle DuFord - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (1):1-11.
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  30.  8
    Mark Navin, Values and Vaccine Refusal: Hard Questions in Ethics, Epistemology, and Health Care. New York: Routledge, 2015, 240 Pp., ISBN 978-1138790650. [REVIEW]Jessica Flanigan - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (1):199-202.
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  31.  5
    Biomedical Enhancement and the Kantian Duty to Cultivate Our Talents.Colin Hickey - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (1):165-185.
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  32.  20
    The Human Right to Subsistence and the Collective Duty to Aid.Violetta Igneski - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (1):33-50.
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  33.  22
    Against Hybrid Expressivist-Error Theory.Wouter Kalf - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (1):105-122.
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  34.  4
    John Kleinig, Simon Keller, and Igor Primoratz, The Ethics of Patriotism: A Debate. Chichester, UK: John Wiley, 2015. ISBN 978-0-470-65885-7, £23.50, Pbk. [REVIEW]Iddo Landau - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (1):193-197.
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  35.  8
    Schramme, Thomas, Ed. Being Amoral : MIT Press, 2014). [REVIEW]Luca Malatesti - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (1):187-191.
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  36.  73
    Anscombe on the Sources of Normativity.Katharina Nieswandt - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (1):141-163.
    Anscombe is usually seen as a critic of “Modern Moral Philosophy.” I attempt a systematic reconstruction and a defense of Anscombe’s positive theory. -/- Anscombe’s metaethics is a hybrid of social constructivism and Aristotelian naturalism. Her three main claims are the following: (1) We cannot trace all duties back to one moral principle; there is more than one source of normativity. (2) Whether I have a certain duty will often be determined by the social practices of my community. For instance, (...)
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  37.  25
    Consequentialism, Goodness, and States of Affairs.Fergus Peace - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (1):51-68.
    Consequentialists claim that their theory is simply that the right action is whichever one will lead to the best state of affairs - and that this formulation provides a powerful intuitive ground for accepting consequentialism. Recent arguments in value theory threaten to show that this formulation lacks either coherent meaning, because states of affairs cannot be good simpliciter, or philosophical power, because their goodness provides no reason to bring them about. I respond to two such arguments - from Judith Jarvis (...)
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  38.  14
    When the Reflective Watch-Dog Barks: Conscience and Self-Deception in Kant.Martin Sticker - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (1):85-104.
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  39.  10
    The Closeness Problem for Double Effect: A Reply to Nelkin and Rickless.Joshua Stuchlik - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (1):69-83.
  40.  11
    The Necessity of Moral Reasoning.Leland F. Saunders - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-21.
    A new variety of empirical skeptical moral arguments have been put forward in recent years, drawing on data from neuroscience, social and behavioral psychology, and economics, which strongly suggest that emotions play a central causal role in moral judgment, and that reasoning has at most a limited supplementary causal role in small portion of moral judgments. It follows from these empirical finding, it is argued, that moral judgments and morality more generally cannot be grounded in reason in the right sort (...)
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